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This thesis investigates the thorny relationship between evidence utilisation and 
policy making in a heavily politicised policy area. Expectations for the conflux of 
research and policy formulation have been consolidated in the last decade under the 
banner of 'evidence-based policy'. In recent times, the debate over the nature and 
utility of evidence-based policy has become much more sophisticated. No longer can 
the connection between evidence utilisation and policy formulation be conceived in 
terms of evidence shaping policy outcomes or, conversely, policy being evidence- 
free, where evidence has no impact. Such conceptualisations persist, however, in 
heavily politicised policy areas, where there is intense media scrutiny of decision- 
making, a lack of consensus on its direction, prolonged conflict between competing 
interest and stakeholder groups and a permeating sense of crisis. These tend to relate 
to more 'macro' policy areas, not usually the remit of evidence-based policy-making 
and evaluative research. 
Using recent and ongoing developments in UK drug classification policy as a 
case-study, an explanatory framework of the complex role and nature of evidence in 
heavily politicised policy areas is developed. Central to this, is the use of a 
methodological approach that can account for the role of conflict in the policy 
process. A modified version of the Advocacy Coalition Framework is employed to 
this end. This, in turn, allows for a range of data-collection methods to be used, 
including observation and documentary analysis of Parliamentary Select Committee 
hearings alongside qualitative interviews with a wide-range of key policy actors 
involved in the decision-making process. From this a nuanced account of the 
evidence and policy relationship in such contexts is ascertained, which departs from 
the more established models explaining the evidence and policy nexus. 
Traditionally, such explanations have been conceived as models of research 
utilisation. In this research it is suggested that these do not translate effectively as 
models of evidence-based policy-making. This is because they are beset with some, 
or all, of the following problems: a) they focus more on 'research' rather than the 
broader concept of 'evidence'; b) they operate with a static view of the policy 
process where there is a direct connection between research and policy; c) they 
restrict the role of evidence to one of policy outcomes, rather than viewing the role of 
evidence in the process of decision-making; d) they assume that research is the 
defining influence on the decision-making process; e) they operate at a high level of 
abstraction, offering little account of how research is selected for use in decision- 
making. Consequently, a newer addition to the literature is developed, which, it is 
claimed, avoids these shortcomings. 
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'You say "evidence". Well, there may be evidence. But 
evidence, you know, can generally be taken two ways'. 
Fyodor Dostoevsky (1866) Crime and Punishment 
12 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis develops an explanatory framework for the role and nature of the use of 
evidence in the context of a highly politicised policy area; that of UK drug 
classification policy. Policy-making is subject to ever-changing forces and fashions. 
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the relationship between research and policy 
formulation. The relationship between applied social research and policy-making has 
a long history in the UK and elsewhere. Indeed, Parsons (1995) suggests that it is as 
old as the State itself. Early examples of the relationship include the work of the 
Royal Commission on the Poor Law 1832-4, through to that of philanthropists such 
as Charles Booth and Seebohm Rowntree, whose pioneering studies of London and 
York, respectively, saw the development of the social survey method and an attempt 
to 'scientifically' measure the nature and extent of poverty in Victorian society. 
Continuing into the twentieth century, studies by Sydney and Beatrice Webb along 
with the influence of A. L. Bowley gradually saw the institutionalisation of social 
research and social science in academia and within government (Bulmer 1982). 
This link was consolidated in the twentieth century. Indeed, Booth 
(1988: 224) comments that: 
In both the UK and the USA at roughly the same time, and prompted by 
roughly the same motives, there occurred a quickening of official interest in 
the use of social science for policy-making. Government funds were 
channelled into the expansion of the social sciences; there was a rapid 
increase in expenditure on social research; and social scientists were drawn 
into government. For a while optimism ran high that a new partnership was 
in the making. Before long, however, strains began to show as the 
overblown expectations of each side were, dashed. Social scientists 
complained that nobody listened to them and their work was ignored. 
Policy-makers chuntered about the irrelevance of the research they 
commissioned. Both retreated into their bunkers. 
The bunkers, chunterings and strains highlighted here find their way into the 
present study. Additionally, the complex and fluctuating relationship between 
research and policy-making can also be seen in the changing conceptualisation of the 
way the link between the two phenomena has been conceived. In the 1960s, it was 
claimed that social experiments could shed light on, and inform, programmes of 
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social reform (Campbell 1969). Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the relationship 
was contextualised in terms of models of 'research utilisation' (Bulmer, et A 1986; 
Weiss 1977; Weiss 1986; Weiss and Bucuvalas 1980b) and evaluation research 
(Cook and Campbell 1979; Guba and Lincoln 1989; Pawson and Tilley 1997; Rossi 
and Freeman 1985). Into the 1990s, policy-oriented leaming, a close relation of 
evaluation research was en vogue (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993b). From the 
1990s onwards, starting in the UK, there has been a slight change of emphasis as 
'evidence-based policy' has become the accepted label (Cabinet Office 1999b). 
The current focus is on this latest incarnation, although the role of the other 
manifestations is recognised within this. Arguably, the most (in)famous and 
undoubtedly the most frequently cited example of the origins of evidence-based 
policy was made by then Secretary of State for Education, David Blunkett, to the 
Economic and Social Research Council: 
This government expects more of policy makers... better use of evidence 
and research in policy making and better focus on policies that will deliver 
long terrn goals (Cabinet Office 1999a: 6). 
In effect, the incumbent Government on assuming power promised more 
accountability in the policy-making arena, as part of the 'modernising agenda' 
(Bullock, et al. 2001; Cabinet Office 1999a; Cabinet Office 1999b). Evidence-based 
policy-making, the development of policies devoid of ideology, was to be one of the 
main vessels by which this could be realised. The commitment to evidence-based 
policy became enmeshed with ensuring government policy provided value for 
money, for example, through evaluation. In this sense, Government departments are 
continuously required to: 
... review policies ... to determine when the time is right to modify a policy 
in 
response to changing circumstances so that it remains relevant and cost- 
effective; and departments may need to terminate policies if they are no 
longer cost effective or they are not delivering the policy outcomes intended 
(National Audit Office 2001: 12). 
The modernising agenda, for Solesbury (2001: 6), was part of a process of the 
&opening up' of government. In turn, this called into question, Keynes' well cited 
lament, that 'there is nothing the government hates more than to be well-informed; 
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for it makes the process of arriving at decisions much more complicated and 
difficult' (cited in Mulgan 2005: 216). Nutley and Webb (2000: 20) provide a useful 
overview of what the modernising agenda entails: 
The Modernising government White Paper (CM 4310,1999a) promises 
changes to policy making to ensure that policies are strategic, outcome 
focused, joined-up (if necessary), inclusive, flexible, innovative and robust. 
One of the changes identified as important was making sure that in future 
policies were evidence-based. Two subsequent publications have sought to 
identify how such a goal could be achieved. Adding it up (Cabinet Office 
2000) calls for a fundamental change in culture to place good analysis at the 
heart of policy-making. Professional policy-making (Cabinet Office 1999b) 
examines what modernised policy-making should look like and how it might 
be achieved. 
Solesbury (2001), further suggests that the move towards evidence-based 
policy and practice was initially a British phenomenon, characterised first and 
foremost by a shift towards a 'utilitarian turn' in research, whereby researchers were 
required to produce research that was not only 'useful' but 'useable'. In other words, 
this is research that helps 'not just to understand society but offers some guidance on 
how to make it better' (Solesbury 2001: 6). This process was driven largely by the 
funders of social science who, keen to draw on practices established in economic 
research, stressed the benefits of cumulating knowledge in the research enterprise. 
This model was also typical of the medical research process under the aegis of 
evidence-based medicine. 
It is, therefore, no coincidence that emphasis on evidence-based policy has 
brought to the fore a specific methodology; that of the systematic review. This is the 
strategy of collating all bygone, hopefully good quality evidence in any given field 
(Harden, et al. 2004; Oakley 2003; Pawson 2006; Petticrew and Roberts 2006). 
Organisations such as the Campbell Collaboration have developed with this in mind. 
A second aspect of the movement towards evidence-based policy-making is, for 
Solesbury (2001: 6), witnessed with the propensity of practitioners and policy-makers 
to seek evidence from research knowledge in a bid to recover some of the loss of 
public confidence in their activities that most have suffered in recent years. 
Traditionally, professionals operated like a 'priesthood', reliant on the unquestioning 
faith of their followers. Increasingly, however, patients, parents, students, clients and 
customers of all kinds are less and less inclined to take professional views on trust. 
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Frequently, the 'informed consent' of the public is needed with the implementation 
of any intervention, which means that professionals must be ready to explain not just 
what-they advise and why it is appropriate, but also what they know of its likely 
efficacy (Solesbury 2001: 6). This development is now manifested in the commitment 
to finding out 'what works' in various policy arenas, which has become synonymous 
with the New Labour Government's view of evidence-based policy. 
Although initially well received by the research and policy communities 
alike, the first signs of enthusiasm for the evidence-based policy agenda have been 
replaced with increasing scepticism, based around a number of unresolved issues. 
These include: a) continuing concerns over the correct methodology in producing 
and synthesising evidence for policy (e. g. Oakley 2004; Pawson 2006) and; b) the 
increasing recognition of the limited compatibility between the conventions of the 
research process and those of policy-making. Mulgan (2005: 224-5), for example, 
contends that the problematic nature of research and evidence utilisation and policy- 
making, is a product of significant issues relating both to the nature of government 
and also factors pertaining to the nature of social science knowledge. 
With regard to the former, these revolve around three main themes and can be 
seen as established criticisms of the evidence-based policy agenda. The first issue 
relates to the nature of 'democracy'. Politicians have every right to ignore evidence 
and to follow their instinct. Mulgan (2005) cites the example of the paucity of 
evidence for increasing police numbers 'on-the-beat' in reducing the amount of 
crime in an area. He suggests that this is frequently ignored by politicians as it is the 
public's perception that this is the ideal way to solve the problem. Elsewhere, Pitt 
(2000: 10) and Melrose (2006: 31) have suggested that this is symptomatic of the 
'politics of electoral anxiety'. Here, political concerns are seen to 'trump' the 
evidence-base. The second aspect relates to the 'ambiguity' of evidence production. 
Rationally produced evidence has little impact in policy debates comprised of groups 
with opposed views, precisely because these are so deeply held. The final point is 
'temporal' and refers to the limited compatibility between the conventions of 
evidence production (in-depth, detailed and time consuming analyses of problems), 
something Pels (2003) refers to as the 'unhastening of science', alongside those of 
policy-making (quick-fix solutions to problems). 
16 
These issues reoccur throughout the thesis and will be returned to in due 
course. They are, however, particularly acute when the research in question is social 
scientific as opposed to scientific. Mulgan (2005) comments that because all social 
scientific knowledge is historically contingent and reflexive, it is not always 
conducive to producing definitive solutions to specific policy problems. This has 
lead to antagonism between the 'two communities' of policy and research (Caplan 
1979) and is compounded by the disciplinary organisation of the social sciences 
where there are frequently large gaps in the knowledge base, precisely in areas of 
interest to policy-makers. It is fair to comment, however, that understandings of the 
natural and physical sciences too are changing. Young, et al. (2002) mention the 
increasing 'uncertainty' of scientific evidence arisiný from ecological issues such as 
the emergence of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, more commonly known as 
BSE. In a similar vein, social theorists such as Beck (1992) suggest that under the 
conditions of what he terms the 'risk society', scientific evidence is increasingly 
employed to correct the effects of previous scientific endeavours and innovations. 
For certain thinkers, this critique of the nature of science has gone unnoticed 
by the government in their quest for finding out 'what works and why', the leitmotif 
of the evidence-based policy agenda. Campbell (2002: 89), for instance, suggests that 
evidence-based policy-making has, in fact, been used by the government as a way of 
neglecting the scepticism that exists within the public towards the scientific 
community. Such scepticism manifests itself in the public's fears over a perceived 
tyranny of technocracy (Albaek 1995; Parsons 2002). Clarence (2002: 4) drawing on 
the work of Rildig (1993: 18-9) also suggests that through the 'what works' mantra, 
the government has ignored decades of theory emerging from the sociology of 
science, highlighting the existence of scientific controversy. That is, the fallibility of 
scientific evidence and how this is actually an 'intrinsic element of the scientific 
process' (Rildig 1993: 19). To lay this charge solely at the door of 'government' is, 
however, misleading and serves to disguise the fact that the policy-making process 
actually consists of a much broader range of actors who share a similar perspective. 
The current concern is, however, on the interplay between politics and 
evidence. To all intents and purposes, the established criticisms of the evidence- 
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based 'policy movement, mentioned above, focus on the impact that politics has on 
the policy process. With this in mind, consummate sound bites, such as those which 
suggest that 'policy based evidence' is actually more characteristic of the relationship 
between research and policy in certain policy areas (e. g. Marmot 2004), have become 
commonplace. By the same token, accusations of 'cherry-picking' evidence, and the 
blurring of boundaries between the scientific community and policy-making 
fraternity (Hope 2004), lead to the frequent conclusion that much public policy is, 
'un-evidenced' or evidence-free. This pessimistic view of the research evidence and 
policy relationship also has a long history (Finch 1986; Heinemann, et al. 1990; 
Weiss 1998). 
It is suggested here that these issues are particularly acute in heavily 
politicised policy areas. Although on some level all policies are to an extent 
politicised, for the sake of this discussion the term refers to those issues when the 
political stakes are high and when there are 'powerful constituencies' to face down 
(Tonry 2004: 23). Heavily politicised areas are, therefore, those where there is intense 
media scrutiny of policy, a lack of consensus on its direction, prolonged conflict 
between competing interest groups and a permeating sense of crisis. They are 
characterised by the three Cs of competition, conflict and controversy. In this sense, 
the notion of competition draws on Mannheim's (1952a; 1952b) sociology of 
knowledge. For Mannheim (1952a: 198), competition is one of the principle ways in 
which the 'social' is structured. 'Different interpretations of the world for the most 
part correspond to particular functions that various groups occupy in their struggle 
for power'. As we shall see, in policy debates, this struggle for power is manifested 
in a determined bid to shape the agenda of the particular subsystem so that it is 
consistent with the perspective of a particular individual or group. Following 
logically from the notion of competition is that of conflict. This refers to policies 
based on competing world views or perspectives. These are often simultaneously 
controversial and are the subject of sensationalist reporting in the media. 
In addition, the three Cs of politicised policies, are related to other issues. 
Central to this notion is the view that politicised policy areas are not typical of the 
evidence-based policy initiative, which has been inextricably linked to evaluation 
research. Here the evaluation of policy is seen as one stage in the overall cycle of 
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policy-making (Bridgman and Davis 2000). Heavily politicised policy areas, it is 
suggested, are more ad hoc or 'muddled through' (Lindblom 1959). They are often 
not made with recourse to identifiable Key Performance Indicators and thus it is 
more difficult to ascertain the impact of evidence in the decision-making process. 
One issue that remains is to consider some examples of heavily politicised 
policy areas. It is claimed in this thesis that the drugs issue and its links to crime 
serves as an exemplar. Referring to this, Sutton and Maynard (1993: 455-6) 
previously lamented that in the illicit drugs field policy design and execution is 
'conducted in an almost data free environment where, because of ignorance, it is 
impossible to set sensible policy targets, let alone measure the success of spending 
hundreds of millions of pounds across the Whitehall Departments'. Similarly, but 
referring to the area of criminal justice policy, Tonry (2004: 146) has lamented that 
'on the small issues, evidence sometimes counts' although, when it comes to the big 
issues 'politics is the order of the day'. In both scenarios politics is juxtaposed to 
evidence. This manifests itself in entrenched positions relating to the evidence and 
policy relationship. In politicised areas, characterised by the three Cs, critics 
frequently claim policies to be evidence-free. This is, however, often met with the 
opposite assertion that a policy area formulated with recourse to research evidence, 
in some form, is 'evidence-based'. 
Central to the argument presented here, is that such understandings of the 
evidence and policy relationship are underpinned by a holistic conceptualisation of 
the relationship. It is accepted, however, that arguments which come to the aforesaid 
zero-sum conclusions are understandable. This is primarily a product of the fact that 
there is a fixed understanding about what constitutes evidence in such debates. In 
heavily politicised policy areas, it is argued that the concept of evidence should not 
be taken at face value and requires more sophisticated analysis. The frequent retreat 
into the more comfortable terrain of a linear view of the evidence and policy 
relationship is problematic and inaccurate. It views the union through a restrictively 
narrow lens. In this scenario, policies are seen to be either wholly evidence-based or 
wholly evidence-free. The former position represents a positive, zero-sum stance and 
the latter a negative, zero-sum stance. Such conceptualisations, however, restrict the 
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domain from where evidence can have an impact on the policy decision-making 
process. 
It is not advocated that policies are, or can be free of political motivations 
(Leicester 1999), this is just one aspect of the explanatory mix. In essence, evidence 
is embedded in policy decision-making and thus a more nuanced account is needed 
of the role and nature of evidence in politicised policy areas that moves beyond the 
linear conceptualisations discussed above. In recognition of similar issues, other 
authors have adopted alternative maxims to explain the evidence and policy 
relationship. For example, 'evidence-informed' policy (e. g. Chalmers 2005), or 
'evidence-inspired' policy (Duncan 2005) to highlight potential discrepancies 
between evidence production and policy-making. By contrast, it is advocated here 
that the 'evidence-based policy' label will suffice although it must be treated with 
caution. 
This thesis, then, takes umbrage with the notion of policy, in this case UK 
drug classification policy, being made in a 'data-free' environment. In doing so, it 
casts doubt on the claim that 'evidence' will be discarded in policy areas that are 
highly politicised. It also suggests that the riposte, which states that policy that 
engages with evidence on any level is 'evidence-based', is problematic. This is 
because it is premised on the same logic as those which claim heavily politicised 
policies to be evidence-free. Undoubtedly, because of their very nature, 
conceptualisations of the evidence and policy relationship in politicised areas have 
typically progressed on an unremittingly rationalist and linear conception of the link 
between evidence and the policy-making process. The foundations of this perspective 
have been increasingly eroded more recently. Black (2001) suggests that this linear 
view factors out of the equation the commonly held view detailing the interactive 
relationship of evidence and policy. Similarly, there is an assumpti on in the linear 
perspective of the certainty of scientific evidence. There are further problems with 
this understanding. The linear view restricts the role of evidence to one of policy 
outcomes. This equates to 'analysis of policy'. It is claimed here, however, that 
evidence also needs to be considered as part of the process of policy-making, or as 
(analysis for policy' (Gordon, et at. 1993: 5). 
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Using the recent developments in UK drug classification as a case study, 
starting with the reclassification of cannabis under the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act, 
this thesis can be read as a critique of this conceptualisation of the evidence and 
policy relationship. Oltimately, much of the argument is directed towards Tonry's 
(2004) assertion that when the subject under investigation involves a 'big issue' by 
which he means one that is politicised, politics and not evidence is the order of the 
day. The idea is that in highly politicised policy areas, policies are made with 
recourse to ideological standpoints and consequently cannot be evidence-based. This, 
it is contended, unnecessarily creates opposites out of two unrelated concepts. A 
more fruitful line of inquiry is to consider the mechanisms of evidence use in the 
context of the heavy politicisation of the issue. This issue has been recognised by 
various depictions of the evidence and policy relationship, in the form of models of 
research utilisation. Some of these have their origins in the political science 
literature, particularly in the work of Weiss (1977; 1986) and colleagues (Weiss and 
Bucuvalas 1980b) and have been adopted by various thinkers over the years. In 
recent times, however, there has been a revived interest in this area and more recent 
additions to the literature (e. g. Stevens 2007a) can also be identified. These are 
referred to in Chapter Nine. 
The first siep in the argument here is that the bolder claims of evidence-based 
policy need to be muted. This proposition is not new. Indeed, Nutley, et al. (2002: 76- 
7) suggest that when the expectations of evidence are toned down, that is the 
expectation that evidence production will lead to more effective policies, there is 
more cause for optimism over the way research findings can be incorporated into 
policy-making (e. g. Pawson 2006; Weiss 1999). Pawson (2006), drawing on the 
ideas of Lindblom (1990), has likened this to flying the 'tattered flag' of 
enlightenment. Some issues that remain, and that will be discussed in due course, 
concern the notion of what counts as, or constitutes, 'evidence', in effect, what is its 
nature? The other issue concerns where evidence fits into the policy-making process; 
that is, what is its location? These two interlinked questions represent the main 
aspects of the turmoil of evidence that subsequent analysis will explore and explain. 
As a precursor to this, Davies, et al. (2000), suggest that a useful way of 
conceiving evidence is as "'research" broadly defined'. On one level, there is some 
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sympathy for this view, as evidence is frequently equated to research. It must be 
stressed, however, that evidence, is broader. A discussion relating to the concept of 
evidence forms a central aspect of the analysis and is returned to in Chapter Eight. A 
second point to note concerns the nature of policy. As will become clear, to explore 
issueg relating to the nature and role of evidence in this context, requires a particular 
perspective on the nature of the policy process, one that it is consistent with the 
6opening up' initiative. These are best explained by the broad term 'pluralist' 
understandings and further comment on these are also detailed. With this in mind, the 
thesis is divided into the following sections. 
Chapter Two introduces the substantive aspects of the case in question, the 
case of UK drug classification. This has its origins in issues arising out of the then 
Home Secretary David Blunkett's decision, in 2004, to reclassify cannabis. 
Discussion commences with a brief history of UK drug policy, focusing on the 
nature of conflict from competing coalitions claiming 'ownership' of the 'drug 
problem'. The debate then turns to consider how this power struggle has continued, 
charting this from the 1970s with the passing of the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act, 
through the 1980s and 1990s and up towards the present day with the election of the 
Labour Government. Debate then turns to the 2004 cannabis reclassification. One 
main point to emerge is that the conflict over ownership has never been fully 
resolved and has left a legacy in almost all aspects of UK drug policy, as debates 
over the evidence-base for the classification testify. 
Chapter Three leaves the substantive aspect of the case study to consider 
theories of the policy-making process. It commences by continuing the background 
literature review, via a general discussion on the way policy has been c6nceptualised. 
Consideration is then given to what Colebatch (2002: 23) has termed the 'two great 
models of policy-making'. As will become clear, one of these understandings, the 
horizontal model, is of more relevance due to the nature of the case study under 
consideration. Attention then turns to 'pluralistic models' of the policy process with, 
where appropriate, examples from aspects of UK drug policy to illustrate their 
operation. It is suggested that pluralistic models are useful in understanding the 
turmoil of evidence precisely because they offer an inclusive perspective of the 
nature of the policy process and the role of evidence therein. This is a theme that is 
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followed throughout. The utility of one particular model, the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993b; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999), is 
introduced and then expounded. There is an immediate fit between this model of the 
policy-making process and the substantive findings of earlier chapters. Subsequent 
empirical work explores this further and thus provides the platform on which 
subsequent chapters are developed. 
Chapter Four thus considers a plethora of issues pertaining to research 
methodology and methods continuous throughout the duration of the research. This 
section commences with an overview of the interplay of theory, method and 
substantive issues when researching a 'live' policy issue in 'real-time'. Specific 
methods of data collection are then discussed, including the issues arising from 
interviewing 'influential' respondents. The sampling strategy is then elaborated, in 
this case theoretical sampling, before discussing the significance and difficulty of 
ensuring confidentiality when researching a divisive policy area with interconnected 
actors. Finally, attention is given to the concept of triangulation, more specifically, 
the interplay between theory building, refinement and methodology. In essence, this 
chapter offers some consideration of the substantive, methodological and theoretical 
issues relating to researching a contemporary policy issue in a constant state of flux. 
Chapter Five, although presented as one, can be read in two parts. Initially, 
discussion reverts back to the Advocacy Coalition Framework as a means of 
continuing the methodological considerations of the thesis. It suggests that certain 
modifications are required, a product of real-time events and because of prevalent 
criticisms of the model in the literature. Foremost among these changes is a 
movement away from talking about 'coalitions' to talking of 'perspectives'. The 
reasoning behind this movement is expounded and the perspectives central to the 
analysis are then introduced. The 'second' part of the chapter provides some context 
for the remainder of the thesis by addressing issues that are unique to the case in 
question. Drawing on some emerging findings from the empirical investigation, it 
discusses the impact of politics and the media on policy issues, such as drugs 
classification, the knock-on effect this has for data production in the area, and how 
this can distort the true picture of the role and nature of evidence in the policy 
process. 
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Chapters Six and Seven present the predominant empirical findings emerging 
from the research. The former, draws on the platform of the previous one by using 
the modified Advocacy Coalition Framework to explore appreciations of evidence 
use in the 2004 cannabis reclassification. Underpinning this discussion is a 
commentary on recent developments in UK cannabis policy, occurring alongside the 
current research. This is the first instance of substantive, exogenous factors 
impacting on the direction of the research. In exploring the 2004 cannabis 
reclassification and subsequent events, the first dimension of the turmoil of evidence; 
the tumultuous, or confused and disorderly nature of evidence, is considered. Central 
to the argument presented at this stage, is the manner in which various perspectives 
contribute to the contestation surrounding evidence. This is a result of how the three- 
tiered belief system of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (based primarily on 
ideological standpoints) provides the bedrock for their understandings. Key to the 
debate here, is the notion that the principle of evidence-based policy is a desirable, 
but problematic phenomenon, whose potential has been curtailed as a consequence of 
the widespread prevalence of the zero-sum understanding. Overall, it is suggested 
that this understanding is actually paradoxical because it draws zero-sum conclusions 
whilst simultaneously recognising the contested nature and plurality of evidence in 
this subsystem. 
In the continuing spirit of real-time research, Chapter Seven widens the 
substantive focus to incorporate more contemporary discussions about the evidence- 
base for the UK drug classification system in general. This, it is suggested, acts as a 
good case study for viewing the second part of the turmoil of evidence; the role or 
location of evidence in the decision-making process. This discussion is inextricably 
linked to issues concerning the struggle for power in the policy process. The chapter 
originates with a discussion of more recent developments in UK drug policy, which 
resulted in the broadening of the substantive focus. This is followed by detailed 
consideration of the various perspectives' appreciations of the role of evidence in the 
policy process, highlighted with recourse to their appreciations of the nature of drug 
harm. Two key issues arise from the chapter. First, different understandings of the 
location of evidence, cast doubt on the assumption held by pluralist accounts that all 
evidence brought to policy, competes on a level playing field. This provides context 
24 
for the widely held zero-sum positions and highlights how they are understandable. 
The second point is that by focusing on the role of evidence, another paradox is 
raised, detailing the issue that evidence, as a concept, can be both contested but can 
have simultaneous traces of consistency. 
Chapter Eight, begins the process of explaining this situation. Central to this 
endeavor, is the quest to ascertain clarification on the nature of evidence in 
politicised policy areas. This involves recourse to philosophical and social scientific 
discussions of concept formation. It is suggests that focusing on the fluctuating 
nature of concepts offers the best platform to explain the conceptual certitude and 
contestability of evidence, highlighted in the previous analysis. 
Armed with this understanding of evidence, Chapter Nine begins the process 
of producing a model of research utilisation in politicised policy areas. It is suggested 
that all existing models have shortcomings in this particular context. Consequently, a 
newer 'processual' model of evidence utilisation is tentatively advocated from 
critically engaging with the literature and by drawing on the data from previous 
chapters. Ultimately, the processual model comes into its own by building into its 
analysis the role of power, which is particularly prevalent in conflicting policy areas, 
but also by operating with a non-teleological understanding of the policy process. 
Chapter Ten provides the conclusion, first in the form of an overview of the 
key findings of the previous chapters and then by offering some remarks on the 
nature of the utilisation debate in this area. In doing so, it shows how although there 
is undoubtedly a pluralism of evidence in debates characterised by competing 
perspectives, this does not mean, however, that all have the same potential to 
influence the policy agenda. Comments on the implications of this study for theory 
and method, as well as policy, precede some extended final comments. 
It should be clear from the above discussion that this investigation rests on a 
number of assumptions. First and foremost, it is supportive of the overall evidence- 
based policy-making endeavour, but is critical of the way this is manifested both 
within sections of academia and outside. It is particularly critical of polemics that 
dismiss the aims of evidence-based policy as unworkable in areas of policy, 
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characterised by competition, conflict and controversy. This thesis makes no claims 
that these criticisms are wholly inaccurate, instead it suggests that they operate 
through a narrow and therefore unrealistic lens of what 'evidence-based policy' is 
and can do. By contrast, the current goal is to show how the role and nature of 
'evidence' in the context of 'evidence-based policy' needs clarification particularly 
in politicised policy areas, and it is to this end that the discussion now turns. 
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2. THE UK DRUG CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM: EVIDENCE-BASED OR 
EVIDENCE-FREE? 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the substantive case study through which the tumultuous 
nature of evidence will be explored. As a brief summary, this entails issues relating 
to recent changes in UK drug classification policy and legislation. It is fair to say that 
overall this represents a small cog in the bigger wheel of UK drug policy. The 
classification issue is treated with a degree of antipathy by many involved in other 
areas of the drug policy arena. It is, however, an intensely topical area and one that 
has, in recent years, received endless attention. For now, the purpose is to highlight 
the constituencies involved in the policy debate and to show how it has emerged as a 
highly politicised policy arena. In what follows, the notion that UK drug policy is 
characterised by competing coalitions, made up of interdependent groups and 
individuals, each claiming 'ownership' of the 'drug problem', is introduced. 
Ultimately, the chapter argues that the origins of the schism in the UK drug 
classification debate dates back to legislation passed at the time of the First World 
War which has a continuing legacy. The chapter commences with a discussion of the 
ongoing struggle for ownership of the problem through the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, 
culminating with a discussion of the New Labour drug strategy. Finally, attention 
switches to an infamous example of New Labour policy change, the recent 
reclassification of cannabis. This places the policy in its historical and cultural 
contexts by drawing on international and national developments that have impacted 
upon it. Finally, a summary illustrating the contested nature of 'evidence' in this 
particular debate is offered. 
2.2 Competing Coalitions: Key Developments in British Drugs Policy 
The history of UK drug policy has traditionally been shaped by two opposing sides, 
each with a claim to possession of the issue (Berridge 1984; Berridge and Edwards 
1981). On the one hand, there is the Department of Health-influenced, treatment- 
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focused, medical profession lobby. This places specific emphasis on the public- 
health aspect of the drug problem. On the other, there is Home office inspired 
criminal justice, law-and-order lobby, which stresses the criminal element of the drug 
issue. The medical foothold in British drug policy has a long history despite 
inauspicious beginnings. This stemmed from an early public mistrust of medicine 
which gradually eroded throughout the nineteenth century (Hodgkinson 1968). 
Around th is time, the diagnostic abilities of the medical profession became widely 
appreciated, particularly in times of epidemiological crises, such as the cholera 
epidemic of 1853-4. This coincided with an expanding middle-class and thus, 
equipped with its stock of scientific knowledge, the medical profession was able to 
establish itself, for some, as a prominent player in public and social affairs. It must 
be stressed that for others, it represented an agent of social control (Cohen 1985). 
Early drug legislation in the UK is indicative of the former view. For example, the 
1868 Pharmacy Act 'removed morphine and opium derivatives from the shelves of 
general stores' and gave the pharmacy profession the monopoly of dispensing the 
drug (Barton 2003: 11). 
Legislation passed under the conditions of the First World War saw a shift in 
the power base between the medical and criminal justice professions. This rupture 
can be traced to the passing of the 1916 Defence of the Realm Act, particularly 
section 40B. The origins of this legislation point to various moral panics surrounding 
certain issues (Cohen 1972) - including prostitution and homosexuality - deemed to 
be a possible threat to national security (Davies 1990). Drug use, too, was considered 
in this light. Indeed, it was in this context that it first fell under the jurisdiction of the 
law-and-order institutions, as panic spread over the use and abuse of cocaine and 
opiates by British and Canadian servicemen. This then spread to concern over rising 
drug use in the general public, which, in turn, could affect production in the 
munitions factories (Barton 2003: 16). 
By December 1916, the Home Office had the ascendancy in control of drug 
use. Strang and Gossop (1994: 343) contend that the Home Office 'used its influence' 
to try to push Britain towards a similar system as the United States and 'a reliance 
upon an entirely penal approach with criminal sanctions against both users and 
prescribing doctors'. It was at this time that the origins of drug prohibition emerged. 
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Indeed, commentators such as Smart (1984: 35) have remarked that the Defence of 
the Realm Act established 'British drug prohibition' because for the first time, it was 
'a criminal offence to be in possession of drugs without professional authorisation'. 
Although a law-and-order initiative, however, authorisation of possession could only 
be granted from responsible individuals within the medical profession. 
After the end of hostilities, the Treaty of Versailles contained a clause, as a 
condition of accession, requiring 'all signatories to introduce domestic legislation to 
deal with their respective drug problems' (Barton 2003: 16). In the UK, this led to the 
1920 Dangerous Drugs Act, although the making of this legislation actually preceded 
the 1916 legislation and was intrinsically bound up with pre-war global concern over 
the problems associated with opium. The early 1920s legislation arguably shaped the 
debate over drug legislation in Britain for the next forty years. Barton (2003: 17) 
states that the Dangerous Drugs Act 'set in train a still unresolved dilemma as to 
which arm of the state should "own" the drug problem'. 
The medical profession's foothold in UK drug policy persisted and was 
further established with the meeting of the Rolleston Committee in 1926. Named 
after its Chairman, Sir Humphrey Rolleston, President of the Royal College of 
Physicians, this committee reported that morphine and heroin 'addiction' did not and 
should not necessarily mean drug 'abuse'. The committee recommended allowing for 
the prescription of heroin and morphine to enable gradual withdrawal or to 
&maintain' a regulated supply to those judged unable to break their dependence, or 
those whose lives would otherwise suffer serious disruption (South 1997: 927-8). The 
outcome of this was the consolidation of the medical profession's involvement in 
drug regulation. This created a 'British system' of drug control as opposed to an 
American stance of outright criminal prohibition (Barton 2003; Shiner 2003; Stimson 
and Lart 1994). 
The extent to which there are two 'competing' sides is, however, open to 
some debate. For some commentators, the British system constituted a 'dual 
approach' to the UK 'drug problem' based on a relationship of co-operation rather 
than conflict (Berridge 2005). Lart (1998) questions the extent to which there has 
been a dichotomy between the two institutions, suggesting instead that these are two 
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sides of the same regulatory coin. Stevens (2007b) similarly states that although 
historically UK drug policy discourse has been shaped by a continuing struggle 
between the criminal justice and public health responses to the drug problem, both 
conceive drug use to be a deviation from the norm. In turn, these perspectives have 
silenced, especially within political and academic discourse, a more marginal 
'politically challenging position' that drug use is, sui generis, a 'largely 
unproblematic - not deviant' phenomenon (Stevens 2007b: 86). 
In agreement with Barton (2003) and South (1999b), it is a central contention 
of this thesis that the relationship between the relevant constituencies has been one of 
controversy, competition and conflict. Although the medical profession, in whatever 
guise, has had a prominent position in UK drug policy-making, its relationship with 
the criminal justice system is fundamentally not one of equality. Indeed, South 
(1999a: 89-90) argued that the Rolleston philosophy did not constitute a 'British 
system' per se as the report's framework was 'ultimately regulated by the Home 
Office and the police' and 'its parameters if not its everyday practice were, at the end 
of the day, marked out by controls not treatment'. This has led to commentators such 
as Blackman (2004) to suggest that the British system is actually a 'myth'. 
Overall, in the field of illicit drug use, public health, treatment-focused 
initiatives operate within a framework overseen by the punishment and enforcement- 
orientated Home Office. This was especially so in the aftermath of the enactment of 
the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act. What follows is a brief review of the power struggle 
between the two main agents of social control in the UK drug arena from 1970 to the 
present. These have provided the platform for the competing coalitions that are 
visible in the debate about the regulation of cannabis, and subsequently, the debate 
over the efficacy of the overall classification system. 
2.3 The Continuing Struggle for Ownership of the 'Drug Problem' and Key 
Debates in UK Drug Policy 
British drug legislation enacted throughout the 1960s prior to the 1971 Misuse of 
Drugs Act emerged from, and was heavily influenced by, the events detailed above 
but also events occurring on the international stage. Central to the latter, was the 
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1961 United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, otherwise referred to as 
the Geneva Convention. This proffered a now classically hard-line approach to drug 
use. It aimed to standardise the control of narcotics across nations so that certain 
drugs could be used only for scientific, medical, and in some cases, industrial 
purposes. This was achieved by arranging drugs into schedules and applying 
appropriate controls based on their harm and toxicity. Any article in contravention of 
the convention was a punishable offence, with a custodial term for serious breaches 
(Fortson 2005). Crucially this meant that possession of what later came to be called 
'recreational' drugs, such as cannabis and amphetamines (substances seen to be less 
harmful than 'hard' drugs such as heroin and cocaine) almost invariably became a 
criminal offence within the signatory states. 
Z3.1 The 1970s 
In the UK, the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act replaced the various drug control acts of 
the 1960s; the 1964 Drugs (Prevention of Misuse) Act, and the 1965 and 1967 
Dangerous Drugs Acts. On one level it reflected the times and the global concern 
over opium dependence. According to Fortson (2005: 327), the 1971 Misuse of Drugs 
Act was drafted: a) to include restrictions on the importation and exportation of drugs 
specified by the statute; b) to create an offence directed against occupiers and 
persons concerned in the management of premises to permit (now 'permit or suffer') 
the smoking of prepared opium; c) to make it an offence to unlawfully possess 
prepared opium; d) to prohibit the possession of utensils for smoking opium and to 
make such an act an offence and; e) to punish the performance of acts in this country 
that resulted in the commission of an offence contrary to a 'corresponding law' 
abroad. 
Another important aspect of the legislation was that it established Britain's 
first legal advisory body on illicit drugs, the Advisory Council on the Misuse of 
Drugs (ACMD), who have come to assume a central role in reviewing British drug 
policy. According to Levitt, et al. (2006: 2), the ACMD 'carries out in-depth inquiries 
into aspects of drug use that are causing particular concern in the UK, with the aim of 
producing considered reports that will be helpful to policy makers, practitioners, 
service providers and others'. It is now common practice that the government 
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responds to the recommendations made by the ACMD. The statute states that it is the 
purpose of the council: 
... to keep under review the situation in the UK with respect to drugs which 
are being or appear to them likely to be misused and of which the misuse is 
having or appears to them capable of having harmful effects sufficient to 
constitute a social problem, and to give to any one or more of the Ministers, 
where either Council consider it expedient to do so or they are consulted by 
the Minister or Ministers in question, advice on measures (whether or not 
involving alteration of the law) which in the opinion of the Council ought to 
be taken for preventing the misuse of such drugs or dealing with social 
problems connected with their misuse, and in particular on measures which 
in the opinion of the Council, ought to be taken (cited in Science and 
Technology Committee 2006: 13). 
In addition the act goes on to stress what the measures actually 
involve. It lists the following, as actions that should to be taken: 
a) restricting the availability of such drugs or supervising the arrangements 
for their supply; 
b) enabling persons affected by the misuse of such drugs to obtain proper 
advice, and for securing the provision of proper facilities and services for the 
treatment, rehabilitation and aftercare of such persons; 
c) promoting co-operation between the various professional and community 
services which in the opinion of the Council have a part to play in dealing 
with social problems connected with the misuse of drugs; 
d) educating the public (and in particular the young) in the dangers of 
misusing such drugs and for giving publicity to those dangers and; 
e) promoting research into, or otherwise obtaining information about, any 
matter which in the opinion of the Council is of relevance for the purpose of 
preventing the misuse of such drugs or dealing with any social problem 
connected with their misuse (cited in Science and Technology Committee 
2006: 13). 
It must be stressed that although the consultation must take place between 
Government and the ACMD, the former is still able to act unilaterally if it deems it 
necessary to do so. The work of the ACMD is primarily based on clinical expertise 
and, where possible, they are driven by the clinical evidence-base. This work is often 
sub-contracted to various sub-committees made up of agents with relevant expertise. 
Overall this emphasis on clinical evidence is reflected in its membership: 
Members of the ACMD, of whom there should be not less than 20, are 
appointed by the Secretary of State for a term of 3 years and in accordance 
with the guidance issued by the Office of the Commissioner for Public 
Appointments. Nominations come from a wide range of sources including 
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relevant professional bodies, Public Appointments Unit of the Cabinet 
Office and self-nomination. Under the terms of the MDA [ 1971 Misuse of 
Drugs Act] 1971 the ACMD is required to include representatives of the 
practices of medicine, dentistry,. veterinary medicine and pharmacy, the 
pharmaceutical industry, and chemistry (other than pharmaceutical 
chemistry); and members who have a wide and relevant experience of social 
problems connected with the misuse of drugs (cited in Science and 
Technology Committee 2006: 17). 
Although proffering a unique approach to the control of drugs, the 1971 
Misuse of Drugs Act was, on implementation, denounced by critics as being based 
on drug-war rhetoric commonplace, in policy-making circles, across the Atlantic at 
this time (e. g. Young 1971). This is a prevention-oriented approach, favouring 
prohibition and has shaped international drug control policies since the 1960s. Duke 
and Gross (1993) state of the drug issue that it is America's 'longest running war', 
although the notion of 'war' is something of a misnomer, as the resources mobilised 
against drugs 'are not comparable to efforts during wartime (Husak 1992: 9). Robson 
(1999: 247-8) illustrates how the drug war is, nonetheless, an expensive undertaking, 
with EIA billion spent by the British goverrunent combating drugs in 1997.62 per 
cent went to enforcement agencies and a further 13 per cent went on international 
initiatives targeting cultivation and supply. 
For current purposes, the defining tenet of the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act was 
its instigation of a strict classification system. Drugs were now placed in one of three 
categories, A, B or C. On the passing of the legislation, then Home Secretary James 
Callaghan, stated that based on evidence stemming from the World Health 
Organisation and that presented in the deliberations of the 1961 Single Convention, 
'we have taken those lists and attempted to put them into the Bill in the order we 
think they should be classified in terms of harmfulness and danger' (cited in Levitt, 
et al. 2006: 5). The category into which each particular drug is placed is determined 
by the extent of harm its misuse inflicts. Section 1.2 of the Act states that drugs are 
divided between classes based on: a) whether the drug is being misused; b) whether 
it is likely to be misused and (c) whether the misuse in either case is having or could 
have harmful effects sufficient to constitute a social problem (cited in Levitt, et al. 
2006: 15). 
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These issues are difficult to quantify and there is, therefore, an in-built 
ambiguity in the Act, which placed heroin and cocaine in class A, cannabis into class 
B along with amphetamines and barbiturates, and anabolic steroids (subsequently) in 
class C. The 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act placed great stock in punishment as opposed 
to treatment and compounded in law the continuing prohibition of drugs. Within 
government, from this point on, except for a brief hiatus in the Cabinet Office 
towards the end of the 1990s, the drugs portfolio in the UK has remained the 
property of the Home Office. 
It is important to stress at this stage that it was a widely held view that prior 
to, and in the immediate aftermath of, the enactment of the 1971 Misuse of Drugs 
Act, the UK did not really have a -drug problem per se. According to Webster 
(2007: 15 1), at the start of the 1970s the 'addict' population known to the authorities 
was stable, numbering 4,067 and mainly centred in London. Newcombe (2007: 26), 
through a more historical lens, suggests that the numbers were lower: 
Statistics for notified drug addicts go back to 1935, and show that, for the 
first two decades, numbers dropped fairly steadily - from about 700 in 1935 
to 290 in 1953. Annual numbers then began rising slowly again, up to 927 in 
1965, before rising more sharply to 2881 in 1969, and then falling again, 
down to 1406 in 1973. 
The overarching point is that the number of registered addicts of heroin or 
morphine was low and fluctuating. Also, at this time cannabis use was restricted to 
certain sections of the population, for example, students and certain immigrant 
groups. Consequently, Downes (1977: 89) has characterised British drug policy at 
this time as a period of 'masterly inactivity', referring to the fact that draconian 
policies were implemented to combat what was, at this time, a relatively minor 
problem. 
Z3.2 The 1980s 
The drug situation at the start of the 1980s can be characterised as a time of rapidly 
rising drug use. At this point, events occurring internationally and domestically 
meant that the period of inactivity gave way to the increased 'politicisation' of the 
drug phenomenon, in some sense constructing a 'drug problem' per se. On the 
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international stage, in the 1970s, the Dutch had diverted from the rest of Europe in 
their response to the perceived drug problem. This occurred under the auspices of the 
Hulsman Committee's review of the drugs laws. 
Broadly, this changed the emphasis from a policy based on a philosophy of 
prohibition to one of minimising the impact of drug related harm. Primarily, the 
Hulsman Committee was guided by a liberal philosophy believing in minimum state 
interference in behaviour that is inherently personal, with limited consequences for 
society. This stance drew heavily on the philosophy of Mill (1974). In sociological 
terms, the Hulsman Committee reported that much drug use was a sub-cultural 
phenomenon and that space must be granted in society for 'alternative' lifestyles, 
which 'need not conform to the norms of the so-called respectable citizen' (Barton 
2003: 153). In one sense, the Hulsman philosophy was also consistent with that of the 
philosopher Baruch Spinoza who held the view that those who try to restrain 
personal behaviour by force of law are more likely to arouse vices than to reform 
them (Robson 1999: 249). 
The practical consequence of this, in policy terms, was a general shift 
towards harm reduction on a large part of the continent. Harm reduction is a hugely 
contested term (see Section 7.3) but in this sense is thought to be based on the realist 
principle of containment as opposed to the idealism of outright prohibition and the 
utopia of a 'drug free society'. The policy of reducing drug related harm began to 
permeate more areas of Dutch drug policy into the 1980s and beyond. Around this 
time, a culture of controlled use of heroin, in the form of needle exchanges, became 
widespread, as the threat of HIV/AIDS spread amongst many intravenous drug users. 
This was often a result of needle sharing with those already infected. This harm 
reduction approach was not restricted to the controlled use of so-called harder drugs, 
however. From the 1980s and into the 1990s, the widespread popularity of 'dance 
culture' saw the introduction of pill testing kits outside night-clubs, to facilitate the 
safe use of ecstasy and amphetamines, an integral aspect of this scene (Gourley 
2004; Measham, et al. 2000; Redhead 1997). In essence, this signalled a public- 
health response to the drug problem within the broader criminal-justice paradigm. 
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I On the domestic front, the year 1979 represents a watershed 
in British drug 
policy and problems (Pearson 1991). It would be inaccurate to say that the election of 
the Thatcher administration was a causal factor in the onset of the drug problem, but 
Buchanan and Young (2000: 410) maintain that certain policies, informed by a New- 
Right, neo-liberal agenda certainly confounded the problem in a particular way. 
Indeed, they state of the 1980s that 'it was during this period that de-industrialisation 
ravaged labour-intensive industries, as factories and shipyards closed down'. 
Consequently, whole communities were destabilised by mass long-term 
unemployment. In the 1980s, for the first time in the post-war period, a generation of 
school leavers who would otherwise have found secure employment in 
apprenticeships, factories or semi-skilled positions found themselves surplus to 
requirements. Work was not available and the long-standing concept of 'a job for 
life , was being rapidly eroded. Heroin, for many, provided a means of escape 
(Buchanan and Young 2000: 410). 
These societal changes had a knock-on effect for the drug Situation, as heroin 
use and associated problems, became a more high-profile social issue (Dom and 
South 1987; Parker, et al. 1988; Pearson 1987). Shiner (2003: 773) contends that from 
the 1980s onwards 'central government took on a more active role, the debate about 
drugs became politicised'. Increased emphasis was placed on law enforcement, and 
medicine, arguably already subservient to the criminal justice system in the UK, was 
initially further disenfranchised in its attempt to control the drug problem. Other key 
features of the 1980s drug situation were: a) its size and scale, there was a four fold 
increase in the numbers of registered addicts, arguably a conservative reflection on 
the total number of drug users as most would be unregistered with agencies; b) the 
spread of serious drug use from its base in London to include large Scottish cities and 
mainly large urban areas west of the Pennines; c) the fact that unlike in the United 
States, most heroin users were white and not ethnic minorities and; d) the 
development of global trafficking patterns as heroin was imported from the 'golden 
triangle' of south-west Asia; Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran (Pearson 1987: 67; 
Seddon 2007). 
All of these factors contributed to what was seen as a heroin 'epidemic' and 
prompted renewed vigour for the war-on-drugs policy in political circles. Juxtaposed 
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to this, however, and a by-product of the 1980s heroin epidemic was the outbreak of 
HlV/AIDS amongst many intravenous users, as illustrated above. According to 
Buchanan and Young (2000: 411), this eventually seriously called into question the 
policy of outright prohibition from the medical profession who had remained 
sceptical about the effectiveness of using the criminal justice system as a deterrent. 
HIWAIDS was deemed more dangerous than heroin use, forcing a 'pragmatic shift 
in UK drugs policy towards a public-health inspired, 'harm reduction' approach 
designed to establish contact with the hidden drug-using population'. The policy was 
pragmatic in that it was intended to 'protect the non drug-using society from the risk 
of HIV infection' yet the harm reduction approach closely monitored by the Home 
Office sat uneasily with its crime reduction ideology of punishment (Buchanan and 
Young 2000: 411). The medical profession in the UK was once again exercising its 
muscles. This move arguably reflects the ambiguity built into the 1971 Misuse of 
Drugs Act, which is not solely about prohibition, although it was the Home Office 
who controlled the licensing arrangements for the safe use of heroin. 
Z3.3 The 1990s 
Throughout the 1990s, these harm reduction measures were embraced on a scale 
never before witnessed, albeit still within a criminal justice paradigm. Although the 
numbers of known heroin users continued to rise, overall prevalence rates remained 
low. Towards the turn of the millennium, one per cent of 16-29 year olds reported 
heroin use, within the last year (Ramsay, et al. 2001). While heroin remained a 
political problem, around this time, the UK drug situation began to change markedly. 
It became apparent that drug use was not restricted to problem users of hard 
substances and that the current drug situation was radically different from anything 
that had preceded it (Parker, et al. 1998). Cannabis use remained popular but the 
onset of the Acid House movement and the subsequent expansion of dance culture 
(Collin 1997; Hammersley, et al. 2002) established recreational drug use as a key 
component of leisure. This development contributed to the notion that drug use 
among certain sections of the population had in fact become 'normalised'. For many 
young people certain kinds of recreational drug use became culturally accommodated 
(Aldridge, et al. 1999; Parker, et al. 1998; Parker, et al. 2002). The 'normalisation' of 
drug use is anathema to those who support the war-on-drugs, as the rhetoric 
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associated with the drug-war and the perceived dangers of drugs did not correspond 
with many young people's experiences of illicit drugs (MacCoun and Reuter 2001b). 
These changes were reflected in a subtle policy change occurring around this 
time. For Barton (2003: 136), the key development was the publication of an 
independent report commissioned by the Department of Health (Howard, et al. 1993) 
calling for a 'greater level of co-operation across all agencies involved with illicit 
drug policy and practice' (Barton 2003: 137). This, in turn, led to the fulfilment of the 
Conservative election promise to make sure that action aimed at tackling drug misuse 
was effectively co-ordinated. The upshot of these developments was that the 
publication of the Conservative Party's 1995 Drug Strategy Tackling Drugs Together 
(Department of Health 1995) had a profound influence on the thinking surrounding 
UK drug policy, which continues to this day. This is despite the fact that the 
document only related to policy in England. The Conservative Party, traditionally in 
favour of more draconian solutions to drug problems, amended their drug policy so 
that it attempted to take effective action via law enforcement, accessible treatment 
and a new emphasis on education and prevention. Overall it was the aim of the 
'Tackling Drugs' strategy to: a) increase the safety of communities from drug-related 
crime; b) reduce the acceptability of drugs to young people and; c) reduce the health 
risks and other damage related to drug misuse (Department of Health 1995: 1). 
This initiative received support across the political spectrum and, according 
to Barton (2003: 138), represented a partial broadening of the scope of the drug 
problem. By focusing on problems associated with communities, the Government of 
the time were able to pursue the aforementioned two-pronged approach to tackling 
the problem through an attempt to foster 'joint working' between the public health 
and law-and-order constituencies. This multi-agency co-ordination, both at local and 
national levels would focus on problems associated with crime and public health 
with particular regard to young people (Department of Health 1995: 1). 
Barton (2003: 138) also highlights various issues concerning the institutional 
structure and allocation of resources. Part of this process saw the establishment of a 
Ministerial Sub-Committee of the Cabinet on the Misuse of Drugs. In the spirit of 
joint-working, this was comprised of figures from interested departments. Also in the 
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spirit of togetherness, the government set up Drug Action Teams, the remit of which 
was to tackle drug related issues at the local level. These were also multi-agency 
arenas comprising 'senior representatives from the police, probation services, local 
authorities (including education and social services) and health authorities' 
(Department of Health 1995: 5). The intention was to foster links with voluntary 
sector organisations with a vested interest in drug issues. In terms of organisation, the 
policy arena had opened up, moving away from central government. This created a 
more nuanced approach to the problem. Ultimately, this allowed for greater 'outside' 
involvement as more agents became embroiled within the policy process. 
The approach still operated, nonetheless, in terms of the aforementioned dual 
paradigm debate. Consistent with the hitherto dominance of law-and-order, emphasis 
remained on supply reduction, but 'police forces, probation areas and prisons, were 
all required to develop their own drug misuse strategies' (Barton 2003: 138). The 
health initiative, was one that ensured that drug users, primarily those whose use was 
chaotic or problematic, had 'easy access' to services. This was facilitated by the 
establishment of the National Drugs Help-Line in April 1995 (Department of Health 
1995: 3). According to Barton (2003: 138), the Government's actions stopped well 
short of accepting the normalisation thesis of illicit drugs for certain sections of the 
population. Harm reduction policies were couched in terms of a step towards the 
'somewhat unrealistic' goal of 'drug free states'. Drug abstinence was 'the ultimate 
aim'. Indeed, the twin goals of abstinence and resistance, especially for young 
people, were the messages sent by the drugs education literature. This Was boosted 
by the allocation of an extra E5.9 million for training programmes for teachers to 
enrol on 'innovative drug education programmes' (Barton 2003: 138). Furthermore, 
drug education became part of the National Curriculum (SCODA 1998). 
On the whole, for Barton (2003: 138), the strategy was not a radical departure 
from anything preceding it. As a useful summary, Barton (2003: 138-9) highlights 
five main issues significant to the approach of Tackling Drugs Together. First and 
foremost, it removed the Government's drug policy away from the Home Office to 
the Cabinet Office. Second, it acted as a catalyst for a policy explosion in the field of 
illicit drug policy and practice. Drugs came to be identified as a 'major problem' thus 
further politicising the issue. Third, it began to create a climate where law-and-order 
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and medical approaches could be combined and operate together under a banner of 
harm reduction. Fourth, this placed joint working at the forefront of policy, forcing 
previously unilateral agencies into collaboration. Finally, it gave guarded recognition 
to the fact that isolated law-and-order approaches based on supply reduction alone 
were failing and there needed to be education-based demand reduction approaches to 
tackling drug misuse. 
In his detailed critique of the strategy, Howard (1997: 13) highlighted 
numerous positive and negative aspects. On the desirable side, it provided national 
leadership and co-ordination. The leader of the ministerial sub-committee was the 
Lord President of the Council, thus ensuring some semblance of neutrality in that no 
department could, in theory, dominate proceedings. The formation of the Drug 
Action Teams also served to cement joint working in areas where it was already 
established, providing a model of good practice for elsewhere. In addition, it gave 
recognition to the work of specialis 
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drug service providers and highlighted the value 
of the demand reduction paradigm. In this sense, 'harm reduction' became associated 
with demand reduction within a hitherto supply reduction dominated paradigm. The 
approach also catered for the provision of additional resources and countenanced a 
more realistic approach to the drug scene. This was viewed as providing a counter- 
balance to the more sensationalising and demonising deluges from the press and its 
associated drug war rhetoric. 
There were, however, in turn, a number of problems and criticisms voiced 
about the strategy. Not least, the various problems associated with joint working 
stemming from institutional animosity and suspicion (Colebatch 2002; Crawford and 
Jones 1996). Allied to this, there was still concern over the power struggle between 
law-and-order and public-health, this time over the allocation of resources. Indeed, 
Howard (1997) indicates that the allocation of resources for supply reduction, that is, 
the cause of the law-and-order lobby outnumbered by two to one those allocated to 
the demand reduction initiatives of treatment and prevention. Barton (2003: 139) 
suggests that this was probably related to the fact that the strategy placed greater 
emphasis on the protection of communities from harm rather than the protection of 
the individual and, in doing so, maintained the ascendancy of law-and-order 
responses to drug problems. 
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Overall, the framework provided by Tackling Drugs Together was successful 
in recognising that, until this point, there had been a lack of coherency in UK drug 
policy. By association, as the goal of a drug-free society was proving elusive, the aim 
was to create a new philosophy with which to deal with the drug problem. In this 
respect, it was successful, but only to a point. By reorganising local services, the 
strategy provided a green light for some pioneering means of addressing the 
problems of illicit drug use, thus opening of the door for other voices to be heard in 
the debate. This process continued with the election of New Labour in 1997. 
Z3.4 The Present: New Labour and'Tackling Drugs to Build a Better Britain' 
New Labour came to Power on the back of a huge majority, offering the potential 
platform for sweeping reform in many areas of social and public policy. Toynbee and 
Walker (2001: 17), for example, claim that in the field of welfare reform, policy 
advisers such as Frank Field were given the mandate 'to think the unthinkable'. 
Conversely, in spite of early indications to the contrary by MPs Clare Short and Mo 
Mowlam, public pronouncements about the direction of drug policy, revolved around 
familiar notions that 'all drugs were harmful'. In effect, it became clear that thinking 
the unthinkable, in this area, was actually unthinkable. If anything, there seemed to 
be a tide of continuity flowing from the Conservative approach to drug policy with 
that of New Labour. Indeed, Bean (2002: 56) observed that the New Labour approach 
laid out in Tackling Drugs to Build a Better Britain (Cabinet Office 1998) 'largely 
reiterated the themes of the 1995 document whilst adding performance indicators for 
drug reduction in the next decade'. 
Barton (2003: 141) however, points out that this claim is something of an 
oversimplification and, whilst conceding that the New Labour approach carried many 
similarities with what had gone before, it also offered some new initiatives. It was, 
then, perhaps a quirk of the electoral system and the actions of the electorate that the 
groundwork put in place by the Conservative drug strategy only bore fruit under New 
Labour. With the benefit of hindsight, though, New Labour was able to address some 
of the more noticeable shortcomings in the 1995 document and attempt to iron out 
these deficiencies in their strategy. According to Barton (2003: 142), this has meant 
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that multi-agency work has started to become more 'meaningful' as more 'concrete 
projects' were put in place. 
The more significant changes, however, related to the orgamsation of the 
drug issue within government, rather than the substance of the policy itself. In terms 
of substance, the main policy areas were concerned: a) to help young people resist 
drug misuse in order to achieve their full potential in society; b) to protect 
communities from drug-related anti-social behaviour; c) to enable people with drug 
problems to overcome them through drug treatment and to live healthy and crime 
free lives and; d) to stifle the availability of illegal drugs on the streets. This was 
consistent with the Conservative approach. As regards administrative organisation, at 
the national level, the organisational structure remained in tact with the continuation 
of the Ministerial sub-Committee on Drug Misuse. This kept its brief to ensure that 
individual departments, with an interest in illicit drug use, contributed to the overall 
vision and strategy. 
One major area of change was with the appointment of Keith Hellawell, the 
fon-ner chief constable of West Yorkshire Police as a new 'anti-drugs co-ordinator' - 
or 'Drug Tsar' - with Mike Trace as his deputy. Barton (2003: 14 1) suggests that both 
were seen as 'prepared to think radically about drug policy' and part of Hellawell's 
remit was to head up the UK Anti-Drugs Strategic Steering Group, a new body 
comprised of government officials, local government representatives, representatives 
of independent bodies and voluntary sector agencies (Barton 2003: 141). In addition, 
the Drug Tsar was required to: 
... scrutinise rigorously the performance of departments and agencies - individually and collectively - against the actions, objectives and 
performance indicators set out in this report; and produce a National Anti- 
Drugs Plan for implementation in each succeeding year (Cabinet Office 
1998: 2) 
In this way UK drug policy-making was opened up even further. Policy appraisal and 
a more inclusive consultation process were also key aspects of this process as the 
following discussion of the reclassification of cannabis illustrates. 
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Although the Conservative and Labour strategies did signal a slight shi in 
policy, the treatment/punishment dichotomy still shaped the boundaries of the 
debate. With wider involvement in the decision-making process, the 
treatment/punishment paradigm became fuzzy and new voices in the debate could be 
seen. For Barton (2003: 142) the New Labour approach did, however, recognise that a 
unilateral law-and-order approach was not deemed to be the sole solution to the 'drug 
problem'. In doing so, it kept open the door for policies based on the principles of 
harm reduction to play a key role in the drug strategy. The upshot of such 
developments was the perception of more proactive policies that could address the 
realities of the drug situation in the twenty-first century; a situation characterised by 
a continuing rise in the numbers of recreational drug users throughout the 1990s and 
into the new millennium (Parker, et al. 1998). 
2.4 The Cannabis Reclassification in Context 
There have been many calls for a relaxation of the drugs laws in the UK before and 
since the enactment of the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act. Some have been more 
vociferous than others, and many by powerful and not so powerful individuals and 
groups. By the same token, the call to resist change has also been just as vocal, if not 
more so, and it is this lobby that has traditionally won out. Towards the end of the 
twentieth, and into the twenty-first century, there was a tacit realisation that with new 
knowledge of drugs emerging, the current classification system may not be fit for 
purpose. It was increasingly clear that some substances may be in the wrong category 
on the grounds that the harms associated with them were not equivolant to other 
substances in that group. Cannabis and ecstasy, in particular, were two examples 
(Police Foundation 2000). In effect, the perceived normalisation of drugs was calling 
into question the validity of the current ABC system. 
From the 1990s onwards there had been an increasingly widespread clamour 
for a change in the laws controlling drugs, with cannabis the most plausible 
candidate for reform (MacCoun and Reuter 2001a). This was one premise, amongst 
others, that lead to the reclassification of cannabis in 2004 and the debate thereon. To 
fully comprehend the event of cannabis reclassification, it is necessary to consult the 
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origins of its prohibition and simultaneous campaigns for legislative change, various 
cultural issues surrounding its use and various happenings on the international stage. 
Z4.1 The Origins of Cannabis Prohibition and Law Reform Campaigns 
Cannabis was first outlawed in the 1920s, although the reasons for this remain 
unclear. According to Mills (2003: 216), the Home Office had carefully monitored 
stories about cannabis use in the UK throughout the 1920s and saw 'no reason for the 
cannabis initially to be included in the Dangerous Drugs Acts'. Medical opinion on 
cannabis was divided and commonly ill informed. Significantly for Mills (2003: 217), 
those that could claim to have actually followed debates about drugs in general, and 
cannabis in particular, over a whole career, were adamant that it had no place 
alongside opium in the regulatory system of the UK at this time. Consequently, 
during the early part of the twentieth century, the British government paid little 
attention to cannabis as a domestic issue, yet it would not be long before the British 
press began reporting on the effects on cannabis on the population of the UK. 
By and large, although there was no real domestic cannabis use in the 1920s, 
the drug did enter the statute books in that decade through two routes. Firstly, as a 
direct result of the international opium conference in Geneva, then secondly, and 
significantly for the autonomy of the medical profession, via the Pharmaceutical 
Society and its power to identify substances listed under the 1908 Poisons Act 
(Hayes and Shapiro 1998: 13). According to Mills (2003: 217), the only reason given 
by the Pharmaceutical Society, for nominating cannabis in 1924, was that it had 
come to their attention because of criminal cases relating to its use. Yet for Mills 
(2003: 217), reports from the time show that the police were 'unable to identify 
cannabis' and wrongly thought it to be similar in its properties to opium. Its 
subsequent portrayal in the press as a 'plague' about to sweep London, that was 
directly comparable to heroin and cocaine and 'would induce insanity' was the 
clinching issue for the authorities (Mills 2003: 217). 
Mills (2003: 202-3) thus identifies the 1920s as the start of a moral panic 
concerning cannabis. He claims that overall it was 'caught up in a web of concern 
spun out of little more than aspersions and inferences'. This related to high profile 
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cases from India and Egypt where it was stated that cannabis use was the cause for 
insanity and that the majority of ininates of the Asylums were hashish smokers. 
Initially, it was perceived that the prevalence of cannabis use, in the UK, was 
restricted to the immigrant communities mainly in the seaports. Subsequently, 
allegations of a serious growth in the traffic of cannabis and its association as a drug 
which induces madness became commonplace in the media of the day. It was no 
surprise, therefore, when the issue was raised in parliament in February 1924. In 
spite of a lack of hard data concerning the dangers - either real or potential - of the 
drug, the 1925 Dangerous Drugs Act was passed which finally outlawed cannabis 
possession in the UK (Dom, et al. 1992). 
I According to Shapiro (1999: 192), up to the start of the 1960s, cannabis use in 
the UK remained restricted to certain sections of the population. In particular, 'the 
West Indian blues and rent party scene and the West End jazz clubs with only a small 
band of white musicians, students and sundry bohemians indulging in pot'. Indeed, it 
was only by 1964 that prosecutions for cannabis possession by whites outstripped 
those for blacks (Shapiro 1999: 192). By the middle of the decade, however, cannabis 
texploded out of its narrow confines' to the extent that by 1970 upwards of four 
million people had tried the drug in England (Robson 1999: 71). This was very much 
the origin of the permeation of cannabis use into the mainstream of British society 
and at this time widespread clamour for changes in the legal status of the drug were 
apparent (Shapiro 1999). 
It was also the first sign of a potential movement of cannabis use beyond the 
realm of working-class or immigrant subcultures (Young 1971), whilst still falling 
far short of the levels experienced today. This trend emerged despite the fact that, for 
many years, cannabis had been the subject of significant 'deviance amplification' 
(Wilkins 1964), through continued sensationalist reporting in the tabloid press. The 
first detailed report into cannabis since the Indian Hemp Drug Commission (1894), 
was conducted by the Wootton Committee (Home Office 1969). According to one of 
its members, the report concluded by stating that most cannabis users were 'law 
abiding and industrious' and that 'psychosis or psychological dependence' were 
uncommon (Schofield 1971: 99). It was claimed, therefore, that most of the public 
fears about cannabis were groundless and that innately, there was little linking the 
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drug to violent or aggressive behaviour, as had been claimed by certain sections of 
the press and in the drug-war rhetoric. 
Shapiro (1999: 195), comments that on publication the report was roundly 
condemned. The then Home Secretary James Callaghan suggested that the committee 
had been 'nobbled by the pro-pot lobby'. In spite of this, much of what was 
recommended found its way into the new 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act. Thus, whereas 
internationally the UK had committed itself to treating cannabis as a dangerous drug, 
the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act positioned it in Class B, with lesser penalties for 
possession. In doing so, the Government deflated the vibrant cannabis law reform 
movement, stirring at this time, but not irrevocably. 
The main sense of failure, according to critics of the 1971 Misuse of Drugs 
Act was that its commitment to the prohibition of drugs was a policy that was 
destined to fail (Young 1971). As illustrated, there is increasingly widespread 
critique of prohibitionist policies (Bennett 1990; Bertram, et al. 1996; MacCoun and 
Reuter 2001b; McWilliams 1991; Rolles, et al. 2006; Rosenberger 1996), Robson 
(1999: 248) backs up these assertions with some recent historical, empirical evidence. 
He comments that: 
The illicit production of opium has increased year on year from 2,242 tonnes 
in 1987 to 5,000 tonnes in 1996, whilst that of coca leaves is thought to have 
doubled between 1985 and 1994. Customs and police officers in the 
developed world seem to accept that only 10 per cent or so of illicit drugs 
entering a country are intercepted or seized on the street. 
Additionally, 'despite heroic expenditure on enforcement over three decades, 
the real price of street drugs has fallen steadily while access, especially for young 
people in their teens, gets easier and easier' (Robson 1999: 248). The fact that 
seizures have risen is no index that the war is being won, it merely confirms for 
detractors of the drug war, that seizures only represent 'the tip of the iceberg' 
(Robson 1999: 248). This has not, however, led to a widespread abandonment of the 
policy, although recent cultural changes and changes in Europe are now starting to 
challenge the philosophy of the current system. 
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2.4.2 Cannabis and Cufture 
To equate policy changes (and this particular one is no exception) solely with trends 
in the nature of policy-making, serves to underestimate how various cultural changes 
impact on the process. A useful way of viewing the culture and policy relationship is 
as a duality. Policy change shapes and is shaped by cultural developments. Cannabis, 
occupies a unique status in British society for a number of reasons. It is widely 
documented that cannabis has for some time been the most widely used illicit 
substance in the UK (Pearson and Shiner 2002; Police Foundation 2000; Ramsay, et 
al. 2001; Ramsay and Partridge 1999; Roe 2005). In this capacity, it represents the 
drug of choice for a vast number of people. The significance of cannabis, however, 
goes much further than this, entailing a specific cultural dimension. In this sense, 
cannabis use has become a benchmark for gauging morality. 
Cannabis use is a misdemeanour that captures the imagination like no other 
and the issue over its legal status divides public opinion. Throughout the previous 
century, issues of morality, at various junctures came to the attention of the political 
community, whereby activities once widely frowned upon became the subject of 
much less coercive legislation. Pornography and homosexuality along with drug use 
represent good examples of behaviours commonplace in the so-called permissive 
society (Davies 1990; Newburn 1992). Unlike pornography and homosexuality, 
drugs have, however, until recently remained free of liberalising impulses. Indeed, 
Shapiro (1999: 92) says of the 1960s that 'in a decade of unprecedented liberalising 
legislation which saw controls relaxed on gambling, censorship, abortion, 
homosexuality, the laws against drug use ... were tightened'. 
The notion of cannabis use as a measure of morality can be illustrated by the 
fact that one question asked of nearly every politician of the baby-boom generation, 
those born in the aftermath of World War 11, is a variant of, 'have you ever smoked 
dopeT Bill Clinton, when confronted with this question stated, somewhat 
timorously, that as a student at Oxford, he 'smoked' cannabis with fellow students 
but never actually inhaled! Tony Blair, on becoming the leader of the Labour Party 
in 1994 was also asked the same question and replied in a light-hearted fashion, 
mimicking his soon to be close friend and political ally, that he had not ever smoked 
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dope, but if he had, 'he would have inhaled! ' (cited in Stephens 2004: 9). 
Interestingly, this is a vastly different sentiment to those made on gaining power 
where an ideological commitment to the drug-war was the chosen stance (Stimson 
2000). Such is the interest in this issue and the potential for it to blacken a political 
name, that on rising to power, Blair's political aides, knowing the media would want 
to dig into his past, contacted his old acquaintances to inquire about any potential 
skeletons in his closet and that if the cannabis question arose it would be met with a 
quip at Clinton's expense (Stephens 2004: 9). 
Somewhat jocularly, this episode illustrates the continuing significant media 
and public interest in the cannabis issue. It does, however, also show how cannabis 
occupies a unique position in that it is no longer the subject of outright vilification 
that it was hitherto. May, et al. (2002: 6-7) provide a neat summary of the changing 
cultural status of cannabis: 
It is clear that cannabis has lost that set of social meanings that it had 30 
years ago, to do with social protest, counter culture and opposition to the 
mainstream. It is present in the fabric of everyday life for most young 
people, regardless of whether they themselves use it. 
Z4.3 International Trends and Developments 
Current British drugs policy cannot be fully comprehended without considering 
changes occurring on the continent, a phenomenon often referred to as 
'benchmarking'. In this sense, policy change in one jurisdiction provides transferable 
lessons for another. To briefly elaborate, Mulgan (2005: 216) suggests that the 
'Western' world is currently in an era where the demand for knowledge is paramount 
and where today's citizens are 'far more educated, knowledgeable and confident than 
their predecessors'. This manifests itself in the fact that they use scientific knowledge 
to inform a range of choices, for example, from business decisions to dietary 
preferences. This scientific knowledge is tied in with the notion of 'best practice'. In 
various policy spheres, the search for 'best practice' has become paramount. 
For Mulgan (2005: 216), goverment's are often cajoled into searching for 
this by the increasing influence of various trans-national bodies such as the United 
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Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Organisation for Economic Co- 
operation and Development and the European Union. As regards the European 
Union, co-ordination of policy between various European countries is essential for its 
continued survival as a viable political entity and it is in this context that recent 
changes in the UK drugs legislation can be seen. This search for best practice and 
spirit of co-ordination is leading to the creation of similar policies, where once there 
was divergence. 
According to Blackman (2004: 183-4), in various European countries more 
relaxed policies towards cannabis possession were implemented towards the start of 
the twenty-first century. Although prohibition still remains the overarching strategy, 
consistent with United Nations regulations, new ways of monitoring the problem are 
now apparent with some going as far as decriminalisation. As illustrated previously, 
for some time, the Netherlands has pursued a policy of 'normalisation' for soft drugs, 
such as cannabis. Although there have been amendments to Dutch drug policy over 
recent years, and cannabis is still illegal under the 1976 Opium Act, there is now 
great emphasis on keeping drug use and users away from the criminal justice system 
within the 'socio-medical field'. In terms of the substances themselves, this meant 
that licensed premises, which morphed into the coffee shop system, sprang up in 
many Dutch towns where cannabis could be consumed in a controlled environment. 
These premises prohibited the sale of harder drugs on site as well as alcohol. 
Blackman (2004: 184) states that this policy was 'taken up in a variety of 
ways by Switzerland, Portugal, Italy, Spain and certain states within Germany. In 
addition, Belgium has also recently altered its legislation. Drugs are still illegal in 
these countries, as legalisation is not an option for signatory states to the United 
Nations conventions. Thus, they remain within a prohibitionist framework but there 
is an increasing recognition that there is room for manoeuvre where international 
laws are concerned (Boister 2001; Dom and Jamieson 2001). According to 
Blackman (2004: 184-5), the report produced by Dom and Jamieson (2001) confirms 
how the development of drug normalisation policies in Europe gives legitimacy to 
legislative change that occurs within the United Nations conventions. In this respect, 
&non-nalisation' constitutes a new 'paradigm' in understanding contemporary drug 
use in a cross-national context. It presents a new package of ideas and beliefs, which 
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become influential as they structure and determine the terms of the political 
discourse. 
Bell (1997: 24) describes a similar process at work with the disillusionment in 
the 1980s of the Keynesian influenced post-war consensus. In terms of cannabis 
legislation, however, the aforementioned European countries were seeking to move 
away from custodial prison sentences for possession and small-scale supplier 
offences. This highlights recent convergence in this area of European drug policy, in 
contrast to ten years ago when the legal status granted to the use of drugs, without 
any aggravating circumstances, or to possession of drugs for personal use, was 
significantly divergent in the 'older' countries of the EU (Bergeron and Griffiths 
2006: 117-8). 
It is apt to point out at this stage that by convergence the authors do not mean 
now that policies across the fifteen original member states of the European Union are 
the same. This is palpably not the case. There is a history of divergence in the drug 
policies of some European states. For example, the Dutch and Swedish approaches 
are often held up as examples of more liberal and conservative approaches 
respectively. Instead, the analogy of language translation summarises the situation, in 
that a word in one language is not strictly identical to that in another, but has an 
equivalent. This perhaps applies to national drug policies in Europe in that they are 
far from identical but follow equivalent paths (Bergeron and Griffiths 2006: 115). 
Informal warnings and/or civil fines became increasingly the chosen policies to deal 
with possession for small amounts of cannabis on the continent around this time. 
These were deemed to be a 'proportionate response' (Blackman 2004: 185). It was in 
this international context that David Blunkett's decision to reclassify cannabis can be 
seen, but this was not the determining factor. 
2.5 Cannabis Reclassification and Evidence-Based Policy-Making 
The reclassification of cannabis from class B to class C heralded a subtle, but 
significant change in UK drug policy. The consequences of the legislative change are 
on-going as cannabis has once again resurfaced on the political agenda (see Section 
7.2). The policy issue is therefore 'live', but the current concern is with events 
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originating at the turn of the millennium, running up to March 2005. It will suffice to 
suggest that although a relatively minor substantive change, symbolically, the impact 
of cannabis reclassification has been wide-ranging. It represents the first instance in 
the UK whereby a widely used illicit substance has had penal sanctions lightened. 
This is, however, an over simplification of the situation. 
Initially perceived in terms of liberalisation, this view was called into 
question as other legislation was subsequently amended to counter the effects of 
downgrading cannabis. For example, the 1984 Police and Criminal Evidence Act was 
altered so that cannabis assumed a unique status as a class C drug as the police 
maintained the power of arrest for those caught in possession. Additionally, the 2003 
Criminal Justice Act introduced more draconian punishments for supply of class C 
substances from five years to fourteen years, on a par with those of class B. 
Although around this time there was renewed interest in the use of cannabis- 
based substances in the treatment of certain illnesses, this did not form part of the 
justification for the initial reclassification, and consequently is not central to the later 
analysis. There were two initial triggers for this change. Firstly, a number of high- 
profile inquiries into drug policy and legislation which occurred in and around this 
time, both domestically and internationally (Boister 2001; Dom and Jamieson 2001) 
highlighted the relatively benign nature of cannabis vis-A-vis other prohibited 
substances. As regards the domestic situation, the Police Foundation (2000) inquiry 
into the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act, also known as the Runciman Report, suggested 
that in terms of its toxicity or harmfulness, it was not comparable with either class A 
or B drugs. This was supported by the subsequent inquiries of Home Affairs 
Committee (2002) and the ACMD (2002). 
The second trigger was a Governmental concern with public management and 
efficiency. The Police Foundation Report (2000) also recommended that cannabis be 
reclassified from a class B to a class C drug, making cannabis possession a non- 
arrestable offence (except in aggravated circumstances). It was perceived that this 
would reduce the number of 'otherwise law abiding, mainly young people' being 
criminalised and potentially receiving a custodial sentence to the detriment of their 
futures (Police Foundation 2000: 7). It was also perceived that this could remove a 
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considerable source of friction between the police and the wider community of 
cannabis smokers and that this would free up police time, enabling them to 
concentrate on problems posed by class A drugs such as (crack) cocaine and heroin, 
in line with the updated drug strategy (Home Office 2002). In the UK, throughout the 
1990s, for the most part, cannabis-related offences increased as a result of stop-and- 
search policies. This was combined with a general upturn in the prevalence of 
frequent use (May, et al. 2002: 14). This placed significant pressure on the police in 
terms of time and resources. 
Running contemporaneously to the political deliberations of the legal status 
of cannabis was a pilot project of policing cannabis in Brixton, South London. The 
'Brixton Experiment' as it became known, effectively replaced the threat of arrest 
with infon-nal disposal and a formal on-the-spot warning for those caught in 
possession of cannabis. This would not form part of a national record. There is some 
debate as to the origins of this initiative (Crowther-Dowey 2007) and to its success in 
reducing bureaucracy (PSS Consultancy Group 2002). It was, however, subsequently 
evaluated and judged a success by both the Metropolitan Police Authority 
(Metropolitan Police Authority 2002) and the local community (MORI 2002). On the 
back of these findings, the then Home Secretary David Blunkett, told the Home 
Affairs Committee in October 2001 that he was 'minded' to downgrade cannabis and 
would seek advice from the ACMD, on the possibility of reclassification. Both 
parties reported back in early 2002, that cannabis should be reclassified (May, et al., 
2002). In July 2003, it was announced that cannabis would be reclassified to a class 
C drug, coming into force in January 2004 and remaining unchallenged until March 
2005. 
For some commentators, the cannabis reclassification has been heralded as' 
one of the first examples of UK drug policy being developed with recourse to 
significant evidence (Levitt, et al. 2006). Hence the episode can be considered as an 
explicit conjoining of UK drug policy with the principles of evidence-based policy- 
making. It can be seen also that the two main triggers reflect the different evidence- 
bases and are linked to the two main traditions in the UK drug policy debate. 
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Although the change was considered in light of the movement towards 
evidence-based policy-making, it needs to be stressed that no in-built evaluation of 
the impact of reclassification was ordered by the Home Office and no Key 
Performance Indicators were identified through which to gauge its impact. 
Ultimately this resulted in confusion as to what was the purpose of the policy change 
and opened up the possibility of continuing debate as to the efficacy of UK drug 
policy and its associated evidence-base. This adds credence to the notion that 
politicised policy areas are characterised by ad hoc or 'muddled through' policy- 
making (Lindblom 1959), which are often in conflict with those typically referred to 
in the remit of evidence-based policy, as Tonry (2004) conceives it. It is suggested 
here that for Tonry (2004), evidence-based policy-making is consistent with a 
cyclical view of policy (see Figure 3.1 and Section 3.2). According to Bridgeman and 
Davis (2000: 27) this entails the following: issue identification, policy analysis, 
policy instruments, consultation, co-ordination, decision, implementation and 
evaluation. As more ad hoc policies do not conform to this sequence, the view of 
evidence in such policy areas is complex and nuanced. This is far removed, however, 
from the zero-sum suggestions that the policy was evidence-free and conversely that 
it was evidence-based. This notion is explored in more detail in subsequent chapters. 
2.6 Summary 
The above discussion has shown how the history of UK drug policy is characterised 
by conflict, primarily stemming from ownership of the drug problem. This conflict is 
ongoing and pervades all aspects of UK drug debate, the efficacy of the classification 
system being just one example. For the purposes of the current discussion, this 
chapter has suggested that the episode of cannabis reclassification initiated the fusion 
of two main areas of concern: the conjoining of UK drug policy with the principles 
of evidence-based policy-making. It must be stressed, however, that this is a 
controversial reading of the event and it makes certain assumptions about the policy- 
making process. In essence, the episode of cannabis reclassification provides the 
making of a critical case for examining the use of evidence in a controversial policy 
area. 
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In subsequent chapters, a closer look at the understandings of 'evidence' in 
the initial cannabis reclassification reveals a range of different understandings about 
the evidence-base for the decision. For now, however, what this chapter has 
illustrated, and what is argued throughout, is that evidence clearly has a role in the 
decision-making process. This is not to suggest, however, that the products of 
research have had a direct impact on policy-making, only that there is an increasing 
emphasis on policy analysis as being central to the policy-making process. By way of 
a conclusion, as the above discussion illustrates, a solid case can be made for the 
cannabis reclassification initiating a scenario whereby, in the area of drug policy, 
many interested parties' involvement in the process can be ascertained. The 
relationship between research and policy-making has been a widely contested area in 
policy analysis and it is to the nature of policy analysis that the discussion now turns. 
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3. THE NATURE OF POLICY-MAKING: STAGES OR PROCESS? 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter introduced the substantive aspects of this investigation: firstly, 
by illustrating how UK drug policy can be characterised as a continuing struggle over 
ownership of the drug problem and; secondly, by showing how significant changes in 
UK drug policy coincided with the election of New Labour and their modernising 
agenda. Evidence-based policy-making was a key aspect of this. It was suggested 
that the cannabis reclassification can be seen as a case study fusing both strands of 
the debate. By means of continuing the background literature review, this chapter 
commences with a discussion of the 'policy' side of the evidence and policy 
relationship. Accordingly, the chapter is organised in the following way. A general 
discussion of the way policy has been conceptualised is presented before some 
consideration is given to the 'vertical' and 'horizontal' models of policy-making, 
which for Colebatch (2002: 23), represent the 'two great models'. Discussion then 
turns to pluralistic modýls of the policy process, developing the idea presented in the 
previous chapter, of multiple recognisable views engaged in the process of policy- 
making in the area of drug classification policy. Various manifestations are identified 
but the Advocacy Coalition Framework is highlighted as being of significant utility 
in the context of the thesis. This is because of its focus on conflict in the policy 
process. The remainder of the chapter is concerned with providing a detailed 
synopsis of this model. Some criticisms and counter-criticisms of the approach are 
discussed in subsequent chapters. 
3.2 What is Policy? 
Policy is undoubtedly a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon. Comprehending the 
nature of policy is, therefore, a troublesome enterprise. For the purpose of this thesis, 
the focus is on policies that are made at the level of central government. In this sense, 
the kind of policy-making in mind is that variously described as 'social' or 'public'. 
Deciphering this is still a problematic past-time. Gordon, et al. (1993) contend that it 
is misleading to view policy analysis as the study of identifiable things called 
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(policies', which are produced, or crystallise, at a particular stage in the decision 
process. For these thinkers, ultimately, such views of the policy process are ones that 
stress that policy is an artefact, that is, an object created by policy-makers. Hill and 
Bramley (1986) also suggest that policy should not be treated as self-evident or a 
static, motionless phenomenon and that any attempt to define policy will be artificial 
in that what is actually being defined is inherently contested. 
Bridgman and Davis (2000: 6) further define policy as 'a course of action by 
government designed to achieve certain results'. This definition comes closer to the 
one advocated in this thesis, however, it neglects the notion that policy-making is not 
always the sole domain of the government or State and could involve various 
external actors and stakeholders. In this sense, Jenkins (1978: 15) suggests that key to 
deciphering the nature of public policy is to view the phenomenon as 'a set of 
interrelated decisions taken by a political actor or a group of actors concerning the 
selection of goals and the means of achieving them'. This occurs within specified 
situations and 'where these decisions should, in principle, be within the powers of 
these actors to achieve' (Jenkins 1978: 15). As we shall see, this more inclusive 
understanding is pivotal to the following discussion. 
There is, however, an assumption here that policies are tangible phenomenon 
and that policy-making is a rational process. Anderson, et al. (1984: 4) comment that 
policy is a 'purposive' course of action. This perspective has a'significant lineage. 
Friedrich (1963: 70) previously stated that 'it is essential for the policy concept that 
there be a goal, objective or purpose' and Laswell and Kapalan (1950: 71) suggested 
that policy is 'a projected program of goals, values and practices'. In contrast, policy- 
making entails various issues. The nature of administration, management, the 
organisational process, structure, regulation and governance all play a part in policy 
decision-making. Additionally, the spectre of politics looms large in policy. In this 
respect, Lindblom (1959) has famously pointed out that policy is actually about 
4muddling through'. In effect, there is little agreement on the nature of policy, which 
raises significant issues for how it is to be analysed. There are, however, numerous 
schools of thought on how best to address this issue. For the sake of clarity, two are 
introduced here and expounded below. 
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3.3 Exploring Policy-Making: The Two 'Great Models' 
Jones and Newburn (2005: 60) comment that 'there is a large body of work within 
political science that has analysed policy-making by dividing it up into distinct 
stages' and has then proceeded by 'undertaking detailed examinations of each'. This 
is taken as a 'common-sense' aspect of the nature of policy. Research into this kind 
of policy-making also has a long history and follows a rigid process involving 
'problem definition, formulation of alternative solutions, consideration of 
implications of alternatives, to experimentation with the preferred choice' (Jones and 
Newbum 2005: 60). This general idea is not dissimilar to that of the policy cycle 
model illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
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(source: Bridgman and Davies 2000: 27) 
Nutley, et al. (2007) suggests that this represents a 'linear-rational' 
understanding of the research and policy relationship that has recently fallen into 
disrepute. By contrast, the second school of thought starts from the premise that this 
is an over simplistic mechanistic and sequential outlook to the process which is, in 
reality, much more arbitrary. Here the decision-making process is more diffuse or 
'horizontal'. Colebatch (2002) has likened the former to a 'vertical' model of policy- 
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making, which he contrasts with the more horizontal variety. Colebatch (2002: 23) 
suggests that the two models view the policy-making process as occurring either 
along a vertical axis characterised by 'authorised decision-making' or a horizontal 
axis characterised by a 'process of structured interaction'. As a result of the complex 
nature of the policy-making process, these are ideal-types. Both of Colebatch's 
models provide an alternative answer to the thorny question of where policies are 
made. 
3.3.1 The Vertical Model 
Influenced by thinkers such as Lasswell (1951) and Easton (1965), the vertical model 
divides the policy process into neatly packaged and logically ordered stages. These 
specify the 'functioning of input, throughput, output and feedback mechanisms 
operating within broader "environments"' (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1993: 1). Such 
depictions have been described variously as the 'Stages Model' or 'Stages Heuristic' 
and the 'textbook approach' (Nakamura 1987). Commonplace throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s, the vertical model has facilitated a multitude of research and analysis at 
the various levels of policy decision-making. This has aided the development of a 
whole movement of policy analysis around the various stages. The burgeoning 
discipline of evaluation research, for example, has progressed as a stage focused 
research outlook. 
The stages approach has obtained significant longevity as an explanation of 
the policy-making process. It has been suggested that this is a result of its 
resemblance to how powerful decision-makers also understand the policy process. 
According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993a: 2-3): 
Bureaucrats find it attractive because it portrays a rational division of labor 
between the executive and legislative institutions of government, thereby 
legitimizing the role of the bureaucracy within representative systems. - 
In addition, policy-makers view the stages model as being in concurrence 
with democratic theory, as it draws on the inputs of the broader society to make 
policy, which is, in turn, handed over to other government players for 
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implementation. For detractors, as we shall see, this represents a somewhat idealist 
account of the operation of the policy process. 
As illustrated, this model is consistent with what is often referred to as the 
(common-sense" understanding of the way that policy is made. Broadly speaking, for 
Colebatch (2002: 38), this understanding of policy rests on many assumptions. 
Foremost among them, is that policy-making involves some sort of hierarchical 
structure whereby policy is 'made at the top and passed down the line' (Colebatch 
2002: 38). This, in turn, can involve a specialised division of labour amongst policy- 
makers, for example, in a Cabinet where one minister is responsible for education, 
another for health, another for transport and so on. In this regard, there is delegation 
downwards to a plethora of 'subordinate individuals' who deal with less pressing 
matters. The caricature presents a 'single chain of authority' in decision-making. In 
relation to the above question of where policy is made, the answer is at 'the top'. 
This vertical model, then, is often associated with 'Westminster' style of 
political decision-making. For Colebatch (2002: 40) there is here: 
... an elaborate procedure which involves framing policy proposals which filter up the bureaucratic hierarchy, receive the approval of ministers, are 
discussed with other departments and finally-go before the Cabinet. Once 
they are approved, there, all ministers are committed to support them and 
they become "government policy". 
The above quotation is the epitome of the vertical model. A significant 
strength of this is the explicit recognition that the political domain is not 
homogenous. The most powerful figures are not always government agents, even 
though the focus is on more centralised government decision-making. In the UK, a 
Minister is unlikely to remain in the same position for more than a few years and so, 
consequently, there is a scenario where they are in charge of a portfolio of which 
they know very little about. In this regard, there is a tacit reliance on the expertise of 
others, often officials with specific expertise in any given area. 
The usual scenario then is that a Minister presides over a body of officials 
who are in reality likely to have more knowledge and expertise in the area. Colebatch 
(2002: 40) comments that although political leaders will probably have ideas of their 
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own about the direction in which they want policy to go, the officials will 'have more 
ideas, more specific ideas and more sense of which ideas will work'. This does not 
mean that the vertical model is to be abandoned. It merely means that the level of 
officials must be included in the explanation. 
Within the vertical model, it is necessary to make a distinction between the 
Westminster style of politics, as typified in the UK, and that of elsewhere. Other 
systems of government, or intergovernmental bodies, like the EU, operate with a 
contrasting organisational structure, albeit one with similar traits. In this sense, it is 
possible for political activity to take place outside the political domain. This is often 
the case in Federal administrations. Here, a great deal of policy activity takes place 
out of the Cabinet Office as the legislature and the legal process take centre stage. 
According to Colebatch (2002: 40-1), this view is most common in the United 
States. In such circumstances there is a 'sharp constitutional distinction between the 
executive and the legislature', which advances the view that the 'legislators are 
making the broad policy choices, which executives then put into practice, and that it 
is the legislators who are the policy-makers'. In Australia - another federal 
administration - an example of this can be witnessed in the Mabo ruling in the 
Supreme Court. This granted hitherto unobtainable land rights to the indigenous 
population and resulted in a fundamental restructuring of this area of domestic 
policy. Additionally, tribunal courts have come to play an increasingly prominent 
role in the formation of policy. Fields such as immigration and trade are two 
examples. 
Again this is an oversimplification as policy is still debated by the executive. 
Colebatch (2002: 41) provides the following caveat suggesting that in those 
parliamentary systems, where party discipline normally ensures the legislation 
passed is that of which the executive approves, it is not really plausible to speak of 
legislators as policy-makers as they are trumped by the political process. However, 
governments in federal administrations often do not have overall majorities and 
policies made by the legislature are frequently the subject of much negotiation. 
Those which are passed can rightfully claim to have been 'made' by the legislature. 
It is also necessary to point out, where the making of policy is concerned, where the 
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relationship between law and politics crosses over. Colebatch (2002: 41) points out 
that a great deal of policy is often made in the courts, particularly in federal systems. 
In sum, although the best example of the vertical perspective can be seen in 
its Westminster guise, the vertical perspective is not restricted to this understanding. 
Unsurprisingly however, this model of policy-making is seen by many authors as 
being flawed. In most instances, policies transcend a number of disciplines, areas or 
government departments and thus it is not always transparent where the top is. In UK 
domestic drug policy, and this is a recurring theme, there are a range of interested 
participants. Focusing just on Government, although the Home Office has the lead, 
the Department of Health is a key player, as illustrated previously, not to mention the 
predominance of advisory bodies such as the ACMD. Consequently, although the 
model assumes policies are made at 'the top', this is too general an account as it is 
unclear which actors occupy this position. In light of this, an alternative view of the 
policy process has become noticeable in recent years. Its advocates are essentially 
critics of the vertical account (e. g. Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Hill 1997; Kingdon 
1984; Ostrom 1990). 
3.3.2 The Horizontal Model 
In contrast to the vertical model in its Westminster guise, the horizontal model 
suggests that policy-making is not characterised by direct diffusion from the top, 
filtering down through subordinate levels. Instead, it involves negotiation and the 
'dispersal of authority' through various spheres of the political arena. Accordingly, 
attention can also be focused on regional and local government involvement in the 
process instead of restricting policy-making to the national level. Also, as emphasis 
is placed on the nature of negotiation, the horizontal model allows further 
consideration of other agents' roles in the process, for example, agents of state 
apparatus, such as the police and those from non-state agencies and non- 
governmental organisations (NGOs) and think-tapks. The horizontal model can, for 
current purposes, be seen as an umbrella term linking together various alternative 
views of the nature of policy-making. 
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In terms of the relationship between research and policy, March and Olsen's 
(1976) notion of the 'garbage can model' is of the same lineage as the horizontal 
model. The same can be said of the widely referenced incremental model, as both 
cast doubt on rational views of the policy-making process. According to Nutley and 
Webb (2000: 27): 
Incrementalism, as a model, was born out of dissatisfaction with the rational 
view of decision-making. As a result of an analysis of decisions in public 
sector organisations, proponents ... argued that decisions are not made as a 
movement towards predetermined goals, based on a thorough analysis of the 
situation. Instead, the process is more piecemeal. 
The proponents of incrementalism include Dahl and Lindblom (1953), Lindblom 
(1959) and Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963). They advocate a much more diverse 
role for how research can enter the policy-making process. Here, multiple interests 
are said to impact on the policy-making process via 'a process of mutual adjustment 
to achieve consensus' (Nutley and Webb 2000: 27). For now, however, the primary 
concern is with the nature of policy per se rather than the relationship between 
research and policy. 
The horizontal model takes as its starting point the 'pronouncements of 
authorised decision-makers', but suggests that these can only be understood with 
recourse to the 'continuing interaction which makes them possible' (Colebatch 
2002: 42). The horizontal model accounts for the mobilisation of actors both inside 
and outside government who potentially or actually come to engage with the policy 
process. This is consistent with the evidence-based policy agenda (Solesbury 2001). 
it illustrates how the policy process, in this scenario, is far more complex than that 
envisaged by the vertical model, particularly the Westminster version. Furthermore, 
the horizontal approach does not perceive the policy-making process as a closed 
system. Lindblom (1968: 5) has suggested that policy-making is an extremely 
complex process without beginning or end, and whose boundaries remain most 
uncertain. Somehow a complex set of forces, including unintended consequences, 
produce effects called 'policies'. In essence, it offers a more long-term view of the 
policy process than the vertical model, which has a knock-on effect for how evidence 
is used, as will become clearer throughout the thesis. 
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Colebatch (2002: 43) also contends - and the case of UK drug policy backs up 
the assertion - that the horizontal model shows that 'policy is only part of governing' 
as opposed to the act of governing. What is more, it is able to extend the analysis of 
the process 'to take in a wide area for interaction' by focusing on who actually 
participates. There is, thus, a significant amount of crossover between the concept of 
the horizontal model and pluralist models of policy-making (Haas 1992; Heclo 1978; 
Kingdon 1984; Rhodes and Marsh 1992; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993b; Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith 1999). 
3.4 Pluralist Models of Policy-Making 
Pluralist models of the policy-making process are consistent with Solesbury's (2001) 
view of evidence-based policy-making as involving the 'opening up' of Government. 
They are concerned with the role played by a wider range of actors in the decision- 
making process, beyond a central administration. As we saw in the above discussion, 
the horizontal model, with its emphasis on inclusion and participation, is consistent 
with this perspective. Benson (1982: 148) succinctly describes pluralist perspectives 
as 6a cluster or complex of organizations connected to each other by resource 
dependencies and distinguished from other clusters or complexes by breaks in the 
structure of resource dependencies'. In addition, pluralist approaches mirror a 
t ible shift in the nature of government in contemporary society. Many labels have angi 
been attached to this, including the concept of governance (Cope 2001: 2-3), which 
according to Pierre (2000: 3) has a dual meaning: 
... on the one hand it refers to the empirical manifestations of state 
adaptation to its external environment as it emerges in the late twentieth 
century. On the other hand, governance also denotes a conceptual or 
theoretical representation of co-ordination of social systems and, for the 
most part, the role of the state in that process. 
This initial explanation is somewhat ambiguous and Pierre, in a separate 
article with Stoker, later adds some points of clarification. They suggest that 
governing any advanced western democratic state, such as the UK, has become a 
'matter of multi-level governance'. In effect: 
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... the challenge of governing requires a 
focus on multiple levels of decision- 
making - in both spatial and sectoral terms - and the way in which 
exchanges in those locations are conducted and managed (Pierre and Stoker 
2000: 29-30). 
Kooiman (1993: 41) similarly contends that governance 'takes place in interactions 
between actors on micro, meso and macro levels of social-political aggregation'. 
Here, the act of governing is extended beyond Government to incorporate other 
disparate groups. In this sense, the words 'government' and 'Government' can be 
exchanged for 'policy-making' and 'policy-makers' so that the process of policy- 
making now incorporates a greater range of players than those traditionally labelled 
6policy-makers'. Kooiman's (1993) account of the various sectors of society 
involved in governing is linked closely to the view of the policy-making process 
expressed in this thesis. Drawing on the sociology of Elias (1978), this involves 
Ifigurations' of diverse interdependent actors, articulating their own values, ideas and 
beliefs and engaging in the policy process by offering advice, making arguments, and 
importantly, in the context of this thesis, by producing and supplying evidence (Haas 
1992; Heclo 1978; Kingdon 1984; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993b). 
Before we consider this in more detail, it is necessary to highlight some 
examples of the nature of pluralist models of policy-making in the form of Policy 
Communities, Policy Networks and the Advocacy Coalition Framework, with the 
full recognition that this is a sample and not an exhaustive list. These are effectively 
introduced by Nutley, et al. (2007: 106) who suggest that: 
Pluralist approaches to understanding the policy process suggest that 
decision making may be diffuse rather than centralised, operating outside 
formal channels and emerging through pressure from different groups who 
are themselves involved in setting agendas and developing policy solutions. 
3.4.1 Policy Communities 
Kingdon (1984) provides an early example of a pluralist explanation of the policy 
process. He claims that a useful way to view the policy process is to focus on its two 
main constituent parts. These are the 'policy process' (the 'how') and the 
('substantive level' of policy (the 'what'). The former is, in turn, split into three 
distinct 'streams'. The 'problem strewn' refers to the ways in which particular 
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problems or issues emerge that require attention of policy-makers. The 'policy 
stream' refers to the process of deciphering 'compelling' problems that require 
responses from policy-makers and politicians. Finally, there is the 'political stream' 
which refers to the outcome of elections, developments in the 'public mood' and 
interest group campaigning, amongst other things. Of particular note, is the notion of 
the policy stream, which can be analysed quite distinctly from the generation of 
policy ideas and proposals that float around continuously in what Kingdon (1984) 
terms the 'policy primeval soup'. Some of these come to the surface and become 
attached to certain 'problems'. In essence, the key is that policy formation is not 
always a 'rational' process. Policy-making occurs on various levels, and to uncover 
the nature of this, it is necessary to understand 'how' and 'why' certain ideas arise 
and become promoted. In addition, consideration is given to the circumstances in 
which they become linked with a particular problem. 
Jones and Newbum (2005: 61) state of Kingdon's (1984) theory that these 
three groups operate independently of each other most of the time but do 'converge 
at critical times'. At such junctures, solutions become joined to problems and when 
joined to favourable political forces, 'a policy window' is created. In effect, policy 
windows are created by developments in the political stream, or the emergence of a 
particular compelling problem(s), which often, in turn, creates opportunities for a 
4policy entrepreneur' to champion a specific policy. Kingdon's general 
understanding is that the activity of policy-making is not a singular phenomenon, or 
something that occurs in isolation. By contrast, it contains a processual dimension, 
that is, it is a 'set of processes involving a number of analytically distinct 'stages' or 
('streams'. Jones and Newbum (2005: 60) go on to suggest that by uncovering and 
understanding the policy process, in terms of the 'structure of the streams and the 
way they interact with one another', analysts are able to grasp the nature of the 
policy in question at the substantive level. 
As this is the case, at the substantive level, Jones and Newburn (2005: 61) 
contend that typically empirical research has tended to focus on the outcomes, or the 
'formal policy statements or legislation'. Substantively, however, policy formation 
can, and must, be considered on a number of levels. These range from the 'the more 
symbolic elements, such as ideas and rhetoric to the more concrete manifestations, 
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such as policy instruments and practices' (Jones and Newburn 2005: 61). It is, 
therefore, a multifaceted and intensely complex phenomenon. Bernstein and Cashore 
(2000: 70) suggest, furthermore, that this has occurred, and is necessary, because 
policy decisions in the form of statutes or other kinds of legislation capture 'the 
actual choices of government'. It is not the intention to explore these in great detail, 
only to highlight them as a means of illustrating the multi-faceted character of 
'policy'. In addition, as Jones and Newburn (2005: 62) contend, it is important (and 
necessary) to 'draw a distinction between policy styles, symbols and rhetoric' that 
often underlie the concrete manifestations of policy-making. Importantly, in the 
context of this thesis, these signal how policy-making has a very substantial political 
dimension. 
The two main elements of policy, highlighted by Kingdon (1984) (the process 
and the substance), converge at critical times, when a policy window opens. One 
benefit of considering the 'process' of policy-making is that the substantive aspect of 
policies are often shaped not only by the latter stages of political decision-making, 
but are negotiated continuously in the earlier problem, definition, legislation, 
regulation, and court decisions, and again in the subsequent decisions made by 
practitioners and 'street-level' bureaucrats; the 'policy community' (Jones and 
Newburn 2005: 60). In sum, for Kingdon, the policy community is made up of a 
range of professionals and specialists in any given area. Coleman and Skogstad 
(1990), in particular, have pointed out how there are usually two tiers within a policy 
community, which they term the 'sub-government' and an 'attentive public'. The 
former, are a core of officials who tend to dominate the process, and the latter, are 
various participants who hold an interest in the particular policy debate. 
In this sense, being on the periphery does not necessarily mean limited 
influence. The existing literature recognises that level of involvement is not a simple 
dichotomy of participation and non-participation but actually resembles a scale. This 
process of negotiation and renegotiation occurs in the 'Policy community' and is 
often missing from more vertical definitions of the policy-making process. Also the 
process, to reiterate, is not linear. It is inherently iterative to the extent that it can be 
chaotic. This notion is problematic for other authors such as Bennett (1991) who 
previously ascertained that in fact a number of distinct aspects of policy can be seen 
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in any policy change, including content (statutes, administrative rules, and 
regulations), policy instruments (institutional tools to achieve goals such as 
regulatory, administrative, judicial tools) and policy style (consensual, 
confrontational, incremental) (cited in Jones and Newburn 2005: 62). 
Although the model of policy-making expressed in Kingdon's (1984) analysis 
of policy communities is one that shares many similarities with this thesis, it does 
have particular drawbacks. Ultimately, little account is given to the actual minutiae 
of the decision-making process and, in particular, the conflict that occurs in the arena 
of agenda setting. These are issues which are central to the emerging theory in this 
thesis. 
3.4.2 Policy Networks 
A more recent example of a pluralist model of the policy process and one that 
underpins the notion of a policy community, albeit in a modified way, is portrayed in 
the 'policy networks' literature (Rhodes and Marsh 1992; Ryan, et al. 2001). 
Networks are becoming an ever-increasing, prominent and fashionable concept in a 
variety of spheres including the analysis of social, political and economic life. 
Castells (1996: 469) has noted that 'as a historical trend, dominant functions and 
processes in the information age are increasingly organized around networks', the 
Internet being an obvious example. The emergence of policy networks, as a unit of 
analysis in policy research can be considered in light of the aforementioned switch 
from government to governance. Although examples of the policy networks 
approach have been frequently employed in political science, and are entrenched in 
this discipline (Knoke 1990; Marsh and Rhodes 1992; Marsh and Smith 2000; 
Rhodes and Marsh 1992; Smith 1993), they are a recent development in the study of 
policy analysis within the disciplines of sociology and social policy. That said, one 
area of policy where networks analysis has been widely employed, is in criminal 
justice policy (Duke 2002; 2003; Ryan, et al. 2001; Savage and Charman 2001). 
Policy networks are heterogeneous. Duke (2003: 9) highlights how they 
6 emphasise the interaction and patterns of association between various actors in 
particular policy areas'. In this respect, a contrast can be drawn between the concept 
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of network and those of hierarchy and markets. Networks are based on the principles 
of co-operation stemming from shared interests and the latter based on command and 
competition, respectively (Cope 2001: 1). In reality, it is likely that any system 
shares, at the very least, one or more of the aforementioned principles often with one 
being more dominant. 
Central to the policy networks literature is the work of Rhodes (1988) and 
Rhodes and Marsh (1992). Table 3.1 illustrates an early conceptualisation of the 
varieties of policy networks portrayed by these thinkers. They are conceived as a 
continuum characterised by integration and variety of membership. 
Table 3.1: Types of Policy Networks 
Type Characteristics 
Policy community Stability, highly restricted membership, vertical interdependence, 
limited horizontal articulation. 
Professional network Stability, highly restricted membership, vertical interdependence, 
limited horizontal articulation, serves interest of possession. 
Intergovernmental Limited membership, limited vertical interdependence, extensive 
network horizontal articulation. 
Producer network Fluctuating membership, limited vertical interdependence, serves 
interest of producer. 
issue network Unstable, large number of members, limited vertical 
interdependence. 
(source: Cope 2001: 6, adapted from Rhodes and Marsh 1992: 183) 
It is not necessary at this juncture to offer a comprehensive account of all types. 
Referring directly to different kinds of policy networks, Nutley, et al. (2007: 108) 
suggest that they: 
... differ in terms of their level of integration and the basis for their 
membership. They will vary across policy sectors and between states, and 
their different forms will affect policy development and implementation, and 
the ways in which research is accessed and considered as part of this 
process. 
It will suffice to say that, for the above authors, policy communities are the most 
integrated type of policy network. They are characterised by 'limited membership of 
policy actors, involving perhaps a single government agency and a few privileged 
"insider" interest groups' (Cope 2001: 6). These groups are often sheltered from 
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outsider involvement (i. e. from the public) and 'are based on the major functional 
interests in and of government' (Rhodes 1990: 304). 
In terms of policy formulation, for Rhodes (1988: 390), there is 'much 
continuity of policy' primarily a result of 'consensus between actors'. There is a 
&positive-sum game' whereby all policy actors increase their influence in the policy 
community. Consequently, policy is made in a stable and regulated environment 
within which policy communities 'routinise relationships by incorporating the major 
interests to a "closed" world' (Rhodes 1988: 390). Judicial policy-making, according 
to Cope (2001: 7), is a fine example of a policy community in operation as policy is 
made by an 'exclusive and small set of actors, namely the Lord Chancellor's 
Department, the Home Office, the courts' system, the Crown Prosecution Service 
and the legal professions'. What is more, this is only rarely open to outsiders and 
even then to those with some privileged link, often institutional, to the other groups 
such as the police, prison, probation and social services. 
At the opposite end, issue networks are the least integrated type of policy 
networks. They are characterised by a 'large number of participants and their limited 
degree of interdependence' (Rhodes 1990: 305). In these cases, members6 is fluid, 
with few restrictions, and members are free to participate and leave almost at leisure. 
An issue network often displays: 
[A] lack of continuity of policy, erratic interactions between participating 
actors, a low degree of consensus between actors, a limited exchange of 
resources between actors and a 'zero sum-game' with some policy actors 
gaining influence at the expense of others (Cope 2001: 7). 
The relationship between the government and various lobby groups has often 
been characterised on such criteria. Cope (2001: 7) uses the example of the aftermath 
of the Dunblane massacre in the 1990s to illustrate this. Here, a campaign was 
launched by many of the parents of the children involved to restrict the possession 
and use of guns. The campaign, titled 'Snowdrop', received considerable popular 
support and media attention but also had, the ear of the Home Office, police service 
and parties spanning the political spectrum, as well as gun, sports and civil liberties 
lobbies (Cope 2001: 8). This issue network was typified by a variety of conflicting 
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goals of many of those involved, and subsequently some disappeared from the 
political scene as the Labour Government implemented some limited gun reform 
measures when assuming office (Cope 2001: 8). The differences between the two 
ends of the spectrum are illustrated in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2: Characteristics of Policy Networks 
Dimension Policy Community Issue network 
Membership 
Number of participants Very limited, some conscious Large 
exclusion 
Type of interest Economic/professional Wide range of groups 
Integration 
Frequency of Frequent, high quality Contacts fluctuate 
interaction 
- 1 Continuity Membership, values, outcomes Fluctuating access 
persistent 
Consensus All participants share basic values but A degree of agreement 
conflict present 
Resources 
Distribution of All participants have resources. Some people have 
resources within Relationship is one of exchange resources but limited 
network 
Distribution of Hierarchical leaders can deliver Varied and variable 
resources within members distribution and 
participating capacity to regulate 
organisations members 
Power There is a balance among members. Unequal power. Power 
One group may be dominant but power zero-sum 
is positive-sum 
(source: Marsh and Rhodes 1992 cited in Cope 2001: 8 ) 
Duke (2003: 9) points out that analysis of policy networks is particularly 
useful as it illustrates how groups 'both influence the policy process and reflect the 
relative status and power of the various interests in particular areas of policy'. 
Typically, this can involve analysis of the types of relationship that can evolve in the 
context of the policy-making process. For example, between civil servants, 
politicians, lobby group representatives or other key stakeholders and thus has 
significant usage in policy analysis. 
For Wilks and Wright (1987), policy networks revolve around the varying 
nature of interpersonal relationships involved in the policy-making process. In this 
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respect the 'nptwork' is one of three levels of association along with the 'policy 
universe' and 'policy community'. According to Duke (2003: 10), the policy universe 
refers to the large population of actors or potential actors who share a direct or 
indirect interest in a particular policy area, and interact with one another to shape 
policy. Policy communities are more disaggregated systems of actors drawn from the 
policy universe, who share a common interest in a particular area and interact with 
one another to shape policy. The policy network is the linking process or the 
outcome of the interaction within a policy community or between a number of policy 
communities over particular policy issues, problems or functions. In essence, policy 
issues, problems and functions provide the platform on which a policy network 
emerges. 
It is fair to comment, however, that the notion of policy networks have 
received significant criticism, a primary issue being the fact that the concept of 
policy network or community is not used consistently in the literature. Rhodes and 
Marsh (1992), however, equate policy networks with 'meso-level' analysis, 
providing a link between the micro-level analysis concerning the role of interests, 
and the macro-level anal! sis of the corridors of power, with a typical focus on the y 
way the power is distributed. According to Cope (2001: 9), it is Rhodes and Marsh's 
terminology that has now become common currency in the discussion of policy 
networks. The defence of networks is vociferous. Advocates accuse detractors of 
confusing relativism with epistemological and ontological schisms. In this sense, the 
development of formal models is inappropriate if one accepts that the social reality is 
very complex, characterised by ontological depth and occupied by reflexive actors 
(Marsh and Smith 2001). 
Another main criticism, however, concerns the confused nature of the policy 
networks literature. Dowding (1995: 137), for example, suggests that the term policy 
network is 'essentially metaphorical' and therefore relates to phenomena that, quite 
simply, do not exist. Duke (2003: 11) also highlights numerous criticisms 
commenting that: firstly, a network approach fails to provide an account of why 
these relationships form and change between the various actors and how power is 
exercised. Secondly, they fail to provide an adequate account of the role of the state 
and institutions and also the impact of political discourse, ideology and cognitive 
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frameworks of network members. Thirdly, there are problems with boundary issues 
in that there is no clear demarcation over who is excluded and included. Fourthly, 
there is the issue that policy networks tend to focus on whole policy sectors. Fifthly, 
issues tend to overlap with other issues and solutions and therefore analysis May 
have to span more than one network. 
On the whole, policy networks, like Kingdon's (1984) analysis of policy 
communities offer significant potential for studying the policy process when research 
questions focus on an area of policy characterised more by consensus than conflict. 
As the previous chapter illustrated, however, the history of UK drug policy is 
characterised more by discord (Berridge 1984; Berridge and Edwards 1981) and is 
thus of limited utility for present purposes. Although the view of the policy process 
advocated in this thesis is ontologically consistent with the policy networks 
literature, another approach is required, capable of explaining conflict in policy 
debates. This is not to suggest that the policy networks model is incapable of this, but 
that others models are more explicit in this aim. 
3.4.3 The Advocacy Coalition Framework 
Like Kingdon's (1984) notion of policy communities and Rhodes and Marsh's 
(1992) policy networks analysis, the Advocacy Coalition Framework, initially 
developed by Sabatier (Sabatier 1987; 1988) and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
(1993b), can also be read as a critique of the vertical approach of policy-making. 
However, Sabatier and his colleagues do not completely dismiss the ideas expressed 
in the textbook approach. They suggest that it has made some significant 
contributions to our understanding of the policy process. 
For these thinkers, however, the contribution made by pluralist models and, 
by association, lacking from the stages approach, is the recognition in the former that 
the policy-making process operates 'across the various institutions of government' 
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993a: 2). In doing so, it provided an alternative to the 
'institutional approach' of more traditional political science focusing analyses on 
'top down' policy-making from the point of view of those in positions of power. The 
Advocacy Coalition Framework can also be read as addressing many of the problems 
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raised by Duke (2003: 11) regarding the utility of policy networks. In particular, it 
promotes to the fore a consideration of the role of conflict and power differentials 
within a policy arena. In addition, it also promotes a discussion of the use of policy 
analysis in policy decision-making, as will become clear. 
3.5 Inside the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
Whereas for Kingdon (1984) the 'process stream' is the unit of analysis, and in the 
policy networks literature it is 'the network' in the form of the interplay between 
different groups in the process, in the Advocacy Coalition Framework, the unit of 
analysis is the 'subsystem'. This is made up of identifiable 'advocacy coalitions' 
actively concerned with a specific policy issue. The Advocacy Coalition Framework 
has undergone a number of iterations, resulting in small but noticeable differences 
between early versions (Sabatier 1987; 1988) and later ones (Sabatier and Jenkins- 
Smith 1999). Below, using recent developments in UK drug policy by means of 
illustration, some of the fundamental aspects of the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
(most pertinent to the present discussion) are expressed. These are akin to what 
Lakatos (1970) calls the 'core' aspects of a scientific programme. As will become 
apparent, in outlining the key features of the Advocacy Coalition Framework, its 
creators inadvertently borrow their terminology from Lakatos. In particular, the 
criterion for conceptualising the nature of belief system structures, in the former, 
overlaps with the nature of research programmes for the latter. 
Central to the understanding of the Advocacy Coalition Framework are the 
nature of subsystems, the nature of coalitions, the role of belief systems, the role of 
policy-oriented learning and the nature of collective action. It is also clear that the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework is consistent with an Eliasian (Elias 1978) 
perspective by showing how those actors involved in the policy process are 
interdependent with one another. 
3.5. lThe Nature ofSubsystems 
Broadly speaking, the subsystem refers to the policy issue under discussion. Sabatier 
(1993: 24) states that the 'policy subsystem' consists of 'a set of actors who are 
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involved in dealing with a policy problem'. Within the broader context of UK drug 
policy, there are a number of sub-policy issues. For example, those concerning drugs 
education, drugs prevention and drug treatment. In the context of this thesis, the 
policy in question is equated with the efficacy of the UK drug classification system 
thus signalling the conflation of 'law' and 'policy'. It is this breaking down of policy 
into more specific areas that allows for a fuller comprehension of how the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework can be applied in relation to the evidence and policy debate. 
In the Advocacy Coalition Framework, a degree of specialisation is required 
on the part of actors, due to the complex nature of policy issues. An actor, for 
instance, may need knowledge of relevant laws or regulations, the nature and scale of 
the problem, as well as the influence of various potential causal factors which may or 
may not impact on the issue in hand. The Advocacy Coalition Framework thus 
assumes that the policy subsystem should move beyond traditional notions of iron 
triangles (see Figure 3.2 below) traditionally associated with the stages explanation. 
Journalists and policy analysts and researchers must be added into this configuration 
(where appropriate) as these play an important role in the generation, assimilation 
and evaluation of policy ideas. 
Figure 3.2: A Sketch of Iron Triangles in Policy Formulation 
Administrative Agencies 
Interest Groups Legislative 
Committees 
(adapted from Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999) 
In addition, actors at all levels of government are often active in policy formulation, 
implementation and brokering. International treaties, for example, United Nations 
conventions and European Union legislation, have also increasingly provided an 
international dimension in many policy areas. A policy subsystem is, therefore, 
74 
complex but some analytic space is needed for how actors become embroiled in the 
policy process, or, in other words, why subsystems form and emerge. 
For Sabatier (1993: 24), the most likely reason for a subsystem to emerge is 
when a group of actors in an existing subsystem become dissatisfied to a significant 
extent with the neglect of a particular problem that they form their own subsystem. In 
UK drug policy, the 1980s heroin epidemic serves as a useful example (see Section 
2.3.2). Towards the end of the 1980s, a significant treatment-focused 'harm reduction 
alliance' emerged. This consisted of various actors, mainly external to government, 
who lobbied the administration to take a more pragmatic policy stance towards many 
intravenous drug users in many. cities in the UK. This involved giving access to 
needle exchange schemes, making health education more available, supplying free 
condoms and introducing flexible prescribing of methadone in order to reduce the 
threat posed by high levels of HIV/AIDS amongst their number (Robertson 1987). 
This was the first sign of a movement away from the heavily moralistic stance 
adopted by the Conservative Government at the time, on the grounds that the 
HIV/AIDS outbreak came to be seen as a greater public health threat than drug use 
itself (Buchanan and Young 2000). This stance 'demonised' and criminalised the 
drug-using population, deeming them to be unworthy of public support 
Critics have claimed that this was as much a move to maintain the 'health' of 
law-abiding members of society as it was a sympathetic gesture, by a government 
committed to the drug war, to help those addicted to drugs whom they saw as 
4criminals'. In terms of policy formulation, this movement involved a minority 
coalition breaking away from a larger subsystem, concerned with a drug policy based 
on prevention, to form a large, powerful and specialised subsystem. The legacy of 
this remains, and is highlighted by the central position of drug treatment in the 
current UK drug strategy. This new outlook then changed the way other coalitions 
viewed the problem and established a new playing field on which future policy 
discussions would be held. Pivotal to this process was policy-oriented learning. This 
is discussed in due course but basically refers to the use of evidence to impact on the 
perspective of those from alternative coalitions. 
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3.5.2 The Nature of Coalitions 
As noted, for Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999: 120), within any policy subsystem, a 
number of advocacy coalitions or groups can be identified. These have specific, and 
often competing belief systems over what they perceive to be the most appropriate 
policy outcome in any given area. Advocacy coalitions are comprised of- 
... people from a variety of positions (elected and agency officials, interest 
group leaders, researchers etc. ) who share a particular belief system - that is, 
a set of basic values, causal assumptions and problem perceptions - and who 
show a nontrivial degree of co-ordinated activity over time . 
According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999), there are usually between 
one and four identifiable coalitions in any subsystem. The Advocacy Coalition 
Framework does, however, build into its explanatory framework the notion that the 
policy process is not neatly packaged. This is characterised by the fact that it 
highlights how it is possible for some actors to be engaged in the process, at any 
particular stage, who do not belong to any coalition. Also, it is possible that the 
boundaries between coalitions may not be clearly delineated; giving rise to the notion 
that certain actors could span coalitions. Thus, although the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework is a neat categorisation of the policy process, there is some recognition 
on behalf of the authors that the true picture is somewhat opaque. It will suffice to 
say, however, that irrespective of their origins, subsystems consist of actors grouped 
together to attempt to influence the policy agenda. 
Adherents of the Advocacy Coalition Framework suggest that in most policy 
subsystems, there are usually at least fifty and'often upwards of a hundred 
organisations at several levels of government and outside organisations, that are 
active over time. Sabatier and Pelkey (1987) have pointed out that it is an extremely 
complex task to develop a model that could involve changes in the positions and 
patterns of association of the many units involved over the time-span of a decade. 
This is the specified time in which this analysis best works. Heclo (1978) has 
commented that institutional models have huge difficulty in accounting for variations 
in the behaviour of individuals within the same organisation or institution. It would 
be difficult, for example, to explain the different outlook of a Member of Parliament 
(MP) who was an outspoken advocate of legalising drugs when their party line was 
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that prohibition, through rigorous enforcement of the law, should be the chosen 
policy. It is, therefore, a central task when identifying coalitions to consider the often 
4neglected role of ideas in shaping policy choices'(Goddard 1997: 413). This is done 
via an analysis of belief systems. 
3.5.3 The Nature of Belief Systems 
Belief systems are the building blocks for the explanation of the nature of evidence 
in a politicised policy area. It is only over the course of the last few decades, 
however, that commentators on the policy process started to focus on their impact on 
policy formulation (Heclo 1978; Majone 1989). This is particularly the case from the 
perspective of those not usually considered to be 'normal institutional actors', that is, 
those outside administrative agencies (e. g. Jordan and Richardson 1987; Marsh and 
Smith 2000; Rhodes 1988; 1990). Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993b; 1999) have 
developed this perspective more than others by integrating a belief systems approach 
into pluralist analysis. In doing so, they have a strong focus on ideas and beliefs, 
which prompts an incorporation and appreciation of 'the role of research and the 
development of policy proposals among the academic community, in pressure groups 
and in policy formulation groups (for example, think tanks and advisory bodies)' 
(Goddard 1997: 414). In turn, this is valuable in drawing our attention to the 
important role that such groups and their ideas and beliefs play in the long term 
development of policy. 
Fundamental to understanding the operation of the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework is that policy change is regarded as the outcome, via a multiplicity of 
routes, of groups or individuals (coalitions) attempting to implement different 
normative beliefs. These beliefs often become neatly packaged as small programme 
theories (Pawson 2006) and, therefore, at the most elementary level, in the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework, it is* ideas that generate policies. The Advocacy Coalition 
Framework is ultimately a tool for highlighting how these ideas come into fruition 
(Sabatier 1988: 132). One question that must be addressed is how is this achieved? 
By and large, the Advocacy Coalition Framework operates on the premise of a 
hierarchical tripartite, Lakatosian structure of 'Deep Core', 'Policy Core' and 
I Secondary Aspects'. Here, the higher levels (Deep Core) constrain the more, specific 
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(secondary) beliefs. For Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999: 191-2), the Deep Core 
refers, in essence, to an ontological perspective or 'world view'; a set of standard 
beliefs and values or the 'basic ontological and normative beliefs' of coalition actors, 
and these shape the 'perceptual filters' through which coalitions view the social 
world. A good example of this could be whether one's political outlook favours 
policies geared towards valuing individual freedom over the pursuit of social 
equality. This is also the level at which the traditional right/left scale of politics 
operates. 
At the opposite end, the Secondary Aspects are a large set of narrowly held 
beliefs that are often not held by all members of the coalition. This can be manifested 
in the way that administrative agents or agencies, within a coalition, often hold 'less 
extreme' positions than, for example, a campaigning NGO and could be a product of 
institutional constraints, such as, a politician's need to be re-elected, for example. In 
the middle-range lies the 'Policy Core'. This contains various dimensions including 
'basic normative commitments and causal perceptions of the problem" (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith 1999: 122). Returning to a previous example, a typical set of 
contrasting values in drug policy relates to whether harm reduction approaches 
should be adopted as a treatment strategy for heroin addiction, or whether complete 
abstinence should be the policy goal. Further issues in the Policy Core relate to basic 
perceptions concerning the 'general seriousness of the problem and its causes'. In 
terms of the current investigation, this can be seen in the debate over various 
coalitions relating to issues surrounding the efficacy of the 1971 Misuse of Drugs 
Act, and its associated evidence-base. 
As these represent basic normative and empirical commitments within the 
domain of specialisation of policy elites, it is the Policy Core and not the Deep Core 
that provides the 'fundamental glue' of coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
1999: 122). Overall, the more deeply held the belief is, the less resistant it is to 
change. Indeed, a change in Deep Core beliefs is considered to be akin to a religious 
conversion. Changes in the Policy Core are also unlikely as many of the Policy Core 
beliefs are 'exclusively normative', thus where change does occur, it is usually in the 
Secondary Aspects of a coalition's belief system (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
1999: 122). Implicit in this, is the notion that coalitions adopt various strategies as a 
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means of altering the behaviours of other coalitions and thus shaping the policy 
agenda. This can result in significant conflict, for example, through the process of 
policy-oriented learning, which broadly refers to the production, supply and 
dissemination of evidence supporting the claims of a particular belief system. 
Policy change is usually a slow process of gradual change in the Secondary 
Aspects and to a lesser extent the Policy Core of a coalition. This raises the question 
of the role that 'evidence' and research play in the policy process. Indeed, one aspect 
of coalition solidarity, and arguably the most pertinent for this thesis, concerns the 
role of 'policy-oriented learning'. This refers to the way coalitions back up their 
assertions with recourse to relevant research and use emerging data to consolidate or 
refine their views. The link between the Advocacy Coalition Framework, and the 
evidence-based policy initiative is cemented through the promotion of policy- 
oriented learning as a key aspect of the explanation of policy analysis. 
3.5.4 The Nature of Policy-Oriented Learning 
Drawing on the work of Heclo (1974: 306),, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999: 123) 
are of the view that policy-oriented learning 'refers to relatively enduring alterations' 
of thought or behavioural intentions that result from experience and/or new 
information and that are concerned with the attainment or revision 'of policy 
objectives. In this sense, the nature of learning involves a kind of zweck-rational 
action, in that it is specifically conducted 'for the actor's own rationally calculated 
ends' (Weber 1968: 24). The learning is instrumental in the sense that members of 
particular coalitions seek to influence those in others, including those in position of 
power, that their evidence is the most applicable and should be called on to alter or 
continue the direction of policy. In essence, a better understanding of the world 
serves to further their policy objectives (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999: 123). 
Theories of the policy process or policy change must consider the role played 
by technical infonnation, especially that detailing the scale and nature of the 
problem, its causes, and the likely impact of various potential solutions. This 
information is of primary importance in the making of administrative agency 
(governmental) decisions. Most legislators want or demand some knowledge of the 
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severity of any problem and any potential benefits associated with possible solutions, 
primarily on fiscal grounds. In the UK, for example, the National Audit Office is 
charged with the task of ensuring that policies deliver value for money (e. g. National 
Audit Office 2001). By association, there has been a discernable rise in the volume 
and use of think tanks and policy analysis units both within and outside government, 
suggesting that there is a growing market for technical analysis or, in other words, 
&evidence'. 
It must be stressed, however, that policy-oriented learning is only one means 
by which the direction of policy can be influenced. Linking in with the current issue 
of evidence-based policy in a politicised policy area, the authors suggest that changes 
in the real world, for example in related socio-economic conditions, can also have a 
direct impact on policy change, as can a change in the political landscape of a 
particular country, such as the election of New Labour in 1997 and their associated 
modernising agenda. These are exogenous factors impacting on the policy 
subsystem. Furthermore, changes internal to the subsystem can also have a direct 
bearing on the nature of policy change. For example, the death or retirement of a 
significant policy actor 'can substantially alter the political resources of various 
coalitions and thus policy decisions' (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999: 123). 
For the authors, this means that major policy change is unlikely to be the sole 
product of policy-oriented learning, but minor policy change is possible. This is 
because such learning is unlikely to alter the Deep and Policy Core beliefs of rival 
coalitions but could affect their Secondary Aspects. Major social change, for the 
authors, is usually the product of significant turbulence external to the subsystem, for 
example in the realm of politics. This is consistent with the argument presented here, 
and introduces a dose of realism into the role played by evidence. 
It will suffice to say that the Advocacy Coalition Framework assumes that 
evidence does not directly impinge on policy resulting in change, but it is the gradual 
accretion of evidence that is of significance. This view of the evidence and policy 
relationship is akin to what Weiss (1977; 1986) has termed the 'enlightenment 
model' of research utilisation (see Section 9.2.2). In other words, it is the gradual 
permeation of evidence into the debate that is paramount. In the context of the 
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ongoing example, this can be seen with the adoption of pragmatic harm reduction 
approaches, such as the aforementioned needle exchange schemes implemented in 
the 1980s by the Conservative government, which were, in part, the product of the 
gradual accretion of evidence as to their utility and efficacy in combating the spread 
of HIV/AIDS. 
3.5.5 Th e Role of tit e In dividual an d tit e Nature of Collective A ction 
In contrast to many other theories and models of the policy process, the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework places less stock in an actors' organisational affiliation, as a 
decisive characteristic determining, or at least influencing, individual action. 
Alternatively, it encourages us to think of agency officials along with other policy 
actors as a coalition of individuals and groups who share a specific belief system. As 
illustrated, this can range from a general world view to many smaller beliefs about 
the desirable or undesirable aspects of certain policies and, in turn, this leads to a 
4non-trivial degree of co-ordinated activity over time' on behalf of coalition members 
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993a: 25). As expressed, the subsystem comprises 
actors from a variety of public and private organisations who are interdependent on 
one another and are actively concerned with a policy problem or issue. In this sense 
it is a figuration (Elias 1978) of those who seek to influence policy in any way in that 
domain. It is necessary to decipher the Advocacy Coalition Framework's 
assumptions of the individual as this provides a platform for understanding the nature 
of coalitions and the issue of collective action, in particular. 
It is fair to say that there is a taken-for-granted assumption within the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework that actors are 'instrumentally rational'(Weber 
1930; 1968). In terms of the policy process, and looking at ways of influencing 
policy change, this would manifest itself in a commitment towards searching for 
information or evidence to either inform policy, in one way or another, or at the very 
least to support a personal policy stance. Although instrumental rational action plays 
a key role in much economic theory, the action under consideration here relates more 
to a body of theory from social psychology. It is worth highlighting that in this 
understanding of the 'individual', there is a tacit assumption that goals are highly 
multifarious and that in achieving goals, that is in providing admissible 'evidence' 
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for their policy stance, individuals are not free agents as such but are constrained by 
various cognitive, structural and institutional predilections, which serve to limit the 
actual degree of co-ordinated activity. 
The notion of policy goals, furthermore, is linked intricately to issues relating 
to the Policy Core. To reiterate, there is an assumption that actors are driven by a set 
of 'policy-oriented goals'. In this sense, actors within a subsystem are not necessarily 
egoistical, acting in terms of material self-interest, but action is shaped and shapes 
the action of the coalition. As will become clear, in relation to the nature of evidence, 
the very act of understanding the nature of 'evidence' involves cognitive biases 
linked to coalition membership. Through coalition solidarity, actors view the world 
in a certain way, that is, they share the same ontological perspectives. Interpretations 
and perspectives of 'evidence' reflect this, fostering epistemological solidarity. For 
the purposes of this thesis, it also reinforces the view presented in this thesis that the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework provides a solid buttress on which to develop ideas 
concerning the plight of 'evidence'. It is fair to say that overall, this understanding of 
the policy process has also not been accepted uncritically and in light of various 
criticisms, the creators have undertaken some points of clarification, which are 
significant in the context of the current discussion, as we shall see in Chapter Five 
3.6 Summary 
As indicated at the end of the previous chapter, it is a Central theme of this thesis that 
under the conditions of evidence-based Policy-making, there has been an 'opening 
up' of the policy-making process. As a consequence, the groundwork for exploring 
the issues described above is prepared by pluralist understandings of the policy 
process. In effect, these are consistent with evidence-based policy-making, as they 
offer a more inclusive understanding of the nature of policy-making. This moves 
away from the notion of iron triangles. Schaffer (1977: 148) provides a useful 
illustration of pluralist models, with specific resonance for current purposes, 
suggesting that: 
The public policy process is ... a multi-person drama going on in several 
arenas, some of them likely to be complex large-scale organisational 
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situations. Decisions are the outcome of the drama, not a voluntary willed, 
individual, interstitial action. Drama is continuous. Decisions are convenient 
labels given post hoc to the mythical precedents of the apparent outcomes of 
uncertain conflicts. 
In this sense, Schaffer's analysis is consistent with Lindblom's (1959) 
previous assertion of policies being 'muddled through'. It can also be seen as a 
formative influence on the Advocacy Coalition Framework and its emphasis on 
conflict in the policy process. On the whole, pluralist models of the policy process 
depict a multifarious web of inter-connections. Lindblom (1980: 5) thus suggests that 
policy, in this sense, is 'an extremely complex process without beginning or end, and 
whose boundaries remain most uncertain'. It is this understanding of the policy 
process that shapes the subsequent analysis. In addition, precisely because the 
substantive area of investigation here concerns a heavily politicised policy area, the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework, as a result of its focus on the nature of conflict in 
the policy arena, offers the best framework through which to illustrate the turmoil of 
evidence. 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework is, however, used in a specific way in 
the context of this thesis. It is fair to comment that it was designed as a means of 
explaining policy change, but is employed here more as an explanatory tool of 
analysis. The point of departure in this thesis is that emphasis is not so much on 
explaining social change as much as offering a tool for the analysis of the nature of 
evidence in a policy area, characterised by the three Cs of conflict, controversy and 
competition. These issues are explored in the following chapters. For now, it is also 
necessary to illustrate various other methodological issues that underpin a study such 
as this. 
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4. RESEARCHING POLICY IN REAL-TIME: FLEXIBLE METHODS AND 
METHODOLOGY FOR COMPLEX PROBELMS 
4.1 Introduction 
Although presented here as a discrete section, issues pertaining to research methods 
and methodology are continuous throughout the duration of the thesis. This section, 
in part, details some personal reflections on key issues faced by a researcher when 
involved in research design and in what Denzin (1970) has termed, the 'research act'. 
The chapter starts with a broad introduction to the interplay of theory, method and 
methodology in the context of 'real-time' research. This is followed by a more 
specific discussion of methodology and methods of data collection, including a 
discussion of interviewing 'influential' respondents. Generally, 'influential 
respondents' refer to the subjects of the research. The term 'influential' is preferred 
to 'elites' or 'the powerful' as it avoids labelling respondents in a way that some 
would find uncomfortable. This discussion does, however, draw on the literature of 
elite interviewing and researching powerful groups. 
Moving on, the sampling strategy is then outlined by considering the notion 
of theoretical sampling. Details of the sample itself and some reflexive comments on 
the conduct of the research are then highlighted. Contained within this, is a 
discussion of negotiating and maintaining access and the process of leaving the field. 
Issues relating to what Goffman (1959) refers to as the 'Presentation of Self in the 
research act, are also highlighted as are the significant and difficult issues of ensuring 
confidentiality and anonymity, when researching a well-defined, but small policy 
subsystem. Finally, attention is given to the concept of triangulation in real-time 
research. The focus is specifically on the interplay between theory building and 
refinement, and how this is actually a key aspect of the methodology. In what 
follows, some consideration of a selection of the key substantive, methodological and 
theoretical issues relating to researching a contemporary policy issue are offered. 
Such issues are described by Hirsch (1995) as 'critical decision moments'. 
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4.2 Theory, Methods and Methodology in Real-Time Research 
Real-time research refers to researching a 'live', contemporary policy issue, in a 
constant state of flux. It can be epitomised by drawing on a famous quotation from 
politics. When asked what the greatest challenge for a Statesman was, the one time 
British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan asserted, in a somewhat languorous 
fashion: 'Events, my dear boy, events' (Bering 2005) and so it is with researching a 
contemporary policy issue. Central to real-time research, then, is the notion that 
various exogenous factors continuously impact on the research process, which can 
have the effect of changing its direction. 
Throughout the duration of this research, the emergence of new organisations 
(e. g. the 'United Kingdom Drug Policy Commission' and the 'Drugs-Health 
Alliance') altered the shape of the policy subsystem. This occurred alongside 
changes in personnel in the governing administration, for example, the change of 
Home Secretaries (four times) and the change of Prime Minister (one time). 
Additionally, new policy deliberations (the renewal of the ten-year drug strategy in 
2008) and new knowledge and ideas concerning the nature of evidence were 
continuously entering the public domain. Various publications (e. g. Levitt, et al. 
2006; Nutt, et al. 2007; Reuter and Stevens 2007; Royal Society of Arts 2007; 
Science and Technology Committee 2006) were indicative of this. These were 
produced in the aftermath of the 2004 cannabis reclassification, with a focus on the 
evidence-base on the wider drug classification system. 
These developments meant that. the scope of the research had to be modified 
when already underway. This manifested itself in a movement away from a sole 
interest in evidence use in the cannabis reclassification, to consideration of the 
evidence base for the wider drug classification system (see Sections 6.2 and 7.2). In 
addition, these substantive changes impacted on the methodology and the theory. The 
emergence of 'new' actors in the wider drug classification debate gave added 
credence to the emerging theories underpinning the research that heavily politicised 
areas are characterised by long-standing conflict between competing groups trying to 
shape the agenda. In addition, these different groups have differing ideas over what 
counts as evidence in this particular policy arena. Consequently, the Advocacy 
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Coalition Frameworkoffers best way to analyse, explore and explain this imbroglio 
and key methods of data collection are required that can account for the 
understandings of evidence from those who are engaged in the process, on some 
level. 
There are, however, few hard-and-fast rules when it comes to conducting 
research with advocacy coalitions in the policy process. Goddard (1997: 416), in a 
similar vein, has used the Advocacy Coalition Framework to research the belief 
systems of various actors involved in post-war criminal justice policy-making. This 
was achieved by using a variety of methods and techniques, similar to Downes 
(Downes 1982; 1988), in his study of criminal justice systems in Western Europe. 
These provide a useful model to emulate, and in some ways adapt, as advances in 
technology, particularly the Internet, have made sources such as those from official 
bodies and coalition statements much more accessible. 
4.3 Multiple Methods of Data Collection 
Central to Goddard's (1997) and Downes' (1982; 1988) research was the use of: a) 
official sources including Government White Papers and Bills, Acts of Parliament, 
Advisory Committee Reports and other minor official documents; b) advocacy 
coalition statements including evidence to official and semi-official bodies from 
various members of the criminal justice policy subsystem, alongside the pamphlets, 
letters and publications of groups and significant individuals; c) sources on structural 
and policy change including analyses of structural factors, such as the development 
of pressure groups and academic research and changes in bureaucratic structure and 
practice. (the use of advisory committees, etc. ) that affect the level of influence of 
such factors. Also, insider accounts and biographical material for more precise 
explanation of the mechanisms through which information and ideas alter 
perceptions and practice over time and; d) interviews with key participants and 
observers. 
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4.3.1 Observation and Documentary Analysis 
It must be stressed at this stage that observation played a more pragmatic role in the 
methodology of this thesis. By carrying out observation at the Science and 
Technology Select Committee (2006) oral evidence sessions, access was gained to 
the policy subsystem (see Section 4.5.1). Attendance at these meetings was also used 
to: a) network; b) identify some key stakeholders and; c) look at the nature of 
evidence that gets selected in research and the methodological implications of this. 
Table 4.1 provides an overview of these. This data is in the public domain and 
therefore pseudonyms are unnecessary. 
Table 4.1: Timetable of Meetings Attended and Observed 
Date Time Witnesses 
Wednesday 9: 00 Professor Colin Blakemore, Chief Executive Medical Research 
26 April 2006 Council and Professor of Physiology, University of Oxford; 
Professor John Strang, Professor in Addiction Research and 
Director of the National Addiction Centre; Mr Andy Hayman, 
Chair, Association of Chief Police Officers Drugs Committee 
Wednesday 10: 15 Mr Steve Rolles, Information Officer, Transform Drug Policy 
26 April 2006 Foundation, Mr Martin Barnes, Chief Executive, Drugscope, Mrs 
Lesley King-Lewis, Chief Executive, Action on Addiction 
Wednesday 9: 00 Joan Ryan, a Member of the House [of Commons), Parliamentary 
14 June 2006 Under-Secretary of State for nationality, citizenship and 
immigration, Mr Vernon Coaker, a Member of the House [of 
Commons], Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for policing, 
I security and community safety 
(cited in Science and Technology Committee 2006). 
Observation was also useful in terms of gaining a- valuable insight into how 
' 
evidence is obtained from this medium. When discussing these evidence sessions, in 
the aftermath of one interview, it was suggested by the respondent, that he was aware 
of at least one occasion when those giving evidence to the committee, may have felt 
the need to exercise some caution. This was on the grounds that they were, or could 
potentially be, the recipients of funding from the organisations they were discussing 
and that representatives from funding organisations were observing in the public 
gallery. This confirms the maxim that data never speaks for itself, and must always 
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be critically evaluated. Data used in this thesis from transcripts of these sessions is 
done with this in mind. 
In terms of documentary analysis, a variety of documents including both 
written and oral evidence, provided to Parliamentary bodies such as those of the 
Home Affairs Committee (2002) and the Science and Technology Committee (2006), 
proved a vital source of data. Similar coding techniques were employed to these 
documents as to the interview transcripts (see Section 4.3.2). Confidentiality and 
anonymity, were however, not. necessary as this information was also in the public 
domain. Although the final report of the latter committee was published as the 
current research was underway, the process of data gathering for the report was 
concurrent with it, hence researching in real-time. The minutes from the various 
evidence sessions were available on the Internet, prior to the publication of the final 
report and could, therefore, be built into the methodology. 
The objective was not so much to test one kind of data (such as documents) 
against another (interviews) but to use them in conjunction with one another. In 
essence, to ascertain the way different appreciations of evidence were apparent in 
UK drug classification decisions. This related to the emerging theory that the UK 
drug policy debate is characterised more by conflict than consensus and that 
recognisable coalitions are apparent in this policy area. As indicated, records of the 
recent Science and Technology Committee Report (2006) and oral evidence sessions 
were particularly useful. The following exchange, relating to the utility of the wider 
drug classification system, in light of the 2004 cannabis reclassification, is indicative 
of how this worked in practice. It is between Dr Brian Iddon MP, a member of the 
Science and Technology Committee, Steve Rolles, a member of a leading NGO 
advocating drug legalisation and Martin Barnes, the Chief Executive of a principal 
drug information service: 
Q461: Dr Iddon: ... is cannabis in the right classification system? Mr Rolles: The problem with the ACMD's deliberations were not that they 
did not look at all the evidence ... but that their decision ... was based on an 
assumption that re-classification has some impact on levels of use. ... so you 
can argue until you are blue in the face about which category it should be in. 
I have been trying to think of a metaphor for this and the best one I can 
come up with is that it is like arguing over what colour to paint a square 
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wheel. Even if all the experts agree it should be blue it does not matter 
because that wheel does not turn. The classification system does not do what 
it is supposed to do, it does not reduce harm, it does not reduce misuse, it 
does not reduce mental health problems. In fact it seems to do the exact 
opposite so the whole thing is an exercise in distraction. 
Mr Barnes: Yes, but let us keep it under review (cited in Science and 
Technology Committee 2006: 95) 
Here we see contrasting philosophies about the cannabis issue and what the 
drug classification can do. For Rolles, the system is redundant and even counter- 
productive. The insinuation is that not only has it not achieved its aim of reducing the 
harms of drugs, but that the current system has actually made these worse. The 
cannabis question at this stage is unanswered. For Barnes, however, there is simply 
no suggestion that the current system is problematic, but the cannabis issue is 
addressed. Ultimately, this has a knock-on effect for appreciations of what evidence 
is in this particular subsystem and it is this developing theory that is explored in 
Chapters Five, Six and Seven. For present purposes, to get a further insight into these 
different qualitative appreciations of evidence, it was necessary to talk to those 
involved in the policy subsystem. In this regard, the method of qualitative interviews 
was central to the methodology. 
4.3.2 Qualitative Interviewing 
Qualitative interviews were used to explore the views of evidence from a range of 
key policy actors engaged in the policy process. In all, 24 semi-structured interviews 
were carried out between June 2006 and April 2007. Further details of the sample are 
discussed in due course (see Section 4.5). All interviews were recorded on audiotape 
and transcribed verbatim by the author. They were then analysed using thematic 
coding, assisted by an Nvivo computer software package. The codes primarily 
related to key themes ascertained in the process of interviewing. 
In terms of research design, external events influencing the research process, 
such as the changing scope of the thesis impacted more directly, in terms of research 
design, on the interview schedule. In essence, the purpose of continuously amending 
the interview schedule related to the significant methodological, theoretical and 
substantive developments occurring contemporaneously to the project. Appendices I 
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and II provide examples of, respectively, earlier and later versions of the interview 
schedule and Appendix III explains the continuities and changes that brought these 
about, reflecting the tumultuous nature of doing real-time research. 
Substantively, the most noticeable difference, as mentioned, was the change 
of emphasis from the episode of cannabis reclassification, to the process of renewed 
interest in the wider drug classification system. In later iterations, therefore, more 
stress is placed on 'the turmoil of evidence', with this in mind. On the whole, 
however, looking at how belief systems (based primarily on ideological standpoints) 
provide the bedrock for different understandings of 'evidence' from perspectives 
which are often incompatible with one another, but share certain similar features, 
was a consistent theme. The interview schedule gradually covered the key themes of 
the way that: a) evidence is conceptualised by various players in the process, in 
particular, considering the key issue of the intricacy of evidence; b) it also addressed 
whether there were recognisable coalitions or perspectives in this particular policy 
debate and how these shape the evidence that is produced and used in policy. This 
involved some consideration of the role of competing and conflicting ideas and 
beliefs and; c) the issue of power, which subsumed the debate over different 
appreciations relating to the location of evidence in the policy process and whether 
there is a recognisable, or a prevailing understanding of 'evidence' where drug 
classification policy is concerned. These key themes are central to exploring the 
, turmoil of evidence' and form the crux of the analysis in subsequent chapters. 
It is recognised that there are grounds for criticism of this aspect of the 
methodology in terms of reliability. In response, it is argued that this is frequently the 
nature of exploratory, theory-driven research: 
The methods used to conduct exploratory research need to be flexible and do 
not need to be as rigorous as those used to pursue other objectives. The 
researcher may need to be creative and resourceful in gaining access to the 
information required (Blaikie 2000: 73). 
This provides some vindication for the approach adopted here. The implication that 
to be 'creative' and 'resourceful' is to somehow compromise on rigour, however, is 
open to debate. The nature of qualitative interviewing is such that everything 
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depends on context. Thus, questions and sections become interchangeable throughout 
, the course of the 
interview. The benchmark for rigour in this kind of research is, 
therefore, different to what is required in research with a more inflexible research 
strategy and design. 
4.4 Theoretical Sampling 
Theoretical sampling is also a useful technique in real-time research as it allows 
sufficient flexibility to enter the research process. Here, all sampling decisions do not 
have to be taken at the outset. On completion of each interview, respondents were 
asked to recommend some names and contact details of those they thought it would 
be worthwhile talking to. This yielded some interesting data in its own right and was 
also useful in ascertaining the individual's location within the policy subsystem, in 
terms of coalition membership, for example. Walford (1994) suggests that this aspect 
of research involves the 'personal sponsorship' of the researcher by the researched 
and is important for identifying and accessing potential respondents with whom the 
researcher has no prior links. 
Theoretical sampling represents an ongoing process throughout the research. 
Somewhat similar to Grounded Theory (Strauss and Corbin 1992), the process 
continues until the point of theoretical saturation is reached. Here, the chosen method 
of data collection creates and confirms the importance of the categories developed to 
the extent that: 
a) no new or relevant data seem to be emerging regarding the category; b) 
the category is well developed in terms of its properties and dimensions 
demonstrating variation, and; c) the relationships among categories are well 
established and validated (Strauss and Corbin 1992: 212). 
In the context of this thesis, theoretical saturation provided the primary reason for 
curtailing the sample at 24. 
Following on from this, the next stage is to generate hypotheses or develop 
theories out of the categories, with the process of data collection then starting again. 
This process ensures that the researcher is fully familiar with the data and thus is able 
to hone in on the 'best' data available in relation to the research problem. As with 
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every chosen method of sampling, there are drawbacks. These are well rehearsed and 
often take the form of discussions of reliability and validity. 
A key danger of the 'personal sponsorship' approach alluded to above, is that 
there is the risk of bias creeping into the sample. A snowball may incorporate 
colleagues or acquaintances of respondents who share similar view-points. Critical 
self-awareness, on behalf of the author, was a way of overcoming this. In effect, the 
process of theoretical sampling is described by Bryman (2004: 334) as an iterative 
approach 'where there is movement backwards and forwards between sampling and 
theoretical reflection'. This is consistent with the process of theory building and 
refinement, a decisive, if not definitive, factor in the methodological approach 
adopted here. 
4.5 The Sample 
In the UK drug classification subsystem there is a diversity of actors. At the 
international level, numerous agencies, including the International Narcotics Control 
Board are influential and were critical of the 2004 cannabis reclassification, without 
managing to influence it. The current focus, though, is at the domestic level. Here, 
interested parties are the Government, in particular, the Home Office (and Ministry 
of Justice) and the Department of Health. From the perspective of organisational 
structure, within government, there are MPs, Ministers, advisers of various types and 
civil servants of various ranks. There is the ACMD, in turn, comprised of a range of 
professionals from a variety of backgrounds. Away from government, there are 
agencies concerned with (drug) law enforcement such as the Police, in the guise of 
the Association of Chief Police Officers and the Board of Customs and Excise. 
Agencies advocating drug treatment and those advocating drug prevention and 
education are also prevalent. Legal experts, medical experts, QUANGOs and NGOs, 
Research Councils, institutes and sections of academia, along with representatives of 
the mass-media 0ournalists and writers) are also interested actors, and this is by no 
means an exhaustive list. 
To explore the views of a wide-range of key policy actors involved in the 
policy-making process in UK drug classification policy, qualitative interviews were 
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conducted with various participants. Different respondents had differing degrees of 
involvement in the policy process. None were involved in direct decision-making, 
but most were involved in consultation, either directly or via their occupational 
organisation. The selection criteria required participants to have significant 
knowledge of the evidence and policy relationship, in relation to the 1971 Misuse of 
Drugs Act. This links into the notion of respondent's being 'influential'. Many 
respondents did not see themselves as influential within the wider policy debate, 
although some of them were. All could, however, be considered key actors within 
their own coalition as we shall subsequently see. Table 4.2 offers an overview of the 
final sample. 
In all, 34 requests for interviews were made, with 24 successful, a response 
rate of around 71 per cent. Of the unsuccessful attempts, in six cases, no answer to 
the inquiries was forthcoming. Of the remaining four, one was declined as a result of 
time constraints and two on the grounds that they felt, on hearing the nature of the 
research, that they would be either unable or unwilling to co-operate. The final 
unsuccessful approach, related to an occasion when a potential respondent was 
identified and contacted, only to subsequently receive an email back from a close 
family member, that the respondent would have been very pleased to participate, but 
was recently deceased. 
As mentioned, all interviews were carried out between June 2006 and April 
2007,22 face-to-face and two telephone-based. Although grateful of the data yielded 
from the non face-to-face interviews, the advantage of face-to-face interviewing, 
relates to issues of control. Knowing when to 'probe' is a much more precise science 
in this scenario. For instance, it is easier to ascertain when a respondent is 
comfortable, or not, with a specific line of questioning. This is, though, a relatively 
costly method in terms of logistics as all the interviews involved significant travel 
within the UK. 
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Table 4.2: The Final Sample 
Interviewee Sex Occupation Institutional/Organisational 
Code (M/F) Affiliation(s) 
_ RADI M Media and Information Member of Drugs-Health Alliance 
Officer, NGO 
RATLI M Forensic Scientist; ACMD Technical Committee 
Government Adviser 
RATL2 F Independent Consultant ACMD Main Committee; 
Pharmacist Pharmaceutical Society; Royal 
College of GPs 
RAD2 M Member of Parliament N/A 
RATL3 M Forensic Scientist ACMD Technical Committee 
CONI M GP Coalition Against Cannabis 
CON2 M Researcher, NGO Coalition Against Cannabis 
RAD3/RATL4 M Director of Research, NGO UK Harm Reduction Alliance; 
Drugs Health Alliance 
CON3 F Teacher (Retired), Member of EURAD (Europe 
Campaigner Against Drugs); Coalition Against 
Cannabis 
RATL5 M Academic/Psychiatrist ACMD Main Committee; ACMD 
Technical Committee 
RATL6 M Lawyer, Author N/A 
RATL7 M Academic; Chief International Drug Policy 
Executive, Drug Service Consortium; 
Provider; Former 
Government Adviser 
RATL8 M Head of Publishing International Drug Policy 
Consortium, International Harm 
Reduction Alliance 
RATL9 F Director of Leading Drug N/A 
Treatment QUANGO 
RATLIO/CON4 M Academic; Drug Misuse N/A 
Researcher; Former 
Government Adviser 
RATL II F Former Member ACMD UK Drug Policy Commission 
RATL12 M Civil Servant, Home N/A 
Off ice 
CON5 M Chief Constable (retired); International Task-Force on Global 
Independent Consultant Drug Policy; 
United Nations 
RATL13 M Director, NGO International Harm Reduction 
Alliance, UK Harm Reduction 
Alliance; Action on Hepatitis C 
RAD4 M Author, Journalist Transform Drug Policy Foundation 
CON6 M Customs Off icer (retired); National Drug Prevention 
Independent Anti- Alliance; 
Corruption Consultant 
CON7/RATLI4 M Local Government Officer National Drug Prevention Alliance 
(South East) 
CON8 M Director, NGO National Drug Prevention Alliance_ 
RATL15 M Chief Executive, NGO UK Drug Policy Commission 
0 
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On making initial contact with respondents, the opportunity was presented for 
them to view the schedule prior to the interview. This was not always taken up but 
was done primarily on the grounds of expediency. As respondents were squeezing 
me into their daily diaries, where possible, this was to decrease the intrusion into 
their schedules. This process of arranging and conducting interviews was a constant 
reminder of the - relatively powerless position of the post-graduate researcher. 
Throughout, sufficient flexibility was required to fit around the respondent's 
schedules. 
As can be seen, a code has been assigned to each respondent as a means of 
protecting identities in line with relevant ethical commitments in conducting social 
research. The former (alphabetical) part of the code relates to the coalition within the 
subsystem to which the respondent belongs. Three are central to the analysis, the 
6radical', 'rational' and 'conservative'. The latter two, have their origins in the 
aforementioned history of the UK drug policy debate, concerning 'ownership' of the 
drug problem. The radical perspective is an additional, increasingly powerful voice 
in legislative debates. 
The latter (numerical) aspect is a means of identifying the respondent within 
the perspective or coalition. For the sake of confidentiality, the name of the employer 
with which the respondent is currently employed or affiliated, is not supplied as this 
could lead to identification. The institutional or organisational affiliation could either 
be a product of individual choice and/or occupational function. This affiliation may, 
or may not correspond to the occupation. In other words, the role of a position in an 
NGO listed in 'occupation' may not necessarily be specifically referring to the one 
identified in the 'institutional or organisational affiliation'. 
It is to be noted that certain respondents span coalitions. This relates to the 
fact that various Secondary Aspects on the nature of the drug problem crossover 
perspectives. Where appropriate to the narrative, these are made clear. With regard to 
cells with absent information, in the final column, a number of reasons account for 
this. In the case of 'RADT, the respondent's occupational status was their 
determining characteristic and including this information could lead to identification. 
For 'RATL9', this was a result of the fact that the characterisation of the policy 
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subsystem employed in this research was not necessarily shared by the respondent 
and that their particular employer actively networked with a range of other 
organisations as part of the nature of their work. 'RATL6', 'RATLIO/CON4' and 
'RATLIT all placed great stress on their 'independence' within this policy 
subsystem and had no 'official' ties with any organisation. 
4.5.1 Negotiating and Maintaining Access and Leaving the Field 
The label 'influential respondents', is seen as a preferable description to that of 
6elites' in the context of this research. Similar themes do relate to both kinds of 
research. For example, gaining access can undoubtedly be problematic. Often there 
are various levels of gatekeepers to negotiate; including personal secretaries or other 
colleagues within an organisation. Duke (2002: 45) notes how elites have the power 
to 'create barriers, shield themselves from scrutiny and resist the intrusiveness of 
social research'. A similar issue was encountered during the early part of the 
fieldwork when undertaking observations at the Science and Technology Select 
Committee oral evidence sessions. Although this eventually led to entry into the 
policy subsystem, this was a less than successful means of gaining access to those in 
positions of power (for example, politicians). Indeed, access was literally blocked to 
these actors by the 'army' of staff at their disposal before, during and after the 
evidence proceedings. Oral evidence sessions took place on Wednesday mornings, 
usually concluding around half-past eleven as Prime Ministers Questions were due to 
commence. At this point most, if not all, would make their way to the House of 
Commons flanked by civil servants and/or special advisers. This left little 
opportunity for interaction. I 
More figuratively, access was also blocked due to the conventions of the 
sessions. In the case of the Science and Technology Select Committee, like most 
Parliamentary Select Committee hearings, public involvement in the proceedings is 
nil. On Gold's (195 8) scale of participant observer roles in research, it was the role of 
4complete observer' that best characterised the role of the researcher at this point. 
Access is granted to 'observe', but in no way to 'participate', or engage with those 
contributing to the official session. In Eliasian terms, through necessity, the 
researcher is more detached than involved at this stage (Elias 1956). On completion 
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of proceedings, however, there was an opportunity for increased involvement with 
respondents and the chance to change status from a 'complete observer' towards 
(observer-as-participant'. This provided initial access to the sample, albeit with a 
respondent who was a self-confessed 'peripheral figure' in the policy-making 
process, but who later transpired to be a key member of the policy subsystem. 
Having a gatekeeper is undoubtedly a valuable commodity in any research 
project, arguably more so when researching the influential. In the current research, 
this was particularly true when dealing with the civil service. Requests often went 
unanswered for a number of weeks before dates were offered that were inflexible and 
frequently reneged on. Consequently, alongside attendance at Select Committee 
meetings, access to the sample was established with participation at conferences and, 
in one scenario, a personalised telephone 'cold-call' to the office of a potential 
respondent (Useem 1995). Through this combination, access was somewhat 
serendipitously established to a broad range of respondents. 
To develop the sample, the process of 'chaining' was employed. This was 
usually in the form of an email requesting potential participants' co-operation. 
Towards the beginning of the correspondence, where appropriate, this included the 
name of prior respondents who had recommended them. For additional reassurance, 
the chance of obtaining further details of the research in a letter on 'official 
university paper' was offered. This was, however, never taken up although frequent 
requests were made for more information, and these were granted in email form with 
a link to a summary of the project on the School of Sociology and Social Policy 
webpage. 
I 
Drawing on the advice of Duke (2002) and Thomas (1995), within all emails, 
an attempt was made to 'personalise' the research problem by making it clear that the 
current interest was in their views and experiences, rather than those of the 
institution, organisation or department to which they belonged. Duke (2002) 
describes this as 'getting beyond the official line'. Personalising the research 
problem also enabled the avoidance of being diverted elsewhere within an 
organisation, to another person whose experience, in the context of this research, 
may not have been as exhaustive or appropriate. 
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When access was established, Hirsch's (1995) notion of demonstrating one's 
Gstreet-smart' was paramount. In other words, it was necessary to explicitly portray 
relevant expertise. Although certain skills are applicable to all kinds of research, such 
as the need for preparation and planning, some issues are more acute when 
researching influential actors or elites. For example, interviewing elites can entail the 
possibility that the respondent is not only sufficiently knowledgeable about the 
substantive aspect of the research, but also, that they are often ýamiliar with the 
research process itself, adding another level to the requirement of professionalism. 
4.5.2 The Presentation of Setf in the Research Act 
Professionalism in the research act is also linked to the process of 'checking out' the 
researcher by the respondent (Cookson 1994; Ostander 1995). There are numerous 
dimensions to this. One aspect is linked to the 'presentation of self' in the research 
situation (Goffman 1959). In the current research, one manifestation of this 
concerned the nature of knowledge, and the way respondent's were frequently trying 
to decipher the extent and variety of the author's familiarity with the topic. There 
were instances when it was necessary to concede to respondents that certain 
documents, to which they were referring, or which they identified as being of 
significance, had. not been read and these were subsequently followed, up. This 
process required careful monitoring so that the direction of the research was not 
unduly influenced by the respondents. 
In this sense, a delicate balancing act was required as to what 'leamer role' 
was to be portrayed (Lofland and Lofland 1984). A snap decision was often needed 
about whether to play an 'insider' or 'outsider' role. The former, is characterised by 
in-depth knowledge of certain issues and topics, and a clear familiarity with the 
world of the respondent. The latter, involves honesty about gaps in knowledge, and a 
willingness to draw on the expertise of respondents. This is also consistent with the 
notions of involvement and detachment (Elias 1956). It became apparent, however, 
that these were not mutually exclusive and were best seen as a scale. Quite often, it 
was not necessary to pick one role and maintain it through the duration of the project, 
as is often the case with ethnographic research designs, for instance. Indeed, within 
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the course of a single interview, greater insider and outsider roles were interchanged, 
depending on how well the interview was progressing and the topics being discussed. 
For the most part, the notion that honesty was the best policy guided the interviewing 
technique, and clarification was sought for unfamiliar issues or themes. This reduced 
the chance of becoming a hostage to fortune by pretending to be knowledgeable of 
certain subjects when this was not the case, thus, risking personal credibility, the 
candour of the respondents and potentially j eopardising the future sample. 
On the whole, the interviewees were sufficiently candid and few proved to be 
reluctant respondents, although there were some hurdles to overcome in this respect. 
For example, one respondent took umbrage with the perceived assumptions behind a 
certain question by commenting on the naivetd of the author's interpretation of the 
cannabis reclassification, and its associated evidence-base. By contrast, some 
respondents required more cajoling than others. - Those who were the recipients of 
central government funding, or those that referred to themselves as 6critical friends' 
of government, often felt that they were not best placed, or at liberty, to provide 
responses to some lines of questioning. Examples included those asking for some 
reflection on the motivations for political decisions taken in relation to changes to 
UK drug classification, or those involving comparisons between the current and 
previous administrations. This was in contrast to respondents from NGOs, whose 
primary task is, in many cases, to critically engage with government policy (and to 
try and change it). These issues are, however, indicative of researching a topic 
characterised by competition, conflict and controversy. 
There are also some institutional considerations to take into account when 
thinking about data collection, especially when interviewing members of the civil 
service. Once more, Duke (2002: 49) offers some useful advice in this respect stating 
that: 
Civil servants are prevented by the terms of their employment from 
disclosing information gained during the course of their service without 
official sanction. At the extreme, some disclosures might amount to a breach 
of the Official Secrets Act. 
Additionally Ball (1994: 110) suggests that: 
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Civil servants are socialized to present their absence from the processes of 
policy-making. They are clearly often decisively influential but are almost 
always unwilling or unable to account for such influence. 
Duke (2002: 49) offers some conchisive comments remarking that: 
I was often reminded by civil servants in the interviews that they were not 
responsible for 'making' policy. They always underemphasised their own 
roles in the policy process, even though other members of the policy 
network saw them as clearly influential. 
The latter part of the final quotation was certainly a familiar scenario. The civil 
servants, although a small part of the sample, offered some interesting insights, 
where possible, into the nature of evidence-based policy-making. 
Another issue encountered in the research, concerned the difference between 
the conventions of Sociology and Social Policy and those of the respondents. Quite 
often, this manifested itself in the need to adapt language to the target informant. For 
example, when discussing ideas in the thesis with academics, academic language 
proved unproblematic. This was particularly noticeable when discussing issues 
relating to the policy analysis literature, such as Policy Networks and Advocacy 
Coalitions (see Appendices I to III). On the other hand, this often required some 
adaptation and unpacking when dealing with respondents from outside academia. 
Careful attention had to be taken here as to not shape the data in anyway. The use of 
semi-structured interviews, enables these changes to be incorporated, and is part of 
the process of 'packaging' or 'customising' the research. Hirsch (1995: 7) suggests 
that this is necessary because respondents are often unfamiliar with the theoretical 
categories driving research, and for the most part, these are largely irrelevant to their 
interests. 
There was a further dimension to the subtleties of language, relating to what 
is 'acceptable' when discussing issues of a sensitive nature. Sociology, as a 
discipline, can consider itself reasonably well advanced in its avoidance of abusive 
language. In a minority of cases, the standards accepted as 'normal' in this discipline 
seemed alien to those not familiar with it. In the course of responding to certain 
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questions, the language used by respondents, by the standards of sociology, bordered 
on racism, homophobia and stigmatising of disability. Although the motivations for 
this were not considered to be untoward, it was, nonetheless, problematic. In such 
instances, Aldridge's (1995: 118) description of the research act requiring the social 
scientist to successfully negotiate 'relations of prestige, of deference, acceptance, and 
derogation' was brought to mind. Here, careful negotiation was required by 
simultaneously not wanting to condone the sentiments, however much unintended, 
and not wanting to be confrontational and jeopardising the current interview and 
potential ones. In the end, in dealing with such issues, the answer of the respondent 
was rephrased in the next exchange into more 'acceptable language' to try and show 
unease without detracting from the flow of the interview. 
Explicit in the previous discussion has been the notion that researching the 
influential, like researching elites and the powerful, entails acute problems but that 
these can be overcome with constant critical self-reflection. This involves recurring 
consideration of personal behaviour throughout the research process by the 
researcher. Goffman (1959) refers to this as 'impression management'. The 
significance of impression management, it is suggested here, is a vital part of the 
researcher's armour when the sampling technique involves personal sponsorship of 
existing respondents. Impression management is linked to the control of emotions. 
Creating a good impression relies on the avoidance of portraying any number of 
negative emotions. Giving the impression of laziness, naivet6, being unprepared or 
unorganised, could endanger the chances of continuing the sample. 
With this in mind, in the early stages of fieldwork, the interview schedule was 
made clearly visible in the interviews. As the research progressed and confidence 
grew, there was less cause to have the schedule clearly visible. Also as the interviews 
were semi-structured, there was sufficient flexibility for an exploration of ideas, 
themes and theories and for respondents to discuss any matters they deemed 
pertinent to the topic in hand. A flexible interview schedule also allowed changes to 
be made when external factors impacted on, and needed to be incorporated into, the 
research programme. 
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4.5.3 Confidentiality andAnonymity 
A further aspect of 'checking out' the researcher, and one also encountered by Duke 
(2002; 2003), is that respondents frequently asked a variant of the question; 'who 
else you have spoken toT (Hunter 1995), qualified with reasons for why this was 
necessary. Such examples from the current research included; 'they have been 
around for a long time in this field' (RAD2), or 'they will be well placed to help and 
are very approachable' (RATL6) and 'you could try them but they are very busy! ' 
(CON4). This also required significant management. When confronted with this in 
her research, Duke (2002: 47) stated that: 
I tried to give vague answers because I felt that any information of this 
nature would be breaking my assurances of confidentiality and anonymity. 
But in many cases, the respondents already knew whom I had interviewed 
and had discussed my research and its value with each other, often placing 
me in a very awkward and apparently foolish position. 
Faced with a similar problem in this research, a balance was struck between 
too much disclosure and over-evasiveness. It was felt that the motivation for 
respondents wanting this information was less idle curiosity and more wanting to be 
helpful and supplying names and contacts that may not otherwise have come up. 
Alternatively, in some cases the reasons may have been less altruistic and the 
intention was, in some way, to try and shape the direction of the research by trying to 
influence the sample. These issues raise the question of how far one can achieve 
one's goal, as a researcher, of ensuring confidentiality and anonymity as certain 
things remain beyond a researcher's control. This caused Duke (2002: 47) to question 
rhetorically, without conclusion, how far respondents should have a commitment to 
maintain confidentiality and anonymity, as part of the research bargain. It is 
suggested here, that even though total anonymity and confidentiality may be 
impossible to guarantee, this is insufficient grounds to not try. 
Another common theme when researching a sensitive topic is that 
respondents frequently requested statements they made to be 'off-the-record'. More 
often than not, these related to the personal opinions, and sometimes, animosity of 
certain respondents towards other members of the policy subsystem. This served to 
reinforce the point that this research was undertaken within a policy area 
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characterised by conflict. Very little management of this data was required as 
anything that was requested to be un-attributed, was left out of the final analysis. A 
more pressing concern, however, concerned the need to manage data given by 
respondents, which mirrored that already in the public domain. The commitment to 
establishing the informed consent of the respondents, under the conditions of 
anonymity and confidentiality, meant that regular cross-checking between personal 
interview data, and data in the public domain (such as Hansard), was an iterative 
requirement and was undertaken with due diligence. 
4.6 Triangulation: Method and Theory 
The methodological approach adopted here underscores a commitment to what 
Denzin (1978) terms 'methodological triangulation'; that is, the use of multiple 
methods of data collection. Although often taken to refer to 'multiple methods', there 
are actually a variety of different kinds of triangulation. Methodological triangulation 
is the most common understanding of the term. For Seale (1999: 53), it represents one 
of four ways (along with the search for negative instances; analytic induction and 
member validation) of assuring the quality of data obtained from social research. 
This stems from the realisation that data generated from one method is likely to be 
less comprehensive than data from multiple sources. In essence, it is a means of 
establishing validity. It draws on ideas established by Campbell and Fiske (1959), 
relating to the convergent and discriminant validation of measurement instruments. 
This understanding of triangulation, according to Seale (1999: 53), evokes an 
&analogy with surveying or navigation': 
People discover their position on a map by taking bearings on two 
landmarks, lines from which will intersect at the observer's position. If only 
one landmark were taken, the observer would only know that they are 
situated somewhere along a line. Triangulation used in this way assumes a 
single fixed reality that can be known ob ectively through the use of 
multiple methods of social research (Seale 1999: 53). 
There is, however, little agreement on the efficacy of triangulation as a means 
of ensuring the validity of research. Other thinkers have questioned whether criterion 
such as reliability and validity should actually apply when assessing, in particular, 
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the quality of qualitative research, as it is perceived that these are linked to more 
4positivist', quantitative methodology (Lincoln and Guba 1985). Furthermore, 
ethnomethodologists (e. g. Cicourel 1964; 1974) highlight 'constructivist objections' 
to the 'inherently positivist assumptions' of triangulation. Drawing on lessons from 
the linguistic turn in philosophy, these stem from the unproblernatic use of language, 
which assumes single interpretations of complex phenomena. 
This debate gets right to the heart of methodological issues concerning 
ontology and epistemology. There is an assumption that methodological 
triangulation, by its nature, enhances validity in research, but this is open to 
significant debate. Seale (1999: 61) offers pragmatic advice concerning triangulation 
stating that if used with 'due caution' it can enhance the 'credibility of a research 
account by providing an additional way of generating evidence in support of key 
claims as well as deepening and enriching understanding of particular settings and 
events'. This notion of triangulation represents a commitment to the use of multiple 
methods with the purpose of aiding the objective of theory adjudication and testing. 
In this sense, triangulation relates to more than just validation, it is part of the 
iterative process of interplay between theory and methods in relation to the 
substantive issues. 
On this path, the goal is as much theoretical triangulation as methodological 
triangulation but the two are interlinked. Theoretical triangulation is often considered 
to be the process whereby a researcher approaches their data with various hypotheses 
in n1ind to see how they fare in relation to the data (Denzin 1978). In essence, this is 
akin to the process of eliminating alternative explanations of the data. The use of 
multiple methods is a useful way of undertaking this endeavour, but theory 
development also constitutes a key aspect of methodology in its own right. The 
emergence of the Advocacy Coalition Framework, in light of the theory that there is 
significant conflict of ownership of the drug problem in the history of UK drug 
policy, is indicative of this. 
This discussion of methodology and methods is contextualised by the 
consideration that flexible methods were required, precisely to cater for the 
fluctuation of theories and substantive issues that result from researching a topic in 
104 
real-time. With this in mind, the nature of the research adopted in this project is 
inspired by Wright-Mills' (1959: 139) suggestion that 'in actual practice, every 
working social scientist must be his own methodologist and own theorist'. As 
illustrated, the process of theory development and refinement, in relation to the 
turmoil of evidence, was aided by the use of various methods. The commitment to 
using multiple methods in this research, then, is not down to a technical preference 
for combining favourable research techniques but is driven by the emerging theory. 
4.7 Summary 
As politicised policy-making does not occur in a vacuum, research design should 
factor in any significant developments that emerge concurrently with the research 
process. Broadly speaking, they refer to the widespread renewed interest in wider 
classification issues in light of the initial cannabis reclassification and the 
recognisable conflict of perspectives that both developments entailed. In terms of 
research design, these were accounted for with the changing nature of the interview 
schedule; the primary method of data collection. 
Overall, the data yielded from the sample of interview respondents and 
documents selected, enables some lessons to be learned with regard to the nature of 
evidence in politicised policy subsystems. This, in turn, fulfils one of Hammersley's 
(1992: 68) pre-requisites, that effective social research should be 'relevant to some 
legitimate public concern'. In terms of theory, what emerges is an analysis of the 
tumultuous nature of evidence in politicised areas that focuses on the role and nature 
of evidence therein. Ultimately, it is the methodological buttress of the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework that enables an initial exploration of this and it is to a more 
detailed appreciation of this view of the policy-making process that the discussion 
now turns. 
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5. COALITIONS, APPRECIATIONS AND PERSPECTIVES: JUSTIFYING 
AND MODIFYING THE METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter documented in detail some quandaries when researching policy 
issues in real-time. Various substantive, theoretical and methodological factors were 
discussed in relation to the changing nature of this project. These were primarily a 
product of various occurrences external to the thesis that explicitly impacted on its 
overall direction. The current chapter continues and extends this discussion. In light 
of this, the current chapter is best read in two parts. It is the link between the more 
methodological aspects of the thesis and the more substantive findings, and is 
organised in the following way. Based on the platform provided by Chapters Three 
and Four, first, a revised version of the Advocacy Coalition Framework is presented. 
To reiterate, as the substantive area of investigation - UK drug classification 
concerns the three Cs of competition, conflict and controversy - it was deemed that 
the Advocacy Coalition Framework offers the most effective model of policy 
analysis to illustrate the turmoil of evidence. This is a result of its focus on conflict in 
the policy arena. It has, however, been the subject of much criticism. Based on 
emerging findings from the research, it is claimed that modification of the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework is necessary. This is because first and foremost, it is a model 
used to explain policy change. The current analysis is less concerned with explaining 
policy change but is concerned with the role of conflict in the policy process and the 
impact this has for 'evidence'. Clarification is, therefore, given to the organisation of 
the current subsystem via the introduction of the 'perspectives' that are central to the 
remaining analysis. 
With the organisation of the subsystem outlined, the second part of the 
chapter serves as an introduction for the analysis of subsequent chapters. Central to 
this thesis, as will become clear, is the notion that in politicised policy areas, 
evidence is frequently embedded in the decision-making process, but because of the 
impact of politics and the knock-on effect it has for data production, this nuance is 
often overlooked. It is ultimately suggested that politics impacts on the evidence, 
especially in a heavily-politicised policy subsystem, but that this does not preclude 
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the inclusion of evidence in the decision-making process. Data from the current 
research is also used to illustrate this. 
5.2 Modifying the Framework 
Reviewing a significant proportion of their own work and others (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith 1993b; Sabatier and Zafonte 1995; 1999; Wonte and Sabatier 1998), 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999: 128) suggest that by developing a range of 
techniques such as systematic coding of testimonies given to legislative hearings, 
they have been able to 'confirm the existence of advocacy coalitions'. This statement 
was made in response to numerous commentaries on the framework, which in its 
original form has been the subject of much criticism. 
Schlager (1995: 261) has particularly questioned the efficacy of the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework Model of policy analysis. She states that there are clear issues 
which mitigate the ability for actors to engage in meaningful co-ordinated action, one 
of the central tenets of the model (see Section 3.5.5). She lists three of these: first that 
the transaction costs involved in coming to a common understanding of the policy 
problem are often greater than the pull of co-ordinated activity; second, the difficulty 
of finding policies that fairly address distributional conflicts among coalition 
members are few and far between and; finally, there is a temptation for an individual 
or group to free-ride (adapted from Schlager 1995: 261-2). The upshot of these 
criticisms is that for detractors they serve to erode the cohesion of a coalition's co- 
ordinated activity or even the potential for this. Furthermore, it is suggested by 
Schlager (1995: 262) that there is no reason why actors who share the same beliefs in 
regard to particular policy issues will coordinate activity because of this. There is a 
distinct possibility that this may occur regardless. 
In effect, Schlager (1995) questioned the extent to which the pioneers of the 
approach had empirically tested whether coalitions actually shared similar beliefs, 
and thus engaged in meaningful co-ordinated behaviour. This is particularly pertinent 
because a defining tenet of the Advocacy Coalition Framework is that coalitions are 
glued together by adherence to a set of causal and normative core beliefs (Sabatier 
1987; 1998; Sabatier and Pelkey 1987). Logically, it follows that if there is no such 
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commitment to the belief system, then coalition membership cannot be sustained, 
and ultimately the framework becomes redundant. 
Schlager's (1995) main point is that an actor is often actually constrained by 
the requirement of the organisation to which they belong and this is a stumbling 
block for co-ordinated activity. This could be a result of the fact that first and 
foremost, many individuals or organisations have a commitment to increase their 
6visibility and welfare'. Thus, although they may share similar beliefs with other 
groups, they are actually in competition for resources with them and this becomes the 
defining tenet of the relationship. 
In response, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) point out how their 
understanding of individual motivations is premised on a different set of criteria. 
They also claim that the costs of 'co-ordination' are smaller than Schlager (1995) 
conceives and that Schlager's understanding of the individual draws on Ostrom's 
(1990) theory of Institutional Analysis and Development. Broadly speaking, this 
understanding of the individual is as a rational and 'self-interested' actor. In contrast, 
and as will become more apparent, the Advocacy Coalition Framework understands 
the individual as 'not necessarily preoccupied with maximising their material self- 
interest' (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999: 139). 
Consequently, the Advocacy Coalition Framework, in its later guises, makes 
a distinction between 'material' and 'purposive' groups. Jenkins-Smith and St. Clair 
(1993: 151) offer an explanation of these, suggesting that purposive groups attract 
members usually on the grounds of ideology or policy orientation which they claim 
will benefit society as a whole. On the other hand, material organisations 'pursue 
more narrowly the interests of their members'. This manifests itself in profits for 
shareholders, for example. Distributional conflicts and free riding are more 
associated with material groups whereas policy debates usually relate to purposive 
groups. That said, the authors concede that developing a set of policy proposals that 
negate these issues 'can no longer be assumed away' (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
1999: 138). 
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Additionally, Zafonte and Sabatier (1998) have subsequently made a 
distinction between 'strong' and 'weak' types of co-ordination which are of more 
significance in this thesis. Strong co-ordination requires a 'common plan of action, 
the communication of that plan to, potential coalition members, the monitoring of 
member compliance, and the imposition of sanctions for non-compliance' (Zafonte 
and Sabatier 1998: 480). By contrast, weak co-ordination simply requires 
organisational actors to monitor each others political behaviour and then alter their 
actions 'to make their political strategies complementary with respect . to a common 
goal' (Zafonte and Sabatier 1998: 480). There is clear overlap here with the policy 
networks literature, in particular, the recognition that integration within a coalition or 
network is fundamentally on a scale, as opposed to a zero-sum basis. At its most 
basic level, weak co-ordination presupposes that actors share Policy Core beliefs and 
it is this understanding that is employed in this research. 
In light of the criticisms, however, recent iterations of the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework, in contrast to its earlier incarnations, no longer assume that 
that 'beliefs' are identical across entire coalitions and that the boundaries between 
them are more fluid than early iterations suggested. This is particularly significant for 
the way the Advocacy Coalition Framework is employed in this thesis. It is 
advocated here, therefore, that there is scope for a range of beliefs within a coalition. 
Notwithstanding that some limitations of the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
approach are effectively shown via primary data from the current research, it is 
suggested that these do not necessarily constitute insurmountable problems. 
In this research, for the most part coalition members did share a set of core 
beliefs, which in turn impacted on their understanding of 'evidence'. A solid belief 
system, however, was not necessarily the sole reason why they adhered to a certain 
evidential perspective, as Schlager (1995) suspects. An actor could just as easily be 
part of a recognisable coalition for more pragmatic reasons, such as occupational 
function. According to one journalist and writer on the history of drug use and 
frequent expert witness in criminal proceedings: 
I wouldn't frame it so much in terms of core-beliefs; this is maybe because 
I've been around for ten-years and if you stay involved in this for ten years 
how are you paying the rent? I mean I am doing it on a sort of voluntary 
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basis ... I have known many people in this field, for quite a long time and ... 
I 
often find it hard to identify a real core of moral beliefs there ... Some are 
real expert operators in terms of forming coalitions and seeing where the 
money is going and I think a lot of the people in that central block are like 
that. I don't think that they are there because of any particular core belief 
(RAD4). 
For current purposes, 'that central block' corresponds broadly to the rational 
position in this research. It is suggested here, however, that this does not make the 
visibility of coalitions any less valid. There is still a recognition that the system is 
internally differentiated and it is this that is of prime significance, not the manner in 
which this occurs. 
Although there can be little doubt that the drug classification system debate is 
characterised by competing perspectives with recognisable adherents (see Chapter 
Two), there were further issues which concerned the utility of the framework. In 
particular, there were disagreements in the minds of the respondents in the research 
over whether: a) the policy-making process is as rational as that underpinned by the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework and; b) coalitions are comprised in the manner 
briefly introduced in the previous chapter and expounded below. 
The following exchange between the author and a Director of research from a 
leading Drug Treatment QUANGO is indicative of this. 
MM: My hunch is, with regard to the cannabis reclassification, there were 
three different coalitions involved in the policy debate and you can get a 
perspective of what each coalition was arguing, in relation to where they 
stood with regard to the UN conventions and also the 1971 Misuse of Drugs 
Act. 
RATL9: I don't think policy-making is a rational process in the way that you 
are describing it at all. 
MM: No? 
RATL9: I see it as reactionary, driven by anything from something 
happening 'out there'... Reactions to media stories, or fear reactions from 
politicians about being elected. They need to be seen to be doing 
something ... but basically I don't think that particularly rational policy development happens ... It's messy, it is really messy and it doesn't quite 
work like that. The Government runs with half ideas and pointers in that 
direction or they will go and try something to fill a gap and what have you. 
You have got to kind of run with something sometimes even if you haven't 
got the evidence. 
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Similarly, it was the view of a Chief Executive of a drug prevention policy NGO 
that: 
I wouldn't necessarily use a categorisation, a simple three-tiered approach. I 
think what you are illustrating is that there is a continuum of views and 
perceptions about how we deal with this and that people position themselves 
along that in different ways. I think it is more nuanced than just a simple set 
of three boxes and again I think that is partly a view about moral, cultural 
and philosophical debates with Transform having the Libertarian view in 
contrast to Peter Stoker [chairman of the National Drug Prevention 
Alliance], for example, but also I think there is a pragmatic approach needed 
as to how policy development and change works (RATL13). 
Here, 'Transform' relates to the Transform Drug Policy Foundation (hereafter 
'Transform'), a key organisation within the radical position, with the National Drug 
Prevention Alliance central to the conservative group. For the most part, however, 
these were the minority positions. The following exchange between the author and a 
Director of a drug service provider with experience of Whitehall is indicative of this: 
MM: My understanding of the whole process is that you can really see 
coalitions at work in the process as a result of the cannabis classification and 
review. Where you have got the conservative minded Coalition Against 
Cannabis, as they called themselves, and then on the other side there are 
groups like Transform who are arguing another radical point of view and a 
broader group in the middle. What is your view on this? 
RATL7: The mass are arguing the middle ground who state that this is 
broadly sensible, it's not a step on the route to legalisation. That is what I 
call the groundswell. If you spoke to most university departments, most 
people who had done research in this area and most people who provided 
services to drug users and other public health bodies they broadly say that on 
balance this is not the biggest risk in the world and it is broadly sensible in 
terms of the evidence that we had. At the two ends you had this conservative 
coalition and at the other ends you said you had the Danny Kushlicks 
[Director of Transform] who said well "absolutely but the real thing is to 
take the law away all together". 
In response to whether there were recognisable coalitions in the field, along 
the lines of the ones alluded to above, according to one leading academic in the drugs 
research field and adviser to the Scottish Government on drug matters: 
I think my sense is, although I wasn't really privy to the discussions of the 
ACMD, my sense is there are distinct groupings each of which in a sense Jay 
claim to evidence most of which to a degree that is not at all clear and are 
being driven by other sets of ideas and ideologies and it is a bit of a melting 
pot of very different groups (CON4). 
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There is one final, pivotal point in the demarcation of the current research 
from the conventional Advocacy Coalition Framework approach. This relates to the 
notion of 'coalitions'. As illustrated above, 'coalitions' assume a significant degree 
of co-ordinated activity. In the current research, this was open to significant debate. 
In essence, other explanations were given and had more credence as to why 
recognisable perspectives were noticeable in the policy process, which relate more to 
occupational necessity and political manoeuvring. Thus, although there was some 
notion of a sharing of resources and interdependence, this was not necessarily the 
glue which held them together, as the Advocacy Coalition Framework maintains. 
To speak of 'coalitions' is, therefore, inherently problematic. As an 
alternative, the term 'perspectives' is favoured here as an explanatory mechanism. 
Perspectives do not presuppose the same amount of co-ordinated activity from 
actors. In this regard, they more accurately reflect the muddled through, ad hoc 
nature of policy-making in this area. The notion of perspectives is informed by what 
Vickers (1965) has termed 'appreciative systems'. These involve: 
... making ajudgement of 
fact about the 'state of the system, both internally 
and in its external relations. I will call these reality judgments. These include 
judgements about what the state will be or might be on various hypotheses 
as well as judgements of what it is and has been. They may be thus actual or 
hypothetical, past, present or future. It also involves making judgments 
about the significance of these facts to the appreciator or to the body for 
whom the appreciator is made. Thesejudgments I will call valuejudgments. 
Reality judgments and value judgments are inseparable constituents of 
appreciation ... (Vickers 1965: 40). 
The incorporation of appreciations is intended to pacify critics of the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework who are troubled by its rationalist assumptions. Appreciations 
and perspectives build into the analysis the aforementioned notion that there are 
'fuzzy' boundaries between groups in the policy subsystem. In essence, actors could 
be located in a certain perspective in terms of Deep and Policy Core beliefs but 
Secondary Aspects may be consistent with other groups. As will subsequently 
become apparent, similar appreciations of 'evidence' can be ascertained across the 
policy subsystem. 
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It is then to illustrate the nuances of 'evidence' that 'appreciations' and 
'perspectives' form the basis of the reworking of the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework. The three-tier belief system structure of the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework is maintained, however, as a key aspect of the analysis. The advantage of 
pursuing this path is that it helps to incorporate the inevitable spectrum of views on 
topics from within the various perspectives, and also provides a useful tool for 
highlighting similarities across the subsystem. 
As a result of such issues, the Advocacy Coalition Framework is utilised here 
as a middle-range theory (Merton 1968) explaining the role of conflict in policy 
debates, in this case about evidence. This differs from the approach adopted by the 
creators of the framework, and selected followers, who have put its assumptions to 
empirical test in a bid to ascertain a literal explanation of the nature of the policy 
process and the conditions that result. in policy change. The framework used here 
also combines the existing and emerging theory of weaker co-ordinated activitý 
between individuals in a coalition with the emerging data, in the spirit of what 
Layder (1998) has termed 'adaptive theory'. Grouping together certain organisations 
with others often involves some arbitrary distinction and may lead to unions that are 
uncomfortable on the part of those involved. This latter problem is particularly acute 
in highly polemical policy debates such as illicit drug policy. With this re-working, it 
is claimed that as a mechanism for highlighting the conflicting nature of policy 
debates within a wider environment of inclusion, the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
cannot be surpassed amongst its pluralist peers. 
5.3 The Organisation of the Subsystem 
Along with recognition of the three-tiered belief system structure, an explanation is 
required of the actual participants of this particular subsystem. Interested parties in 
UK drug classification issues have previously been identified, but how these fit into 
the framework is our present concern. Adapting the work of Goddard (1997), the 
various actors in this particular policy subsystem are split into two identifiable parts: 
'interest groups' and 'official organisations' (see Tables 5.1,5.3 and 5.5). For the 
purposes of this research 'interest groups' refer to any organisation (usually not for 
profit), ranging from the tightly to the loosely organised. They are determined to 
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impact on policy through advocacy, whilst remaining independent of the political 
arena. An 'official organisation' shares many of the same traits but is answerable to, 
or linked with, certain agencies of the 'State' in some manner, most obviously 
through being the beneficiary of central funding. 
Goddard's (1997) work on belief systems in post-war criminal justice policy- 
making, incorporated Political Parties into the analysis. One paradox of the UK drug 
classification debate, however, is that although it is highly politicised, the stances of 
Political Parties are non-partisan. In effect, differences within Political Parties are 
frequently greater than those across the political spectrum. In the subsequent 
discussion, mention is given to how certain perspectives have an affinity with 
'traditional' Party political stances, with the caveat that there are caveats in this. 
There is correspondence between the sample of interviewees and the formation of 
perspectives. Without revealing too much information that could jeopardise 
anonymity, the respondents were in some way affiliated to at least one of the key 
organisations cited in Table 4.2, either directly or in partnership within a wider 
organisation. 
Perspective membership, as has been alluded to previously, was identified 
from a sample of statements (both written and oral) given to previous UK 
Parliamentary Select Committee Report§ covering similar terrain to the current 
inquiry, namely the Home Affairs Committee (2002) and the Science and 
Technology Committee (2006). In substantive terms, belief system structures relate 
to appreciations of the role of evidence in the cannabis reclassification (Chapter Six) 
and also in the broader drug classification system (Chapter Seven). All perspectives 
start from the premise that the relationship between evidence and policy in this area 
is disorderly because alcohol and tobacco, the most widely used substances (along 
with caffeine) and generally regarded as the two substances which cause the most 
harm, (for example by causing drug-related deaths), are absent from the 1971 Misuse 
of Drugs Act. In this regard, all perspectives are, to varying degrees, critical of the 
&official' Government line with regard to the efficacy of the UK drug classification 
system and its associated evidence base. 
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A recent statement on the Government position in relation to the 1971 Misuse 
of Drugs Act is expressed by Vernon Coaker MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary at 
the Home Office, who has suggested that: 
The Government maintain that the classification system has withstood the 
test of time and that it continues to discharge its function fully and 
effectively. Its single purpose is to provide a legal framework in which 
criminal penalties are set by reference to the harmfulness of a drug to the 
individual and to society, and to the type of illegal activity undertaken ... Our 
tri-partite classification system allows clear and meaningful distinctions to 
be made between drugs. Its familiarity and brand recognition should not be 
dismissed (Hansard 2007, June 14). 
This position - that the current system is fit for purpose - is understandable and to be 
expected in that countenancing any radical change to drug legislation, in the current 
climate, is not, for a politician, conducive to furthering ones career. As we shall see, 
this kind of pragmatism is the crux of the issue in this area. 
All the perspectives, then, are founded on general ontological or 
philosophical ideas and beliefs about the nature of the drug problem and what it is 
that the classification system is supposed to do. These ideas and beliefs can be 
described as 'ideological' (Deep Core). There is also significant debate as to whether 
the reclassification of cannabis was evidence-based and whether the overall 
classification system is evidence-based (Policy Core). The Deep and Policy Core 
beliefs of each perspective are presented in table form (see Tables 5.2,5.4 and 5.6). 
Each perspective, as indicated, also entails a range of opinions or appreciations 
(Secondary Aspects) on the kinds of evidence that were or ought to have been used 
in the cannabis and wider drug classification decisions. An illustration of these is 
considered throughout the analysis. Bearing this in mind, it is to each perspective that 
we now turn. 
S. 3.1 The Radical Perspective 
The radical perspective is comprised of various NGOs and supporters concerned with 
significantly reforming UK drug legislation. Their aim is the abandonment of the 
prohibition of illegal substances. Table 5.1 highlights the key players in this group. 
In terms of the sample, four respondents were located in this perspective, with one 
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respondent (RAD3/RATL4) leaning towards the rational position. The appreciations 
of this perspective are consistent with the smaller political parties in the UK such as 
the Green Party and, in a partial way, the Liberal Democrats, with fringe support in 
the main Parties. No 'official organisation' is located in this perspective as, 
historically, advocating the legalisation of drugs has precluded organisations from 
receiving large sums of public money; a product of the politics of electoral anxiety. 
Conversely, it has traditionally been the way to achieve widespread vilification in the 
media. 
The radical perspective occupies a position in the drug policy debate that was 
at one time considered extreme. Consequently, its adherents occupied a pariah status 
and this stance is still unpalatable for most decision makers in positions of power. In 
recent years, there are signs that this is changing, typified by the increasing media 
profile of members of the group and a space opening up for informed debate as to the 
opportunity to deregulate certain illicit substances, both domestically (Home Affairs 
Committee 2002) and internationally (see Section 2.4.3). This is compounded by the 
fact that as of August 2007, 'Transfonn' were granted consultative status at the 
United Nations. 
Table 5.1: Radical Perspective Composition 
Interest Groups Official ' 
Or anisations 





Table 5.2: Overview of the Radical Perspective Belief System Structure 
Deep Core Policy Core 
Minimise drug Cannabis 
related barm via a reclassification not 
humane and useful 'evidence-based' but 
regulatory system of broadly a step in the 
drug control right direction for 
culminating with the UK drug 
abolition of classification; wider 
prohibition. Less classification (1971 
emphasis on Misuse of Drugs Act) 
enforcement as drugs system primarily not 
an inevitable feature evidence-based 
of daily life for many 
Transform are the leading NGO concerned with law reform on the basis of 
legalisation and regulation of all illicit substances. Sharing a similar outlook towards 
the drug problem, it was the view of one Labour MP that the origins of the problem 
with the current drug legislation were clear: 
One thing you can guarantee in politics is that when all parties agree on 
something they are almost certainly wrong ... They did agree in 1971 that 
they needed to have a crackdown on the use of illegal drugs. This was 
promoted by the United Nations and by the United States of America and 
the great dream was that by having harsh laws against the use, manufacture 
and selling of illegal drugs, they would reduce their use. In Britain, we 
tackled this by producing a classification of illegal drugs and that was 
irrational and omitted the dangerous legal drugs. The classification was an 
abject failure and was counterproductive in that when it was introduced in 
197 1, there were a thousand addicts of heroin and cocaine and after 35 years 
of the classification, the number had grown to 280,000 and there was 
certainly a causal link between those two events (RAD2). 
The respondent went on to say: 
There was a recent meeting in Maastricht ... supported by the international Red Cross and Red Crescent organisations. [It said] that we have got to drop 
the prohibitionist policies - they don't work. Most of Europe and the rest of 
the world are not ready for the pragmatic policies of the Benelux countries 
and so we have got to find a middle way through this which concentrates on 
health, and we've got to get universal support. At the moment we are signed 
up, all the United Nations countries are signed up to a policy set in 1998, 
that we will work towards the elimination of the use, or a very substantial 
reduction in the use, of illegal drugs and this was a ten-year strategy. Those 
ten years are up in 2008 and we haven't made an inch of progress towards 
that aim. Let alone eliminating drugs, we haven't reduced them in any way. 
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The situation is very much the same, if anything slightly worse than it was in 
1998, so the United Nations and all the countries that are signed up to its 
policies are on a course that is completely impossible (RAD2). 
The pragmatism of the Benelux countries is actually the compromise position 
for the radical perspective. The starting point of their analysis is that drug use is an 
inevitable part of existence for certain individuals predisposed to this activity. This 
has the outcome that there is some inevitability about the place of drugs in society. 
This is an interesting point of comparison between the perspectives. Much of the 
core beliefs of the radical perspective relate to the futility of the current 1971 Misuse 
of Drugs Act framework, stemming from the view that the current system does not 
effectively carry out its deterrent function. The radical group are not alone in 
surmising this, but are unique in their suggestion that the cause of this state of affairs 
relates to the ineffectiveness of using a criminal justice mechanism to control what 
is, essentially, a public-health issue. For thinkers in this perspective, this is the 
epitome of a prohibitionist paradigm, which is itself an 'evidence-free zone' (Rolles, 
et al. 2006: 6). With this in mind, the Deep Core beliefs of this perspective are 
expressed by ajournalist and writer with a long-standing interest in the drugs debate: 
I think it is a curious warping effect that the health debate has because, as far 
as I am concerned, it is not about arguing that drugs should be legal because 
they are safe, that is kind of back-to-front. If there are more concentrated 
and different forms of cannabis on the street, that is precisely because we 
have an illegal market in which we can't intervene and which is driven by, 
in the case of Skunk, those people who are growing a dozen plants in their 
back bedroom. And you get five-times as much money out of a very strong 
Skunk plant than you do out of a mellow old-school weed, and that is why 
we have got stronger stuff on the street. But there is a moral and ideological 
debate in disguise where politicians pass the buck to health professionals 
and ... ACMD become the kind of arbiters of this. Ministers, instead of 
taking a moral stand, say "well we act on the advice of our medical 
authorities" (RAD4). 
Thus, for the radical perspective, a new framework is required that would 
enable State regulation of the currently illicit drugs market. This solution equates to a 
policy position that states not only is the current system an ineffective deterrent, but 
it actually causes many problems associated with drugs, as alluded to above. 
Consequently, policy reformulations that involve existing tweaks to the legislation, 
such as cannabis reclassification, do not radically alter the framework of the 1971 
Misuse of Drugs Act. Ultimately, this means that the current system cannot be 
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'evidence-based'. Again, this is linked to the evidence surrounding the deterrent 
effect. The above respondent continues: 
... As regards questions about what is the evidence-base for the classification 
system acting as a deterrent. The answer is there is no evidence base for that. 
But the government response was "yes we are a bit short of evidence for that 
and we will go out and get some evidence supporting that view and we will 
get back to you" so, you know, I think it is difficult for drug policy to be 
evidence-based if it is not prepared to countenance a profound rethink 
(RAD4). 
In this sense, the radical perspective has a clear line on the nature of evidence 
in this subsystem. There is some acceptance that analyses of the risks associated with 
the drugs themselves, for example, in terms of toxicology, is a necessary 
development and played a role in the proceedings. Ultimately, though, the system is 
seen as being evidence-free. This will become clearer in subsequent chapters, -when 
the issue of cannabis reclassification and drug classification are discussed in more 
detail. Overall, however, there is also a more definite understanding that 'evidence' 
should be of the evaluative kind relating to the overall efficacy of the 1971 Misuse of 
Drugs Act as a deterrent, 'or at least, evidence relating to the efficacy of the current 
policy. 
5.3.2 The Rational Perspective 
Comprising of actors from a range ofbackgrounds and disciplines, the rational 
perspective is the broadest in the subsystem. This is reflected in the sample, with 
thirteen respondents affiliated to this group, one of whom had conservative leanings 
(RATLIO/CON4). In the words of a senior figure in a leading drug treatment NGO 
(RAD3/RATL4), it constitutes, although not solely, the drug policy 'establishment', 
and 'critical friends' of government. Table 5.3 highlights how it also includes many 
members of the ACMD and a-number of official organisations and other NGOs, 
often the recipients of central funding. These include 'DrugScope', the 'National 
Treatment Agency' and the 'Association of Chief Police Officers', amongst others. 
Additionally, more independent bodies such as the Royal Society of Arts and the 
newly formed United Kingdom Drug Policy Commission share, to a degree, the 
same philosophical standpoint. 
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This is a perspective that promotes, as Table 5.4 illustrates, a Deep Core view 
that drug treatment is as an effective way of managing the drug problem. In party 
politics, support for this stance has usually been linked with Liberal Democrat 
policy, but has also been shared by some of the Labour Party and less of the 
Conservative Party. Within most administrations, before and since 1971, this has 
been the favoured policy direction of the Department of Health. Many members of 
this perspective also come from 'academic scientific' backgrounds. Table 5.4 also 
indicates a set of Policy Core beliefs focusing on anomalies in the location of certain 
drugs within the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act, which undermines its credibility. 
Table 5.3: Rational Perspective Composition 
Interest Groups Official 
Organisations 
UK Harm Reduction ACMD, National 
Alliance, Treatment Agency, 
International Harm Association of Chief 
Reduction Police Off icers, 
Association, The Traditionally the 
Beckley Foundation, Department of 
DrugScope, United Health 
Kingdom Drug 
Policy Commission, 
Table 5.4: Rational Perspective Belief System Structure 
I 
Deep Core Policy Core 
Promotion of human Cannabis 
rights and public reclassification 
health placing primarily 'evidence- 
treatment at the based' as a step 
centre of the drug towards ironing out 
strategy (Harm 1971 Misuse of 
Reduction) as drug Drugs Act's 
use is an inevitable anomalies; wider 
part of everyday life classification system 
for many. Using increasingly 
evidence to inform evidence-based 
policy by ironing out 
anomalies of existing 
framework 
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Further features of the rational perspective reveal that this group sees the 
cannabis reclassification as a broadly 'evidence-based' decision, signalling an 
attempt to eradicate one, such anomaly. The core beliefs of this perspective reflect its 
composition of leading figures in the drug policy establishment, such as the ACMD 
and the National Treatment Agency. In this sense, the starting point for what 
constitutes the 'drug problem' demarcates them from their conservative counterparts, 
and links them to the radical perspective, in that drug use is inevitable for certain 
individuals. According to one Head of Publishing for a leading drug information 
charity: 
We start from a position that ... the reality is that as a species we have got a 
very long history of a desire to alter consciousness and take mood enhancing 
drugs whatever they are, and you ain't never going to stop that from 
happening. Therefore, if you are never going to stop it from happening, 
what's the next thing that you do? Well, you try and mitigate the risks and 
dangers that people will be putting themselves through, as a result of using 
both as individuals and for communities and society at large, and in the 
process of doing that you have to weigh up all sorts of different things. 
Community safety against human rights, and all of that kind of stuff, which 
is why we sign up to a harm reduction agenda, so that is where we come 
from (RATL8). 
Different manifestations of what constitutes harm reduction are discussed in 
Chapter Seven. For now, this understanding maintains that drug harms can be 
reduced by introducing public-health responses to the drug problem, such as 
methadone maintenance programmes for heroin users, whilst simultaneously 
maintaining the criminal-justice framework and prohibiting other kinds of substance 
use and possession. It is clear that this view has an impact on the actual minutiae of 
the Deep Core belief of this perspective, which is succinctly described by the 
Director of a Leading Drug Treatment QUANGO: 
I think it is very rare that the law is based on evidence actually. I don't think 
we quite know what we are trying to achieve, which doesn't help. Are we 
trying to contain? Are we trying to punish? Are we trying to prevent 
harmT. 1 think that the only bit that is evidence-based is around drug 
treatment actually, because if you look at the four strands of the drug 
strategy, the only one where there is any real coherent evidence of any 
quality is around drug treatment having an impact on health and crime 
(RATL9). 
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On one level, such a statement is to be expected when its origins are taken 
into consideration. A particular appreciation on the nature of evidence, however, 
emerges from this perspective. Although not directly linked to the goal of drug 
treatment, it advocates a similar use of evidence. This concerns that which makes the 
current system as efficacious as possible, without implementing a radical overhaul of 
the legislation. It was the view of one forensic scientist and member of the ACMD 
technical committee that: 
... one of the problems is the historic drug classification system is riddled 
with anomalies. So there are two aspects to it; one is looking at the evidence 
which surrounds any particular drug which is being considered at the 
moment, to establish the degree of harm or potential harm. But you have 
then got to calibrate that against, a not quite random, but a good scatter in 
terms of where the existing classified drugs actually sit in a harm 
classification status spectrum. One of the initiatives which the current head 
of the ACMD technical committee has taken on board is to take a root and 
branch look at how classifications look. To start to build up a firm evidence 
base because the classification system came through a whole raft of 
historical issues. And when you take a cold, hard look at it, there are some 
spectacular anomalies in there. Why is something a class A? Why is 
something else only a class C? It just doesn't seem to fit. So Professor Nutt, 
one of his initiatives when he took over the role of chainnan was to say "we 
really need to start looking at this and can we get some kind of more 
structured approach as to how drugs are classified? " (RATU). 
The work of Professor Nutt, et al. (2007), (hereafter referred to as the 'Nutt, 
et al. matrix') is also explored in more detail subsequently. It was, however, a key 
development in real-time research, as it was published alongside other critical studies 
of the current operation of the UK drug classification; namely the Royal Society of 
Arts report (2007). The Nutt, et al. matrix proposed an alternative to the current 
classification system. Here, all legal drugs, along with tobacco and alcohol would be 
placed in a scale according to the harm they cause drug users. This would, in turn, be 
decoupled from the associated penalties. 
The authors identified three main categories of harm. These include: a) 
physical, which is an assessment of the propensity of the drug to cause physical 
harm, for example, damage to organs and systems. There are three separate aspects 
to this. First, acute physical harm this is the immediate effects linked to the notion of 
overdose. Second, chionic physical harm this is the health consequences of repeated 
use, such as the link between cannabis and psychosis and, finally, specific problems 
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associated with intravenous drug use; b) dependence, which entails the relationship 
between the pleasurable effects of the drug and its propensity to induce dependent 
behaviour both psychologically and physically and; c) social harrns, which occur in 
various ways, for example with intoxication impacting on family, community and 
social life through costs to systems of health and social care and the police (Nutt, et 
al. 2007). 
As a brief snapshot, the Nutt, et al. matrix provides a contrast to the current 
location of certain drugs in the ABC system of the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Acts. 
According to another forensic scientist and current member of the ACMD technical 
committee: 
From the work we did in this risk assessment exercise, starting in 2000, what 
we did was we looked at 20 substances over a period of a couple of years, 
we usually examine a few substances at each meeting. This process was 
presented as evidence to the [Science and Technology] Select 
Committee ... Without going into the details of the risk assessment process 
we scored these 20 substances in a single dimension of scale and came out 
with the conclusion that the rank order had no correlation with the status of 
the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act. Notable exceptions were ecstasy which we 
scored fairly low yet it's a class A drug and there were some anomalies in 
the other direction as well we felt that barbiturates were under classified and 
far more dangerous but the situation is that barbiturates are a pretty unusual 
substance these days but overall there was no good correlation with the 
classification in the act. That didn't come as too great a surprise to us as we 
knew that the original classifications were not really evidence-based we also 
have to say that the evidence oiý the toxicology, pharmacology and all the 
rest of it of these drugs has built up over the years (RATLI). 
A more detailed picture of the Nutt, et al. matrix is included in Appendix IV. 
it will suffice to say here that although there are many similarities between the work 
of Nutt, et al. and the Royal Society of Arts report, there are numerous differences. 
Indeed, the former operates within the broader substantive framework of the 1971 
Misuse of Drugs Act but suggests that it needs arnmending, whereas the latter is 
more explicit in advocating its repeal and replacement with a Misuse of Substances 
Act: 
The new Misuse of Substances Act should acknowledge that, whether we 
like it or not, drugs are and will remain a fact of life. On that basis, the aim 
of the law should be to reduce the amounts of harms caused to individuals, 
their friends and family, their children and their communities, certainly by 
alerting people to the risks of using potentially harmful drugs as far as that is 
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possible. The use of criminal sanctions should be confined to the 
punishment of those'offences connected with drugs that cause the most 
harm, and only the most serious drugs-related offences should attract 
custodial sentences - and those sentences should be long rather than short 
(Royal Society of Arts 2007: 14-5). 
The Royal Society of Arts report also offers some novel suggestions for the 
direction of UK drug policy such as 'requiring ministers to take into account the best 
available scientific evidence relating to drugs and their use' and if this is not done 
then for ministers to 'state formally and publicly' theiý reasons (Royal Society of 
Arts 2007: 15). Both reports are, however, consistent with the rational perspective, in 
that evidence is linked to the working out of the toxicological properties of certain 
substances, which are then calibrated against other ones to show where they should 
fit into a system of drug control legislation that maintains the prohibition of drugs. 
The philosophy underpinning this perspective is one that operates within the 
paradigm of prohibition. For the radical perspective, as we have seen, this is not the 
best platform on which to deal with the drug problem. The terrain marked out by the 
rational perspective differs, then, in many respects from the radical one, even though 
there is an acceptance by both that drug use is an inevitable feature of contemporary 
society. The primary difference is that the rational perspective operates within the 
current prohibitionist 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act framework, whereas the radical 
perspective wishes to transcend this. An alternative perspective is provided by the 
conservative contingent, who stress that more emphasis on drug prevention is a 
desirable policy direction. 
5.3.3 The Conservative Perspective 
The conservative perspective consists primarily of actors advocating drug 
prevention, education messages. They also have a strong emphasis on determined 
law-enforcement as the most effective means of dealing with the drug problem. 
Table 5.5 illustrates that members include the 'National Drug Prevention Alliance' 
and the 'Coalition Against Cannabis', amongst others. In terms of the fieldwork 
sample, seven respondents were allied to this perspective, one of whom had leanings 
towards the rational perspective (CON7/RATL14). 
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Politically, the philosophy of this group corresponds with that of the 
mainstream of the two main political parties, although there are signs that this is 
wavering and this does not translate into widespread support via central funding. The 
Home Office's law-and-order philosophy is particularly consistent with this 
perspective, although recently there are signs that this also is beginning to change. 
Table 5.6 suggests that the conservative perspective holds a set of beliefs within this 
subsystem farthest away from the radical perspective, although there are a few 
common threads that can be identified between them. Key to both perspectives is the 
belief that the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act is fundamentally flawed and more 
specifically that the decision to reclassify cannabis was fundamentally not 'evidence- 
based'. For the conservative perspective, however, this is because the 1971 Misuse of 
Drugs Act is too complex and needs to go back to basics. This requires a much 
simpler system such as the Swedish approach, still based on prohibition where, 
broadly speaking, the only distinction between substances is those that are legal and 
illegal and where drug education is premised on the principles of harm reduction, 
which equates to drug prevention. 
Table 5.5: The Conservative Perspective Composition 
Interest Groups Official 
Organisations 
The Coalition (Traditionally) Home 





Table 5.6: The Conservative Perspective Belief System Structure 
Deep Core Policy Core 
To promote drug free Reclassification of 
healthy and wholesome cannabis 
lifestyles through drug fundamentally not 
enforcement/prevention evidence-based nor 
and education (Harm a step in the right 
Reduction). Drug use direction; 
not an inevitable aspect classification system 
of daily life not evidence-based 
125 
The first point to note about the conservative perspective is that unlike the 
other groups, there is a reluctance to accept that drug use is an inevitable aspect of 
social life. Therefore, drug prevention should be the overall, and most desirable, 
direction for drug policy. This, in their own words, puts them at odds with the rest of 
the policy subsystem and even from the Parliamentary process which is increasingly 
sympathetic to this view. The Deep Core beliefs of this perspective are best 
illustrated in the following quotation from a retired senior officer in Customs and 
Excise and leading figure from an established UK drug prevention NGO: 
I have a feeling that drugs are harmful, illegal drugs are harmful, so 
Government, ACMD and senior police officers, indeed everyone, ought to 
be very careful about what they say and do less they make the situation 
worse and Blunkett made the situation worse. [Reclassifying cannabis] 
[flrorn B to C was damaging (CON6). 
This is supported by data from an ex-Chief Constable and current consultant 
to the United Nations on drugs and security who stated: 
... you have got to ask the question 
in the first place, why are we classifying 
drugs, what is the purpose of classifying them? Is it by the nature of their 
harm? Is it by their ingredients? Is it by the commonality of their use? Is it 
by the way that they are marketed? ... maybe I am being simplistic but I don't know why in enforcement terms, which is what we are talking about 
primarily ... why you need to classify drugs because police officers don't go 
out and say "right today I am going to investigate class A drugs", you go out 
saying that you suspect somebody is trafficking drugs so let's see what they 
are up to? And if it turns out to be a class C drug or a class A drug the 
procedures and the consequences and penalties are very similar. Maybe the 
classification influences judges and they say that this is a particularly 
horrible drug and you get an extra two years in jail but I don't think so and I 
don't think it matters. I think each case needs to be considered individually 
and thejudge and thejury are capable. of deciding the nature of the harm in 
the context of the case (CON5). 
As a result, it is a commonly held view that the understanding of 'evidence' 
related to this position, is not considered in debates about UK drug policy that occur 
at the level of central Government. This is reflected in the Deep Core views of the 
perspective. According to one GP and committee member of a Christian 
campaigning group: 
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In my submission [to a Parliamentary Select Committee] I basically 
mentioned the Swedish approach, which basically has just one group of 
illegal drugs, rather than saying A is more dangerous than B or C because I 
think it is very problematic, like comparing apples and pears. You end up 
with endless debates about whether cannabis is more dangerous than 
amphetamines or amphetamines are more dangerous than cannabis and I 
think it also leads to confusion and in the end you need to give a clear 
message that drugs are dangerous and if you have a certain amount of drugs, 
a small amount is for personal use and if you have a large amount then you 
are a potential drug dealer and have penalties associated with that. That is 
the approach, they use in Sweden and looking at the data it seems to work 
(CON 1). 
Another key concern for the conservative perspective, then, is that the current 
system has the propensity to send out misleading messages to drug users about the 
dangers of drugs. This is a particularly acute issue when there are calls for a 
reclassification downwards of drugs within the existing framework. 
I was against it because I thought the downgrading was going to send mixed 
messages to young people and indeed the government accepted that when 
they did their review and went back to the ACMD, you have got Charles 
Clarke effectively saying "we fucked up". We made a mistake. He wasn't in 
sympathy with it. The intelligence that reaches me is that it was sold to 
[Tony] Blair on the basis of a package of things, one of which would be 
reducing crime through more prescription of heroin ... I don't have any 
particularly strong views about the drug classification system, I don't think 
it is that important. I think it is much more important about clear messages. 
Moving things up or down does send a signal (CON6). 
The problem of down classifying drugs, within the 1971 Misuse of Drugs 
Act, from the conservative perspective, is that it is contrary to the emerging 
evidence-base relating to the substances themselves. This is a key distinction that 
marks this perspective out from the radical group, for example. For the 
conservatives, the harm of drugs stems from the innate properties of the substances 
themselves. For the radical group, the main dangers of drugs are a product of their 
(il)legal status. According to the UK representative of international Drug Prevention 
NGO: 
... they [the Government] just don't take the evidence on board. I mean I 
wish they would just do what Sweden does. All drugs are the same because 
cannabis, for somebody with one of these genes, is more dangerous than 
probably even heroin, heroin can be prescribed in a hospital safely, you are 
never going to get a proper hierarchy of harms. There must be hours and 
hours and hours spent arguing this amongst people who, half of them don't 
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know what they are talking about anyway. It would just be so simple if you 
said that all drugs are the same (CON3). 
This relates to the point mentioned previously concerning how this position is 
frequently neglected in recent drug policy debates. Similarly, when the deliberations 
for the report of the influential United Kingdom Drug Policy Commission (Reuter 
and Stevens 2007) were taking place, these were viewed with some scepticism on 
behalf of the conservative perspective. In the words of a previous respondent: 
My expertise is in the drugs market and she [the Chair of the Commission] 
has never taken evidence from me, I am pretty noisy and well known. 
Nobody has invited me and I am not difficult to find. Nobody has taken 
evidence from [our organisation's Director] and hý knows about treatment 
and he knows about Prevention. They say that prevention doesn't work, well 
it does work because ultimately drug use occurs because of peer pressure 
and we need to give people confidence to resist peer pressure (CON6). 
It is clear, therefore, that the conservative perspective has a clearly demarcated set of 
core beliefs. On the whole, there are many more differences and conflicts that have 
been made visible here. 
From the overview of the structure of the subsystem, it is apparent that 
central to each perspective is a range of views about the nature of evidence in this 
particular area. It must be stressed, however, that although lines of demarcation 
between the perspectives have been illustrated in the above discussion, there are also 
lines of consensus within the subsystem over certain issues, in particular, the context 
in which the debate takes place. 
5.4 The Impact of Politics, the Media and Public Opinion: Contextualising 
Evidence Utilisation in Heavily Politicised Areas 
As has been alluded to throughout and will be explored subsequently, in politicised 
areas, evidence is frequently conceived in zero-sum terms. It is suggested here that 
this is because the omnipotence of politics looms large over this area. It is 
intrinsically linked to sensationalist media reporting which is a product of, but also 
impacts on, public perceptions. Despite being a policy area characterised by the three 
Cs, the impact of politics on policy, somewhat ironically, constitutes on one level, an 
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area of consensus across this particular policy subsystem. Even though politics is 
prevalent, a further claim of this research is that evidence is still embedded in the 
decision-making process. This nuance is, however, not necessarily realised by those 
engaged in the policy process. This is intriguing because by recognising the 
centrality of politics in decision-making, there is recognition of other factors, other 
than evidence, impacting on the decision-making process. The following exchanges 
offer a glimpse of the differing appreciations of these issues. 
In response to a question concerning agenda setting in the area of drug 
classification, it was the view of one member of the radical perspective, the Director 
of a leading NGO in the treatment sector that: 
There is not a simple answer to that but ... you have got basic science that 
changes our understandings about risks and harms and that, in turn, can 
change the agenda. But in turn that requires the Cabinet Office or the Home 
Office to take note of that and is contingent on the media. So it is a sort of 
constellation of those things. So science, media and advisers, but if that 
doesn't fit with the broader political process then you are still not going to 
get it (desired policy change], those different components are all necessary 
but alone are not sufficient (RAD3/RATL4). 
Similarly, when asked whether the respondent thought the decision to reclassify 
cannabis drew on the available evidence at the time, as stated by the Levitt, et al. 
(2006) report - produced for the Science and Technology Committee Report - it was 
the view of a colleague of the then Home Secretary David Blunkett that: 
They are probably right, but the decision was still a politician's decision. 
Certainly the evidence was there. I supported it at the time and it was a rare 
event where the Home Secretary was in possession of an intelligent idea 
(RAD2). 
There is an assumption from the radical perspective that evidence of some 
variety fought for attention alongside the politics of the issue. Members of the 
rational perspective, in contrast to those of a more radical persuasion, are more 
optimistic about the use of evidence in drug classification policy formulation, 
although the impact of the political process was not lost on them either. Witness the 
following exchange between the author and a Director of a leading Drug Treatment 
QUANGO: 
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MM: Your understanding of the evidence-base for the classification system 
would be along the lines of .. getting the right science 
behind the harms and 
matching it to where they should be in the system? 
RATL9: Yeah, but I don't think it is possible actually. 
MM: You don't? 
RATL9: The principle is good though but I just don't think that we have got 
the evidence and I don't think that we look at it the right way and because 
people are frightened around drugs, or lots of people are frightened around 
drugs, there is lots of politics involved because it is the kind of thing that the 
media pick up on and the general public pick up on and it wins and loses 
elections. 
Correspondingly, in response to a question detailing the relationship between 
evidence and policy with recourse to the overall classification system, it was the 
view of a one time senior government adviser that: 
... you know, when evidence needs to 
be taken into consideration and 
political realities have to be taken into consideration, politics almost always 
wins. But that is not to say that the system that was set up for classifications 
was designed as an evidence-based system ... There is a scientific process 
either internal or external and at any one time there are committees and 
researchers saying "well the evidence behind a certain substance justifies 
class A or justifies class B or j ustif ies class C" that is a process that is 
happening but fundamentally that evidence-based process then gets put into 
a political process and if the politics doesn't fit then the change won't be 
made. But it is actually structured in the law and through the ACMD as an 
"evidence-based" process (RATL7). 
For the conservative perspective, the politics behind the initial reclassification 
of cannabis was the decisive factor in its eventual implementation. For this 
perspective, the decision to initially reclassify cannabis was completely devoid of 
evidence. However, in response to a question concerning the evidence presented 
from the ACMD to the government in the initial classification decision, the following 
respondent, a retired Customs Officer and leading figure in a drug prevention 
organisation, suggested that there was certain selectivity in the evidence utilised. The 
implications of this are discussed in the following chapter. For now, in this scenario, 
the respondent is referring to a group of scientists who had put forward a contrary 
case to the Home Secretary from that of the Government's advisory council: 
All the other people were just as eminent ... and the Home Office refused to 
see them so they wrote a letter to which there were six signatories. The 
Home Office weren't interested in evidence. You are asking about evidence, 
it is inconceivable that what happened with the downgrading would have 
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happened under Jack Straw because of the fuss about Jack Straw and his son 
and so on and so on. So it is inconceivable. So Blunkett gets in and within 
weeks says to the ACMD, well really strangled the ACMD didn't he? I 
mean he may have known he was getting a sympathetic hearing from the 
ACMD and he knew the way the chairman thought. Well he really drove the 
policy of the ACMD? (CONS6). 
As a consequence, their more prevention-based evidence was not deemed to 
be consistent with a predetermined policy direction and was thus ignored by those 
more central to the decision-making process. There are similar misgivings about the 
role of the then Home Secretary David Blunkett, and the advice he was getting at the 
time from other members of this perspective. In reply to whether the respondent 
agreed with the Levitt, et al. (2006) research that the decision to reclassify cannabis 
was "evidence-based', a retired senior police officer and current independent 
consultant to the United Nations stated that: 
I would think, and again I would have no first-hand knowledge that I can 
point to, but based on my professional experience and the way that politics 
was operating at the time I am absolutely convinced that Blunkett had made 
his mind up in advance and he wanted cannabis reclassified for his own 
reasons, and I suspect that that had a lot to do with winning the popular 
youth vote and going with the tide of public and media opinion that is now 
being persuaded that the only way to deal with drugs is to legalise them 
(CONS5). 
In sum, there is, then, a general acceptance across the policy subsystem of the 
role that politics plays in the creation of policy in this area. In turn, this has a knock- 
on effect for the nature of 'evidence' which is particularly complex and relates to 
broader problems with the production of data; that is data that can be used as 
evidence in policy-making. In other words, the arena in which the drug debate takes 
place can lead to significant problems of data gathering in this area. For example, 
data relating to the actual effects of certain drugs is often stifled for ethical reasons 
(Adler 1995). The following extract from the oral evidence sessions of Science and 
Technology Committee (2006) between the Chairman, Phil Willis MP, and the 
Chairman of the ACMD, neatly summarises this issue: 
Q242 Chairman: Our frustration ... is that time and time again you seem to have responded to Members of the Committee that there is a lack of 
evidence or you have agreed that there is a lack of evidence to make certain 
decisions. We want to know why the ACMD has not done more to promote 
research in those areas where there is a lack of evidence. Do you think it is 
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your job to do it or have we misjudged what the purpose of the committee 
is? 
Professor Sir Michael Rawlins: It is arguable whether it is our job. This is 
an area in which it is extraordinarily difficult to do research, not just for 
legal reasons but for real reasons. Would I, for example, be prepared to do 
volunteer studies with Ecstasy? Would I be prepared to give volunteers 
Ecstasy? I could probably get the Home Secretary's approval ... it is possible. I am not sure I would. I do not know what an ethics committee would think 
about it, but how would I think about it? We start getting into very real 
problems of doing research in this area. It is all very well people saying, 
"You should promote research" but you have to promote research that can 
be done, not research that we would just like to see (Science and 
Technology Committee 2006: 77). 
Drug classification is not the only aspect of the area that is beset with 
research difficulties. Similar problems of data gathering span many research 
enterprises and are often, although not solely, related to the way the activity, event, 
behaviour, person or group being researched are stigmatised (Goffman 1963). The 
consequence of this is that the phenomenon is often hidden. Such areas have been 
described as 'sensitive topics' (Lee 1993). Research into sex work (Day and Ward 
2007; Sanders 2006); sex offenders (Levinson and D'Amora 2007) and sexual 
violence (Schwartz 1997) provide some other examples. 
For the current discussion, however, the more pressing concern is 
measurement issues surrounding drug data, which adds another level to the 
complexity of evidence use in this area. Indeed, a current member of the ACMD 
technical committee with a background in forensic science suggested that: 
... there are real issues there with controlled drugs as by its very nature ... it is 
a hidden activity. So it is very difficult to get well-founded evidence, which 
isn't biased by, for example, taking a particular group of people, self- 
declared drug users, in which case, how representative are they of the 
general community? There are a lot of pressure groups active in this area, 
how representative are their views? So getting unbiased results is quite 
difficult and it is not uncommon for the ACMD and its committee's to find 
that there is a gap in the research base. There are things they would like to 
know but there is no published data. I think there will, in the future, be more 
of a drive towards freeing up funds to commission that and certainly the 
indications are that there will be a drive to fill in those research gaps. 
Historically, if the gap was there you had to work Mith what you got 
(RATU). 
The fact that drug use is primarily a hidden activity poses significant 
problems for researchers and contributes to doubts about the evidence-base for 
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policy-making, in this scenario. In terms of general prevalence figures, Newcombe 
(2007) concedes that although more recently technologies for undertaking such a task 
have greatly improved (Frischer, et al. 2001; Stimson, et al. 1997), they are still beset 
with difficulties. For example, they are too narrow in their focus and require, but are 
yet to have agreed upon, 'standardised definitions and conceptual frameworks' 
(Newcombe 2007: 32). There is also a need to 'go beyond the established concepts of 
lifetime, past-year and past-month prevalence of individual drugs to examine the 
prevalence and incidence of different patterns of drugs consumption as they occur in 
real-life' (Newcombe 2007: 32). In addition, consistent with the phenomenological 
critique of measurement in social research (Blumer 1956; Cicourel 1964), 
Newcombe (2007: 33) continues: 
Another key issue is the use of commonsense notions and everyday terms as 
theoretical concepts and research variables. Although this is common 
practice, ordinary language terms are typically laden with value judgements 
and subjective connotations, and so adopting them for scientific usage 
requires that they be given standardised operational definition, ideally within 
a broader conceptual framework. For instance, in the early days of drug 
prevalence research, it was common for surveys to produce estimates/rates 
of "recent" or "current" drug users, without any clear definitions of these 
terms. 
It is important to stress, as Newcombe subsequently does, that recently such 
terms have been replaced with clearer definitions including life-time, past month and 
past year measurements. The juxtaposition of ambiguous measurements alongside 
more precise ones has meant that estimating long-term trends in the nature of drug 
prevalence is, inherently, an inexact science as there is clear disparity over what 
constitutes a 'regular' drug user. Indeed, regular users have been variously defined in 
surveys, as any cases which use between at least three times per year, at least once a 
week, or at least once a month (Newcombe 2007: 34). 
There is clear recognition, and consistency of views, of the problems 
associated with drug data across the policy subsystem. All measures and data of this 
kind filter into the decision-making of policy makers along with anecdotal research 
of people presenting at hospitals, rather than through formalised studies on drug 
effects. Consequently, often the only available data in this area is anecdotal and 
lacking in scientific rigour. This goes some way to explaining the prevalent view- 
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point that UK drug policy is made in a data-free environment. It is argued here, 
though, that this reasoning is problematic as it suggests that the policy area is data- 
free whilst recognising that data of some variety is present in the decision-making 
process. By the way of a neat summary, the complexity of drug data is neatly 
summarised by one current member of the ACMD and an independent consultant 
pharmacist who suggested that: 
... when it is related to drugs and policy, the classification and legislation, it's incredibly foggy to sort out the evidence from what is an opinion or 
something that is in the back of your brain because you heard it once and 
you couldn't remember if it was a scientific journal or the Daily Mail 
(RATL2). 
5.5 Summary 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework is conventionally employed in the analysis of 
policy-making over the time-span of a decade or more. This is the time it takes to 
complete the 'policy cycle'. Although, in part, there is a current concern with the 
issue of policy change - in the form of cannabis reclassification - the primary focus is 
on the role and nature 'evidence', as understood by various individuals and groups in 
the policy arena. Allied to this point, is the view that even though the origins of the 
cannabis reclassification can be traced back to the aforementioned Police Foundation 
Report (2000), the renewed interest in drug classification is a more recent 
occurrence. Furthermore, it has already been suggested that the policy cycles relate 
to a more conventional view of the policy process. This is not consistent with the 
nature of politicised policy areas, which do not conform to this. 
From this overview of the structure of the subsystem, it is apparent that 
central to each perspective is a range of views about the nature of evidence in this 
particular area. There is, however, some consistency as to the relationship between 
politics and the evidence, with the general recognition that evidence is not the only 
player in the decision-making process. Weiss and Bucuvalas (1980a cited in Booth 
1988: 240) make a similar point: 
People in official positions of power often do not catalogue research 
separately in their minds. They interpret it as they read it in the light of their 
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other knowledge, and they m'erge it with all the information and 
generalisations in their stock. 
From the quotations detailed in the final section of the chapter, two key issues 
can be ascertained that are central to the emerging theory. First, there is a general 
acceptance that politics is central to the decision-making process and that this raises 
difficulties for the nature of evidence-based policy-making, as it has a knock-on 
effect for the kind of data that is available for policy-makers. This makes the zero- 
sum views understandable. Second, there is a clear appreciation that despite the 
politicised nature of thq policy area, evidence is embedded in the decision-making 
process, in spite of views to the contrary by certain groups. In effect, this means that 
politics and evidence are not juxtaposed but that the notion of heavy politicisation 
provides the context in which appreciations of evidence are explored and explained. 
This appreciation is, however, absent from most of the appreciations of the 
relationship illustrated here. 
Overall, the term 'evidence' is, however, often used without caution by 
members of the policy subsystem. This is in spite of the fact that there are already 
noticeably different appreciations over what should count as evidence in the area of 
drug classification policy (a product of differing appreciations of the nature of the 
policy arena) stemming from their core beliefs. In the following chapter, discussion 
turns to the issue of cannabis reclassification to illustrate these claims and also to 
illustrate the complexity and nuance of the relationship between evidence and policy 
in this area. This is achieved with recourse to the re-working of the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework, established at the outset of this chapter. This re-working 
ultimately suggests that the model should be the basis of a middle-range theory 
(Merton 1968), highlighting the significance of conflict in the policy process. It is, 
then, an organisational tool for viewing the conflicting and contrasting ways in which 
4evidence' is perceived by various members of the UK drug policy subsystem. 
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6. THE NATURE OF EVIDENCE 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter extended the discussion of Chapters Three and Four by 
highlighting how the turmoil of evidence will be explored in this thesis. That is, via a 
modified version of the Advocacy Coalition Framework. This chapter follows on by 
detailing the relationship between the Advocacy Coalition Framework, the UK drug 
classification system and evidence-based policy-making. Although substantively, this 
thesis is generally concerned with issues relating to the wider UK drug classification 
system, this chapter has a 'narrower' focus on the event of cannabis reclassification. 
By focusing on this episode, the concept of evidence is brought to the fore and 
placed under analytical scrutiny. In doing so, the first dimension of the turmoil of 
evidence is introduced; the intricate and disputed nature of evidence in policy. 
As illustrated in the previous chapter, it is contended that evidence is 
multifaceted and that a plurality of it is frequently 'embedded' in policy discussions. 
To illustrate this, the chapter begins - again in the spirit of real-time research - by 
documenting more recent developments relating to the regulation of cannabis in the 
UK. A discussion of the three perspectives' understandings of evidence with regard 
to the cannabis reclassification then follows. This entails an account of the various 
appreciations of what evidence did and did not get used in this particular episode and 
what should have been used. The possibility of the different appreciations of the 
nature of evidence being linked to issues of methodology, under the aegis of a 
discussion of a hierarchy of evidence, is then raised. Finally, some concluding 
remarks are offered. It is the central claim of this chapter that in politicised policy 
areas, zero-sum conceptualisations of the evidence and policy relationship by 
stakeholders and other interested parties are widespread, but these are paradoxical 
and premised on contradictory logic. 
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6.2 Later Developments in the Cannabis Episode 
Whereas an overview of the history of UK drug policy culminating with the 2004 
cannabis reclassification was presented in Chapter Two, this section charts the events 
that occurred in the aftermath of this policy change. The overview of the initial 
cannabis policy change, indicated that for some time, there has been a feeling from 
various stakeholders and others that policy design and implementation, in UK drug 
policy, have been conducted in 'an almost data free environment' (Sutton and 
Maynard 1993: 456). It was suggested, though, that the cannabis change represented 
the conjoining of evidence-based policy with UK drug policy. This was, however, a 
controversial reading of the event. The general concern about the perceived lack of 
evidence in this area of public policy can be witnessed in an extract of a speech given 
in 2002 by Bob Ainsworth MP, then Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Home 
Office and Minister with the drugs brief: 
In 1998 it was decided that a strategic overview was required in an attempt 
to marry together the different elements of government activity relating to 
drugs ... Despite the 
frustration among practitioners caused by the absence of 
pure evidence-based policy formulation some advance was achieved by 
focusing on a holistic approach ... As a result of the thin evidence-base, many 
of the targets set were unrealistically optimistic ... The growing evidence- base should result in more realistic targets and more effective policies 
(Beckley Foundation 2002: 41). 
From this a number of other issues can be inferred. In particular, there is a tacit 
suggestion that, prior to 1998, drug policy was not based on 'evidence' but on 
something else. It is suggested here, by contrast, that actually it was at this stage that 
the relationship between evidence and policy in this area became formalised. 
The 2004 reclassification of cannabis, from class B to class C, is an 
interesting episode in this respect. To recap, the two main triggers for the reform of 
the cannabis laws were the Police Foundation Report's (2000) assertion that cannabis 
reclassification would free up police time, as part of a public management provision. 
This was allied to the 'Brixton Experiment'. The second trigger stemmed from the 
same report's conclusion that cannabis should be reclassified on the premise that, in 
terms of its toxicity or harmfulness, it is not comparable with either class A or B 
drugs. On the back of these findings, the then Home Secretary David Blunkett, 
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advised the Home Affairs Committee that he was 'minded' to downgrade cannabis. It 
is also necessary to comment here that there was no in-built evaluation of the impact 
of reclassification by the Home Office and no Key Performance Indicators identified 
through which to gauge its impact. This resulted in confusion on the purpose of the 
policy change. 
Media reports in the aftermath of the reclassification illustrated that in light of 
the change, arrests initially dropped by a third (BBC 2005a). Bennetto (2004: 13), 
commented that 'in the five months since the law changed, the number of people 
arrested in London for cannabis'possession dropped by 53 percent from 6,231 to 
3,307, compared with the similar period the year before'. Contemporary data from 
the British Crime Survey, furthermore, suggested that cannabis use had actually 
decreased (Roe 2005). More recent figures suggest that since reclassification in 2004, 
the numbers of people using cannabis has fallen from 24 per cent to 21 per cent 
(Guardian 2007). On this measure, it would appear that the change had 'worked'. 
Caution is required, however, because of the absence of Key Performance Indicators. 
Consequently, although more cannabis was being seized, this was a product of more 
interactions between the police and the public relating to cannabis. There was, thus, 
little celebration of this by the Government. 
Ik Another significant development, following reclassification, was the 
(re)discovery-by various charities and academics of the link between cannabis use 
and mental illness. This association between cannabis use and mental illness has a 
long, but uncertain, history (Mills 2003). A study by New Zealand scientists 
(Fergusson, et al. 2005) suggested that smoking, particularly virulent -strains of 
cannabis -"skunk' - virtually doubled the risk of developing mental illnesses, such as 
schizophrenia, for those with a family history, and significantly increased the risk for 
those without. This was backed up by similar findings from the Netherlands 
(Henquet, et al. 2004) and the UK (Arseneault, et al. 2004). Such was the public and 
media attention of this issue that in March 2005, the then Home Secretary Charles 
Clarke announced that the reclassification, undertaken by his predecessor David 
Blunkett, would be placed 'under review'. In doing so, Clarke asked the ACMD to 
return to the issue. 
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Justifying this move, the Home Secretary cited further evidence from the 
continent to back up his proposals. He stated that the Dutch government was recently 
looking into the issue of whether skunk above certain strength, should be given a 
higher classification (BBC 2005b). This move was welcomed by many, but also 
treated with caution by others. According to Moreton, et al. (2005), there was 
publicly a great deal of cynicism surrounding the Government's decision to review 
the reclassification of cannabis at this time. It was perceived that they were trying to 
head off a challenge from the Conservative party that it was 'soft on drugs' in the 
run-up to a General Election. The perception was that the review was as much about 
political gerrymandering as evidence-based policy-making, posing serious questions 
about the latter. , 
In January 2006, the ACMD (2005) published its review, stating that 
the initial reclassification should remain, thus maintaining cannabis as a class C 
substance. 
In replacing David Blunkett as Home Secretary, Charkes Clarke kept the 
cannabis issue in the spotlight. Such changes in Government represent a good 
example of exogenous factors impacting on the research process in real-time 
research. Prior to this, one other significant development relating to cannabis 
reclassification was also significant; the resignation of the 'drug-tsar' Keith 
Hellawell and subsequent dissolution of the post. According to Blackman 
(2004: 183), in the aftermath of the initial reclassification, newspapers including the 
Sun, the Daily Mail and the Daily Express - all Conservative-leaning papers - were 
'triumphant with glee' over Hellawell's public announcement of his resignation, as 
he expressed exasperation over from where the Home Secretary had got his advice. 
Blackman (2004: 183), however, describes Hellawell's resignation - done live 
on the Radio 4 programme 'Today' on Wednesday July 10,2002 - as a 'piece of 
theatre", revealing that he had actually tendered his resignation a month earlier but 
requested that this information be held back from the public. Blackman (2004: 183) 
also stressed that by claiming not to know where the policy of reclassification 
stemmed from, the drug tsar 'made a fool out of himself as 'government drug advice 
comes from numerous official sources; the Police Federation, the House of Lords 
Select Committee on Science and Technology, the Advisory Council on the Misuse 
of Drugs, medical experts, DrugScope and lawyers' (Blackman 2004: 183). 
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Additionally, Levitt, et al. (2006: 2) state that work produced by the European 
Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction is also pertinent and other sources 
of evidence include the annual British Crime Survey, the Health Statistics Quarterly, 
the Home Office Research Programme and the Government's drug strategy. 
Additionally, organisations such as the Association of Chief Police Officers and 
various other government department research units play a key role (Science and 
Technology Committee 2006). The main source of government advice, however, is 
from the ACMD. 
For present purposes, this brief overview illustrates that David Blunkett and 
Charles Clarke had different understandings over what 'evidence' could trigger 
potential policy changes, which also typifies the understanding of policy advocated 
here as being complex and messy. Acevedo (2007: 178) summarises the cannabis 
episode, stating that initially the debate centred on a 'neo-liberal' approach of 
improving public services, by the more efficient use of resources. This subsequently 
morphed into a matter of mental health and criminality over the period of the 
following year, with the emergence of aforementioned scientific reports detailing the 
dangers of skunk, alongside increasing media reports of the drug being a contributory 
factor in many high-profile crimes. These crimes included the murder of Scottish 
teenager Jodi Jones in 2004 and the attempted murder of Abigail Witchalls in 2005. 
Paradoxically, this shift in emphasis occurred in spite of the fact that, as mentioned, 
in light of the reclassification, figures suggested that cannabis use had actually 
decreased. 
I 
This chapter is concerned with the initial reclassification and the first review. 
It is clear from the above discussion that the political justifications given for initially 
reviewing the cannabis reclassification were informed by different priorities and 
concerns. This is significant as it illustrates that there was inconsistency in the 
evidence-base used to justify the decisions taken at the political level. This has had a 
profound effect on the interpretations of the evidence and policy relationship in this 
area, as we shall see. What is beyond debate, however, is that there was very little 
agreement by interested spectators of, and those involved in, this particular policy 
process over the evidence-base for the decision and whether this was evidence-based 
at all. It is to this debate that we now turn. 
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6.3 Perspectives of Evidence Utilisation in the Cannabis Reclassification and 
Review 
An insight into the complex nature of evidence in the drugs area serves as a useful 
introduction to understanding the problematic nature of evidence in the cannabis 
episode. This is illustrated succinctly in the following quotation from a former senior 
government adviser who stated that: 
... because it is a complex 
field and it cuts across health policy, crime policy, 
education policy and ideology, it is not a field where you can assemble the 
evidence to prove the case ... I don't think we will ever be able to say "the 
evidence clearly says we should do this"... and in that situation you never 
have something strong enough that you can plonk in front of a minister or 
public and say we are following the evidence-base. It is always open to 
question (RATL7). 
In what follows, the relationship between evidence and belief systems, with respect 
to each perspective, is considered. Continuities and change are deliberately sought. 
The nuance of evidence is explored by ascertaining from each respondent, 
appreciations of whether the reclassification was 'evidence-based' (Policy Core) and 
what evidence was used in the decision-making process (Secondary Aspects). The 
secondary aspects range fro , rn 
the very abstract to the less abstract and more 
definitive. This data is presented in table form (see Tables 6.1,6.2 and 6.3). The core 
beliefs, detailed in the previous chapter (see Tables 5.2,5.4 and 5.6), provide the 
necessary context for this, and also and shape the understandings of evidence of each 
perspective. A summary of each perspective's view of the cannabis reclassification is 
presented in Table 6.4. 
6.3.1 The Radical Perspective 
Table 5.2, revealed a Deep Core view that for the rational perspective, the most 
effective way to regulate drug use is through the abolition of prohibition, thus 
placing less emphasis on the enforcement of unworkable laws. Applying this directly 
to the debate in hand, this underscores a wish for the abandonment of the 1971 
Misuse of Drugs Act and the system of classifying drugs with an arbitrary hierarchy 
of harms. It was maintained in the previous chapter, that the radical perspective is 
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particularly sceptical as to whether the prohibition of drugs has any deterrent effect 
on their use. As we shall subsequently see, this criticism is actually taken further, 
with the claim that prohibition not only fails to solve the drug problem but actually 
makes the problem more acute, as it serves to concede control of the market to illegal 
syndicates (Rolles, et al. 2006: 6). It was the view of one member from a leading UK- 
based NGO advocating drug law reform that an evidence-based policy in this area 
would involve: 
Basing policy on science rather than ideology. It's about having effective 
evaluation procedures in place ... you decide what you want your policy to 
achieve, you assign a series of Key Performance Indicators to measure 
whether it is achieving that, you look at evidence from other countries or 
other regions to see which policies have been effective there. Then you 
come up with a balanced scientific view on which is going to be the most 
effective policy for achieving the aims that you want as measured by your 
indicators. Then once a policy is put in place you evaluate, measure and 
monitor it properly in a scientific and consistent way to see whether it is 
doing what it is supposed to do, and if it isn't you either change it or 
abandon it altogether and try something else entirely (RAD I). 
In the above quotation, 'evidence' is equated with policy evaluation and 
appraisal. On these grounds, it is possible to anticipate the answer this group offered 
as to whether the cannabis reclassification was evidence-based. The same respondent 
continued: 
I think you could paint it as that ... if you accept the [premise of the] 
classification system, clearly cannabis was misclassified ... I'd refer you to 
the ACMD report on cannabis which was really a high quality meta analysis 
of a load of research concluding that cannabis is not without risks, of course, 
and for a small number of people those risks are very significant but for the 
majority of people, in terms of relative harms compared with other drug 
using populations with other drugs it was relatively less harmful than other 
class B drugs and should therefore go to class C which is, within the 
classification paradigm, perfectly sensible (RADI). 
The 'high quality meta-analysis' refers to aforementioned work carried out by the 
ACMD (2002; 2005) detailing risks associated with cannabis by looking at 
epidemiology, acute and long terms risks to human health (physical and mental), and 
issues of potency in the form of a systematic review of available research. Although 
there is a hint here that some forrn of evidence did have a role to play in this policy 
decision, this is not the conclusion that is drawn: 
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Whether that was an evidence-based policy, I would argue clearly not, 
clearly not. The fact is that cannabis was criminalised in the first place as a 
political decision back in whenever it was ... The ACMD was calling 
for 
cannabis to be reclassified for more than 20 years ... It has systematically 
been ignored, ignored and ignored. Not because they were wrong or the 
evidence wasn't good enough but because it wasn't politically the moment 
to do it. The decision to reclassify cannabis made by Blunkett; it wasn't that 
they suddenly went "oh look there is all this new evidence and cannabis is 
misclassified", that had been known for years ... It was always political 
(RADI). 
The initial criminalisation of cannabis, documented by Mills (2003) and 
highlighted in Section 2.4.1 showed that, in effect, cannabis initially became 
prohibited almost by default. It was an unintended consequence of political- 
manoeuvring by various states, in particular Egypt, with support from the United 
States, in negotiations over what to do with the problem of opium, towards the 
beginning of the previous century (McAllister 2000). Ultimately, what can again be 
witnessed here is the juxtaposition of evidence and politics. 
The politicised nature of drug policy-making is clear in the cannabis 
reclassification and is a theme that resonates with the radical perspective. Politics is 
viewed as inherently detrimental to the nature of evidenced-based policy-making. In 
the words of the aforementioned Labour MP, regarding the initial reclassification: 
David Blunkett was impressed by a group of parents that he saw who said to 
him that their children, having taken cannabis, decided that the warnings that 
they had were baseless ... The warnings they had were [that cannabis was] a 
wicked, dangerous drug. But having tried cannabis, they realised it was 
nothing of the sort and it wasjust like having a couple of pints of bitter beer. 
They stopped believing those warnings and they also stopped believing the 
warnings about heroin as well. They thought that if someone is deceiving us 
on cannabis theyare probably deceiving us on heroin as well (RAD2). 
Here, evidence is more anecdotal. There is some discrepancy in the literature as to 
whether this constitutes 'evidence'. In one sense, it is more akin with 'polling' the 
views of constituents by politicians. This is ruled out of the evidence reckoning by 
Pawson (2006: 4-6), but constitutes a significant kind of evidence for other thinkers 
(e. & Culyer and Lomas 2006). For current purposes, anecdotal evidence serves as an 
appreciation of the kind of evidence that was used in the cannabis reclassification 
according to the radical perspective. 
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Up to this point, a prevailing zero-sum position on the nature of evidence in 
the cannabis classification can be seen. For adherents of the radical perspective, this 
is illustrated in the way that they perceive the policy change to be broadly evidence- 
free. A more moderate view is put forward by one respondent who, although a 
member of the radical group, shares many appreciations of the situation with the 
rational perspective. In response to a question detailing why the conditions were right 
for a change in the cannabis legislation in 2004, it was stated by the Director of 
Research from a UK based drug-treatment, NGO that: 
... you had got a change 
in society where more and more people are smoking 
cannabis and general trends are in that direction and the government 
reciprocated with a series of reports, you know Runciman and so forth, that 
were all pointing in the same direction and this allowed them to more 
strongly assert that they were just following 'expert guidance'. So, you 
know, obviously we have had that sort of thing before. There is a strong 
history to this sort of stuff and I think this time the voices were clearer, 
stronger and included the establishment, you know ACMD, Runciman 
Report for the Police Foundation, and I think that made it easy for the 
Government ... (RAD3/RATL4). 
This respondent suggests that the cannabis reclassification was not made in an 
evidence vacuum, hinting that various high-profile studies had contributed to the 
legal change. By association, a key aspect of the Police Foundation Report (2000) 
was that reclassifying cannabis would free up police time. This appreciation of 
evidence is summed up as a 'public management issue' and is, therefore, included in 
the radical perspectives appreciation of evidence used in the cannabis 
reclassification. 
As, mentioned, although it is acknowledged that some form of 'evidence' 
played a role in the government's decision, this is not enough for the policy to be 
considered 'evidence-based'. This line of argument can be seen from another 
respondent, a journalist and writer, and frequent expert witness in court proceedings 
concerning 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act offences: 
I think there has been an enormous accretion of evidence supporting the 
contention that the prohibition of cannabis is ineffective and unjustified and 
Commission after Commission from the '60s onwards has found relatively 
little evidence of harm ... So I think for those who wanted to say that the 
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evidence is now that cannabis is less harmful than we thought there was an 
enormous amount of evidence to point to (RAD4). 
As a consequence, in respect of whether the cannabis reclassification was an 
evidence-based change, the respondent goes on to suggest that: f 
... some bits of evidence get much, much more media play and public debate 
than others. I mean a good example in the cannabis debate is the question of 
evidence as to whether cannabis is stronger now than it used to be in the 
1960s. I mean this is a complete "non-evidence" really. I mean who is 
comparing what with what? Are people altering their doses? So if it is 
stronger they use less of it... So that whole body of evidence has been given 
an enormous amount of publicity and airplay and I would argue. that that is 
not evidence at all (RAD4). 
Ultimately, this is the crux of the zero-sum view of evidence that is evident from this 
perspective. The appreciation here is that the evidence that shows the futility of 
prohibition is left out of the decision-making process. An overview of this is 
presented in Table 6.1. This amalgamates the data in Table 5.2 with the data 
presented above. 
By way of a summary, it is clear that for members of the radical perspective, 
the maintenance of the existing legislative framework means that the policy cannot 
be providing value for money (Deep Core). However, implicit in the argument here 
is that evidence was not entirely absent from the policy discussion, as the final 
column in Table 6.1 illustrates. Overall, for the radical perspective cannabis 
reclassification, although nominally a step in the right direction in terms of the 
reduction of criminal penalties, ultimately changes little. No matter what research, 
scientific or otherwise, is produced to support a policy change, this is not the 
defining tenet of what it means for a policy to be 'evidence-based', if this occurs 
within the existing paradigm. In this context, the maintenance and futility of 
prohibition means that until this changes, UK drug policy remains 'evidence-free' 
despite being made with recourse to some evidence. 
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Table 6.1: The Radical Perspective's View of the Nature of Evidence in the 
Cannabis Reclassification 
Deep Core Policy Core Selected Secondary 
Aspects/Appreciations 
Minimise drug Cannabis 0 appreciation of the risks and harms 
related harm via a reclassification not of substances (toxicological and 
humane and useful 'evidence-based' but social) and the weak link to mental 
regulatory system of broadly a step in health problems 
drug control right direction for 0 appreciation of anecdotal evidence 
culminating with the UK drug from parents of drug users 
abolition of classification; wider 0 appreciation of the role of high- 
prohibition. Less classification (1971 profile reports in the drug 
emphasis on Misuse of Drugs Act) legislation field 
enforcement as drugs system primarily not 0 appreciation of public 
an inevitable feature evidence-based management issues, with the 
of daily life for many saving of police time 
6.3.2 The Rational Perspective 
As indicated in the previous chapter, Table 5.4 revealed Deep Core beliefs that 
advocate drug treatment for the most chaotic drug users. This is a public-health- 
inspired approach that operates within the wider criminal justice paradigm of the 
1971 Misuse of Drugs Act. For the rational perspective, there is great emphasis on 
the nature of substances themselves. This constitutes a key aspect of what 'evidence- 
based policy' means to this group and is linked to the notion of scientifically 
assessing the risks of all substances of abuse. The increasing significance of risk 
assessment, as a key aspect of the evidence-base in this area, was augmented by the 
publication in the Lancet, in March 2007 of the Nutt, et al. matrix. This had its 
origins in the Police Foundation Report (2000). The matrix questioned the validity of 
the current classification system under the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act, advocating 
instead a hierarchical system, placing the major illicit drugs, along with alcohol and 
tobacco, into a scientific scale of harm. This, it was claimed, would more accurately 
reflect the relative hanns and dangers of substances. 
It is suggested, furthermore, that the matrix should be used as the basis for 
criminal justice responses to the drug problem, in effect, determining the extent of 
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the criminal sanctions with regard to offences relating to particular substances. In this 
sense, the rational perspective operates with a similar philosophical outlook to that of 
the Government. This is underpinned by a view of harm reduction, which suggests 
that drug use is an inevitable aspect of social life and that to reduce the impact of 
drugs on individuals and society, drugs should be located in the correct place in the 
framework. This should also form the basis of more accurate drugs education. There 
is a clear stress for the rational perspective that the most up-to-date research should 
direct the framework. In this context, the key distinction between members of the 
rational perspective and those of the radical perspective are that the former advocate 
modifying the existing legislative mechanism but, ultimately, criminal sanctions 
should still apply to certain drug offences. For the radical perspective, this is 
precisely the cause of the problem. 
For the purposes of this discussion, it is the maintenance of a hierarchy of 
drug harms allied to the continuing prohibition of substances that shapes the rational 
perspective's understanding of evidence. Thus, in response to whether the cannabis 
reclassification was an evidence-based decision, it was the view of a one-time senior 
government adviser that: 
If you are going to invest tax payers money in enforcing drug laws you 
should target that investment at the most harmful behaviours and we weren't 
targeting that investment at all but by proxy, all that investment was going 
on very minor people who shouldn't be in the criminal justice system in the 
first place so, in that sense, it was evidence-based (RATL7). 
There was a clear consensus among many members of the rational perspective, that 
the evidence-base for efficient management of public services, in this case, policing, 
was pivotal. A senior academic psychiatrist and member of the ACMD suggested 
that: 
I think he [David Blunkett] thought the law was stupid, was being flouted 
widely, the Brixton experiment had shown that in practice you could save a 
lot of police time by not arresting people for smoking or dealing in small 
amounts and I think he thought it was a sensible policy, and I respected him 
for it (RATL5). 
The conclusion that the cannabis decision was evidence-based, in terms of 
targeting investment of taxpayer's money to ensure policies provide value for 
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money, relates to the appreciation of evidence as policy evaluation, and this is 
consistent with the appreciations of the radical perspective. These similar 
understandings, however, lead to different conclusions. For the radical perspective, 
the cannabis reclassification was, ultimately, evidence-free. By contrast, for the 
rationalist perspective, it was primarily evidence-based in that by highlighting how 
cannabis is not as harmful as other substances, the overall drug policy is rationalised, 
via reclassification and by directing criminal justice resources towards the drugs that 
do the most damage. A similar sentiment was expressed by a co-opted member of the 
ACMD technical committee, and an expert in Forensic Science: 
The evidence was very closely examined ... There was a groundswell I think building up ... particularly 
highlighted in south London where the issues had 
come up with local policing priorities and that had brought things to the 
fore. The police had been signalling for a long time that given the broad 
range of things they are supposed to be responsible for, policing cannabis 
was increasingly coming to be seen as a bit of an embarrassment. So I think 
the time was right to look at it and the Home Secretary was right as well 
(RATL3). 
Other schisms between the radical and rational perspectives can be seen in 
the nature of evidence used to rationalise the current system. Another member of the 
ACMD technical committee and current adviser to a major Government spending 
department, stated of the cannabis reclassification that: 
... we had a couple of days reviewing cannabis, [it] was almost entirely on 
the work done ... on cannabis potency, that work ... published in 2004 was done for the European Agency in Lisbon who saw at that stage the need to 
review the information because of a lot of conflicting information in the 
press on what high-strength cannabis actually meant and what were the 
facts, so that was quite timely ... it was 2005 when ACMD were asked to 
review cannabis and one of the areas of concern was the appearance of high 
potency cannabis one of the other ones, of course, was the mental health 
issues (RATL I). 
The published work referred to in the above quotation, relates to that carried 
out by the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA 
2004). This study concluded that based on the available evidence, contemporary 
cannabis is no more potent than in previous times. There is the suggestion here that 
the potency issue, in this sense the lack of evidence to suggest that contemporary 
cannabis is of a higher strength than in previous years, was a major aspect of the 
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evidence-base for the eventual reclassification. As we have seen, this appreciation 
contrasts with that of the radical perspective, where this was referred to it as 'non- 
evidence', and as we shall see, the conservative perspective's appreciation of this 
particular aspect of the evidence-base is different again. 
The health issue surrounding cannabis potency is particularly contested. 
According to a one-time ACMD member (when the initial cannabis decision was 
undertaken) and current Chairperson of an NGO specialising in drug policy analysis, 
it was the consideration given to such issues that typified why the cannabis 
reclassification was evidence-based: , 
Well I think that there was a lot of assessment in terms of the relative health 
harms, we were fully aware of some of the stuff around the mental health 
problems so there was no discounting that. One looked at the relative risk, 
the known risk assessment across the harm domains, one looked at those, 
had what material was available and in that sense used that to weigh up a 
proportionate response of which seemed to suggest that its alignment was 
not right in class B (RATLI 1). 
Similarly, a former senior ministerial adviser questioned rhetorically: 
... does the science around an 
issue such as cannabis use indicate that its 
potential risk to individuals is of a lower class C order? ... I think that that is 
evidence-based as well. The sorts of things you need to look at are acute 
effects, acute neurological effects. In which case, in the global evidence on 
cannabis, it is hard to find any trend or body of evidence showing the 
harmful impact of cannabis. 160 million people use cannabis world-wide 
and nobody has ever died from an over-dose. There is not an acute reaction 
in the brain that could cause an immediate dysfunction and it doesn't cause 
violence and all that sort of thing. So clearly it can't be called a dangerous 
drug on these fronts (RATL7). 
This appreciation is the epitome of the Deep and Policy Core views of the 
rational perspective. There is clearly an acceptance that a plethora of evidence was 
included in the debate over cannabis reclassification, although there was also clear 
recognition that this takes place in a heavily politicised context, as illustrated in the 
previous chapter. The above respondent states: 
Well I think these things are partly to do with personal opinions of powerful 
people such as David Blunkett, second of all political realities, third of all 
the institutional, Whitehall, professional politics and fourthly the evidence- 
base. And the evidence-base was pointing pretty strongly that in this country 
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under the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act, over 80 per cent of arrests made under 
the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act were for possession of cannabis and in over 
50 per cent of all those arrests, we arrest, we record, we confiscate and we 
give a caution. So the evidence had been developed to say that whatever you 
think about policy this is a monumental waste of money, we don't deter 
anyone from cannabis use (RATU). 
Similarly, when asked if the cannabis reclassification was an evidence-based 
decision, a Chief Executive of a leading drug policy NGO stated: 
Oh very much so on the grounds of the Ruth Runciman work [Police 
Foundation Report 2000], the Home Affairs Committee and I know, being a 
member of ACMD, we looked through the evidence base. I think there was 
a ... collision of opportunities and windows and 
doors opening and it 
provided a match between the evidence and the policy aspiration of the 
Home Secretary and I think, in that sense, the planets were aligned 
temporarily (RATL15). 
The lack of evidence for the deterrent effect of the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act 
represents an area of consensus between the radical and rational perspectives. The 
conclusions drawn from this are, again, much different. This final appreciation also 
reveals the importance of high-profile reports to the Government in their decision- 
making process. A summary of the rational perspectives' appreciations of the 
cannabis reclassification subsystem is provided in Table 6.2. This amalgamates the 
data from Table 5.4 with the data presented above. 
In sum, the rational perspective has misgivings over the operation of the 
current classification system. This is because there are anomalies in the location of 
certain drugs, which distort the messages it gives out. The solution is that science and 
evidence should inforrn policy to create a holistic drug policy that promotes public 
health and human rights by accurately assessing the risks of all drugs and 
coordinating criminal justice responses accordingly. The key feature of the Policy 
Core reveals that the cannabis reclassification was broadly an 'evidence-based' 
decision in that it signalled an attempt to do precisely this. The significance of this is 
that politics and evidence are not necessarily juxtaposed to one another. There is, 
however, a tacit acceptance that evidence is diverse, but this still yields a zero-sum 
I conclusion. 
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Table 6.2: The Rational Perspective's View of the Nature of Evidence in the 
Cannabis Reclassification 
Deep Core Policy Core Selected Main Secondary 
Aspects/Appreciations 
Promotion of human Cannabis appreciation of risks and 
rights and public reclassification harms of substances 
health placing primarily evidence- (toxicological and social) 
treatment at the based' as a step and the unproven link to 
centre of the drug towards ironing out mental health 
strategy (Harm 1971 Misuse of appreciation of the potency 
Reduction) as drug Drugs Act's issue and the lack of data to 
use is an inevitable anomalies; prove contemporary 
part of everyday life classification system cannabis is stronger 
for many. Using increasingly appreciation of wider 
evidence to inform evidence-based policy outcomes, with 
policy by ironing out policies providing value for 
anomalies of existing money (ironing out 
framework anomalies of 1971 Misuse 
of Drugs Act) 
appreciation of the role of 
influential reports in the 
drug legislation field 
appreciation of public 
management issues, the 
saving of police time 
6.3.3 The Conservative Perspective 
Table 5.6 reveals a Deep Core perspective that more rigorous drug prevention and 
enforcement can result in drug-free lifestyles. To recap, unlike the radical and 
rational perspectives, there is no assumption from the conservative group that drug 
use is an inevitable aspect of social life for many people. For the conservative 
perspective, then, the decision to reclassify cannabis was devoid of evidence on the 
grounds that it compromised the goal of more rigorous enforcement of drug laws as a 
means of addressing the drug problem and, therefore, sent out the wrong messages 
regarding the dangers of the substance. In addition, where cannabis is concerned, 
there is a major preoccupation with the medical issue, in particular, the potential 
harm cannabis use can cause. For this perspective, this moves beyond effects on the 
brain, to encapsulate a range of medical dangers associated with the substance. 
Regarding whether the reclassification was evidence-based, it was the view of one 
GP and committee member of a national Christian organisation that: 
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The policy issue, I think is not evidence-based ... you have the entire issue of 
the health effects of cannabis, the issue of the adverse effect on the 
respiratory system, the increase in cancer rates, the increase in chronic lung 
disease. Then there is the entire issue of mental health, with a number of 
studies linking cannabis to schizophrenia, depression, anxiety and other 
mental health issues and all this evidence was there and I thought it 
extremely problematic for them to say that it is actually less dangerous 
(CONI). 
The view here is that there was evidence relating to the negative impact of 
cannabis on human health, but that this was ignored. Of all the medical issues, the 
subject of mental illness was fundamental. The submission by the Maranatha 
Community -a Christian charity group and lobbying organisation and a key member 
of the Coalition Against Cannabis - to the Science and Technology Committee also 
illustrates this point: 
When the downgrading of cannabis from a Class B to a Class C drug was 
debated in both Houses of Parliament in October and November 2003, 
strong scientific evidence was available linking cannabis to serious mental 
illness including schizophrenia, psychosis and depression. This link between 
cannabis and serious mental illness has prompted the current Home 
Secretary, Charles Clarke, to review the classification of cannabis (cited in 
Science and Technology Committee 2006: appendix 6) 
Futhermore: 
Sufficient evidence existed at the time to seriously question the 
downgrading of Cannabis, 
- This evidence should have at least served to delay any decision to 
reclassify, if policy is based on the precautionary principle, and 
- In this instance, any mechanism that does exist to ensure policy is based 
on evidence failed, with grave consequences for the mental health of 
thousands of young people (cited in Science and Technology Committee: 
appendix 6). 
In a similar vein, in response to whether the cannabis decision was evidence- 
based, a UK representative of an International Drug Prevention Organisation stated: 
No. The worst thing with cannabis is the mental illness and there have been 
papers around on that since the '60s and '70s and even before, warning of 
mental illness. So it goes back in history that people were warned about 
mental illness and so they [the Government] didn't look at the evidence, 
they really didn't (CON3). 
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The absence of evaluative research into the harms of cannabis and its 
potential to cause schizophrenia was problematic. This belief is compounded further 
in relation to a question detailing why a political decision was taken, by Charles 
Clarke, to review the initial reclassification of cannabis made by David Blunkett. The 
above respondent continues: 
[It was] about mental illness because people like Robin Murray then started 
really campaigning. This is the trouble with research scientists, they are not 
campaigners, but Robin Murray is. He is not an out and out table thumping 
campaigner, but he has spoken out a lot more than a lot of the others have 
and he started saying things in the press and on the radio and got through to 
people about the problems, and then there were lots of people who wrote in 
to papers, there was a great flood of things like "My son's life was destroyed 
by cannabis" or "My son has schizophrenia". Loads and loads of articles 
came out there and I think all that had an influence, even journalists 
(CON3). 
Likewise, the significance of the health issue is reinforced in the views of a retired 
senior Customs Officer: 
Well certainly the downgrading sent a signal to potential users ... that 
cannabis was less harmful than when the list had been drawn up, pre- '71 
and that isn't the case. We now know that it is actually more harmful, all the 
evidence is there and the evidence was there in the 1997 WHO report ... all 
the thing about schizophrenia is in there, couched in strong language about 
whether it is causative, causal or you know ... all the evidence coming out 
was that some people are genetically disposed to be damaged by cannabis. 
So it was all there and the Government ignored that at the time the 
classification was being thought through (CON6). 
There is again a shared understanding of what the evidence should be in 
regard to cannabis reclassification, between the conservative and rational 
perspectives. That is, that the decision should have been based with recourse to the 
mental health evidence. However, the conclusions reached are diametrically 
opposed. For the rational group, this formed a key part of the decision-making 
process with the conclusion that cannabis was not as harmful as other drugs . Forthe 
conservative perspective, this evidence was not taken into consideration, because if it 
had been, the reclassification would have been impossible. All the evidence, for the 
conservative perspective, pointed to increasing medical harms linked to cannabis use. 
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A similar line of argument can be seen with the potency issue. Already 
considered as either 'non-evidence' (radical perspective) or a key aspect of the 
evidence-base, in that there was no evidence for increased potency (rational 
perspective), for the conservative perspective, by contrast: 
Now you have fairly high concentration cannabis available that wasn't 
available 20 years ago or so. The genetically modified cannabis and 
hydroponic cannabis that can have THC contents of thirteen, fourteen, 
maybe even 20 percent. In the '60s it would have been maybe a maximum 
of five percent average so it is much stronger now than it has been in the 
past (CON 1). 
THC, or Tetrahydrocannabinol, is the main psychoactive ingredient found in 
cannabis. The assumption is that the higher the THC content, the greater the 
likelihood that the drug will alter the users brain function. In the majority of cases 
this is temporary but in the most extreme scenarios it can result in chronic mental 
illness such as schizophrenia. The conclusion, is that this aspect of the evidence-base 
was also ignored. In the words of a one-time Chief Constable of a Scottish police 
force and current Independent Consultant to the United Nations: 
I can point to lots of research that was not taken into account when that 
decision was arrived at. The ACMD went into a great deal of explanation as 
to why they had reclassified cannabis, I emphasise 'reclassify' and not 
'downgraded' because they said that cannabis remains a dangerous 
substance. But they were anxious that people would not get the impression 
that other drugs in class B were not of a similar nature to cannabis and by 
that I mean that you can smoke a joint and it can have absolutely no effect 
whatever but, you know as well as I do, that the modem forms of cannabis 
are significantly more potent than they were 30 years ago, and the average 
strength now is around eleven and a half percent THC and the Skunk and 
Nederweed is as much as 35 percent. So the UN world drug report and the 
head of the UNODC [United Nations Off ice of Drug Control] has said that 
they regard cannabis as being as dangerous as the other botanically based 
drugs; cocaine and heroin (CON5). 
That cannabis potency and mental illness issues were not given due weight in the 
discussion was not the sole reason as to why the decision was seen, by the 
conservative perspective, to be evidence-free. One other body of evidence base 
linked to the cannabis reclassification, was the public management variety. This 
relates to the freeing up of police time. For the conservative perspective, this was 
also problematic: 
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One further point I would like to make about evidence-base and this refers to 
the Brixton experiment and what the downgrading did, is that it pretty much 
nationalised the Brixton experiment, in saying that we are not going to focus 
on cannabis now. And I think the result in Brixton was catastrophic because 
you had an increase of drug misuse and an increase in hard drug misuse; 
there was an increase in drug dealers there. And so I think the experiment in 
Brixton was a disaster, it led to more police time being saved and blah, blah, 
blah but I'm not really convinced (CON I). 
Additionally, a Director of a leading NGO in the drug prevention field suggested 
that: 
We were told from Westminster sources ... Blunkett bought the idea that if he 
gave the Libertarian camp something they would back off and stay quiet, but 
as a politician this was absolutely crass because it was completely obvious 
to us, having lived in that atmosphere for 20 years, that if you give these 
guys something that will encourage them to ask for the next thing and the 
next thing which is exactly what has happened (CON8). 
The critique of politics triumphing over the evidence is again apparent here. 
The overall conclusions drawn from this are, like those of the radical perspective, of 
the zero-sum variety that the cannabis reclassification was evidence-free. The 
rationale though is much different. A summary of the conservative perspectives 
appreciations of the cannabis reclassification subsystem is provided in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3: The Conservative Perspective's View of the Nature of Evidence in the 
Cannabis Reclassification' 
Deep Core Policy Core Selected Main Secondary 
Aspects 
To promote drug free Reclassification of None 
healthy and wholesome cannabis 
lifestyles through drug fundamentally not 
enforcement/prevention evidence-based nor 
and education (Hann a step in the right 
Reduction). Drug use direction; 
not an inevitable aspect classification system 
of daily life not evidence-based 
From this perspective there is clear sense that 'cherry-picking' evidence is a 
significant issue and one that ultimately means that for this perspective the cannabis 
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reclassification was completely devoid of evidence. There is no appreciation here 
that any relevant evidence was used when the decision was taken to reclassify 
cannabis because all the existing evidence that should have been used would have 
made the policy change unworkable. 
6.4 Evidence Utilisation in the Cannabis Subsystem: A Summary 
It is worthy of'note that to a lesser extent within, and to a greater extent between 
perspectives, there are clear discrepancies over what constitutes evidence in this 
particular subsystem, but at the same time there are clear crossovers. This is 
consistent with the modified Advocacy Coalition Framework methodology used 
here. Cross referencing these findings with the Deep and Policy Core views of each 
perspective, in terms of whether the decision to reclassify cannabis was evidence 
based, provides some intriguing data. To recap, for the radical and conservative 
perspectives, the answer was negative, but for the rationalist perspective it was 
affirmative. Based on the evidence presented earlier, it is possible to summarise the 
nature of evidence in the cannabis reclassification subsystem, in relation to what each 
perspective deems was present, but to highlight the complex nature of evidence, 
appreciations of evidence deemed to be absent are also identified. This is particularly 
revealing when it is remembered that all perspectives adhere to a zero-sum position, 
in one way or another. A summary of the key firýdings are presented in Table 6.4. 
The three perspectives illustrated above are all, to differing degrees, critical 
of the Government position with regard to the overall drugs debate. We see that on 
the issue of cannabis reclassification, however, the rational perspective shares much 
the same view as the Government. Its appreciations relate directly to the 
aforementioned reports and their key findings (e. g. Police Foundation 2000; Home 
Affairs Committee 2002). This is a key distinction as it takes us down the ladder of 
abstraction for what constitutes evidence. 
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Table 6A Evidence Utilisation in the Cannabis Subsystem: A Summary 
Perspective Present Evidence Absent Evidence 
Radical 0 appreciation of the risks and appreciation of wider policy 
harms of substances outcomes with policies 
(toxicological and social) and the providing value for money 
weak link to mental health (efficacy of prohibition) 
* appreciation of anecdotal 
evidence from parents of drug 
users 
0 appreciation of the role of high- 
profile reports in the drug 
legislation field 
0 appreciation of public 
management issues with the 
saving of police time 
Rational 0 appreciation of risks and harms None 
of substances (toxicological and 
social) and the weak link to 
mental health 
0 appreciation of the potency issue 
and the lack of data to prove 
contemporary cannabis is 
stronger 
0 appreciation of wider policy 
outcomes with policies providing 
value for money (ironing out 
anomalies of 1971 Misuse of 
Drugs Act) 
0 appreciation of the role of high- 
profile reports in the drug 
legislation field 
0 appreciation of public 
management issues, the saving 
of police time 
Conservative 9 None 0 appreciation of medical risks 
and harms of substances 
(general health effects) 
" appreciation of the risks and 
harms of substances 
(toxicological and social) and 
the strong link with mental 
health 
" appreciation of the potency issue 
and growth of data to prove 
contemporary cannabis is 
stronger 
" appreciation of wider policy 
outcomes that reclassifying 
cannabis provides a 
contradictory message to 
prevention which 'works' 
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This demonstrates the two key points established at the outset, that evidence 
is a complex concept and, by association, that zero-sum perspectives on the evidence 
and policy relationship in politicised areas are understandable but problematic. The 
radical perspective shares with the rational perspective many of the same 
appreciations of evidence. These are also less abstract than the Government position. 
Ultimately, however, their conclusion is different in that the cannabis reclassification 
was not evidence-based. It is this perspective which typifies the paradoxical nature of 
zero-sum assertions. Their conclusion that the cannabis reclassification was 
eviden'ce-free was made in spite of the recognition that the government did draw on a 
range of evidence in its decision-making. Decisively, for the radical perspective, 
because there is no appreciation given in this instance to the futility of prohibition as 
a means of regulating the drug problem, the cannabis decision, although a step in the 
right direction, ultimately achieves little in terms of the bigger picture of UK drug 
policy. The change cannot be evidence-based as, in their appreciation, the evidence 
points to the legalisation of cannabis and all other substances as the most effective 
means of dealing with the drug problem. 
The conservative perspective, like the radical one, departs from the 
Government and rationalist view by stating fundamentally that the cannabis 
reclassification was not evidence-based. This is primarily because the reclassification 
sent out the wrong signals. In their eyes, for a policy change to be evidence-based it 
would have to move in the opposite direction. This would entail more emphasis on 
prevention and not something that tacitly suggests certain drugs are less harmful than 
others. Unlike the radical position, there is no paradox here, as in their eyes, no 
appreciations of evidence were used in the decision. There are, though, clear 
similarities between the conservative perspective and the others over what kinds of 
evidence should have been used in the decision-making process in this scenario. 
It is suggested that descending down the ladder of abstraction in relation to 
the concept of evidence reveals some interesting issues. On one level, the 
perspectives have a general understanding of the same kinds of evidence but offer 
different interpretations of this, as seen in the slightly different wording of some of 
the appreciations in Table 6.4. The cannabis potency issue and the link with mental 
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health are indicative of this. In turn, this casts some doubt on Government claims to 
evidence-based policy-making in these areas and sheds light on why such 
announcements are treated with scepticism by interested parties. On another level, 
there are clearly discrepancies between the perspectives over what should count as 
evidence in this subsystem. 
One outstanding question concerns how the plethora of appreciations of 
evidence, in this subsystem, is to be explained. In other words, what are the origins 
of the key differences between the different perspectives' understandings of what is 
evidence-based policy-making in this context? The hypothesis at this stage is that the 
different appreciations exist precisely because of the different core beliefs of each 
perspective in relation to the issue. In other policy areas (those more akin with the 
principles of evidence-based policy-making), the concept of a hierarchy of evidence 
has been applied to explain the predominance of particular kinds of evidence when a 
plurality of evidence is apparent. This has an impact on why different accounts of the 
nature of evidence are visible. One question to consider, then, is whether this serves 
as a plausible explanation in this scenario. 
6.5: The Plurality of Evidence as a Hierarchy of Evidence? 
The notion of a hierarchy of evidence has emerged in evidence-based policy from 
evidence-based medicine. In the latter, in light of Cochrane's (1972) radical critique 
of medical procedure, it refers to how a shift in medical practice based on 'expert 
opinions' of doctors and clinicians, should be replaced with research from 
experiments and demonstrations. Culyer and Lomas (2006) provide a broad overview 
of the notion of a hierarchy of evidence, which details a three-tiered account of the 
different manifestations of evidence, visible in policy-making. 
Referiing to the area of health policy, they contend that a clear distinction can 
be made between scientific and non-scientific varieties of evidence. Non-scientific, 
or (colloquial evidence', they note, 'is broader than the more restricted scientific 
view' (Culyer and Lomas 2006: 360). Generally speaking, colloquial evidence is 
reduced down to the opinion of stakeholders on a given subject. This helps to provide 
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the best kind of evidence short of the scientific variety. As regards scientific 
evidence, they suggest: 
Even within this more restricted, scientific view of evidence there are two 
distinctive manners of study relevant to healthcare decision-making ... One, 
relating mostly to medicine and the biological sciences and evaluating the 
efficacy of interventions, uses methods that try to exclude contextual 
"contaminants" (such as the natural variability in the skills and attitudes of 
doctors, the symptom presentation of patients, or the organisational and 
funding circumstances of service delivery). This type of science employs 
randomised control trial methods in its ideal form to uncover, as far as is 
epistemologically possible, "context-free knowledge". The other, relating far 
more to the social sciences and the environments in which decisions will be 
implemented, uses methods that describe and evaluate the contextual factors 
that might influence the practical impact of an intervention once it is 
deployed. This type of science employs a wide variety of methods, usually 
tailored to the nature of the implementation concern - the impact on the 
effectiveness of the intervention elucidated by surveys of provider or patient 
attitudes, cost-effectiveness analyses of funding regimes or healthcare 
technologies, forecasts of demographics and so on. This science is designed 
to provide "context-sensitive" results that appraise the facilitating or 
attenuating circumstances surrounding a particular decision (Culyer and 
Lomas 2006: 361). 
This view of evidence in policy is consistent with the concept of a hierarchy 
of evidence, now firmly established in the mind-set of both the policy-making and 
evidence-producing communities. It is typically constructed as in Table 6.5 below 
and a more detailed account is provided in Appendix V. Culyer and Lomas' (2006) 
account can be superimposed on to Table 6.5. Here 'context-free' scientific evidence 
equates to the first three levels. 'Context sensitive' evidence can be found in levels 
four to seven and colloquial evidence in levels eight to ten. This particular hierarchy, 
furthermore, mirrors one outlook of the nature of evidence-based policy, that of the 
Campbell Collaboration. Launched in 2000, the Campbell Collaboration is a non- 
profit organisation 'that aims to help people make well-informed decisions about the 
effects of interventions in the social, behavioural and educational arenas' (Nutley, et 
al. 2007: 17). 
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Table 6.5: The Hierarchy of Evidence in Evidence-Based Policy 
Level Methodology 
I Systematic reviews and meta-analyses 
2 Randomised controlled trials (RCT) (with concealed allocation) 
3 Quasi-experimental studies (using matches) 
4 Before and after comparisons 
5 Cross sectional, random-sample studies 
6 Process evaluation, formative studies and action research 
7 Qualitative case study and ethnographic research 
8 Descriptive guides and examples of good practice 
9 Professional and expert opinion 
10 User opinion 
(adapted from Pawson 2006: 49) 
This hierarchy has not been accepted uncritically, particularly in terms of 
whether meta-analysis and systematic review should be the gold standard. These 
debates need not concern us here. It is suggested, however, that the cannabis 
reclassification and its aftermath, because it is a controversial area, is an un-typical 
example of evidence-based policy-making and thus the hierarchy is not a 
comprehensive explanation for the plurality of appreciations of the nature of 
evidence, in this particular scenario. This is primarily a product of the fact that as 
stressed before, no in-built evaluation of its implementation, with recourse to any 
possible and relevant Key Performance Indicators, was undertaken. In this sense, it 
shares many similarities with other examples of the crime policy agenda: 
Anecdotal evidence, program favourites of the month and political ideology 
seemingly drive much of the crime policy agenda. As a result, we are left 
with a patchwork of programs that are of unknown potential in preventing 
crime. Crime prevention programs may or may not work or worse may 
provide iatrogenic results. We are not suggesting that the public is being 
intentionally misled by law makers and policy makers who are funding 
programs with no scientific evidence but rather law makers and policy 
makers are shirking their responsibility to the taxpaying public by not 
funding only those programs with evidence of effectiveness in crime 
prevention (Welsh and Ferrington 2001: 159). 
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In the above quotation, the word 'crime' could, where appropriate, be 
substituted with 'drug' or 'drug misuse'. In this sense, the kind of evidence 
associated with the UK drug classification issue is pnmarily colloquial. However, 
this only broadly explains what kind of evidence is used in the subsystem and not 
why. In essence, it is suggested here that the hierarchy of evidence offers an account 
of the pluralism of evidence that is primarily methodological. In UK drug 
classification, issues surrounding the methodology of evidence were not the sole 
concern of those in the subsystem. Other criteria appear to be pressing: 
My impression is that there is a huge amount of selectivity [of evidence] but 
it is blurry. There is some sense of a hierarchy of a research quality. Not sort 
of strictly in terms of a Cochrane hierarchy sense but people will pay more 
attention to studies that include larger samples, or that are more culturally 
applicable or relevant. I think there is some of that going on there but there 
is a huge amount of selectivity as well (RAD3/RATL4). 
The notion of selectivity is frequently linked to the consultation process when 
new or reworked policy ideas are championed. The expectation of consultation on 
behalf of the government with key stakeholders is increasingly commonplace in the 
development of policies in many areas, including the drugs field. The respondent 
continues: 
The government, within a consultation, is often just an expediency thing. 
You have got to consult; you are committed to consulting. How do you 
decide between 50 or 60 or whatever the number is of possible groups you 
want to consult? Or do you say: "well who do we think are the main ones? " 
And approach them. There is a bit of ajudgement made there and sometimes 
they get it wrong but I do think it can have a bearing and that is the way it 
happens (RAD3/RATLA). 
The general idea here is that the cherry-picking of evidence is commonplace 
but in this particular subsystem this is not based on methodological considerations. A 
similar sentiment is expressed by members of the rational perspective. When asked 
whether there was a hierarchy of evidence in this subsystem, one experienced 
denizen of the bar, with expertise in criminal drug trials, commented that: 
My impression is that government has called for a great deal of evidence 
about all kinds of matters relating to drugs. What happens to that evidence is 
another matter. My belief is that some of it is "lost" (given that there is so 
much of it) and that other information simply does not speak loudly enough. 
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The Runciman Inquiry [Police Foundation Report] was highly influential... 
but that is my view. It had the advantage of collating a wealth of material 
and then authoritatively speaking its recommendations. This led to intense 
public debate during the course of which some issues (more than others) 
were brought into sharp focus. I am not convinced 'that there exists a 
structured "hierarchy of evidence". I have no doubt that the voice of the law 
enforcement agencies carries much weight with government, particularly if 
it appears to chime with public opinion (RATL6). , 
Likewise, the conservative perspective proved equally sceptical as to whether 
the widely accepted cherry-picking of evidence was based on a preference for a 
certain kind of methodological evidence. One researcher for a leading NGO in the 
Drug Prevention field commented: 
I wouldn't say that, I wouldn't say there was a hierarchy based on those 
things ... If you look at other 
debates going on, for example, sexual 
orientation discrimination, all those regulations that are being proposed are 
based upon very, very small-scale incidences of what is deemed to be 
homophobia so they have drawn up far reaching regulations based on a 
handful of instances when a homosexual couple have not been able to get a 
hotel room together or something like that ... I think there is an ideology that is determining the cherry picking as opposed. to any other kind of idea that it 
is methodological (CON2). 
What is not in question here is the fact that the selectivity takes place. In this 
sense some kind of hierarchy is applicable to the selection of evidence in politicised 
policy areas in 
' 
that the evidence is usually found from the last few rows of the 
hierarchy. Unlike the hierarchy of evidence shown above, it is suggested that in this 
circumstance the bases of selection are not methodological but more a product of the 
standpoints of each perspective. Therefore, although there is a perceived significant 
degree of selectivity in the use of evidence in this area, the origins of this are as 
much ideological as methodological and relate to the Government preference for 
particular kinds of evidence in this manner. 
6.6 Summary 
It has been an aim of this chapter to explore the different appreciations of evidence in 
the cannabis episode. Where politicised policy areas are concerned, the principles of 
evidence-based policy-making are less applicable as policies are much more ad hoc. 
Although the hierarchy of evidence is useful for indicating various different 
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appreciations of evidence in terms of methodology, it does not account for issues of 
ideology, which are more prevalent in politicised areas. 
The potential of evidence-based policy-making in politicised areas is called 
into question by constructing evidence and politics as binary opposites. This has 
manifested itself in the widespread prevalence of the zero-sum understanding where 
politics, not evidence, is the order of the day where the big issues are concerned. 
With regard to the cannabis reclassification, it is claimed that the decision was taken 
on the back of various cerebral reports (e. g. Police Foundation 2000). This has, 
however, led to the opposite zero-sum claim, which the Government do not deny, 
that the policy was evidence-based. 
On the whole, if we accept, as pluralist models do, that all perspectives make 
a legitimate claim to evidence, it is interesting to note how, despite a plethora of 
understandings over what constitutes evidence, as the Policy Core beliefs of each 
coalition show, zero-sum conclusions are common-place. This reasoning is 
paradoxical because it draws zero-sum conclusions, whilst simultaneously 
recognising the contested nature of evidence. The paradox of this position is clearly 
striking for the radical perspective, as they accept that some evidence was used in the 
decision-making process but do not accept that it was evidence-based. All parties, 
however, make zero-sum claims whilst recognising the diversity of evidence and all 
are guilty of employing paradoxical logic. This logic either claims policies to be 
evidence-free whilst accepting that some form of evidence played a role in the 
decision-making process. Conversely, the other side of the argument claims the 
policy to be wholly evidence-based, whilst accepting that certain kinds of evidence 
were not considered in the decision-making process and that there is significant 
contestation as to the nature of evidence in this area. 
This raises a number of issues when trying to explain the role and nature of 
evidence in politicised policy areas. First and foremost, the pluralist appreciations of 
the nature of evidence call into question the wisdom of taking the concept of 
evidence at face value. It can be concluded from the above discussion that evidence 
means different things to the different perspectives. It is, therefore, not completely 
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uncontested. The implications of this conceptualisation of the evidence and policy 
relationship are explored in more detail in the following chapters. 
Second, zero-sum views restrict the role of evidence to policy outcomes. In 
this sense, policy decision-making is seen to be static. A policy that is evidence- 
based will remain so and one that is un-evidenced will likewise. These appreciations 
neglect the fact that policies and the associated evidence are always in a constant 
state of flux and hence require real-time research methods. In effect, zero-sum views 
are contrary to the dynamic nature of real-time issues, which as has been illustrated, 
are continuously changing. 
A third and related point is that zero-sum views that restrict the role of 
evidence to policy outcomes are linked to the view of the role of evidence as one of 
policy evaluation. In contrast, based on the data presented in this chapter, it is 
suggested that evidence also has a role to play in the process of policy decision- 
making, as the rational perspective, in particular, show. This is consistent with the 
view of policy-making advocated throughout this thesis. Indeed, the location of 
evidence in the decision-making process is central to the following discussion. 
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7. THE ROLE OF EVIDENCE 
7.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the way in which the episode of cannabis reclassification is a 
useful case study through which to explore the tumultuous nature of the evidence and 
policy relationship, in a politicised policy area, was illustrated. Such policy areas are 
characterised by a significant degree of internal conflict between rival perspectives 
over the direction of policy, which has a knock-on effect for appreciations of, in 
particular, the nature of evidence. This chapter highlights how similar trends can be 
ascertained with regard to the broader picture of UK drug classification. One 
consequence of broadening the substantive focus of the project, from the event of 
cannabis reclassification to the process of the wider drug classification system, 
however, is the introduction of another key focus in the tun-noil of evidence. This 
concerns data relating to appreciations of the location of evidence in the policy 
process, which, in turn, stem from different understandings of the nature of 'drug 
harm'. 
There are certain issues that have been central to the analysis thus far, some 
of which are called into question here. Foremost, is that because of the highly 
politicised nature of the policy process, the cyclical understanding of the policy 
process (Figure 3.1) seen in more 'conventional' evidence-based policy debates, does 
not apply in this circumstance (Chapter Two). In other words, politicised policy areas 
are more ad hoc and suited to pluralist analyses of the policy process. Allied to this, 
because this particular subsystem is fortified by significant conflict, the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework, with its in-built ability to analyse conflict, is the most effective 
means of conceptualising the debate (Chapter Four), but this required modification 
(Chapter Five). 
The impact that politics has on decision making in this area is widely 
acknowledged and this influences the way various perspectives view the nature of 
UK drug classification policy. Indeed, because there are recognisable perspectives 
within this policy subsystem, there are a range of views over the nature of evidence 
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in this particular debate (Chapter Six). For some, this means that policies are 
ultimately evidence-free (radical and conservative perspectives), whereas as others 
diametrically oppose this stance and maintain that the policies are evidence-based 
(the Government and the rational perspective). As we shall see, also underpinning 
these standpoints are differing appreciations on the role of evidence in policy- 
making. These have become particularly noticeable in light of factors occurring 
alongside the research, the product of researching in real-time (Chapter Four). 
This chapter documents another such instance and what follows is thus 
organised accordingly. First, consideration is given to more external events running 
contemporaneously with the current research that impacted significantly on its 
course. Discussion then turns towards appreciations of the role of evidence in the 
policy process. A closer look at the mechanism through which the Government 
receives its information and an appreciation of the notion of drug hann is used to 
illustrate this. The data presented here is ultimately viewed through the lens of 
considering the location of evidence in the decision-making process. In one sense, 
this also serves to reinforce the findings of the previous chapter concerning the 
enigmatic nature of evidence, but as we shall see, some semblance of certitude is also 
brought to the understandings of the concept. Finally, some summarising comments 
are given, detailing the complexity and nuance of evidence in politicised policy 
areas. 
7.2 A Consequence of Real-Time Research Part 2: Recent Developments in UK 
Drug Classification 
In the aftermath of cannabis reclassification and review, several other events 
occurred, each affecting, to a greater or lesser degree, the substantive aspect of the 
research. This process started with the Parliamentary debate over the passing of the 
2005 Drugs Act. This Act was subsequently the subject of much criticism, in 
particular, the inclusion of magic mushrooms as a class A substance. The primary 
significance, however, was the wider interest in the, drug classification system that 
this fostered. 
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As an aide-memoire, towards the end of 2006 and into 2007, the debate 
between various constituencies concerning the, efficacy of current UK drug policy 
and legislation, specifically relating to the evidence for the efficacy of the 1971 
Misuse of Drugs Act, became more widespread (e. g. Levitt, et al. 2006; Nutt, et al. 
2007; Reuter and Stevens 2007; Royal Society of Arts 2007; Science and 
Technology Committee 2006). The publication of the Science and Technology 
Report (2006) was particularly central to this. In addition, early in 2007, on a number 
of occasions, the famous 'pips' of Radio 4's Today programme, gave way to news 
headlines announcing (usually a few items iii) that a major overhaul of the system for 
classifying illegal drugs has been proposed by a group of leading academics in a 
report to be published later this week, or that UK drug policy will today be revealed 
as not fit for purpose by a major report released later today, and that a report by the a 
new commission set up to look at the evidence for UK drug policy will today reveal 
that Govenu-nent policies have had limited impact on rates of drug use. 
Respectively, these related to: the Nutt, et al. matrix published in March; a 
report, also published in March, of a two year study by the Royal Society of Arts 
(2007), examining various aspects of public policy and the use and abuse of illegal 
drugs and; the establishment, in April, of the aforementioned United Kingdom Drug 
Policy Commission with the brief of providing objective analysis of UK drug policy 
on the grounds that the rigorous use of evidence has, in this area, thus far been found 
wanting. The work of Reuter and Stevens (2007) is related to the emergence of the 
United Kingdom Drug Policy Commission, an independent commission which 
provides critical analysis of the Government's drug policy. It has already been 
stressed how there is cross-over between all these publications and the outlook of the 
rationalist perspective. In essence, the interest in the evidence-base for UK drug 
classification, more generally, gained such momentum that the cannabis 
reclassification could not be considered in isolation from these subsequent events and 
was actually the trigger that brought them about. 
Later in 2007, cannabis once again became a pressing issue, however. Within 
weeks of assuming office, the Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced at Prime 
Minister's Questions that, in light of continuing in 
* 
terest in the link between cannabis 
use and mental health (e. g. Moore, et al. 2007), and as part of the run-up to the 
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review of the 2008 Drug Strategy, the classification of cannabis would be referred 
back to the ACMD (Woodward 2007). Also that same week, the Home Secretary 
Jacqui Smith announced, along with five Cabinet colleagues including the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Alistair Darling, that she too had tried cannabis as a 
student but welcomed the call to revisit the classification. In early April 2008, Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown highlighted his support for cannabis to be reclassified back 
up to class B (Winnett 2008), although early indications were that this would be 
contrary to the advice of the ACMD (BBC 2008b). 
In May 2008, against the prevailing advice from the ACMD (2008), the 
Government signalled its intention to reclassify cannabis back up to a class B drug, 
stating that it had considered 'the evidence' and that this would send a message out 
to users and potential users about the dangers of the drug (BBC 2008a). The most 
recent review by the ACMD concluded that: 
The Council is still very concerned about the widespread use of cannabis 
among young people. Although the number of users has decreased over the 
past few years, cannabis still poses a real threat to the health of those who 
use it ... The Council hopes that the government, parliament and the public 
appreciate that the use of cannabis is, ultimately, a public-health problem; 
and that it requires a public health response if current use and the associated 
harms are to be substantially reduced. Although the criminal justice and 
classification systems have a role to play - especially in reducing supply - 
the major emphasis must be directed at ways that drastically reduce demand 
(ACMD 2008: 33). 
The accompanying recommendation was that cannabis should remain a class 
C drug. This is premised on the fact that although there is recognition of a 'consistent 
(though weak) association, from longitudinal studies, between cannabis use and the 
development of psychotic illness, there was little evidence of the social harms 
associated with cannabis use, particularly its association with 'acquisitive crime and 
anti-social behaviour' (ACMD 2008: 34). Furthermore, it is stated that decisions 
about classification are ultimately 'based on the Council's collective judgement of 
substances within and between classes' (ACMD 2008: 34). As this is the case, the 
report suggested that cannabis currently resides in the correct class, as class C, as the 
harms caused by cannabis are 'not considered to be as serious as those of drugs in 
class B' (ACMD 2008: 34). It was one conclusion of this latest ACMD study that the 
cannabis classification issue should, however, remain under review, with the council 
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returning to the issue in 2010. This is a product of the likelihood of new data 
emerging over the next few years. This latest development does, however, highlight 
the centrality once again of evidence, particularly from the ACMD, to the decision- 
making process although this is a significant point of contention. 
7.3 Classification Perspectives and Appreciations of 'Evidence' of 'Drug Harms' 
In the latest cannabis debate, the notion of drug harm was central to the decision- 
making process. Additionally, the concept of drug harm is a significant, even 
defining feature, of the perspectives' positions on the efficacy of the 1971 Misuse of 
Drugs Act. This section is concerned with the various perspectives' appreciations of 
the efficacy of the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act, as a means of addressing the drug 
problem. At present, the Government, and the majority of Parliament, are alone in 
arguing that the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act has withstood the test of time and that the 
tri-Partite structure is currently fit for purpose. 
As was the case with the initial cannabis reclassification (see Chapter Six), 
there are noticeable differences between perspectives and their view of evidence in 
this area. The central concept of drug harm in relation to the classification system is 
indicative of this. In a neat synopsis of what follows, a Local Government Officer in 
the South East of England, with an interest in drugs education, suggested that: 
... it is this definition of harm that has been. fought over so very much. Harm from the social point of view? Harm from the physical point of view? Harm 
from a mental point of view? Harm from an emotional point of view? 
Everyone clearly comes at this from a different perspective 
(CON7/RATL14). 
7.3.1 The Radical Perspective 
In the previous chapter, it was claimed that for the radical perspective, the cannabis 
reclassification was not an evidence-based change. This was in spite of the fact that it 
did involve the use of some particular bodies of evidence. Central to this perspective 
is the view that it is not the intrinsic properties of the substances themselves that 
produce the greatest harm, but the manner in which they are regulated (Deep Core). 
Moving the debate on to consider the wider drug classification system, when asked 
170 
about the relationship between evidence and policy in this sense, it was the view of a 
Director of Research for a leading drug treatment NGO that it was: 
Weak, laughable, you know we have got the silly international history to it 
with the American influence ... There are also lots of messages in there ... the idea that a three-c 
' 
ategory system [based on drug harm] is meaningful has 
proved a dubious enterprise in its own right so there is a weak relationship - 
but obviously there is some area of ramification with cannabis at one end 
and heroin at the other end - there is something in that (RAD3/RATL4). 
In terms of drug harms, the key point here is that in its present guise, there is some 
semblance of order to the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act, but that within this, certain 
drugs are misplaced. This appreciation shares an affinity with that of the rationalist 
perspective. Looking at the bigger picture, for the radical perspective, the framework 
is rendered meaningless by what is excluded; alcohol and tobacco, as these are 
widely perceived to cause the most harm. 
The concept of drug harm was also a key aspect of the Science and 
Technology Select Committee hearings. The nature of drug harm, particularly the 
thorny issue of social harm, provides a good example. The following excerpt is 
between Liberal Democrat committee member, Dr Evan Harris, MP and the 
chairman of the ACMD: 
Q188 Dr Harris: In this matrix you include under "social harms" 
intoxication, health care costs, and other social harms. Included under "other 
social harms" do you include the harm that stems from criminalisation 
itself? 
Professor Sir Michael Rawlins: Yes. 
Q189 Dr Harris: You do not spell that out but that is understood? 
Professor Sir Michael Rawlins: Yes and whether this leads to acquisitive 
crime... (Science and Technology Committee 2006: 72) 
Fqr the radical perspective, this is the crux of the reason as to why the current 
classification system is not evidence-based. According to one respondent from a 
leading NGO advocating drug law reform: 
There is this bizarre ... you know it does your head in ... bizarre circularity 
and [the next question] basically said "well why don't you classify alcohol, 
it's a dangerous drug that kills loads of people" and the response was "well 
you know the problem is we tried that in America and loads of gangsters 
took over and everyone was selling hokey moonshine and people were dying 
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of it" and the chairman [Phil Willis] was going well "isn't that what 
happened with all the other drugs? " And Rawlins (sheepishly) goes "well 
now you mention it, yeah it is". You know, honestly some of those 
responses from Rawlins, respect to the guy for being really straight and 
honest and I don't think they [ACMD] are unprincipled scum bags or 
anything, they are doing their job within a system. Their failing on my part 
is that they haven't challenged the system that I think they deep down know 
is flawed ... They work in the system and they are too seared to challenge it ... Our role is to be that voice that challenges by asking those difficult' 
questions and saying, you know, "hang on, if the system that you are 
advocating is creating. the harms that you then use to define the system, is 
that not a bit weird? " (RAD I). 
In terms of the themes of the chapter, we see here certain misgivings about 
the philosophy of the ACMD, the main vehicle through which the Government 
receives its evidence. The following passage gets to the crux of the problem for what 
the evidence should be for the radical perspective, in relation to the wider 
classification system. Here, as with the cannabis issue, drug harms are caused 
primarily by the legal status of the drugs themselves. As we shall see, this is in 
contrast to not only the government perspective, but also that advocated by the 
ACMD and thus the rational perspective. In relation to the overall classification 
system, the above respondent continues: 
It's methodologically flawed and the evidence for it is that it has achieved 
the exact opposite of what its supposed to. [For] any scientist coming at this 
objectively, it would be laughed out of town, it fails every single test, and 
yet ... we just waltz 
blithely on. I think in a way the debate about the 
classification of cannabis and the scientific evidence for that really suits the 
government because we've been arguing this boring bull shit debate about 
cannabis classification for four years now, you know it dominates the media. 
Does cannabis cause mental health problems? Does cannabis turn you into - 
you know, a gecko? Does cannabis ... whatever it is that day ... does it cause 
schizophrenia? And the answer to those things is yes it probably does, it's a 
dangerous drug, all drugs are harmful especially if you have mental health 
problems before you do them. Or, you are fourteen and you are smoking 
bongs everyday for breakfast, yes of course cannabis is bad for you ... But we knew that anyway, it's actually nothing new. Any drug, if you use it the 
wrong way, it is going to harm them, but in the meantime, whilst we have 
been arguing over this, the tiniest policy tweak i. e. the reclassification of 
cannabis hasn't made much difference at all, or not a particularly significant 
one. The bigger picture ... is the apocalyptic failure of prohibition and all the harm it causes and the fact that the classification system is ridiculous, 
scientifically laughable (RAD I). 
The understanding of 'science' here is particularly illuminating. Here, we 
witness a certain understanding of the way an intervention works. In this sense, the 
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intervention is the implementation of the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act (the independent 
variable), and the desired outcome is the eradication of the drug problem (the 
dependent variable). For the radical perspective, the intervention has not only failed 
to achieve the desired outcome and then must be considered to have not worked, it 
has actually made the problem worse, hence the above reference to the 'apocalyptic 
failure of prohibition and all the harm it causes'. For the radical perspective, for the 
policy to be considered to be evidence-based, it must transcend the wider parad. igm 
of prohibition, as one j ournalist and writer points out: 
If your policy really is evidence-based, then I think it really all points one 
way, and you can't include the evidence that says the system of 
classification and prohibition works and exclude the evidence which shows 
abundantly that it doesn't work. So I think that they have made themselves a 
bit of a problem by declaring that they are going to have an evidence-based 
drug policy because they obviously haven't got one and we saw that quite 
clearly in the Science and Technology Committee hearings (RAD4). 
In a similar vein, it is also suggested that: 
I think that the classification system is incredibly vague. If you look at the 
various vectors of drug harms, in terms of different types of users, different 
drugs, different drug using patterns, modes of administration, different users 
predispositions, different doses, it's actually incredibly complex and there is 
a whole series of variables which are translated into a whole series of short, 
medium and long term harms for the individual, or for the community. To 
boil all that down for an individual drug into A, B, C, I really do think is 
almost completely meaningless. If you're a potential drug user or a current 
drug user, if you want proper, useful information on drugs, about how 
harmful they are, or about how to reduce risk or anything like that, ABC 
gives you no information at all - none (RAD I). 
Consequently, this has a knock-on effect for how the perspective views the 
efficacy of the overall system and is problematic when trying to accurately depict 
what is meant by drug harm, especially using science to depict drug harm: 
Something ... said in one of the select committee sessions was that for some 
people ABC becomes a sort of quality guide so its like A is only for special 
occasions, you know the good stuff, and B is for week days and C. But a 
class A drug, something like cocaine ... used occasionally in small doses its 
relatively un-harmful. People who have a line of coke at a party... Sir Ian 
Blair's middle-class cocaine snorters, you know, its not a problem for them, 
it doesn't do them any harm, they enjoy it, its not giving any physical, 
personal or community harm, really aside from the argument about illegal 
markets which are intrinsically harmful, but again that is a factor of 
prohibition (RADI). 
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Similarly it is the view ajoumalist and author that: 
There is a lack of clarity about harm because people don't distinguish 
between the harm caused by prohibition and the harm caused by drugs and I 
think this is skewed rather by alcohol ... In terms of drug harm, what most 
people see in real life is alcohol, leery people fighting in the street, but 
because the assumption is that alcohol is safe because it is legal and all other 
drugs are worse than alcohol, then there is an assumption that all these other 
drugs are very dangerous and harmful in the way that alcohol is, except 
worse. And in public health terms, alcohol is really quite conspicuously 
harmful and the harm caused by cocaine, for example, is really hard to 
identify. I mean the odd soap star may damage their nasal septum but 
cocaine deaths are pretty low. Most people go through a period of cocaine 
use where they make arse-holes of themselves and come out the other end 
with their wallets a bit lighter, but not much harm done otherwise. So I think 
that drug harms are radically misperceived because of the illegal activities 
associated with them (RAD4). 
There is a clear recognition within this perspective that their concept of 
evidence does not sit comfortably with that of the Government. This is most apparent 
in the different appreciations of harm and views on what constitutes 'harm 
reduction'. The concept of harm reduction, for this perspective, involves removing 
the damage caused by the legal status of the drug. This renders the current system as 
evidence-free because it is doing the exact opposite of its original intention. That is, 
the introduction of a hierarchical system of drug regulation with associated 
punishments, as in the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act, has not only failed to solve the 
drug problem, but is actually a contributory factor to the problem and has actually 
made it worse. 
For now, the key point is that for the radical perspective, scientific and 
methodological propriety are key considerations in the drug debate. However, these 
are contextualised at a higher level of abstraction. In terms of evidence-based policy, 
this restricts the role of evidence to an evaluation of the outcome of the overall 
policy, which is evidence-free. This is a short-term view of the policy process and is 
similar to the policy cycle understanding of policy discussed previously. 
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7.3.2 The Rational Perspective 
The key feature of the Policy Core of the rational perspective reveals that the 
cannabis reclassification is broadly conceived as an 'evidence-based' decision. It 
signalled an attempt to apply a scientific understanding to, or 'rationalise', the 1971 
Misuse of Drugs Act. When asked about the relationship between evidence and 
policy with regard to the current UK drug classification system, a one-time member 
of the ACMD, and Chief Executive of a leading drug policy NGO commented that: 
The short-hand answer to that is, if you look at Colin Blakemore and David 
Nutt's work [Nutt, et al. matrix] and if you look historically there isn't a 
huge relationship. I think, in a way there is a crude relationship between 
these historically. In terms of nuancing. and finessing, not a huge amount, 
though that is not to say it is hugely wrong but rather it is a nuancing and 
you look at things like Ecstasy and Magic Mushrooms and stuff like that and 
there isn't the evidential base, I would suggest personally ... that I wouldn't think this particular classification is warranted in terms of the harms and the 
risks (RATL 15). 
Like the radical perspective, there is recognition that certain drugs are 
misplaced within the framework. Unlike the radical perspective, it is eradicating 
these discrepancies from the current framework that typifies the understanding of 
evidence for this perspective. The mechanism through which this is achieved is 
written into the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act. This states that the Government must 
seek advice from the ACMD when entertaining the possibility of amending the 
legislation. A discussion of these issues is detailed by the chair of the ACMD, 
Professor Sir Michael Rawlins, who stated in oral evidence to the Science and 
Technology Committee that: 
When we look into a particular area we usually set up a small working 
group. That small working group undertakes or usually commissions a 
systematic review of the public evidence, the chemical, the basic science and 
the social science evidence. That is supplemented by a search for 
unpublished material from all sorts of sources, not only from scientists we 
know are working in the field but through our national and international 
contacts, and then we interact with experts in the field, seeking their written 
evidence, seeking oral evidence from them and seeking their views on the 
systematic review and , yhether we have left anything out. That then forms 
the basis of a draft report which is looked at by the Technical Committee 
and then finally goes to the Council for further discussion and consideration 
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and sometimes a bit of iteration between the Council and the Technical 
Committee (Science and Technology Committee 2006: 66). 
It was the view of a current government adviser and member of the ACMD 
technical committee, in response to a question detailing understandings of the 
government's favoured kind of evidence in this area, that: 
This comes down to the sort of evidence that ACMD might collect and 
present and in the case of the cannabis review last year that was very much 
based on published academic work ... Peer-reviewed work ... but in other 
cases it is not always possible to do that, I'm thinking of the Khat review of 
a year or so ago. There is not much evidence base for Khat, partly because 
it's restricted to a narrow ethnic group of people, partly because there is not 
a lot of academic work on it and certainly not a lot of hard scientific 
toxicological information on it. So it's just got to grasp at whatever evidence 
it can there really., So, I don't know that the government is at all thinking in 
any detail about the sort of evidence it's getting. If it's getting something 
from ACMD, which it trusts is the best synthesis of evidence that's out 
there, it probably doesn't question it too much. I don't think there's any 
questioning of ACMD it'sjust going into a bigger melting pot (RATLI). 
From the above discussion, a number of issues are identifiable. There is a 
confirmation of the core beliefs of the perspective. That is, the current problems with 
the overall 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act framework stem from a concatenation of 
causes internal to it. Another key point relates to how, for the rational perspective, 
there is great emphasis on the nature and properties of substances themselves. In this 
sense, there is not the same view that the current system has not worked, only that it 
can be improved. As a result, we get, at this stage, an insight into what constitutes 
evidence. This takes the form of systematic reviews of known toxicological and 
pharmacological data, for example. In addition, there is also an indication of where, 
ideally, this evidence should come from (peer-review) and how it is synthesised (by 
the ACMD), all of which can improve on the existing framework. The significance 
of 'peer-review' and 'published academic work' is apparent only to the rational 
perspective. This shares an affinity with the government understanding and contrasts 
with both the radical and conservative perspectives, who make no mention of these 
manifestations of evidence. This will be returned to in due course. 
This discussion again highlights the significance of the ACMD to UK drug 
policy-making. However, it is necessary to suggest that the work of the ACMD is not 
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accepted uncritically by members of the policy subsystem. As we shall see, the 
conservative perspective is particularly sceptical of this organisation, even within the 
rational perspective there are voices of concern. A central figure from a leading drug 
information charity was of the view that: 
I think they have been guilty - and this came out in the Science and 
Technology report - of keeping their deliberations secret and there has not 
been an awful lot of transparency about how decisions have been reached. 
Mainly what you see is the final report, but not how you got to that final 
report. I mean we are on the ACMD and when the papers turn up here for a 
meeting, I mean I am not joking, they can be off the floor. Just the cannabis 
reclassification thing, it was hundreds of individual scientific papers, you 
know, the "evidence-base" turned up on your desk and we were expected to 
read it. So I think also they have got virtually no budget and so they are 
actually quite limited in what they can do... (RATL8). 
Similarly one former member of the organisation was of the view that: 
I don't know the current round but I would say that when I was a member of 
it, I was a member of what I would call the purple patch because drugs and 
crime was a big issue and Harm Reduction was a big issue so we all got 
excited about it and wrote reports about it and there was a culture, like in the 
profession, of "what do we need to do? Let's get on and do if'. I resigned 
from ACMD [to take up another role] ... and my feeling of ACMD was that 
they got lost in relevant debates, I am not sure that anyone tried to move it 
that way and I suppose they would say that they were knocked sideways by 
the drug tsar and didn't know what their role was. So it kind of lost its edge 
in the mid to late '90s and I am not sure where the culture or group within 
that impacted. All I know is that there are some very good people some very 
expert people within that who haven't been all that focused either because 
they are very cleverly manipulated, or they are being naYve. It has been a bit 
disappointing (RATLI 1). 
Although there are some voices of concern, there is also general satisfaction 
with the way the ACMD operates, as a rounded institution. The above respondent 
from a leading drug information charity continues: 
Yeah, you'll have differences of opinion and scientists who come at it from 
one perspective and other scientists who'll come from another. So I don't 
think ... the idea of total objectivity, even within clinical medicine is true, 
everyone has got their own agenda. But yes, I have never found ACMD 
reports anything other than a pretty thorough and balanced view of whatever 
situation they happen to be investigating ... they are certainly not as proactive 
as they used to be and that is often down to the personalities in charge but I 
have never had any sense that they are biased in any way and if there is a 
bias in their deliberations it seems to get ironed out when the reports come 
out and I thiýk some of the stuff they have written over the years has been 
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some of the best stuff written on drug policy that we have had so I've always 
been a great admirer of ACMD (RATL8). 
The lack of bias identified above, highlights the affinity between the rational 
perspective and the outlook of the ACMD. The following exchange between the 
author and the Director of a leading international drug treatment NGO testifies the 
effective nature of the ACMD and the scope of its deliberations: 
RATL13: I think it probably still does a good job. Although it was 
marginalised for a long time, I still believe in that sort of committee that 
isn't executive and is outside of government. Rawlins didn't take on many 
challenges in his first period but certainly moved into some fairly risky areas 
and perhaps having, as is traditional, the chairman of ACMD to be from 
science is a strength. Generally it has been a Psychiatrist or a psycho- 
pharmacologist or someone in that area and that is quite a strength. 
MM: Does that shape the kind of evidence they produce? 
RATL13: Well it does, in my experience they were always more interested 
in the social evidence and the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act requires them to 
take into account the social impact and social harms. 
The 'risky areas' referred to here relate to developing policies based on the 
principles of harm reduction as it applies to this perspective. Referring back to the 
belief system structure of this perspective (Table 6.4), harm reduction is considered 
primarily in terms of drug treatment. To summarise, this involves catering for the 
most Problematic drug users in a public-health setting as opposed to applying 
criminal justice sanctions on such behaviour. It also begets a view of the 1971 
Misuse of Drugs Act, which contrasts with both the conservative and radical 
perspectives. 
The thorny issue of drug harm is approached from a particular angle within 
this perspective, which as stated, focuses more on the properties of the drugs 
themselves. The following quotation serves to clarify the issue. In reply to a question 
asking whether applying science into the current framework to accurately place drugs 
in relevant categories, based on harm, is what should constitute 'evidence' in this 
debate, it was the view of a Director of an international drug treatment NGO: 
Well, I think one of the problems is how we decide what the harms are and 
what causes the harms. Because if you take an argument that I imagine 
Danny [Kushlick] would put forward for Transform, that a lot of the harms 
stem from the control mechanisms themselves, so you take some of the 
control mechanisms away and regulate the market ... So, at one level, you 
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can say what are the inherent harms and I suppose on a health basis that 
would be pretty easy to do, once you start looking at social harms you are 
then in a bit of a circle because it is hard to decide where the social harms 
originate, whether they are inherent in the drug itself. Well, certain drugs 
possibly, yes, because certain drugs have a deleterious effect on behaviour 
but very often culture mediates those behaviours and very often there is a 
risk environment, which is a whole constellation of things coming together 
which determines whether people suffer harms or not so that becomes rather 
complex to tease out. So yes, but a qualified yes, in answer to your question 
(RATL13). 
Part of the rationalising process involves introducing 'science' into the 
control of substances, by attempting to equate levels of harm with levels of 
punishment. In effect, this constitutes 'evidence-based policy' for members from this 
perspective. In an overlap with some of the themes mentioned previously, in 
particular the significance of the peer-review process, the following exchange from 
the Science and Technology Committee (2006) oral evidence sessions is informative. 
It is between Dr Evan Harris MP, the chair of the ACMD technical committee 
Professor David Nutt and the chair of the main committee Professor Sir Michael 
Rawlins: 
Q177 Dr Harris: ... Professor Blakemore [Co-author of Nutt, et al. matrix] has argued for a scientifically-based scale of harm for all drugs with alcohol 
and tobacco included in some form of calibration. I am curious as to your 
thoughts on that. 
Professor Nutt: I think it is a very sensible idea. 
Professor Sir Michael Rawlins: I think, inevitably, as David says, it will 
inform the decision but it will not determine it. These things cannot be 
entirely algebraic. - 
Q178 Dr Harris: You have not done that. You have got this matrix that you 
sent us, which you did not send us originally, but you kindly supplied it 
later, which is very interesting and I think it is possibly among your 
interesting memorandum the most interesting. If you did this scale and you 
put in tobacco and alcohol then that would be a useful thing. I cannot 
understand, since you have agreed it would be useful, why you have not 
done it, unless it would show that the current ABC would not- 
Professor Sir Michael Rawlins: We can send to you the paper that David 
has been preparing. 
Professor Nutt: We have done this. 
Q179 Dr Harris: Has it been published? 
Professor Nutt. No, it has not but the plan is to send it to The Lancet, get it 
peer-reviewed, and hopefully have it in the public domain. 
Q180 Dr Harris: Has there been a delay? If you have done it, why not 
publish it? 
Professor Nutt. Because it takes some time. It is an iterative process. There 
are four authors and it has taken some time. It is not trivial writing a quality 
paper for The Lancet. 
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This paper was, as stated, finally published in March 2007 anq such 
discussions have come to dominate the ACMD understanding of requisite evidence 
in this field. According to one member of the ACMD technical committee: 
It's only since we've taken on board the risk assessment processes in the last 
six years or so that we've really made any effort in changing that early 
policy [of the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act], because all the time that the act 
has been in existence, very few substances have been removed and very few 
substances have been reclassified. Some that were removed had to go back 
in again later because misuse then grew once they came out of the act and so 
the feeling with time was that it was dangerous to tinker with the Act 
because it caused all sorts of problems, so the feeling was that we should 
leave things where they were, or at least other people felt that. It's only been 
in the last few years to say that the scientific base doesn't really support the 
classification we've got today, I feel that very strongly now (RATL I). 
From the current discussion, it- is clear that the Nutt, et al. matrix, and its 
associated understanding of the nature of drug harm, sees evidence as part of the 
decision-making process and does not restrict evidence to one of policy evaluation as 
is the case with the radical perspective (as we have seen), and as is the case with the 
conservative perspective (as we shall see). 
The general understanding of drug harms is equated to the substances 
themselves in this perspective, but this has numerous dimensions, including 
toxicological harm and social harms. Reducing harm, however, does not require a 
radical overhaul of the current framework but can be done by keeping it in tact. It 
suggests that by accurately depicting the harmful nature of drugs, in relation to one 
another, within the framework, drug users should be able to make informed choices 
about the risks they take. For those that do come into difficulties, drug treatment is a 
means of reducing the harms associated with drug use instead of some form of 
legalisation or emphasis on prevention, which are policy goals seen as unrealistic for 
advocates of this perspective. 
There is, here, a clear indication of a general acceptance that the ranking of 
drugs in some form of scale of harm is a desirable enterprise and is thus central to the 
general understanding of evidence. The Nutt, et al. matrix is an example of this but 
there is some recognition that it may not necessarily be the most efficacious solution. 
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Additionally, it was the view of one director of a leading NGO in the drug policy 
sector and former member of the ACMD that: 
There is no doubt that in the long-run it might help to have categorisation for 
classification more rigorously and scientifically based ... I am not necessarily 
sure that David Nutt and Colin Blakemore's contribution is the only one 
because it was a Delphi Group, and it was a Delphi Group particularly 
around psychiatrists who will have a view of the world. If you had done that 
exercise with a bunch of coppers it may have worked out very differently. 
So what is 'science' in that sense? Science has got values and professional 
inputs clouding it and shaping it. I think the choice of evidence, inevitably, 
is always shaped by the people coming to it. What [my organisation] wants 
to do is to try and marry very, very different disciplines into its work and 
analysis and to try and stand back so it is not coming from any particular 
viewpoint or issue and it will try and synthesise some of the available 
evidence to try and reach a conclusion like that as best it can. But I will go 
back to the fact that there is limited evidence about what is happening so 
that everyone, everyone is driving half-blind (RATL15). 
There is a claim to objectivity here, but this is open to question. It is stressed 
here that one of the subtleties of the rational perspective is its claim for this ground, 
but when applied to the drug debate, this is actually another standpoint and not 'the' 
solution to the problem, for example. Overall, the causal explanations of the defects 
of the current system, via understandings of drug harm, do reveal an interesting point 
of comparison, which results in a broader view of the evidence and policy 
relationship than is identifiable in either the radical and conservative perspectives or 
the Government. This stems from the rational perspective having a more long-term 
view of the policy process than either the radical or conservative perspectives. In 
short, this views the role of evidence in decision-making, not just in terms of 
outcome but also process. In other words, the relationship between evidence and 
policy is conceptualised in the various ways evidence is. used and engaged with in 
policy discussions, and not just in terms of the impact it may or may not have on the 
final policy that is made, as in the policy cycle model. 
7.3.3 The Conservative Perspective 
The key feature of the conservative core belief structure (Table 5.6) shows a specific 
concern with the deleterious properties of the drugs themselves. These statements are 
consistent with the Deep Core beliefs of promoting wholesome and healthy lives 
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through abstinence. In this sense, underpinning the appreciation of evidence here is a 
medical philosophy. For their part, when asked about the relationship between 
evidence and policy with regard to the current UK drug classification system, a 
typical response of members of the conservative perspective was to point out the 
futility of the current system. For example, one former UK government, and current 
adviser for the Scottish Parliament stated that: 
I don't think that it is enormously shaped by evidence. I think that in certain 
senses it is a bit of a mystery as to why certain drugs are placed in some 
categories and others are in a different one. I think that one can envisage that 
the classification system is something that should be much more evidence- 
based. Devoting an enormous amount of time to placing drugs in their right 
position, in their right relative position as well as their right absolute 
position ... in a sense ... 
is rather fiddling while Rome bums ... Actually the 
classification system is neither here nor there, whether it is right or wrong, it 
is something of an irrelevance in terms of the choices and decisions that 
people make over whether to use or not use illegal drugs. So I don't actually 
have a huge degree of sympathy with the investment of considerable effort 
in trying to work out where certain drugs sit within the classification system. 
I think it is a bit outmoded actually and I don't know that it serves any more 
useful function, for example, to seek to differentiate between heroin and 
cannabis but that is where the classification system takes you 
(RATLIO/CON4). 
There is here, then, a sense that the initial implementation of the 1971 Misuse 
of Drugs Act has done little to address the drugs problem. In this sense, there is some 
overlap with the radical perspective. In causal terms, the intervention has not 
achieved what it set out to do and that is solve the 'drug problem'. For the 
conservative perspective, however, it is not the Act itself that produces the problem 
per se. The overarching criminal justice philosophy is generally considered to be 
sound, but more enforcement is needed and more emphasis should be placed on 
prevention. At present, the current framework does not target the correct areas and a 
three-tiered, ABC structure only confuses the issue. 
Associated to this perspective, is a noticeable critical view of the mechanisms 
by which the government receives its evidence. The efficacy of the ACMD as a body 
capable of synthesising the evidence is called into question, particularly the extent of 
its objectivity. It does not require any reading between the lines to ascertain that it is 
the view of the respondent below that the ACMD's deliberations and reports, 
although for the most part significantly cerebral, are shaped by a particular 
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philosophy. According to an ex-Chief Constable from Scotland and a current adviser 
to the United Nations: 
The ACMD is not an organisation I have a particularly high regard for and I 
don't think it is as impartial, as independent and as professional as it could 
be. There are an awful lot of experts that ought to be on that committee that 
aren't and I mean genuine qualified people from well established 
universities and the like, but nevertheless the ACMD has made some good 
reports (CONS). 
A more damning criticism of the ACMD comes from the following 
respondent, a current representative of an International Drug Prevention 
Organisation. It ultimately raises serious doubts about the mechanism through which 
the Government receives its advice. Regarding initially the cannabis reclassification, 
she suggests: 
It certainly wasn't scientifically based because if they'd even looked, as I 
say, at some of these papers and papers going back ... OK some scientific 
research is faulty, you'll always get that but if you take the complete volume 
of papers you'll see that the bulk of it is warnings of psychological and 
mental damage (CON3). 
Similar sentiments are expressed in relation to the wider drug classification system: 
The ACMD are not a proper scientific body. There are only a few proper 
scientists and even they are libertarian types ... The ACMD is government 
appointed, everything is skewed ... There was one paper by a chap called MacLeod and others on mental illness. I think it was dated 2004 and they 
[ACMD] looked at that and that bucked the trend of all the papers that had 
been written and it sort of downplayed it. I was asked to look at that paper 
and I did, and I did a criticism of it ... To begin with, two of the co-authors 
were on the ACMD, they looked at a whole load of papers, obscure papers 
that I have never seen. I wrote a paper on psychosis and schizophrenia with 
76 references. They included, I think it was two ... They just downplayed 
everything and I mean they didn't look at the main research of people who 
had been in the research field for years and years and years, really prominent 
people and they just ignored all that research and downplayed it because Iwo 
of the authors were on the committee. They were asked to look definitely at 
that paper and about four others, but of course, it obviously had a lot more 
influence - it was a faulty paper (CON3). 
Overall, allied to the views that the ACMD is not a completely objective 
organisation and that the concept of hann has become distorted, is the assumption 
from this perspective, in line with their Policy Core beliefs, that the platform on 
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which the evidence debate takes place is misleading. According to one retired 
Customs Officer and Independent Anti-Corruption Consultant for the UN: 
I think that whole thing about that new list [Nutt, et al. matrix] is a con 
job... Where is the advantage in discussing it? I would just rather have they 
are legal or they are not legal and the hierarchy of harm ... it is used by 
law 
enforcement and it is used by the Courts but I actually think that a better 
determinant would be scale and size of operation and profitability and I 
think we have got ourselves locked in a debate splitting hairs... (CONS6). 
In public debates about the relationship between evidence and policy, with 
regard to the drug classification system, it has been precisely the endeavours of 
Professor Nutt and colleagues that has come to assume a dominant status. For those 
who adhere to the conservative standpoint, this is problematic. Other respondents 
were more concerned that the understanding of harm within the drug policy debate 
was actually too narrow. Thus, according to one Director of a leading Drug 
Prevention Organisation: 
In general when people talk about harm and harm reduction they tend to talk 
about harm to the user, they tend to talk only about physical harm and I am 
including brain damage in that, rather than the use of the brain cells, and 
they tend to think that it is only in the stages of addiction that it occurs but 
this is wrong in all three senses. Lots of other people are affected by drug 
users and you could do a bulls-eye if you like of the drug user in the middle 
and you get family, friends, and siblings and then you go out to work mates 
and ambulance drivers, police and so on, and so any one drug user actually 
affects a lot of other people, that is the first of the three points. The second 
one is that if you are looking at health damage it isn't just physical and these 
things include physical but also mental, intellectual, social, emotional, 
spiritual and environmental and I didn't invent those, the World Health 
Organisation uses those and actually if you look in biblical readings or in 
Buddhism or in Jewish you'll find pretty similar things that it is not just the 
physical. Thirdly, there is the issue of costs to people. This can start from 
day one. Using an unlikely example, but one that is easy to explain, 
someone uses cannabis for the first time, they are stoned and they get in 
their car and they wrap it around another car and bump off a number of 
people. I am not saying that that will happen with every cannabis user, that 
is patently stupid, but I am trying to illustrate that harms can happen from 
day one (CON8). 
Additionally, for the same respondent, this has a knock-on effect for the 
measurement of harm and the way it is discussed in policy debates: 
People are not measuring these other harms when they are assessing or not 
how harmful a particular drug is. We do know, if you take, for example, 
184 
siblings and other relatives, in the drug agency work we did - face to face 
work with alcohol and street drug abusers - time and again it came up that it 
was the people around the user who were suffering more or were harmed 
more. Until the drug or alcohol user got to the real stage of addiction, then 
they were suffering a lot, but up until that point they were fine. They were 
getting all the stuff they wanted and they weren't getting 'nicked' by the 
police because they were lucky and they had ways of getting it or maybe 
they had ajob (CON8). 
These harms are generally considered to be social harms and, for the 
conservative perspective, they are downplayed. In contrast to the rational 
perspective, there is clear scepticism concerning the utility of basing policy on a 
rationally developed scale of harm. The key point is that the intervention of the 1971 
Misuse of Drugs Act unnecessarily complicates the issue, and that tweaking the 
mechanism internally does not get to the route of the problem. In essence, drug 
classification does not accurately depict that all drugs are dangerous and should be 
given equal weighting in the legislation. Consequently, a reworking of policy is 
advocated which places both more emphasis on prevention mechanisms and more 
stringent enforcement in a model that mirrors, as mentioned, the Swedish approach. 
This is in many ways, the antithesis of the rational model of informed choice 
based on receipt of accurate information about the nature of drug harms. In this 
regard, there is an affinity in appreciations of the location of evidence in evidence- 
based policy-making between the conservative and radical perspectives, in that the 
focus is on the overall efficacy of the policy. This equates evidence with policy 
evaluation and is restricted to the outcomes of policy. In effect, policy outcomes are 
seen as the correct location for considering the role of evidence in policy-making. In 
this sense, the conservative perspective also has a short-term appreciation of the 
nature of policy. This, too, is a departure from the view of evidence advocated by the 
Government and the rational perspective. 
7.4 The Complexity and Nuance of Evidence in a Politicised Policy Area 
detailed interrogation of the various perspectives on the nature of drug harm also 
reveals that like in the cannabis reclassification (see Chapter Six), there are also 
discrepancies in appreciations of the nature of evidence with regard to the wider drug 
classification system. Of more pressing concern, however, have been the schisms in 
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appreciations over the way the Government receives its information; that is, via the 
ACMD. This manifests itself in a debate over the role or purpose of evidence in the 
decision-making process. In this regard, despite the numerous differences, there are 
also elements of consistency over the way the various perspectives view the location 
of evidence. 
By taking the location of evidence in policy as a key theme, a dominant 
understanding of evidence emerges in this context. This view of evidence is that of 
the rationalist perspective, whose appreciations share a significant overlap with those 
of the Government. This view suggests that evidence can have an impact in the 
process of policy-making and is not necessarily equated with evaluations of current 
policies, or with policy outcomes. Focusing on the location of evidence, ultimately, 
casts the doubt on the pluralistic explanations of evidence in the UK drug policy 
debate, which are premised on the notion that all actors in the policy process are 
equal. The inequality in this particular subsystem stems not from a preference of the 
Government towards the rational perspective's kind of evidence, which shapes its 
policy outcomes, it is more that this appreciation of the location of evidence is 
consistent with that of the Government and it is thus a powerful explanation. 
The question that remains is how to explain this impasse? In response, it is 
suggested that three main, interrelated issues need to be given consideration. The 
first explanation is temporal and relates to causality. Referring, once again, to the 
core beliefs of each perspective, the radical group wish to repeal the current 
prohibitionist legislation and replace it with a system of legalised regulation. Drug 
harms are a product of the legal status of the drugs, which means that because control 
of the market is surrendered to illegal producers and distributors, drug purity and 
potency, for example, go unregulated and left to chance. In other words, the harms 
associated with drug use have occurred as a result of the intervention and the main 
danger, for the individual drug user, according to the radical perspective, has arisen 
because of, or after, the implementation of the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act. 
By contrast, the conservative perspective wishes to significantly alter and 
simplify the current legislation so that the true dangers of substances are more 
accurately depicted. This involves switching to a system that is similar to the 
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Swedish approach. This places emphasis on drug prevention and drug enforcement. 
For the conservative perspective, the current system fails to invest in the former 
aspect to a satisfactory degree, thus the main danger for drug users occurs before the 
1971 Misuse of Drugs Act can have any impact. 
To reiterate, these are also the origins of their negative, zero-sum 
appreciations of the evidence and policy relationship in this area. In other words, 
why for both perspectives the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act drug classification system is 
evidence-free and why it will remain so unless there is a significant alteration to its 
operation. In effect, both perspectives' solutions to the drug problem involve much 
speculation as to how their chosen direction for policy would represent an 
improvement on the current deadlock. This defies empirical test and is linked to the 
above point that the radical and conservative perspectives are not concerned with 
peer-reviewed, 'scientific' evidence and are more pre-occupied with the broader 
notion of policy evaluation. 
In contrast again, the rational position works within the current framework. In 
doing so, they suggest that any defects in the current system can be overcome by 
making it more scientifically valid. The rationale is that individuals can make 
infon-ned choices on the use of drugs if supplied with accurate information. This does 
not require drastic change but minor tweaks to the legislation. The conceptualisation 
of evidence cited by the rational perspective is, therefore, contemporaneous and 
consanguineous to the legislation. In other words, it occurs in real-time, and is 
intrinsic to the legislation to which it refers. In terms of evidence, there is some 
speculation as to what a policy would look like if all the 'evidence' in the debate was 
truly considered but this could be put to empirical test by rearranging the drugs in the 
framework, in line with the findings of the Nutt, et al. matrix for example. 
Furthermore, it is this privileged vista that means that for the rational perspective 
there is significant emphasis placed on the role of evidence in the process of policy 
formulation, whereas the radical and conservative perspectives conceptualise the 
evidence and policy relationship in terms of the policy outcomes. In essence, the fact 
that the radical and conservative positions do involve a degree of speculation, 
compromises their evidence-base credentials, as rational measurement (via peer- 
reviewed material) is typical of the evidence-based policy movement. 
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The second, related explanation is structural. Although there was recognition 
that the decision was political in that it was designed to combat the problems of 
harder drug use, the rational perspective, for the most part, supports the claim that the 
decision to reclassify cannabis was evidence-based. This represented the first 
instance of an acceptance that the classification system may not be scientifically 
valid and was the first attempt to iron out one of the anomalies of the existing 
classification system by reducing some of the regulations around the drug. 
Consequently, the notion of 'scientific' evidence was pushed to the fore and there 
were indications about how this evidence should be produced. 
Earlier (see Section 7.3.2 and above), the significance of 'peer review' and 
4published material' were mentioned as significant aspects of the evidence-base by 
members of the rational perspective, alongside obtaining "expert advice' from 
relevant bodies. Again, this conceptualisation of 'evidence' includes that used in the 
process of policy-making and shares similarities with that of academia and the 
Government when discussing the notion of evidence-based policy-making. Indeed, in 
the run up to the passing of the 2005 Drugs Bill, then Home Secretary Charles 
Clarke, pointed out: 
Of course, when we look at the analysis of the banding classification system, 
it is appropriate and right to consider the advice of the professionals who 
make the medical assessment before coming to a view. That is precisely 
what we will do... (cited in Levitt, et al. 2006: 3). 
Such appreciations are absent from both the radical and conservative perspectives, 
because their view of evidence, as mentioned, is restricted to the higher level of 
abstraction of policy outcomes. These include notions of providing value for money 
via legalisation (radical perspective) and more rigorously enforcing the law and 
increasing awareness of the dangers of drugs (conservative perspective), 
respectively. The data for such proposals is currently non-existent. No trials of such 
policy directions have been forthcoming. Hence, peer-reviewed published data is not 
the primary concern for these groups. It is, however, central to the wider evidence- 
based policy movement. 
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This issue is linked to the final point, which concerns the notion of semantics 
and returns to the issue of drug harm, prevalent throughout this chapter. Referring 
back to the Dýep Core beliefs of the rational perspective, it is clear that a promotion 
of public health by placing treatment at the centre of the drug strategy is central. This 
is to be achieved by making the existing framework internally valid. In turn, this 
underscores their view of harm reduction. Generall, this perspective finds favour 
with the Government. Indeed, Vernon Coaker, in oral evidence to the Science and 
Technology Committee (2006: 105), highlighted the centrality of the Nutt, et al. 
matrix to the government decision-making process: 
We have a matrix which we use. That matrix is part of the way we 
determine which drug should be in which category. Of course, we always 
look at the evidence that people give us; we always look at the opinions that 
they give to us ... we have a scientific basis for determining harm. The 
ACMD refer to that when they classify drugs. 
Consequently, the concept of harm is related to the concept of drug treatment, within 
the broader criminal justice framework. Treating problematic drug users can reduce 
the impact of drugs on communities. Coaker continues: 
We massively increased the spending on drugs, on trying to tackle the hann 
which drugs are causing in our - 
communities. The drug treatment 
programmes, the establishment of the various projects that we have, have 
seen a massive increase in spending (Science and Technology Committee 
2006: 106). 
This appreciation of harm reduction is in contrast to both the radical and 
conservative perspectives. For the radical perspective, reducing the harm of drugs 
requires a removal of the legal mechanism controlling drugs. Ultimately, harm 
reduction is drug legalisation and the creation of a regulated market. For the 
conservative perspective, harm reduction relates to preventing the harm that drugs 
can cause communities. In effect, harm reduction is drug prevention. 
7.5 Summary 
Until this point the objective of this inquiry has been primarily exploratory. It has 
looked into the nature and role of evidence in a politicised policy area, such as UK 
drug classification policy. Confirmation has been sought, and found, for the claim 
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that some form of evidence is embedded in the decision-making process (regardless 
of ones feelings towards this). This does not necessarily determine the policy 
direction, however. 'Evidence', as a concept, has been shown to be primarily, but not 
wholly contested; there are vestiges of consistency in the way evidence is conceived, 
for example, in the similarities between appreciations over the location of evidence 
in the policy process. 
It is suggested here, that the recognition that there is a dominant appreciation 
of evidence in this subsystem goes some way to explaining the predominance of the 
zero-sum explanations of the evidence and policy relationship in this context. These 
are still, at best problematic, and at worst inaccurate. One question that remains is 
how to explain the nature of evidence in a policy subsystem characterised by the 
three Cs of competition, conflict and controversy. The remainder of the thesis 
addresses this question. It starts by. attempting to ascertain if a plausible account for 
the nature of evidence, that is both contested and certain, can be ascertained and, if 
so, whether this is consistent with existing models of research utilisation that have 
been typically used to explain the relationship between research use and policy 
formulation. Chapters Eight and Nine, respectively, are devoted to these issues. 
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8. THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF EVIDENCE 
8.1 Introduction 
Focusing on issues relating to the wider drug classification system, the previous 
chapter highlighted how again there were various appreciations on the nature of 
evidence. This was manifested in the discussion of drug harm. It also highlighted, 
however, another aspect of the turmoil of evidence. By concentrating more 
specifically on the location of evidence in the policy process, certain vestiges of 
similarities in the appreciations of evidence were also apparent, and that a dominant 
appreciation of evidence, in the wider debate, could also be ascertained. 
Consequently, there is a potential impasse where there is a large degree of 
contestation, but also a significant element of certitude relating to the concept of 
evidence in this particular subsystem. 
There is, however, an additional issue to consider. Recent developments in 
UK drug classification policy, discussed in the previous chapter (see Section 7.2), 
illustrated how evidence in this subsystem, because it is live, is in a constant state of 
flux. This is a product of new data trickling into the public arena. Numerous 
examples could be given to illustrate this. For consistency, the one used here that has 
been used in previous discussions, concerns the issue of cannabis potency. The most 
recent ACMD (2008: 31) report states: 
The Council considers that, since its last review ... there is evidence to 
suggest users of cannabis are now exposed to products with a higher THC 
content than previously ... This has occurred largely because of the substantial 
increase in the market share of sinsemilla [high potency cannabis]. The 
Council is therefore concerned at the dominance of sinsemilla in the market 
because of its greater potency. 
In addition, referring to the issues of drug classification, the report also states that 
4since the Council's last review, further evidence has become available about the 
harmfulness of cannabis to both individuals and society' (ACMD 2008: 33). In spite 
of this, the Council remained unconvinced that cannabis should be reclassified as a 
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Class B drug. Adjoined to this recommendation, as mentioned in the previous 
chapter, was the statement that: 
The Council anticipates that additional data will become available within the 
next few years specifically relating to the causal association between 
cannabis use and psychoses. The Council therefore proposes to undertake a 
further review of the evidence in 2010 (ACMD 2008: 34). 
The task now faced is how to explain this. In undertaking this, it is necessary to get 
to grips with the key tenets of evidence-based policy-making in heavily politicised 
areas. To fully explore this, it is helpful to split the concept into its constituent parts. 
Chapter Three has already completed the task of analysing the 'policy' aspect; 
suggesting that the evidence-based policy movement is consistent with more pluralist 
models of policy-making. The current chapter proceeds by applying the analytical 
lens to the concept of evidence, in a bid to clarify its role and nature in politicised 
policy areas. This is achieved by first introducing the key issues in conceptual 
analysis, drawing on the sociology and philosophy of science literature. An overview 
of four traditions of conceptual analysis (c. f. Pawson 1989), then follows. The final 
section considers the notion of 'conceptual flux' as a means of synthesising the 
traditional understandings of concepts in the social sciences. I 
8.2 Key Issues in Conceptual Analysis 
Blumer (1969) provides a useful way of understanding the significance of concepts 
to science, by claiming that 'to speak of a science without concepts suggests all sorts 
of analogies -a carver without tools, a railroad without tracks, a mammal without 
bones, a love story without love' (cited in Blaikie 2000: 128). Bulmer (1984: 43), 
meanwhile, likens concepts to 'categories for the organisation of ideas and 
observations'. in addition, Bryman (2004: 65) suggests that 'concepts are the building 
blocks of theory and represent the points around which social research is conducted'. 
Essentially, they are a 'label that we give to elements of the social world that seem to 
have common features and strike us as significant'. 
Bryant (1995: 52-3) identifies numerous themes central to conceptual 
investigation. These issues concern matters relating to the nature of the natural and 
social world and, by association, the nature of open and closed conceptual systems, 
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which, in turn, is linked to the potential for concepts to be contested or consistent. 
These issues are, however, inextricably linked to other pressing concerns in the study 
of conceptual analysis. Consideration of the notion of primary and secondary 
concepts, developed by Schutz (1962a) is also significant, as are issues of the 
incommensurability and translation of language. This last aspect is a product of the 
increasing interest in language in the philosophy of science. 
On a crude level, the central themes identified by Bryant (1995) stem from 
issues arising from the hermeneutic critique of the positivist orthodoxy in social 
science. This has its origins in nineteenth century German thought. There were two 
key aspects to this development. First, the onset of linguistic constructivism, with its 
emphasis on language as the basic structure of society, was a fundamental departure 
from the methodological individualism of positivism. Secondly, there was the 
increased emphasis on the notion of intersubjectivity. This is the hermeneutical 
notion that interpretation implies an intersubjective relationship between science and 
its object, as opposed to a relationship of correspondence. Ultimately, the 
hermeneutical conception of science implies cultural construction (Delanty 1997: 40). 
As the focus is primarily on the thorny issue of conceptual contestability or certitude, 
of pressing concern are issues relating to open and closed understandings of the 
natural and social world. 
8. ZI The Natural and Social World and Open and Closed Systems 
it is suggested by Bryant (1995: 52), that social scientists and natural scientists have 
'different situations' to contend with when forming concepts. This revolves around 
the fact that the social world, in contrast to the natural world, is 'preconstituted and 
pre-interpreted by the objects of which it is composed (ordinary and not so ordinary 
men and women)'. The outcome of this is that there is no possibility of objects in the 
natural sciences changing their behaviour in light of what is said about them, which 
is a distinct possibility in the social world. Giddens (1984) refers to this as the 
'double hermeneutic'. These issues also get to the heart of issues of epistemology 
and ontology in the philosophy and sociology of science and knowledge, and it raises 
the question over how the social world is to be studied. 
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Pawson (2006: 18-9) offers a succinct overview of this, suggesting that social 
systems are the product of endless components and forces. Thus, when social science 
tries to focus on a uniform pattern of behaviour, or regularity, it realises that it is 
shaped by historical and institutional forces. The former, concern circumstances 
where the regularity may occur in one culture but not in another. The latter, is where 
different organisational arrangements and political structures render behavioural 
patterns susceptible to change. There is also the notion of the volition and choices of 
people where behavioural patterns are influenced by the choices people make. 
Additionally, people can modify their behaviour in relation to additional stimuli. The 
most fundamental issue this raises is that the research act itself can impact on the 
behaviour being researched. 
Various solutions have been touted. One has been to ignore the problem. This 
is Parsons' (1937) solution. In terms of method, experimental closure in Randomised 
Control Trials and even quasi-experiments are also indicative of this. The closure 
here is artificial, but such methods are seen to offer validity and thus findings can be 
generalised to other scenarios. The second solution, typical of the critical realist 
school (Archer, et al. 1998; Bhaskar 2002), suggests that there are an over-abundance 
of explanatory possibilities for any regularity. As this is the case, the goal of social 
research should be to find a privileged vantage point to unmask the assumptions of 
lay thought and actions that are behind false explanations. Although often seen as 
being contrary perspectives in the social sciences, this approach is not far removed 
from deconstructionism. (Delanty 1997). Another alternative comes from 
methodological realism (Carter and New 2004; Pawson 1989; Williams 2000). These 
thinkers accept that there are going to be alternative explanations of any given 
regularities but that it is worth trying to adjudicate between them even with the 
possibility that further explanations may be available within the unrelenting open 
social systems (a more detailed analysis of this can be seen in the formalist tradition 
of theories of meaning in Section 8.3.4 below). 
The debate over the nature of open systems and closed systems is arguably 
more of an acute issue in the social, rather than the natural sciences. This is 
particularly so for those who wish to hold on to the possibility of empirical 
measurement in social research, rather than an outright abandonment of this pursuit. 
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Advocates of closed conceptual systems suggest that these provide the only way 
forward for the social sciences to develop law-like generalisations and explanations 
that are the hallmark of the natural sciences. In contrast, there are numerous thinkers 
who suggest that advocating closed conceptual systems is misleading and wrongly 
imposes meaning on phenomena in the social world, which by its very nature is open 
and has an endless capacity for reconstruction (Bryant 1995: 53). 
8.3 Traditions of Conceptual Analysis 
The issues identified above as being central to understanding the nature of concepts 
have been discussed by various different traditions in the literature. Pawson (1989) 
identifies four main ones, also referred to as theories of meaning. These are; the 
operationalist tradition, the contestabilist tradition, the reconstructionist tradition and 
the fonnalist tradition. 
8.3,1 The Operationalist Tradition 
Central to the operationalist tradition is the view that there is a clear affinity between 
theory and concepts. This is expressed in Hempel's (1965) model of science, where 
concepts are employed: 
First, to permit an adequate description of the things and events that are the 
objects of scientific investigation; second, to permit the establishment of 
general laws and or theories by means of which particular events may be 
explained and predicted and thus scientifically understood; for to understand 
a phenomenon scientifically is to show that it occurs in accordance with 
general laws or theoretical principles (Hempel 1965: 139). 
In order to fulfil these criteria, it is necessary for concepts to be consistently 
employed: 
Science aims at knowledge that is objective in the sense of being 
intersubjectively certifiable, independent of individual opinion or 
preference, on the basis of data obtainable by suitable experiments or 
observations. This requires that the terms used in formulating scientific 
statements have clearly specified meanings and be understood in the same 
sense by all who use them (Hempel 1965: 141). 
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The view of concepts from the operationalist tradition can be depicted in diagram 
form as in Figure 8.1 below. 
Figure 8.1: The Operationalist Theory of Meaning 
0 
(adapted from Pawson 1989: 229). 
Here general scientific discourse is depicted by the oblong and the clearly 
defined scientific concept is depicted by the circle, which is understood in exactly the 
same manner by all who use it. Although he claims to the contrary, the sociology of 
Parsons (1937) is ultimately indicative of this. This is manifested, in particular, in his 
view that there is correspondence between an external world and the concepts used to 
understand it. Parsons (1937: 730) stated: 
As opposed to the fiction view, it is maintained that at least some of the 
general concepts of science are not fictional but adequately 'grasp' aspects 
of the objective real world. This is true of the concepts here called analytic 
elements. Hence the position taken here is, in an epistemological sense, 
realistic. At the same time it avoids the objectionable implications of 
empiricist realism. These concepts correspond, not to concrete phenomena, 
but to elements in them which are analytically separable from other 
elements. There is no implication that the value of any one such element, or 
even of all those included in one logically coherent system, is completely 
descriptive of any particular concrete thing or event. 
Championing a position he termed 'analytical realism', Parsons rejects the empiricist 
assumptions of those who proclaimed that concepts are actually reflections of reality 
but suggests that they accurately depict certain aspects of social life (Bryant 
1995: 25). In this sense, he offers a perspective of the social world as a closed system. 
Parsons' (1937) revised empiricism is the epitome of the operationalist view of 
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concepts. For Blumer (1969: 143) there is also an affinity between theory and 
concepts: 
Theory is of value in empirical science only to the extent to which it 
connects fruitfully with the empirical world. Concepts are the means, and 
the only means of establishing such connection, for it is the concept that 
points to the empirical instances about which a theoretical proposal is made. 
If the concept is clear as to what it refers, then sure identification of the 
empirical instances may be made. With their identification, they can be 
studied carefully, used to test theoretical proposals and exploited for 
suggestions as to new proposals. Thus, with clear concepts theoretical 
statements can be brought into close and self-correcting relations with the 
world. 
Blumer also indicates the centrality of concepts in the conduct of social 
research, highlighting their significance before, during and after the research act: 
Throughout the act of scientific inquiry concepts play a central role. They 
are significant elements in the prior scheme that the scholar has of the 
empirical world; they are likely to be the terms in which his problem is cast; 
they are usually the categories for which data are sought and in which the 
data are grouped; they usually become the chief means for establishing 
relations between data; and they are usually the anchor points in 
interpretation of the findings. Because of such a decisive role in scientific 
inquiry, concepts need especially to be subjected to methodological scrutiny 
(Blumer 1969: 29). 
It is difficult to disagree with the sentiments expressed by Blumer, but this 
does portray a somewhat one-dimensional view of the research process, based on a 
primarily empiricist and naturalist view of social science, a view similar to Hempel 
(1965). This was the orthodoxy at Blumer's time of writing, but it was one he sought 
to transcend by advocating the use of sensitising concepts in research. Sensitising 
concepts are context sensitive and are used to guide an investigation. These are in 
contrast to the more commonplace operational concepts which have a fixed meaning, 
ascertained at the outset of an investigation. 
The issue of the open-ended nature of the social world and its relation to 
concepts, identified by hermeneuticians and discussed more below, is ignored here. 
In relation to this, Bryant (1995: 25) identifies three main problems with the 
operationalist understanding of concepts, directing much of his ire towards Parsons. 
The basic premise is that there are various inexhaustible sources of conceptual 
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variation in the social sciences, this due to the inherently open nature of the social 
world. The first major point is that Parsons is guilty of neglecting the multifaceted 
character of human acts and social relations. These enable both those whom social 
scientists study, and social scientists themselves, to conceive, constitute and interpret 
the 'same' act or relation differently. For example, in this thesis, we have seen the 
radical and conservative perspectives suggest that the cannabis reclassification and 
wider classification system are 'evidence-free'. Their appreciations of evidence are, 
however, at odds with one another and differ again from the rational group. 
Drawing on the findings of what has become known as the 'linguistic turn' in 
the social sciences, the second source of 
, 
variation concerns the 'possibilities of 
innovation and invention inherent in all natural languages (Bryant 1995: 27). Finally, 
there is 'the unending variation in the forms'of social life' as each new form, does 
notjust'provide sociology with a new object of inquiry, it also presents it with a new 
opportunity for theorising' (Bryant 1995: 27). In contemporary social science, the 
operationalist view of science has, as a consequence, been rendered extremely 
problematic. It rests on a crude logic which has not only been widely discredited by 
developments in the hermeneutic tradition (see Section 8.3.2) but it has also been 
criticised by those who wish to hold on to the possibility of an empirical social 
science, whilst moving away from crude empiricism (Bhaskar 1979; Pawson 1989). 
This widespread critique of science has led to the emergence of numerous alternative 
explanations. 
8.3.2 The Contestabilist Tradition 
Although not generally seen as a member of this tradition, Max Weber is 
undoubtedly a formative influence on this style of thought. In an essay on objectivity, 
Weber (1904: 105-6) suggested that 'the greatest advances in the sphere of the social 
sciences are substantively tied up with the shift in practical cultural problems and 
take the guise of a critique of concept-construction'. Concepts are, in turn, central to 
the production of social science data. Key to comprehending Weber's use of 
concepts is to consider the role of values in social science. Referring to the nature of 
&objectivity' Weber (1904: 84) suggested: 
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The choice of the object of investigation and the extent or depth to which 
this investigation attempts to penetrate into the infinite causal web, are 
determined by the evaluative ideas [Werlideen] which dominate the 
investigator and his age. In the method of investigation, the guiding "point 
of view" is of great importance for the construction of the conceptual 
scheme which will be used in the investigation. 
By 'evaluative ideas', Weber is referring to values. In essence, Weber suggests that 
the 'objectivity' of any account is contingent'on the context in which it takes place. 
Although, in a subsequent article, Weber (1948) is keen to defend a version of value- 
free social science, in this way concepts do become open to contestation. In terms of 
social research, it is thus unavoidable that values enter into the process and impact on 
the nature of concepts and thus not all concepts are of the same variety. 
In the twentieth century, various thinkers took up this line of thought, 
including Gallie (1956), MacIntyre (1973) and Connolly (1974; 1983) who all 
stressed the 'essentially contested' nature of concepts. An essentially contested 
concept equates to more than a mere disagreement about the meaning of a particular 
term. Bryant (1995: 35-6) states: 
The literature on the essential contestability of social and political concepts 
is about what makes closure in the use of such concepts impossible to obtain 
- impossible because we are confronted with an essential, and not a 
contingent, characteristic of such concepts. 
For Gallie (1956), essentially contested concepts relate to those concepts over which 
there is some agreement concerning general understanding but limited agreement 
over usage. Gallie (1956: 169) states, therefore, that there are 'endless disputes about 
their proper use' and that there is 'no one clearly definable and general use of 
[them]'. The concept of drug harm is indicative of this. At first glance, the various 
appreciations of evidence discussed thus far could be considered in this way. 
Gallie (1956: 171-2) maintains that for a concept to be essentially contested it 
must 'approximate sufficiently' five initial criteria which constitute the phenomenon. 
These state it must be: a) appraisive (refer to a valid achievement); b) internally 
complex; c) variously describable; d) open ended and; e) used aggressively and 
defensively. After some critical discussion of these criteria, Gallie expounded two 
further pre-requisites. Thus, an essentially contested concept: f) must be the 
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derivative of an original exemplar; and g) suggests 'that continuous competition for 
acknowledgement as between the contestant users of the concept allows the 
achievement to be sustained or developed in optimum fashion' (Gallie 1956: 180). 
For Gallie, these criteria entail that the contestants, on some level, are referring to the 
same thing, alongside promoting the search for its ideal realisation. The contestabilist 
theory of meaning is depicted in Figure 8.2 below. 
Figure 8.2: The Contestabilist Theory of Meaning 




(adapted from Pawson 1989: 229) 
For contestabilists, the application of any particular term can be made in a 
number of ways. Pawson (1989: 234) states that some of these may share 'common 
ideas' (represented by overlapping circles) but others may not (independent circles). 
Gallie's examples of essentially- contestable concepts include; democracy, religion, 
art, science and social justice. Taking the concept of democracy, Oppenheim 
(1981: 183) states: 
One may define "democracy" by a combination of criteria such as periodic 
elections, competitive parties, representation, freedom of expression, 
diffusion of political power, implementation of collective preferences; but 
the presence of all these traits is neither necessary nor sufficient to 
characterize a given political system as democratic. 
Pawson (1989: 234) develops this by illustrating how both 'Western' and 
'Soviet' applications of democracy might share the notion that the role of elections is 
a significant aspect of the democratic process. The purpose of elections in each 
sphere is, however, divergent. In Western democracies, elections fulfil the function 
of electing a government from a competition between different political parties 
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within the electoral system. In Soviet democracies, elections served as the final 
aspect of the implementation of preferences within a collective, centralised state. 
Pawson (1989: 234) goes on to suggest that these properties may become 
redundant when it comes to 'conceptual contestation on democracy within a 
particular political system'. Using the example of 'representation', he suggests that 
one viewpoint may equate this with 'following the majority view'; however, another 
equally plausible notion could be the 'toleration of minority views'. These 
manifestations, for contestabilists, must be considered fallible and restricted to 
certain periods of time. In a time of war, for example, many or all of the basic tenets 
of democracy may be deemed inoperable with even the ultimate 'need for democracy 
being called into question'. There is then scope for meanings to change as the 
'context of the discourse' shifts (Pawson 1989: 234), hence the dashed oblong in 
Figure 8.2. 
MacIntyre's (1973) study can be read as an exercise in clarifying some of 
Gallie's more normative assertions. He makes the distinction between natural and 
social scientific concepts. Social scientists must debate the nature of concepts 
because not everyone shares the same ontological and epistemological assumptions. 
For MacIntyre (1973), essential contestedness reflects the constitution of the society 
to which the concept refers. In this sense, it is plausible for natural scientists to speak 
of conceptual closure 'because they are not involved in a debate over what the 
natural world should be like' (Bryant 1995: 36), and consequently the concepts that 
they use play no part in its constitution. According to MacIntyre (1973), this is a 
luxury that is not afforded to social scientists, although his reasons for this are 
unclear. 
Similarly, Connolly's (1974; 1983) central concern is to understand and 
explain how concepts used in academic discourse impact on the social world. 
Connolly (1974: 36) states that 'actions and practices are constituted in part by the 
concepts and beliefs the participants themselves have'. This is played out in the use 
of language. This statement was made in response to Broadbeck's (1968: 396) claims, 
(from which Connolly had taken significant pique) that if language is to be 
descriptive it must be put to effective use by indicating 'what there is in the world, no 
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matter how we talk about it'. Broadbeck (1968) believed that it was possible for 
concepts to be open-textured even if the social world was not. Connolly (1974) 
highlights, however, how the world is open textured and illustrates how the use of 
concepts reflects this but also, in part, constitutes it. Thus, the social scientist is part 
of the social process. 
It is, however, subsequent ideas developed in the second edition of the 
'Terms of Poli tical Discourse' (Connolly 1983) that provide the most intriguing, but 
somewhat paradoxical, development in Connolly's analysis. According to Bryant, 
(1995: 39) Connolly in this edition 'enlists' the help of Foucault (1982) (although 
Bryant suggests that more accurately this should be Foucault and Derrida), via the 
methods of genealogy and deconstructionism to support his claim for contestability. 
This is in light of the open-ended nature of the social world: 
Deconstructionists show how every social construction of the self, truth, 
reason, or morality, endowed by philosophy with a coherent unity and 
invested with a privileged epistemic status, is actually composed of an 
arbitrary constellation of elements held together by powers and metaphors 
which are not inherently rational. To deconstruct these established unities is 
to reveal their constructed character and to divest them of epistemic 
privilege. Genealogy is a mode designed to expose the motives, institutional 
pressures, and human anxieties which coalesce to give these unities the 
appearance of rationality or necessity (Connolly 1983: 23 1). 
For Foucault (1982), concepts play a part in social practices but, social 
practices are better thought of as 'discursive practices'. Discursive practices shape 
the way things appear. Phenomenon can only be understood in relation to the 
language (often specialist language), which it not only describes, but also constitutes. 
In Derrida's (1978) hands, this process of deconstruction is continuous. For Deffida, 
everything can be seen as a text of which there is no correct meaning. There are only 
interpretations of interpretations (Delanty 1997: 99). Meaning, or at least 'objective' 
meaning, cannot be attached to concepts because this would assume some sort of 
foundation. Deffida (1976) refers to this as 'logocentricism'. This suggests that there 
is a 'truth' that can be uncovered by science or religion, a view he is highly critical 
of. 
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Concepts will always be contestable because of the context in which they are 
viewed, which will be different by all people. However, for Derrida (1976), concepts 
such as truth, science or reality do not exist objectively but are in fact products of 
language and are not fixed ideas. In this way they are relative because language 
involves interpretations and everything becomes contestable as the process of 
deconstruction is continuous. 
Bryant (1995: 41) highlights a fundamental contradiction in Connolly's 
engagement with Foucault (and Derrida). Through discursive practice, Foucault 
(1982) 'decentres the subject', the actor, as the self becomes a product of modernity 
(with a circumscribed view of the possible'. In this sense, the actor becomes an 
artefact of power. This renders Connolly's view of contestable concepts problematic 
because this relies on the empowerment of the subject to contest them as his criticism 
of Broadbeck (1968) implies. Generally speaking, for contestabilists there is 
ultimately a duality between concepts and reality and both are essentially open and 
contestable. This view goes against the view of evidence presented earlier, whereby 
there was not complete contestation in the view of the concept, as illustrated in the 
discussion about its location in the decision-making process. 
The contestability thesis is, in part, a useful way of conceptualising the 
concept of evidence in politicised areas, but it only tells half the story. It explains the 
dangers of taking the concept at face value as in the zero-sum assertions of the 
evidence and policy relationship, it does not, however, fully explain the complexity 
and nuances associated with the concept. The limitation of Gallie's (1956) thesis, in 
particular, is that just about any concept used in the social sciences from anomie to 
zeitgeist could, by his definition, be seen to be contested. Applied to the concept of 
evidence. ' the contestability thesis is a holistic explanation of its nature. This 
downplays elements of conceptual certitude advocated by the other theories of 
meaning illustrated here. 
&3.3 The Reconstructionist Tradition 
So far, we have witnessed one tradition advocating conceptual closure in closed 
systems and another stressing the inherent openness of scientific, particularly social 
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scientific discourse, and hence the essential contestability of concepts. The work of 
Schutz (I 962b; 1962c) provides an interesting counterbalance to both: 
The world of nature as explored by the natural scientist does not "mean" 
anything to molecules, atoms and electrons. But the observational field of 
the social scientist - social reality - has a specific meaning and relevance 
structure for the beings living, acting, and thinking within it. By a series of 
common-sense constructs they have pre-selected and pre-interpreted this 
world which they experience as the reality of their daily lives. It is these 
thought objects of theirs which determine their behaviour by motivating it. 
The thought objects constructed by the social scientist, in order to grasp this 
social reality, have to be founded upon the thought objects constructed by 
the common-sense thinking of men, living in their dailY-life within the 
social world (Schutz 1962c: 59). 
Schutz's analysis starts from the premise that that there is often some 
discrepancy between the use of concepts in social science and those in 'everyday' 
language. This has been a primary concern of a number of thinkers broadly grouped 
under the umbrella of the interactionist tradition of social science. For Schutz 
(1962b; 1962c), then, all knowledge of the world involves 'constructs'. However, 
according to Bryant (1995: 28) he seeks to demark constructs used into two spheres. 
Those used in everyday life are termed 'first-order constructs' and are understood by 
all and are relevant to the 'daily-life world', whereas those formed by social 
scientists are 'second-order constructs'. 
Social scientists can grasp first order constructs and use them in their research 
in a bid to explain social phenomena. This is possible on the grounds that interaction 
is a central aspect of social life. Second-order constructs, however, are formed in 
relation to, and are a product of, the discipline in which they are produced. In this 
sense, they must adhere to a number of rules, or as Schutz (1962b) calls them, 
&postulates'. There are three of these: 'logical consistency' and the avoidance of non- 
sequiturs and contradictions; 'subjective interpretation' where scientific explanations 
must have recourse to the 'subjective meaning of the actions of human beings from 
which reality originates' and; 'adequacy' where an act attributed to an actor in the 
real world, perhaps via an ideal-type or model, must be understandable to that actor 
and his or her fellows (cited in Bryant 1995: 28). 
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In essence, Schutz's view is that the constructs developed by science should 
play no part in the life-world. In advocating this, Schutz discredits one of Marx's 
more famous assertions that the point of philosophy is to change the world. It also 
questions the entire discipline of social policy, and more recently, evidence-based 
policy which is founded on the premise that scientific and social scientific research 
can play a role in the improvement of society. For Schutz, the goal of social science 
is not to make generalisations about social phenomenon but to typify it. The 
inadequacy of Schutz's position is manifest if we consider again Giddens' (1984) 
notion of the double hermeneutic (which was developed in response to this. ) 
What Schutz's theory does achieve, however, is a vocabulary of scientific 
explanation. In this sense, there is an affinity between thinkers like Schutz (1962b; 
1962c) and Sartori (1984) and Oppenheim (1981) whose aim is to arrive at standard 
concepts which all social scientists will use (Bryant 1995: 28). Bryant (1995: 28) 
labels Oppenheim and Sartori as 'definitive reconstructionists'. - To fully 
contextualise their view, it is necessary to detour into the philosophy of science to 
consider issues relating to incommensurability and translation of language and the 
work of Kuhn G 970b). 
Bryant (1995: 32) claims that the issue of conceptual variation has an intended 
and unintended place in Kuhnian philosophy of science. The unintended aspect 
relates to the variations of the manifestation of 'paradigms', the central concept in 
Kuhn's (1970b) theory of science. It is the intended aspects, however, that are of 
current concern. Referring to the notion of progress in science, Kuhn's main thesis is 
that science proceeds neither inductively or deductively but in the movement from 
4normal' science to 'revolutionary' science. According to Delanty (1997: 34), in the 
course of normal science scientists attempt to resolve problems or puzzles whose 
solutions are contained in the paradigm in which they operate, for paradigms also 
influence the questions as well as the answers'. Normal science does not look for 
anomalies but is content to remain with the problems the paradigm is capable of 
dealing with. The paradigm promotes a consensus that constitutes accepted wisdom, 
in any given field. Sometimes, however, an anomaly persists and, in such a scenario, 
fia period of crisis' ensues in which 'extraordinary science' occurs, characterised by 
a plurality of views which marks the onset of a new paradigm (Delanty 1997: 34). 
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Central to Kuhn's (1970a; 1970b) analysis, is the notion of the non- 
availability of a theory-neutral language, stemming from insights garnered from the 
'linguistic turn' in philosophy. This, he claims, presents science with serious 
problems that other philosophers of science, in particular Popper (1959), tend to 
neglect: 
The point-by-point comparison of two successive theories demands a 
language into which at least the empirical consequences of both can be 
translated without loss or change. That such a language lies ready to hand 
has been widely assumed since at least the seventeenth century when 
philosophers took the neutrality of pure sensation-reports for granted and 
sought a "universal character" which would display all languages ... Ideally, 
the primitive vocabulary of such language would consist of pure sense- 
datum terms plus syntactical connectives. Philosophers have now abandoned 
any such hope of achieving any such ideal, but many continue to assume 
that theories can be compared by recourse to a basic vocabulary consisting 
entirely of words which are attached to nature in ways that are 
unproblematic and, to the extent necessary, independent of theory. This is 
the vocabulary in which Sir Karl's [Popper] basic statements are framed. 
Feyerabend and I have argued at length that no such language is available 
(Kuhn 1970a: 266). 
In his criticism of Popper, Kuhn aligns himself with Feyerabend (1975) who, 
in turn, has argued that science is inherently an irrational phenomenon. For Kuhn, a 
key issue neglected by Popper, amongst others, is the notion that in the conversion 
from one theory to another there is the possibility for words to 'change their 
meanings' (Kuhn 1974: 473). Citing various concepts including 'force, mass and 
element', Kuhn is of the opinion that this renders successive theories 
incommensurable. He likens this to similar problems faced by those charged with the 
task of translating manuscripts from one language to another. Kuhn suggests that this 
is not impossible only that it can frequently lead to distortion. This does not, 
however, preclude comparison but renders the process hugely problematic. 
For Kuhn (1970b), conceptual clarity is only possible within the confines of 
4normal' science, but conceptual clarity also constitutes 'normal' science. This view 
of science relies on a notion of a closed conceptual system. A prime example of such 
an outlook can be seen with the establishment, in 1970, by Sartori (along with 
colleagues Riggs and Teune) of the Committee on Conceptual and Terminological 
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Analysis (COCTA) under the aegis of the International Political Science Association. 
These are referred to as the 'conceptual thought police' by Bryant (1995: 43). 
Although this represents a sophisticated attempt at advocating conceptual closure, 
there is not the room for a detailed exposition of Sartori's analysis. Here, the focus is 
on a similar attempt advocated by Oppenheim. 
Oppenheim (1981) draws on the philosophy of Wittgenstein (1921) to show 
the 'explicative' nature of concepts. These are similar to Wittgenstein's notion of 
6stipulative' definitions in that they defy empirical verification. They can, however, 
be judged by an alternative criteria. Oppenheim states (1981: 179): 
Like stipulative definitions, explications are not veriflable as either true or 
false; but unlike the former, they can be appraised as good or bad in terms of 
their suitability for scientific communication. 
Rather than focusing on the abstract notion of 'truth' as a means of evaluating the 
nature of concepts, for reconstructionists emphasis is instead placed on their 'utility'. 
In effect, this bypasses the whole deconstructionist debate that pre-occupied 
contestabilists such as Connolly (1983) in his explanation of the nature of concepts. 
Oppenheim (1981) does, however, concede that his reconstructions could 
yield different results from others undertaking the same quest, which is something of 
an oxymoron. He states that certain social scientific concepts can be open textured 
and are thus difficult to define or pigeon-hole based on the conditions of their 
application. He also cites the idea of 'democracy' which can be a 'combination of 
criteria such as periodic elections, competitive parties, representation, freedom of 
expression, diffusion of political power, implementation of collective preferences' 
(Oppenheim 1981: 183). He also states, however, that even if all these traits are 
present, this is 'neither necessary nor sufficient to characterise a given political 
system as democratic'. For Bryant (1995: 43), this begs the question why? Answering 
this, he muses that 'it could have to do with the use of a cluster of concepts, or it 
could be that the criteria are contestable', before concluding that Oppenheim does 
not give a reason. The Reconstructionist theory of meaning is depicted in figure 8.3. 
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Figure 8.3: The Reconstructionist Theory of Meaning 
(adapted from Pawson 1989: 229). 
At its most general level, the aim is conceptual closure. Reconstructionists 
assume that 'most fields are plagued with conceptual ambiguity and inconsistency' 
(Pawson 1989: 236). Their point is that the way out of this morass is to try and 
recover as useable a concept as possible from the existing list. In Figure 8.3, the 
overlapping circles represent the various concepts, the area where all circles overlap 
represents the shared theme. This can be reconstructed and made available for further 
use. 
According to Bryant (1995: 42), ultimately the goal is to 'establish certain 
principles of reconstruction, common respect for which will keep conceptual 
variation within manageable bounds'. Bryant claims that, broadly speaking, they 
refer to Gclarity, internal consistency, external systernaticity, avoidance of 
redundancy and empirical sensitivity' (Bryant 1995: 42). Bryant is, however, highly 
critical of this categorisation in that it is untenable because Giddens' notion of the 
double hermeneutic cannot be circumnavigated. According to this theory, social 
science concepts must have some connection with natural language concepts. In 
other words, social science'concepts in their use 'always have some capacity, actual 
or potential, mediated or not, to inform ordinary discourses and practices' (Bryant 
1995: 54). 
In terms of the concept of evidence, all existing manifestations are employed 
before seeing where there are any possible areas of overlap. We have seen from 
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previous discussions that in politicised areas, this is a particularly difficult issue 
because of the context in which debates take place. These are highly ideological. 
Taking the concept of 'drug harm', there is an overlap of appreciations of evidence 
for this because there is huge discrepancy about what it entails. In effect, 
reconstructing a concept from numerous alternatives does not always help to more 
accurately depict its nature as contestation is not always eradicated. In other words, 
there are broad areas of consistency, particularly about whether the current UK drug 
classification system and the cannabis reclassification were evidence-based or not. 
Within this, however, there are a plethora of different reasons. This makes the task of 
arriving at a reconstructed understanding of evidence all the more problematic. 
Overall, social scientists, by their very activity or engagement in social 
research 'have a practical interest' in the object of their study, as well as a cognitive 
one. This practical interest 'may be tangible or it could be a potential interest' 
(Bryant 1995: 54) but it is a practical interest nonetheless. This casts doubt over the 
view of science expounded by the reconstructionists, concerning the privileged role 
of social scientific concepts, based on a philosophy of science failing to engage with 
post-Kuhnian paradigms. These are the linguistic turn in philosophy, represented by 
Wittgenstein (1921) and, most significantly, Giddens' (1984) double hermeneutic. 
For Bryant, this issue bedevils all adherents of closed systems, although one final 
alternative aims to transcend this argument. 
8.3.4 The Formalist Tradition 
Pawson (1989: 239) uses concepts typically associated with physics, such as the 
concept of 'speed' to introduce formalist reasoning. This, he claims, has meaning in 
(everyday contexts' when something falls or a 'race is run'. In science, though, 'the 
concept takes its meaning as part of an extended or postulate system'. Speed, in its 
guise as 'average velocity', is comprehended as the ratio of distance over time. 
Pawson (1989: 239), goes on to suggest that with the invention of differential calculus 
it becomes tied to other concepts such as 'instantaneous' speed which, in turn, is 
associated with concepts like acceleration. In essence, the meanings of terms become 
established by their place within a broader frame of reference. 
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Pawson (1989: 230-1) suggests, then, that in mathematical models key 
concepts are defined in terms of 'abstract calculus', but they are interpreted by 
deciphering their location within 'specific physical systems'. Physical systems are 
reduced to a geometrical structure in which 'forces are depicted as lines or arrows 
applying at particular points in a spatial diagram. Simple mechanics are then used to 
describe the resultant forces applying in the system' (Pawson 1989: 231). Pendular 
motion can be explained this way; that is, as a 'system of forces acting along the arc 
of a circle. The vector addition of forces is used to describe the variation in the 
inward acceleration of the bob' (Pawson 1989: 231). This can then serve as a 
blueprint to describe other forms of motion. 
In terms of concepts, however, the end result is that in a formalist theory of 
meaning: 
when interpreting concepts like "temperature of a gas" or the "oscillation of 
a pendulum", all reference to ordinary language conceptual isation is 
dropped in favour of elucidations using such notions as "kinetic energy of 
gas moleculee' and "point acceleration", which are in turn traceable to the 
elemental units of the same mathematical (mechanical) system (Pawson 
1989: 231-2). 
Thus, although the substantive focus is on different phenomenon in diverse contexts, 
'it is quite possible to traverse the network because the various components share 
(often quite distantly) this same formal substructure of discourse' (Pawson 
1989: 232). This is in contrast to the view of language advocated by the 
contestabilists. 
Pawson (1989) offers an alternative theory of meaning in the social sciences. 
He suggests that the critique of the contestablists, that all concepts are open-ended 
and open to interpretation, is actually aimed at those who are in the reconstructionist 
tradition (in particular Oppenheirn and Sartori). The debate between these two 
positions, for Pawson (1989: 236), 'misrepresents the real choice': 
Operationalism and reconstructionism only have any currency because of 
the misplaced belief that they provide the path to conceptual Tigour and 
consensus which are assumed to be the building blocks of the scientific 
method. However ... conceptual certitude, measurement, empirical validity 
and all the other hallmarks of the scientific method cannot be achieved by 
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attention to singular terms, be they relatively empirical or relatively 
conceptual. Scientists are confident in their usage of particular terms, not 
because they have some once-and-for-all anchorage, but because they are 
entrenched in a formal network of concepts. Faced with a plausible rival 
theory of meaning (namely formalism), we can judge many of the 
contestability arguments for what they are (namely an excuse for sloppy 
thinking). 
In this sense, those advocating formalism, such as Pawson, would agree with 
the contestablists that complete agreement on concepts is not desirable. For Pawson 
(1989: 236), complete agreement on concepts, particularly in science, is dangerous 
because 'it would bring science to a close'. This is not a desirable state of affairs for 
the formalist tradition whose view of science rests on a notion that 'all the major 
concepts have enjoyed continual metamorphosis' (Pawson 1989: 237). The formalist 
theory of meaning is depicted in Figure 8.4 below. 






(adapted from Pawson 1989: 229) 
For Pawson (1989: 230), this only depicts the origins of formal thinking. This 
is because the 'laws of physics' are 'not simply postulates, that is they cannot be 
taken for granted'. Like all regularities, they are the product of underlying generative 
mechanisms being triggered in specific contexts which produce a pattern, or 
outcome, of recognisable physical behaviour. This is very significant in this context 
of this thesis, as the discussion at the outset of the chapter indicated. Pawson 
(1989: 237) cites Bachelard's (1968) discussion of the 'epistemological profile' of the 
concept of mass as being indicative of this process. This provides an index for 
assessing the underlying suppositions of scientific discussions on the grounds that 
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networks of theories are required to explain phenomena rather than one single all- 
encompassing effort. 
With this in mind, the application of concepts in science can become, in the 
words of contestablists, 'unpredictable'. Whereas this is taken as highlighting the 
problematic nature of concepts for the former group, for the formalists this is not a 
new discovery nor is it necessarily problematic. Pawson (1989: 237) describes the 
debate thus: 
When a contestablist says something like "it is in the nature of argument that 
innovatory and unpredictable conceptual moves canoccue', a formalist can 
only reply "I told you so". To be sure a formalist has a couple of particular 
innovatory moves in mind. One is the application of the same formal system 
in new substantive fields ... The other possibility is the extension of the 
formal system by mathematical innovation ... Such innovatory moves cannot 
be predicted in advance, and are in fact largely driven by the interests and 
competitive situation facing particular groups of scientists. 
For Pawson (1989: 237), formalism is a way of transcending the argument 
concerning conceptual openness or closure by giving 'genuine appraisal of the 
conceptual structure of sociological theory'. For Bryant (1995), this is problematic 
and he is reluctant to offer formalism this favourable vista of conceptual analysis. 
Drawing on Barnes' (1981; 1982) theory of finitism, closely linked to the work of 
Hesse (1974), Bryant (1995: 28) denies that the 'inherent properties and meanings' 
can be attached on to concepts, regardless of where they fit in a postulate system. 
The central contention of finitism is that the proper usage of a concept: 
... is developed step 
by step, in processes involving successions of on-the- 
spot judgements. Every instance of use, or of proper use, of a concept must 
in the last analysis be accounted for separately, by reference to specific, 
local, contingent determinants. Finitism denies that inherent properties or 
meanings attach to concepts and determine their future correct applications; 
and consequently it denies that truth or falsity are inherent in properties of 
statement (Barnes 1982: 30-1). 
Barnes' critique can be seen not only as a critique of fonnalism but also as a 
critique of reconstructionism. Finitism casts doubt on the possibility of networks of 
concepts being possible, as each new application of a concept in a new area carries 
with it, its own subjective baggage. In other words, there is always a judgment 
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required that the similarities outweigh the differences when a concept is applied in a 
new situation. What is more, this judgement continues ad infinitum because the 
definitive features of a concept can never be established. In this sense, he advocates 
conceptual openness, not on the grounds of contest, but that closure is not possible in 
the last instance. Definitive agreement on the applicability of concepts is impossible 
both within and between different traditions. 
Pawson's (1989: 146) notion of 'knot concepts' provides a retort to this 
reasoning. Knot concepts are 'a point of access from one physical system to another' 
and which 'have roots traceable to some elemental social process which ultimately 
connects to all others' (Pawson 1989: 237). They work within an entrenched network 
of scientific knowledge. In this sense, the knot concept is akin to Lakatos' (1970) 
notion of the 'hard core' of scientific theory. These occupy a central and sheltered 
place within scientific practice, upon which there is strong agreement. A knot 
concept cannot be considered in isolation, its significance rests with the way it relates 
to other concepts in a similar domain or 'within an entrenched network of scientific 
knowledge' (Pawson 1989: 146). It* is the fallacy of all the other traditions that this 
premise is unrecognised as concepts are treated in isolation. This understanding of 
the -relationship between concepts is not far removed from Elias' (1978; 2000) 
understanding of the social world, inspired by his sociology of knowledge, which 
also relies on a network model of explanation, as we shall see. 
8.4 Conceptual Flux and the Potential of Synthesis 
In relation to key themes highlighted at the outset, the view of concepts. expressed in 
the traditions above, are summarised in Table 8.1. It shows that there are three 
schools of thought who advocate the possibility and necessity of conceptual 
consistency. Yet the issue of contestation has proved stubborn. The question that 
remains is whether social science discourse is essentially open-ended in the manner 
in which the contestabilists state. Taking the example of 'evidence' in this thesis, 
there are reasonable grounds for assuming so. There is also a case to be made that 
evidence constitutes a knot concept. It applies as a statement of fact, in terms of what 
people do as well as what people think. 
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Table 8.1: Truth Table of Conceptual Nature by Theories of Meaning 
Issue/Theory 
of Meaning 
Operationalist Contestablist Reconstructionist Formalist 
Openness x v/ x 
Closure V, x V/ 
Contestability x ve x 
Certitude x %/ 
It is necessary to build a picture of how evidence is conceptualised in 
politicised policy areas in order to be able to produce a model thereon. In the 
summary of his discussion of conceptual analysis, Bryant (1995: 53) concludes that 
the way forward is to 'move beyond' claiming conceptual contestability and certitude 
in the use of concepts in social research. He claims that an acceptance that concepts 
are both is the path to follow. The substance of this conclusion is difficult to refute 
and mirrors the view of evidence expressed in this study. Bryant's strategy for 
moving on, however, is that there should be dialogue between rival traditions. It is 
suggested here, by contrast, that this is likely to be a futile pursuit. This is because it 
requires dialogue between groups with opposing, deeply held views and as has been 
illustrated throughout, in debates where deeply held views are apparent, there is 
limited opportunity for the Deep Core of that view to alter through the process of 
dialogue. This is because, in Lakatosian (1970) terms, the Deep Core is protected and 
provides identity for groups who advocate such stances. 
If dialogue is unlikely, then a good argument can be made that the contested 
and certain nature of concepts represent two polar positions which defy synthesis, if 
synthesis can only be achieved in this manner. Highlighting that concepts are both 
contested and certain sticks within the parameters of the debate. Ultimately, if this is 
the case, it becomes necessary to place one's foot firmly in a camp, depending on 
one-)s ontological and epistemological preference. This involves deciding whether 
one's view of science adheres to a view characterised by conceptual contestability or 
certitude. It is suggested here, however, that Bryant's analysis is rooted in a 
philosophy of science logic, based around long-standing dichotomies, where one is 
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forced to choose how one sees particular situations. Such instances include: structure 
and agency; society and individual; macro and micro (Kilminster 1998). To this list 
can be added; open or closed systems and contested or certain concepts. 
It is maintained that synthesis is possible if a modified version of the 
formalist account is followed. The strength of this approach lies in its 
circumnavigation of thinking in terms of dichotomies, in this case how the open and 
closed system debate impacts on the contested or certain nature of concepts. The 
version of formalism advocated here takes as its starting point, one tenet of Pawson's 
(1989) version. This is that concepts are susceptible to metamorphosis. In effect, it is 
possible for concepts to show signs of both contest and certitude primarily because 
they are in a constant state of flux as are the contexts in which they apply. This has 
also been demonstrated throughout with recourse to the nature of evidence in UK 
drug classification policy decisions. Starting from this position, it is suggested that 
some form of synthesis is possible, which can provide a useful context for viewing 
the role of evidence in politicised policy areas. With this in mind, it is necessary to 
consider the issues of synthesis and flux. Following the lead of Kilminster (1998), 
this is to be achieved with recourse to the sociology of knowledge rather than the 
philosophy of science. 
In his overview of the climate of sociology towards the end of the previous 
century, Kilminster (1998) suggests that since 1945, the discipline can be split into 
three recognisable phases. These are: the 'monopoly phase' circa 1945-65; the 
4conflict phase' circa 1965-80 and; the 'concentration phase' circa 1980 to the 
present. For present purposes, it is the final epoch that is of concern. For Kilminster 
(1998: 165-9), this era of sociology is characterised by a shift in power gradients 
between advocates of theoretical synthesis and those of theoretical pluralism, the 
former currently being in the ascendancy. 
Advocates of theoretical pluralism tend to accept sociological knowledge as 
inherently fallible. For adherents of this school of thought, research findings produce, 
at best, tentative suggestions for the direction of practice or policy, in any given area. 
This is a consequence of the fact that sociology is characterised by a multitude of 
competing schools of thought and perspectives, on any given issue, that defy fusion. 
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Advocates of theoretical pluralism would, therefore, be more inclined towards the 
contested nature of concepts in science. This is problematic in terms of explaining 
the role and nature of evidence in politicised areas as it heads down the road of 
solipsism. I 
- Theoretical synthesis, by contrast, underscores a commitment to conceptual 
clarity, vital for explanation building. By definition, the nature of theoretical 
synthesis involves traces of what went before. In social theory, synthesis has 
frequently been conflated with 'eclecticism'. Citing the work of Sanderson (1987), 
Kilminster (1998: 115) comments that: 
... eclecticism involves a mechanical juxtaposing of elements of research 
traditions, whereas theoretical synthesis combines elements in such a way 
that the recombination produces a novel fusion, structurally distinct from 
any of the combined components. 
Bryant's (1995) idea of synthesis, mentioned earlier, is inherently 
problematic as this involves trying to establish dialogue between two diametrically 
opposed positions. This will struggle to combine components because dialogue is, at 
best, unlikely when deeply held beliefs are concerned. The charge of eclecticism, it is 
suggested, could be targeted at this reasoning. The synthesis advocated here, via a 
modified f6rmalist account of the nature of concepts, recognises the simultaneous 
nature of contestability and certitude involved in concepts. It does not treat these 
things holistically, though, and moves around the either/or reasoning of Bryant's 
(1995) analysis. The theoretical basis for this way of thinking can be found in the 
sociology of Elias (1978): 
Few controversies are as unattractive as that in which two groups of 
antagonists run around in circles, each defending its own speculative and 
untestable thesis by attacking another that is equally speculative and 
untestable on the grounds that no third alternative is possible (Elias 
1978: 73). 
Elias (1978: 112) was concerned that the means of speaking and thinking 
available to sociologists at his time of writing, for the most part, were unequal to the 
task asked of them. Drawing on Whorf s (1956) philosophy of language, he develops 
this point by referring to the nature of wind: 
1 
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We say, "The wind is blowing", as if the wind were actually a thing at rest 
which, at a given point in time, begins to move and blow. We speak as if the 
wind were separate from its blowing, as if a wind could exist which did not 
blow (Elias 1978: 112). 
It is, then, a bi-product of the lexicon of the social sciences which, for Elias, means 
that numerous technical terins, 'which convey the impression of referring to isolated 
motionless objects', on closer scrutiny, refer to people or phenomena who are 
constantly moving and constantly relating to other people or phenomena (Elias 
1978: 113). For Elias: 
The very concept of society has this character of an isolated object, in a state 
of rest, and so has that of nature. The same goes for the concept of 
individual. Consequently, we always feel compelled to make quite senseless 
conceptual distinctions, like "the individual and society", which makes it 
seem that "the individual" and "society" were two separate things, like 
tables and chairs, or pots and pans. One can find oneself caught up in long 
discussions of the nature of the relationship between these two apparently 
separate objects. Yet on another level of awareness one may know perfectly 
well that societies are composed of individuals, and that individuals can only 
possess specifically human characteristics such as their abilities to speak, 
think, and love, in and through their relationships with other people - "in 
society" (Elias 1978: 113). 
Elias' sociological project can, on one level, be seen as a concerted attempt to 
move beyond the circular debates described above. In this spirit, a reading of the 
debate which views evidence as either a contested or reconstructed concept is 
rendered plausible only if the concepts under consideration are seen as static entities. 
Elias' key notion is that concepts are dynamic because they avoid the trap of falling 
into the dichotomies associated with philosophical, metaphysical reasoning. Using a 
modified version of formalism, and taking conceptual flux as the starting point, 
provides an opportunity for synthesis and that evidence can be seen as a knot concept 
and understood and utilised in heavily politicised policy areas. The question that 
remains is how? To be able to answer this question, it is necessary to consider the 
general origins of the nature of evidence as a concept. 
Writing from a health policy perspective, Culyer and Lomas (2006: 359) state 
that 'evidence is anything that claims to be an empirical fact'. Tracing the 
jurisprudential origins of the term, they claim that 'evidence is to do with the facts of 
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a case', before continuing that 'the kind of evidence that is relevant in any situation 
consists of material facts that help establish the truth of someone's assertions or the 
cause of a consequence' (Culyer and Lomas 2006: 360). They conclude, however, 
that this 'will not serve" their purposes. This is a result of the fact that jurisprudential 
evidence is retrospective, whereas health evidence is concerned with 'forecasting, 
prediction and prognosis". Other conceptualisations of evidence also depart from the 
jurisprudential definition: 
When non-scientists in the clinical, management or policy world are asked 
what they consider as evidence they also depart from the legal view. They 
typically come up with a complex mixture of both scientifically general and 
locally idiosyncratic types of information - "colloquial" evidence ... They define evidence broadly ... Clinical or programme effectiveness data compare 
with assertion (sometimes claimed to be expert assertion), cost-utility 
algorithms sit alongside political acceptability and public or patient attitude 
data are combined with vivid recollections of personal encounters. What 
Ministers call evidence is what they get from their constituents at Saturday 
surgery (Culyer and Lomas 2006: 360). 
Variations on this theme have been witnessed throughout this research and a 
sample of some similar, but varied, conceptualisations of the nature of evidence 
illustrates the point. A current member of the ACMD main committee and 
independent consultant phannacist suggests in relation to the government's 
conceptualisation of evidence, that: 
I don't think they necessarily understand what they mean by evidence and I 
think that comes from the House of Commons [Science and Technology 
Committee] review because ... there is more than one type of evidence, there is the hard number crunching science and there is the social science as well 
and it's very easy to say "where is the evidence? " Actually sifting through 
the evidence is much more difficult and getting unbiased evidence ... and 
until probably the last ten to fifteen years it was often quite difficult to get 
negative evidence about anything because generally it was not published so 
that there was always bias. I think things are now improving and that 
evidence is becoming much more balanced... (RATL2). 
Similarly, in relation to the organisation of this particular policy subsystem: 
I think that what you then see are discrete bodies of evidence being used to 
support disparate and political viewpoints. So I think that we don't really 
have much in the way of a mechanism to sift evidence and to differentiate 
between that which is reliable and that which may be quite persuasive but 
which is not fundamentally sound. So I think there is rather a volatile 
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mixture of evidence, with people citing different forms of evidence to 
support their own view and in opposition to other people's view 
(RATLIO/CON4). 
There is a further dimension to this as evidence is always open to interpretation: 
... the Home Affairs Select Committee ... took evidence literally 
from all 
sides of the debate on the drugs policy, for, against, neutral or whatever, so 
the idea that there is a thing called the "evidence-base" is, I suppose, na7ve 
basically. There is a pile of stuff that comprises the evidence-base but what 
interpretations you put on that evidence-base and what nuances you read 
into research evidence and all the rest of it means that what you finish up 
with, particularly if you are an organisation like us, you have to look pretty 
widely and you have to come to some pretty general conclusions about 
things ... You have to have some basis on which to make political and policy decisions otherwise it is people's complete personal prejudices and biases 
and all the rest of it so you have to have something that says "alright we are 
going to do this, on the basis of this body of evidence. We have conducted 
this research, here. is 27 literature reviews, whatever it is, our best guess is 
this, this will work, this won't or whatever". Exact science it ain't (RATL8). 
The fundamental issue is that by relying on this reasoning there is always the 
potential for zero-sum views of evidence to prevail, particularly in policy areas, 
because one person or group's understanding of the term is at odds with someone 
else's. On one level, however, there are traces of continuity between jurisprudential 
evidence and evidence in science and policy. If the notion of flux is taken as the 
starting point for analysis as advocated here, then jurisprudential evidence need not 
always be retrospective. There is always the possibility for 'new' evidence to come 
to light in criminal trials which can lead to the re-opening of criminal investigations, 
for example. As has been suggested, and will be explored again in the following 
chapter, this is the same premise on how evidence should be viewed for policy. 
Formalist reasoning highlights further areas of crossover. Central to this view 
is not how isolated concepts are conceived but how they relate to other phenomena. 
To recap, Pawson (1989: 237) suggests that this entails the 'genuine appraisal of the 
conceptual structure of sociological theory'. In effect, social theories should not 
strive to be all encompassing, but should operate at a middle-level of abstraction, and 
take their meanings from other theories operating in other spheres, as should the 
concepts that are central to them. Taking the concept of evidence, then, any argument 
made with recourse to this, on some level, shows signs that it has been thought about 
in relation to other phenomenon. Davies, et al. (2000: 2) suggest that the unifying 
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theme in all the definitions is that evidence, 'can be independently observed and 
verified, and that there is broad consensus as to its contents (if not its interpretation)'. 
In effect, it is the result of 'systematic investigation towards increasing the sum of 
knowledge' (Davies, et al. 2002: 2). 
This definition draws on that from the Chambers Dictionary, which provides 
the following list as being indicative of the concept of evidence: 'a means of proving 
an unknown or disputed fact; support for a belief-, an indication; information in a law 
case; testimony; witness or witnesses collectively' (cited in Davies, et al. 2000: 3). In 
short, evidence is the phenomenon used to buttress an argument; the physical 
manifestation this takes depends on the topic in question. We can, however, isolate 
its applicability if we consider other terms such as proof, confirmation or 
substantiation. 
A modified formalist account of conceptual explanation is, therefore, 
advocated here. There are, then, traces of both certitude and contestability in the 
concept of evidence. It is suggested here, however, that these should not be seen as 
the defining tenets of what the concept is and what it constitutes. Instead, the reason 
why both traces are found in the concept of evidence is that it is in a constant state of 
flux. Taking this as the starting point and recognising that contestability and certitude 
are apparent can be a good platform for developing a model to explain the role of 
evidence in politicised areas. 
8.5 Summary 
Chapter Six addressed the issue of how the axiomatic view of evidence is 
problematic. On the other hand, as Chapters Seven illustrated, there is not evidential 
anomie in areas characterised by ad hoc policy formulation and some semblance of 
order is apparent. To build up a useful model of evidence utilisation in politicised 
policy areas, an understanding of the concept of evidence is required that can account 
for both certitude and contestability. This concerns the fact that because politicised 
policy areas are 'live', the 'evidence' part of evidence-based policy, like its policy 
counterpart, must also be seen as a process. In this way, its role is not restricted to 
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policy outcomes, but can be more wide-ranging. In essence, it must be seen as 
dynamic. 
Evidence, in this sense, is still a knot concept but one that is dynamic and in 
flux. The pace of change can be slow or quick, which although difficult, makes 
analysis possible. This chapter sets up the discussion for the following one by arming 
us with a suitable conceptualisation of evidence in politicised policy areas that can 
then be applied to a new model of evidence utilisation. With this conceptualisation of 
evidence in hand, the explanatory quest of the nature and role of evidence in 
politicised areas can be continued, via a discussion of the established models of 
research utilisation. By way of a sneak preview, however, it will suffice to say that 
this understanding of evidence, with its origins in Eliasian sociology, provides the 
bedrock for a new model, particularly useful in politicised areas; the processual 
model. 
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9. THE MODELLING OF EVIDENCE 
9.1 Introduction 
It was stated in the previous chapter how a modified version of the formalist theory 
of concept formation offered the most potential in deciphering the 'nature' of 
evidence in politicised policy areas. This chapter subsequently takes this notion of 
evidence and applies it to the other main area of concern; the 'role' of evidence. This 
completes the explanatory goals of the thesis and does so via a discussion of models 
of research utilisation. Harrd and Secord (1972: 72) provide justification for this 
approach stating that 'the key to understanding of the epistemological and logic of 
creative science is to be found in the logic of the model'. 
This chapter takes the following format. At the outset, brief comments 
relating to the nature of modelling evidence are highlighted. Drawing primarily, but 
not solely, on the work of Weiss (1977; 1986), this is followed by a detailed account 
of what are termed the 'established models' of research utilisation, widely cited in 
the literature. Although Davies, et al. (2000: 3) suggest that where evidence for policy 
and practice is concerned, it equates to "'researcV, broadly defined', it is suggested 
here, that this is problematic. This is the result of when the established models of 
research utilisation are applied as models of evidence-based policy, they do not 
contemplate the turbulent nature of the concept of evidence, and how it can equate to 
more than research. In effect, the concept is frequently and often misleadingly taken 
at face value. For this reason, and others, the established models are found wanting in 
the context of this discussion. Consequently, two newer models are introduced which 
offer a potential way out of this morass. 
Of the newer additions to the literature, it is suggested that the evolutionary 
model, introduced by Stevens (2007a), is an important addition to the literature. This 
is a result of its explicit commitment to highlighting what Bulmer (1986: 11) terms 
the 'content of negotiations' in the evidence and policy relationship. These relate to 
the' actual mechanisms of selection of evidence in policy diecision-making. 
Ultimately, it is concluded, however, that in terms of its explanatory logic, the 
evolutionary model is not far enough removed from the linear variety; the most 
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problematic of all models. With this in mind, a newer processual model is developed 
which, in the spirit of synthesis, combines the strengths, and avoids the pitfalls, of all I 
the other models in its explanatory quest. 
9.2 Modelling the Research and Policy Relationship: The Established Models 
It is worth pointing out that although phýased in terms of models of research 
utilisation, the connection between research/evidence and policy has a long history, 
as illustrated in Chapter One. The connection has also been conceived in other ways 
by other thinkers. For example Nutley, et al. (2003), drawing on the work of Weiss 
(1998), demarcate 'types' of research utilisation from 'models' of research 
utilisation. There are four main types: a) Instrumental Use, where research feeds 
directly into decision-making for policy and practice; b) Conceptual Use, where even 
if practitioners are blocked from using findings, research can change their 
understanding of a situation, provide new ways of thinking and offer new evaluative 
insights into particular courses of action. In this way conceptual use can become 
instrumental; c) Mobilisation of Support, where research becomes an instrument of 
persuasion or the act of research is a tool to legitimate particular courses of action or 
inaction and; d) Wider Influence, where research can have an influence beyond the 
institutions studied. I 
There is significant overlap between the 'types' and 'models' of research 
utilisation, as will become apparent. The latter are favoured here on account of their 
prevalence in the wider literature. Stevens (2007a), by drawing on the work of Weiss 
(1986) amongst others, has produced a four-tier model of the evidence-based policy- 
making process. He suggests that the evidence and policy relationship can be divided 
into the following models; the 'linear model', the 'enlightenment model', the 
tpolitical/tactical' model and finally, the 'evolutionary model', for which he claims 
superiority. Although not mentioned by Stevens (2007a), Weiss (1986) also refers to 
an 'interactive model' and the model of 'research as part of the intellectual enterprise 
of society' as plausible accounts of the research and policy connection. All are 
. expounded below, with the exception of the evolutionary model, which is reserved 
for subsequent discussion. Bryant (1995), in his review of this area of the literature, 
covers much the same ground, but uses a slightly different lexicon. Of prime 
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significance, for current purposes, is his mention of the 'dialogical model', which can 
be added to Steven's (2007a) list. With the exception of Stevens' (2007a) 
evolutionary model, these constitute the established models of research utilisation. In 
general, and more specifically in the context of highly politicised policy areas, they 
all have their relative strengths and weaknesses. 
In what follows, the models are judged as to their effectiveness based on 
criteria that have emerged in the discussion thus far. The criteria for what counts as a 
problematic, and conversely, an effective model, relate to various issues of the 
research and policy relationship discussed in previous chapters, and above. For the 
sake of clarity, they are produced in table form alongside a brief description of the 
key tenets of each, as Table 9.1 illustrates. Allied to this, some consideration is given 
to the nature of evidence associated with each model, if and when appropriate: 
Table 9.1: Key Issues for Models of Research Utilisation in Heavily Politicised 
Policy Areas 
Issue Description 
Outcome The role of evidence is equated to policy outcomes (analysis of policy), 
either by shaping these or in the form of policy evaluation. 
Process The role of evidence is equated to the process of policy decision- 
making (analysis Or policy) in policy formulation. 
Static View of A view of the policy process that assumes a direct link between 
Policy-Making evidence and policy; this is a short-term perspective on the relationship 
between evidence and policy, where policy-making is straightforward 
and sequential. 
Dynamic View of A view of the policy process that assumes an indirect link between 
Policy-Making evidence and policy; this is often accompanied by a long-term view of 
the relationship between evidence and policy, where policy-making is 
ad hoc and complex. 
Evidence Central Only considers the role of evidence (and research) in the policy-making 
to Policy process and factors out other issues such as the role of politics and the 
media. 
Mechanisms of Gives a full account of how evidence is utilised in policy-making and 
Evidence how it is selected. 
Selection II 
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9. ZI The Linear Model 
Also referred to as the 'rational model', as the name suggests, the linear model 
portrays a direct link between evidence production and policy decision-making. This 
understanding can be read as an amalgamation of what Weiss (1986) terms the 
'knowledge-driven model' and the 'problem-solving model' of research utilisation. 
For Weiss, the knowledge-driven model is derived from the natural and/or physical 
sciences and assumes a linear application of research findings to policy-making. This 
occurs along the lines of the following sequence: basic research --+ applied research 
-+ development --* application (Weiss 1986: 31-2). In this formulation, basic research 
highlights an opportunity, applied research is then conducted to define and test these 
findings, appropriate technologies are then formulated, and finally, application 
occurs. This model is premised on the assumption that because knowledge exists, it 
will subsequently come to be used in policy-making. Booth (1998: 238) refers to this 
as a 6purist' model stating that: 
It is firmly grounded in a rational view of the policy-making process. In 
Britain, it is most closely associated with the Fabian Tradition in social 
administration ... [and] draws parallels with industrial research and development techniques and the process of technological innovation. 
Also premised on a linear sequence of the research-policy relationship, the 
problem-solving model suggests that research is used to fill gaps in knowledge where 
problems have arisen. This research can be of any variety. In this model, there are 
two main ways in which research enters the domain of the policy maker. First, the 
research antedates the policy problem and can then be drawn on if required, a notion 
not dissimilar from Kingdon's (1984) 'primeval soup' (see Section 3.4.1). In this 
respect, policy-makers, or their associates, may go and search for, happen upon, or 
be familiar with, prior existing research from a variety of different sources. Secondly, 
there is also the notion that research may be specially commissioned to fill the 
knowledge gap. This is based on the assumption that 'decision-makers have a clear 
idea of their goals and a map of acceptable alternatives and that they have identified 
some specific informational needs to clarify their choice' (Weiss 1986: 32). In this 
scenario, social scientists are purposively contacted to fill the knowledge gap. This 
process takes the following sequence: definition of pending decision --* identification 
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of missing knowledge --), acquisition of social science research --+ interpretation of 
the research for the decision context --+ policy choice (Weiss 1986: 32). In this model, 
it is perceived that research directly influences policy choices and decisions by 
providing evidence, information and knowledge which help to solve and illuminate a 
particular policy problem. 
In sum, Young, et al. (2002: 216) distinguish between the two manifestations 
of the linear model by suggesting that in the knowledge-driven variety research 
'leads' policy with the role for the expert 'on top'. By contrast, in the problem- 
solving model, research follows policy and the expert is 'on tap'. The most common 
manifestation of this model lies in evidence-based medicine. The Cochrane 
Collaboration is premised on this as is the social science equivalent; the Campbell 
Collaboration, with its experimental approach to social inquiry. The leitmotif for this 
is the aim of finding out 'what works' in any given policy area. 
For Stevens (2007a), underpinning this model is an 'instrumentally rational' 
approach for choosing the means to arrive at pre-determined ends. This point was 
also recognised by Richardson and Jordan (1979: 19) who suggest that its potential 
influence stems from the way it clearly points to a clear direction in which research 
can shape policy: 
The concept of rationality has actively influenced a whole range of attempts, 
particularly in the USA and UK, to improve the quality of the policy-making 
system. Policy-makers have become aware of the weaknesses of the policy 
machinery and have therefore looked for ways of improving the processes 
and institutions of policy-making. 
As a result, the linear model has enjoyed significant longevity: 
The power and survival ability of the "rational system7' model is surprising 
given that its assumptions have been undermined by empirical studies of the 
policy process, and that its predictive record is uneven. The main 
explanation for its continued existence must lie in its status as a nortnative 
model and as a "dignified" myth which is often shared by the policy-makers 
themselves. Acceptance of the rational model helps the researcher towards a 
comfortable life; it enables him or her to appear to engage in direct debate 
with policy-makers on the basis that information provided by researchers 
will be an aid to better policy-making (Gordon, et al. 1993: 8). 
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According to Linblom (1980: 11), the linear model represents the 'typical' 
understanding of the relationship between research and policy. This stems from the 
fact that there is a general view that to make policies more effective, it is necessary to 
bring 'more information, thought and analysis into the policy-making process'. This 
is, however, a static view of the evidence and policy relationship. It is questionable, 
however, as to how well, or poorly, this model describes data produced in the natural 
and physical sciences, let alone the social sciences: 
Social science knowledge is not apt to be so compelling or authoritative as 
to drive inevitably towards implementation. Social science knowledge does 
not readily lend itself to conversion into replicable technologies, either 
material or social. Perhaps most important, unless a social condition has 
been consensually defined as a pressing social problem, and unless the 
condition has become fully politicized and debated, and the parameters of 
potential action agreed upon, there is little likelihood that policy-making 
bodies will be receptive to the results of social science research (Weiss 
1986: 32). 
It is important to remember that the evidence involved in UK drug classification, as 
illustrated in Chapters Six and Seven, is both scientific and social scientific or, as 
Culyer and Lomas (2006) suggest, 'context-free scientific', 'context-sensitive 
scientific' and 'colloquial'. As this is the case, the linear conceptualisations are 
problematic. 
As has been stated throughout the thesis, there is, in politicised areas, conflict 
between groups with competing interests, which impacts on the nature of evidence 
production. As a result, the insights gained from this research suggest that evidence 
utilisation involves issues of power, a point which is neglected in the linear account. 
Bulmer (1986: 9) takes up this theme, contending that 'one of the principle 
characteristics of the policy-making process in industrial countries is that it is a 
process of adjustment between competing pressures exercised through the political 
process'. In essence, policy-making involves a range of different interests, illustrated 
by pluralist models of the policy process. Bulmer (1986: 10) continues that a feature 
of both British and American social policy 'has been the production of competing 
analyses of the same policy domain' because social researcii is not the sole preserve 
of, or controlled by the State and is, therefore, often filtered into different parts of the 
system. 
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This notion of diverse interests, then, is in direct contrast to the one-size-fits- 
all approach of the linear model. Research undertaken by Weiss and Bucuvalas 
(1980b) on the nature of policy-making supports this. In their research, concerning 
the minutiae of the policy-making process in the mental-health field at the Federal, 
State and local level, they found that most policy-makers viewed their job somewhat 
mechanically. In addition, they suggest that they actually had little autonomy in 
which to individually shape policy formulation. In short, there was little in what the 
policy-makers perceived their job to be that actually constituted 'making policy': 
[Policy-makers] see little'opportunity for rational calculation and little need 
for it. They seldom engage in explicit formulation of problems, seldom 
undertake directed searches for information, seldom canvass the range of 
alternatives available, or calculate the relative merits of each alternative. 
They rely on what they already know to guide their pattern of workaday 
activities (Weiss and Bucuvalas 1980b: 266). 
Alongside the criticism that the policy-making process is rarely characterised 
by rational decisions made on the basis of the best information (Young, et al. 
2002: 18), there is no account in this model of other factors explaining policy 
formulation such as political or media imperatives. There is, however, an assumption 
within this model that both researchers and policy-makers share a common outlook 
on the relationship between research and policy. The main contribution of social 
science research is to help identify and select appropriate means to reach the goal. As 
illustrated, in the previous chapter, there are very prominent schools of thought that 
show that social research is inevitably contested (Connolly 1974; Gallie 1956; 
Machityre 1973), or part-contested (Pawson 1989), and that there are inevitable 
discrepancies between the evidence producers and the requirements of the policy- 
makers (Caplan 1979). 
Consequently, Weiss (1986: 34) suggests that history shows that for a study to 
have a direct bearing on policy, it takes an 'extraordinary concatenation of 
circumstances'. Not least, among these is that social research can be produced in 
sufficient time to be applicable (Mulgan 2005). The popular adage in political circles 
that 'a week is a long time in politics' does not ring true for social scientists. Social 
research, in most cases, is arduous and is often typified by lengthy, verbose reports, 
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which are frequently of little use for policy-makers who require clarity and concision 
with the key recommendations clearly obtainable. This is because politicians spend 
very little time in their working day actually reading (Weiss 1987) and for Weiss 
(1986: 34), a great deal 'depends on the efficiency of the communications links' from 
research community (often via policy-makers staff) to policy-makers. In effect, there 
is a significant element of luck involved in having relevant social research on hand 
for use in policy-making. 
9. Z2 The Enlightenment Model 
For its supporters (Janowitz 1972; Pawson 2006; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993b; 
Weiss and Bucuvalas, 1980b; Young, et al. 2002), the enlightenment model 
represents a more 'sophisticated' explanation of the evidence and policy relationship. 
Given one of its first expressions in the work of Weiss (1977), it refers to the 
arbitrary way research can enter the policy arena. Duke (2003: 17) claims that the 
relationship between research and policy, in this model, is characterised by the 
process of 'indirect diffusion'. Thus, it offers a more dynamic perspective of the 
research and policy relationship. In this scenario, social science research 'percolates' 
into the 'informed public's consciousness' and comes to shape the way they see the 
world (Duke 2003: 17). According to Weiss (1986: 38): 
Social science research diffuses circuitously through manifold channels - 
professional journals, the mass media, conversations with colleagues - and 
over time the variables it deals with and the generalizations it offers provide 
decision-makers with ways of making sense out of a complex world. 
In effect, the enlightenment model supplies conceptual tools to policy- 
makers. It is important to stress that within this model, single pieces, or even an 
entire body of research rarely, if ever, have a direct impact on policy. Instead, the 
process of cumulating research and infort-nation over time, serves to sensitise policy- 
makers to new issues. In this way research influences the way policies are defined 
and framed and can thus help to reshape the policy agenda. Weiss and Bucuvalas 
(1980b), suggest that this is the model that most closely typifies the relationship 
between research and policy formulation. It also highlights how research can be 
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conceived as part of the process of policy-making, as opposed to just helping to 
shape the outcomes, as in the linear approach. 
For Weiss (1986: 38), enlightenment is a two-way process. In one respect 
(research sensitizes decision-makers to new issues and helps turn what were non- 
problems into policy problems'. In this regard, the vast work carried out in the 1960s 
by Richard Titmuss, amongst others, helped to establish the subject of poverty and 
inequality firmly on the policy agenda, whilst simultaneously documenting the 
failures of the welfare state (Banting 1986: 42). On the other hand, research can turn 
what were once pressing problems into issues of less consequence. A good example 
can be seen in the changing status of cannabis, in the twentieth century, especially in 
the United States. Demonised in the 1950s and 1960s as being an 'assassin of youth', 
until successive research reports demonstrated that, in effect, cannabis use was 
actually relatively benign and rational. This was particularly the case when 
considered from the perspective of the drug-takers themselves (Becker 1963). By the 
1970s, then, there were widespread calls for, and the eventual decriminalisation of, 
cannabis within eleven States in the USA. This was subsequently reversed in the 
1980s, but it does serve to highlight how research evidence has the potential to 
, drastically revise the way the policy-makers can define issues' (Weiss 1986: 38). In 
addition, it also shows how research can 'change the parameters within which policy 
solutions are sought' (Weiss 1986: 38). Unlike the linear model, there is no 
assumption that the fruits of the research enterprise must resonate with the values and 
goals of the policy decision-maker. 
Although the enlightenment model offers a most promising opportunity for 
research evidence to' influence the policy agenda, critics of this model highlight 
various problems. Firstly, there is no filtration process by which inadequate or 
invalid research is siphoned out. This means that the notion of the 'indirect diffusion' 
of evidence that typifies the enlightenment model, can lead to 'distortion' and 
(oversimplification'. The end result can be that policies become 'endarkened' by 
research (Weiss 1986: 39). Secondly, it can take a long time for research to reach its 
intended audience, in the policy domain, which can serve to detract from its utility 
and relevance. In this sense, research could be neglected and this can be a wasteful 
process. 
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Thirdly, as Duke (2003: 18) points out, 'the more research that is conducted 
on a particular subject or issue, the more complex the implications become for policy 
decisions 
' 
'. This is partly to do with the nature of social research. Findings frequently 
relate to bodies of theory that can often be complex and contradictory. Furthermore, 
findings rarely converge on a point that could be used as a barometer to guide policy. 
The different appreciations of the UK drug classification debate, discussed 
throughout the thesis, are indicative of this. In effect, these issues relate to the 
absence of the mechanisms of selection of evidence. Fourthly, there is also little 
consideration of the fact that evidence is often not the only factor in policy 
formulation. For Stevens (2007a), a related and final shortcoming of this model 
revolves around the notion that there is an assumption that all kinds of research, 
regardless of theoretical standpoint and methodological preference, have equal 
chance of influencing the policy agenda. As indicated in Chapter Seven, the ability to 
shape, or affect the agenda is not an equal playing field and in actual fact, it involves 
a myriad of power relations (Lukes 1974). In effect, it helps to be consistent with 
those charged with making policy. Overall, it can be said that the enlightenment 
model is characterised by its explanatory under-ambition. 
9. Z3 The PoliticallTactical Model 
The political/tactical model is characterised by the selective use of evidence to 
satisfy the 'short-term' interests of policy-makers. Weiss (1986) also distinguishes 
the two aspects of this model. In the 'political model', various interests and 
ideologies coalesce to pre-determine the position of policy-makers on particular 
issues or problems. It is claimed that new research is unlikely to have a bearing on 
these positions and, instead, has a legitimising or justificatory function for a 
particular policy decision. Duke (2003: 17) illustrates how often research that 
confirms existing arguments, is used by advocates as 'ammunition', to attempt to 
neutralise opponents and persuade those who doubt the wisdom behind certain 
decisions. This is achieved even if the research is 'ripped out of context' (Weiss 
1986: 36). This model serves to illustrate: a) the problematic nature of social 
scientific evidence and; b) that using research to support a pre-determined position or 
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discourse still qualifies as a type of research utilisation (probably much to the chagrin 
of many academics). 
In the 'tactical model', the findings of research are less significant than the 
actual process of research taking place. Duke (2003: 17) refers to this as playing the 
dresearch card'. In this scenario, policy-makers are able to procrastinate on policy 
formulation by stating that they are awaiting the results of ongoing research activity. 
The following excerpt of oral evidence from the Science and Technology Committee 
(2006), between the Chairman, Phil Willis MP, and Vernon Coaker MP, illustrates 
this: 
Q1205 Chairman: In January [2006] the then Home Secretary Charles 
Clarke announced that a consultation paper on the ABC classification 
system would be published within a few weeks. There was obviously a 
concern about it at that time. Why has it not happened? 
Mr Coaker: Two things. First of all, the Home Secretary [John Reid] - in 
post for four weeks - has not yet taken a decision on how to proceed with the 
review of the classification system. With respect to the consultation 
document which is in draft form in the department, the view is that we will 
need to wait until such time as we decide how to proceed with respect to the 
review of the classification system and also, similarly, wait for the report of 
this Committee, which we want to take into account in determining the best 
way forward (Science and Technology Committee 2006: 105). 
In the tactical model, research findings are also used strategically. Social 
researchers and the research they produce can 'deflect criticism' away from the 
government in relation to policies that have proved unsuccessful and unpopular 
(Weiss 1986: 37). Tizard (1990) claims that, as a result, many research reports remain 
unread and are left collecting dust on the shelves of government departments. Young, 
et al. (2002) refer to this process as the 'politicisation' of evidence. 
The political/tactical model, in contrast to the linear and enlightenment 
versions, does start to descend the ladder of abstraction to consider the ways in which 
evidence is (or is not) selected in policy decision-making. There is also some 
recognition that political imperatives, along with evidence, are central to the policy- 
making process. The logic underpinning this position is, ultimately, rational and in 
the political version, it is linear. It also offers a static, short-term view of the policy- 
making process. It factors out the potentially unintentional or serendipitous ways 
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evidence can come to be used in policy-making and suggests that if evidence 
survives political manipulation, it will be used in decision-making. In short, it offers 
a restrictively narrow vista of the research and policy relationship. There is little 
consideration of issues pertaining to the often contested nature of research. Of all the 
established models, Stevens (2007a) is most supportive of the political/tactical 
variety and sees an affinity between this and his evolutionary version, as will become 
clear. The main shortcomings of this approach, and one that the evolutionary model 
seeks to rectify, is the way it does not descend the ladder of abstraction far enough 
and does not provide a sufficiently detailed account of how evidence is used 
politically or tactically. 
9. Z4 The Interactive Model 
On one level, the interactive model is consistent with pluralist models of policy 
analysis. Here, information is sought not only from social scientists, but from a range 
of'actors in the policy process. These include politicians, civil servants, journalists, 
interest groups, practitioners, planners, friends, aides and clients. As a result, 
research is not the only factor influencing the decision-making process. There is also 
no linear relationship from research to policy decision. instead, the process, 
according to Weiss (1986: 35), consists of a 'disorderly set of inter-connections and 
back-and-forthness that defies neat diagrams'. Social scientists are just one of a 
multitude of actors who can have an impact on policy. This is highly unlikely to 
happen as a result of some of their own research impacting directly on policy, but it 
is more likely that they can engage in 'mutual consultations' that eventually move 
towards a policy response to a potential problem. The interactive model offers, then, 
a dynamic and long-term understanding of the evidence and policy relationship. 
Weiss (1986: 35-6) draws on Donnison's (1972: 527) experience of the legislative 
process, to illustrate how policy-makers cannot always rely on the findings of 
research, when considering certain policy responses: 
Research workers could not present authoritative findings for others to 
apply; neither could others commission them to find the 'correct" solution to 
policy problems: they were not that kind of problem. Those in the four fields 
from which experience had to be brought to bear [politics, technology, 
practice and research] contributed on equal terms. Each was an expert in a 
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few things, ignorant about most things, offered what he could, and generally 
learnt more than he could teach. 
In this account, research is just one element of a process. Researchers can 
play an important role in promoting and acting as partisans for their research. There 
are, however, clear barriers to research entering policy. Tizard (1990: 438) describes 
these as 'crucial gateways', which need to be navigated by 'micro-political activism' 
on behalf of researchers. In essence, researchers must act as policy champions to get 
their research noticed by policy makers, particularly at the macro level of policy- 
making. There is, though, no information about how this happens and so the 
mechanisms of selection of research in this model also remain under developed. 
9. Z5 Research as Part of the Intellectual Enterprise of Society 
In a similar vein to the interactive model, according to this view, research is one of 
many 'intellectual pursuits' in society. Consequently, there is again recognition of 
other factors involved in the decision-making arena. Unlike all the other models, in 
this scenario, research is not characterised as an independent variable affecting the 
policy process, but is another 'dependent variable running side by side with policy 
and philosophy, journalism, history, law and criticism etc' (Weiss 1986: 39). Weiss 
(1986: 39) suggests that in such cases 'social science and policy interact, influencing 
each other and being influenced by the larger fashions in social thought. 
This view of the research and policy relationship shares a conceptual 
understanding of evidence with the interaction model, but offers a different view of 
the research policy relationship. If the interaction model defies neat diagrams, the 
notion of research as part of the intellectual enterprise of society can be expressed 
precisely in this manner, as illustrated in Figure 9.1. 
234 
Figure 9.1: Research as Part of the Intellectual Enterprise of Society 
Policy Interest Shapes Social Issue 
Creation of Funding 
Opportunities 
Social Scientists Attracted to the Issue 
The feedback loop from the foot of the diagram to the top highlights how the 
relationship between the research comMU111ty and the policy community can be one 
of reciprocal influence. In this way, funds created for research may be a product of 
policy-makers' interest in existing research, as well as the research community 
tendering for potential funding from policy makers. In both the interactionist model 
and the view of research as part of the intellectual enterprise of' society, because the 
focus is on research per se, there is little concern with the vagaries of' evidence. The 
view of the policy process is one of long-term trends and is, therefore, dynamic. 
There are, however, no appreciations of the mechanisms of selection concerning 
what research plays a part in policy discussions, and the way it is selected. 
9.2.6 The Dialogical Model 
As indicated earlier, in addition to the models identified by Weiss (1996), Bryant 
(1995) highlights a dialogical model of the research and policy relationship. For 
Bryant (1995: 142), the dialogical model offers a departure from all the previous 
ones, which he suggests are 'unambiguously empiricist'. This is consistent with their 
understandings of research, which all involve, in one way or another, conceptual 
closure. The dialogical model offers a 'post-empiricist' view ofsocial science, where 
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the double hermeneutic highlights its essentially contestable character. In this sense, 
the dialogical model draws heavily on the work of Giddens (1976; 1982; 1987). 
According to Bryant (1995: 142): 
The dialogical model of applied social research is similar to the interactive 
one except in its approach to methodology and its orientation to ordinary 
men and women and lay knowledge. 
Whereas the interactive model and research as part of the intellectual 
enterprise of society place significant emphasis on the activities of key stakeholders 
in the policy process, Giddens (1976: 162) suggests dialogue should take place with 
citizens because human agents are 'knowledgeable' about their circumstances and 
society, and 'capable' of acting thereon (Giddens 1982: 14). According to Bryant 
(1995: 146), this premise sets apart the dialogic model from what he refers to as the 
(control' model of applied sociology, for which we can read, 'linear model'. Bryant 
(1995: 146) continues: 
Like so many others, Giddens argues that much of the post-war development 
of sociology has been accompanied by a belief that it would underpin better 
policy-making, and that much of the disillusionment with sociology stems 
, frorn a recognition that all too often it has failed to do so. But the research 
that has failed has, for the most part, conformed to a model of social science 
that Giddens believes to be increasingly rejected. This model is based on 
what natural science is assumed to be like. It aims at a unified conceptual 
structure and of universal laws and ever-increasing incontrovertible 
knowledge, and it believes objectivity to be indispensable to their 
achievement. 
Key to the dialogical model, then, is Giddens (1987: 47) view that research 
will most effectively inform policy through 'an extended process of communication 
between researcher, policy-makers and those affected by whatever issues are under 
consideration'. There is also a re-framing of the temporal framework of research and 
policy as research helps to highlight 'where the most urgent practical questions 
cluster' and offers 'frameworks for seeking to cope with them' (Giddens 1987: 47). 
This is not dissimilar from the notion of research as part of the intellectual enterprise 
of society. 
For Bryant (1995: 147), there are three central assumptions of the dialogical 
model. First, social research cannot just be 'applied' to an independently given 
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subject matter. Instead, it has to be aimed at persuading actors to expand or modify 
the forms of knowledge or belief that they draw on upon in organising their action. 
This should include 'direct consultation of a prolonged kind where feasible' (Bryant 
1995: 147). Second, there is the 'mediation of cultural settings'. This involves the 
6communication, via social research, of what it is like in one cultural setting to those 
in another' (Bryant 1995: 147). This requires conceptual innovation because the 
desire to make positive changes involves positing 'possible worlds' of what might 
become, via programmes of social reforms. For Giddens (1987: 48), novel conceptual 
frameworks open up possible fields of action previously unperceived either by 
policy-makers or by the agents involved. Third, there are the practical issues of the 
double hermeneutic. These mean that social research produces: 
... not sets of generalisations which 
facilitate instrumental control over the 
social world but, rather, the constant absorption of concepts and theories into 
that "subject matter" they seek to analyse, constituting and reconstituting 
what the subject matter is (Giddens 1987: 48). 
The dialogic model, thus, offers a dynamic view of the policy process. Little 
account is, though, given about the outcomes of consultations with stakeholders, only 
that they are necessary. Ultimately, it casts doubt on evidence being able to inform 
policy unless there is a commitment to dialogue between policy-makers, researchers 
and the wider community. As has been suggested previously, it is difficult to have 
fruitful dialogue over issues, such as required policy directions in heavily 
controversial areas, because deeply held views are rigid. Often, the best that can be 
hoped for is consensus over the less stringently held views, or Secondary Aspects; 
changes to which do not significantly alter the overall direction of policy. Taking the 
example of drug harm, there is general agreement by the agents involved in the 
policy process that the required direction of UK drug policy should be to reduce the 
harm caused by drugs to society and individuals. There is, however, little agreement 
over what drug harm actually constitutes. 
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9.3 An Overview of the Established Models of Research Utilisation 
Table 9.2 serves as a summary of the relative merits and weaknesses of all the 
established models of research utilisation, based on the criteria introduced at the 
outset in Table 9.1: 
Table 9.2: An Overview of the Applicability of Existing Models of Research 
Utilisation in Politicised Policy Areas 
Model/Criteria - a 0 >w I %ý FZJ Q- U .0 
U *. I 
AX :2 0 ý. . 1-U i 10 :: 
Q Aw 
0 A4 W 0. ý = *>- :., :ý wU6, 0W (A 
Linear x x x 
Enlightenment X x x 
Politicalfractical -, x V-1 x x V/ 
Interactive x x x x 
Intellectual X x x x 
Enterprise 
__ Dialogic X x x 
Based on the findings of previous chapters, it is suggested that what is 
required in explaining the role and nature of evidence in a heavily politicised policy 
area, is a model that can account for a dynamic, long-term view of the policy-making 
process, which locates evidence not only at the level of outcomes, but also at the 
level of the decision-making process. Furthermore, it must be a model which does 
not restrict the nature of policy-making to the use of evidence in some way, shape or 
form, but rather sees how evidence is only one part of the policy mix. In other words, 
this relates to the multi-faceted nature of evidence and how it cannot be taken at face 
value. Finally, some account must also be given of the way the evidence comes to 
play a role in policy decision-making, not just what its role is. This involves a 
journey down the ladder of abstraction in relation to the concept of evidence. 
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As Table 9.2 illustrates, of all the established models, the dialogical variety 
assumes all these criteria, with the others lacking at least one or more. In the context 
of this discussion, and based on the findings of the previous chapter, the dialogical 
model is problematic, because of its view of research (and evidence) as relentlessly 
contested. In this light, two newer additions to the literature are discussed which 
offer alternative explanations of the evidence and policy relationship. The first is a 
recent addition to the existing literature and the second is an original contribution 
based on the shortcomings of other models, especially in the context of politicised 
areas. 
9.4 The Evolutionary Model 
Unlike the previous models, the evolutionary model was conceived as a model of 
evidence-based policy, rather than as a model of research utilisation. Influenced by 
the. ideas of John (1999), the evolutionary model is, according to Stevens (2007a), 
able to explain the pattern of selection of evidence used in policy-making by 
descending the ladder of abstraction to look at how evidence is used and selected in 
policy decision-making. For Stevens (2007a), this does not rely on a deterministic 
explanation equating the phenomenon with the deliberate manipulation of evidence 
by policy-makers. The pattern of selection is premised on Darwinian, 'classic' 
evolutionary social theory and the notion of 'survival of the fittest' (Spencer 1891). It 
suggests that the most effective way of understanding the evidence and policy 
relationship is to focus the analysis at the level of ideas or perspectives: 
It starts from the assumption that a variety of ideas ... compete for attention in policy, as genes arise and compete for survival. The ideas may be facts, 
findings or recommendations that have been produced by academics, 
journalists, think tanks, pressure groups or others. Some of these ideas fit the 
interests of powerful groups and some do not. Ideas that do fit will find 
powerful supporters. Others will not. Those ideas that fit will therefore have 
groups and individuals that can carry them into policy, as would a gene be 
reproduced if it finds a place in organisms that survive. The ideas that do not 
fit will tend not to be picked up by people who have the power to translate 
them into policy. This evolutionary advantage leads to the survival of the 
ideas that fit (Stevens 2007a: 28). 
By focusing the analysis at the level of ideas, a broader appreciation of 
evidence can be ascertained in this model. Stevens (2007a: 28) states that ideas, and 
239 
thus evidence, can be 'facts, findings, or recommendations that have been produced 
by academics, journalists, think tanks, pressure groups or others'. Like the dialogical 
model, the evolutionary model is also premised on aspects of Giddensian social 
theory (Giddens 1984), most noticeably, the theory of structuration. Both structure 
and agency are defining tenets of the explanation. Issues of power are also 
predominant. There is a reciprocal relationship between the idea and the carrier (the 
powerful supporter). The idea exists within certain structural conditions that are 
partly created by the agents. The conditions under which an idea either flourishes or 
flounders, Are shaped in terms of what Stevens (2007a) calls the 'mechanisms of 
selection'. These are similar to ideas expressed in the political/tactical model of 
research utilisation but are ultimately more advanced and detailed. Stevens (2007a) 
identifies four main ones, which can be illustrated with data from the current 
research and elsewhere. 
The first mechanism focuses on how policy-makers or other powerful groups 
may 'fish' or 'trawl' for evidence. Here, they haul in the bits they require and throw 
back those not needed. A common tactic employed, in this regard, is the use of 
4repetition'. Powerful actors are able to focus the attention of potential critics 
towards evidence that supports a said policy, even if the evidence has been taken out 
of context (Weiss 1986). In doing so, this evidence becomes a key part of the 
knowledge-base, justifying the 'validity' of the policy to which it equates. 
it was suggested in previous chapters that a widely held view, from the 
rational perspective, and one shared by the Government, was how treating 
problematic drug users and steering them away from the criminal justice system, 
represents an evidence-based drug policy. To recap, it was the view of a Director of a 
leading drug treatment QUANGO that: 
... the only bit that 
is evidence-based is around drug treatment actually, 
because if you look at the four strands of the drug strategy, the only one 
where there is any real coherent evidence of any quality is around drug 
treatment having an impact on health and crime (RATL9). 
Data from the conservative perspective, however, cites how the figures for 
drug treatment, compiled by the Government agency responsible for this, are 
indicative of fishing or trawling for evidence: 
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They [the National Treatment Agency] are another organisation that we are 
not happy about. We are happy that they exist but we dont like the fact that 
if you go on their website there is a big sign that says "we are not a 
treatment agency"! This is the National Treatment Agencyl "We just advise 
people and collect figures". I don't like the figures that they collect because 
they say "things are looking a lot better because we have got a lot more 
people in treatment". But, their definition of treatment can be somebody 
who goes to a treatment centre once and then jacks it in ... So the number 
who drop out are immaterial. The figures also include those on methadone, 
well methadone during the time I worked in a treatment agency was a bridge 
to cessation, not a bridge to long-term, endless therapy. So suggesting that 
the situation has got better because we are now giving people an addictive 
and dangerous substance without limitation doesn't impress me at all 
(CON8). 
There is no surprise in the finding that a member of the conservative 
perspective is sceptical of evidence propounded by, what is in effect, a rationalist 
position. A similar theme can be seen from the radical perspective: 
Treatment has historically been cash starved and they are now a big 
beneficiary of central funding ... evidence-based policy tells us that money is 
more effectively spent on treatment than enforcement and we ... have our 
own take on that. So there is a lot of cash flooding into people on the basis 
that the kind of coercive treatment, Home Office criminal justice 
intervention, forced detox works. But it doesn't, the evidence-base is 
extraordinarily poor but the , people who are receiving 
that money are not 
going to focus on that evidence (RAD4). 
Interestingly, there is also an acceptance that trawling occurs, in this respect, 
from within the rational perspective; a perspective generally in favour of the role of 
drug treatment within the drug strategy: 
I am sure that some of the big treatment providers like 'Adaction' and 
'Turning Point' were playing the "treatment card". You know, "that for 
every pound spent on treatment"... and this is a good bit of evidence, useful 
evidence, "three pounds is saved or nine pounds is saved". It is pretty flimsy 
evidence but it is a good catchphrase. We are reducing crime by getting 
people into treatment so there is a constellation between rehab and treatment 
(RATL7). 
In a somewhat similar vein, the second mechanism suggests that powerful 
groups can 'farm' for, or cherry-pick evidence. Here, research is specifically 
commissioned to provide evidence for the proposed policy, although only that which 
actually supports the policy is published. The drugs debate is awash with examples 
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of where this has happened. In 2003, the Prime Ministers Strategy Unit, produced a 
report detailing the (lack of) progress of the current drug strategy. Chaired by Sir 
John Birt, the report amounted to a damning failure of the current approach, and was 
consequently unpublished. The detail of the report became public knowledge when it 
was leaked to the Guardian newspaper. This was cited as a key reason for the radical 
perspective as to why current UK drug policy is evidence-free: 
I also think an awful lot of people have sweated blood producing reports 
which have been ignored, so these people sound as if they are in a position 
of power because they are consultants and have the ear of the Prime 
Minister. But as we know from the number 10 Strategy Unit report, that was 
an expensive and serious piece of work done for the Prime Minister and it 
was a really good piece of work, but it was presented once, and as far as we 
know, was never heard of again. So are people doing that in powerful 
positions? In some ways you could say they are... (RAD4). 
Drawing on the ideas of Chomsky and Herman (1988), a tactic of creating 
'flak' is the third mechanism. Here, a significant amount of disquiet is created over 
evidence that enters the public arena that is detrimental to the chosen policy 
direction. In heavily politicised policy areas, this is a tactic employed by all 
perspectives in relation to the data produced by others. The media plays a powerful 
role in this regard. The overall aim is to discredit the troublesome evidence relating 
to a controversial policy. This primarily occurs via sensationalist reporting. Prideaux 
(2004: 18), drawing on the ideas of Bennett and Asard (1995: 5), suggests that the 
mass-media, via specific kinds of 'journalistic philosophy', has a regulatory effect 
when it comes to policy through the reportage of selected information about certain 
policies. It can, therefore, help to set the 'agenda of political discourse in society' 
(Prideaux 2004: 18). The reception of evidence relating to the abandonment of the 
prohibition of legal drugs and that advocating more rigorous drug law enforcement 
have, typically, been the victim of flak, on the grounds that they are contrary to the 
principles of evidence-based policy-making (see Chapter Seven). 
There is also a methodological dimension to this. In his speech given to the 
Economic and Social Research Council concerning the use of social research by 
government, former Secretary of State for Education, David Blunkett (2000), stated 
that he I felt frustrated' by the tendency for research: 
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... when it does try to be directly relevant to the main policy and political debates, to be seemingly perverse, driven by ideology paraded as intellectual 
inquiry or critique, setting out with the sole aim of collecting evidence that 
will prove a policy wrong rather than genuinely seeking to evaluate or 
interpret impact. A number of studies have tried to claim evidence of poor 
outcomes when policies have barely been implemented ... we need to be able 
to rely on social science and social scientists to tell us what works and why 
and what types of policy initiatives are likely to be most effective. And we 
need better ways of ensuring that those who want this infon-nation can get it 
easily and quickly (Blunkett 2000: para 7). 
Blunkett (2000: para 7) suggests that this is to be achieved by research that 
paints a coherent picture of how society works, and not by 'worthless correlations 
based on small samples from which it is impossible to draw generalisable 
conclusions'. He goes on to suggest that studies which combine 'large scale, 
quantitative information on effect sizes, which allow us to generalise, with in-depth 
case studies which provide insights into how processes work, ' are welcome. in 
response to this article, Hodgkinson (2000) highlights that Blunkett's understanding 
of social research, is inherently positivist, and neglects the widely accepted point that 
social research involves the 'double hermeneutic' (Giddens 1984). 
For Stevens (2007a), the final mechanism of selection involves the ability to 
impose 'strain' on organisations or individuals who produce and advocate 
'unhelpful' evidence (Chambliss 1976). This signals a return to the thorny issue of 
funding. As Chapter Five illustrated, groups and agents making up the rational 
perspective were more likely to be the recipients of central funding (a consequence 
of the politics of electoral anxiety). Indeed, based on the findings of Chapter Seven, 
it was suggested that this was a product of the rational perspective being in a 
structurally and favourable position in the debate, and sharing a similar outlook on 
the nature of the problem to that of the Government. 
To phrase it another way, the rational perspective's appreciation of evidence 
is consistent with the Government's picture; hence its barriers to central funding are 
greatly reduced. This is illustrated in the following quotations. According to one 
journalist and writer on the drugs issue: 
It is kind of obvious that most of the social, economic and criminal harms 
are caused by the illegal activity around drugs, rather than the drugs 
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themselves, but it is very hard to find criminologists who will stand up and 
say that. So I recognise that [there is a] centre ground [in the drug policy 
debate]... that is a centre ground of people who are making livings and 
careers out of working in the drug field, and clearly certain things get funded 
and certain things don't and certain positions that you take, won't get 
funding (RAD4). 
These positions are those akin with the Deep Core beliefs of the radical perspective. 
This contrasts slightly with the view of the following respondent who states: 
I have heard that they have attached a Home Office figure to the new 
[United Kingdom Drug Policy Commission] group. Now I don't know 
whether that is true, but I am told that it is a woman and I am told that she is 
fairly senior, which means that she must be at least a Principle, Senior 
Principle. The funding has come from the Esmee Fairburn Foundation and 
you have got to ask why that is, because Drugs Policy in Britain has been 
driven by legalisation and the legalisation lobby, which it has for 10-12 
years... (CON6). 
This comment is somewhat confusing. It is the view of the above respondent, 
that the goals of the rationalist perspective - of which members of the United 
Kingdom Drug Policy Commission are key players - are actually the same as the 
radical perspective. That is, that the desired direction of UK drug policy is drug 
legalisation. This is open to debate, but what is not, is that those in the centre ground 
are capable of securing central Government funding, whereas the other groups 
struggle. The respondent continues: 
DrugScope are funded by the British govt ... and [they] got the cut of all the 
funding from there and we struggled for a time before a millionaire helped 
us out but it costs money to run the office and keep the weýsite etc (CON6). 
This point is accepted by members of the rational perspective. The following 
quotation, from a Director of a leading drug-treatment QUANGO, in relation to the 
implementation of the New Labour drug strategy is testament to this: 
They were inclusive and used bodies like the Advisory Council on the 
Misuse of Drugs in a very similar way really and they use organisations and 
NGOs like DrugScope ... who get core funding from government, via the 
Department of Health, to act as critical friends and to comment on policies 
and whatever... (RATL9). 
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Overall, the ability to control the agenda, according to Stevens (2007a: 29), 
depends on the relative power and status of the controlling group in shaping the 
dominant discourse: 
Those groups with the most power in society will be most able to implement 
these mechanisms, and so bring attention to research that suits them, and 
encourage the ignorance of research that does not. This does not mean that 
their power dominates the use of evidence entirely. Weaker social groups, 
including trade unions, environmental pressure groups, other campaigning 
bodies and self-organisations of the poor and socially marginalised may also 
attempt to make these mechanisms work for them. However, they have less 
access to the sources of research and its dissemination; they are less able to 
impose their interpretations of research evidence on a wider public. They 
have less opportunity to trawl or farm research, to create flak, to repeat 
favourable evidence or to impose strain on those who produce or 
disseminate unhelpful research. And they have less of a role in framing 
policy (Stevens 2007a: 29). 
As a result, ideas that make it into the policy arenas are those that are fit 
enough to survive the filtration process and those that gain powerful sponsors. 
Evidence that is not used is that which cannot get a powerful sponsor. In this respect, 
there is, again, recognition that the existence of evidence alone is not the determining 
factor in policy-making. The manipulation of evidence is not merely a product of 
policy-makers tampering with 'pure' evidence, although undoubtedly, this does 
happen. 
It has been suggested that, in understanding the role of evidence in politicised 
policy areas, such as UK drug legislative change, the evolutionary model therefore 
has much to its credit. It starts from the premise, advocated throughout this thesis, 
that evidence is embedded in policy debates and, unlike most of the established 
models, highlights how it plays a role. This understanding suggests that evidence can 
play a role at the level of process and, albeit less frequently, in policy outcomes. 
Taking just one example, for evidence to play a role in policy, it needs to be 
consistent with the view of what research ought to be from powerful groups, in this 
case, central Government and policy-makers. As a result, the notion of flak, in 
particular, is useful in highlighting the primacy of the rational perspective's evidence 
which fulfils this criterion. There are, however, significant issues with the model 
which need to be addressed. Ultimately, these criticisms make the model problematic 
as an explanation for the role and nature of evidence in politicised areas. 
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9.5 An Appraisal of the Evolutionary Model and the Potential of the Processual 
Model 
The evolutionary model shares many similarities with, but also departs from, the 
established models of research utilisation. In a similar vein to the enlightenment 
model, the evolutionary model has an understanding of the relationship where 
evidence plays a role in the process of decision-making and not just in the outcome 
of policy formulation. In this sense, the model is realistic. In contrast to the 
enlightenment view, the evolutionary model offers an analysis of the power 
relationships in the policy-making process, which are particularly acute in politicised 
policy areas. It also highlights the filtration process by which certain kinds of 
evidence play a role in policy-making, whereas others do not. Like the 
political/tactical model, however, it does not manage to move beyond a static view of 
the policy-making process. 
Drawing on ideas of the interaction model and the model of research as part 
of the intellectual enterprise of society, which detail an expansive understanding of 
research, the evolutionary model likewise employs a broad understanding of 
evidence. This views evidence produced from social research as primarily 
unproblematic when applied to policy formulation. This is in contrast to the 
dialogical model which stresses the essential contestability of evidence and hence 
how it is problematic when applied to policy-making. - The dialogical model 
understands evidence, as being essentially contested, contrasts with the findings of 
this thesis and it is suggested, therefore, that the evolutionary model is more 
applicable. Like the dialogical model, however, the evolutionary model descends the 
ladder of abstraction in focusing on how evidence comes to be used in policy 
decision-making. Also, both illustrate, along with the political/tactical model, how 
evidence is not the only player in policy decision-making, a particularly pertinent 
issue in politicised policy areas. These themes represent the ultimate strength of the 
dialogic and evolutionary models. 
The evolutionary model, therefore, offers much potential in explaining the 
nature and role of evidence in politicised policy areas, but there are significant 
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problems with the model in its current form. Indeed, three main criticisms of the 
evolutionary model can be garnered from the above discussion, all of which centre 
on its outlook of the process of policy-making. First, it places great stock in the role 
of ideas, which create a market place and need to be adopted by powerful agents for 
them to be part of the policy process. It is less clear, though, on the epistemological 
question of where these ideas come from, how they come into fruition, and whether 
they exist a priori? The evolutionary model makes no claims as to their origin. There 
is little recognition that new ideas that come to assume a role in policy could be old 
ideas resurfacing, often in a new context (Kingdon 1984), as more long-term views 
of the policy process often illustrate. 
Second, there is also an assumption that ideas that survive the filtration 
process will somehow be used in producing policy. This line of argument, it is 
suggested, is too close to that of the linear model. Indeed, it is premised on a linear 
causal connection between evidence production and policy-making. This logic is 
usually restricted for appreciations of the policy process that restrict the role of 
evidence to policy outcomes. In the evolutionary model, the assumption that 
evidence that survives filtration will apply in policy-making is, in the last instance, a 
static and deterministic perspective. This kind of logic has been shown to be 
problematic, in that the relationship between evidence and policy is much more ad 
hoc, and that the policy process is inherently dynamic. 
Finally, the connotations associated with the concept of evolution are 
untenable, in particular, the teleological idea of continuous progress associated with 
the notion of the survival of the fittest. At its most simple level, the evolutionary 
model assumes that ideas survive because of their utility to powerful groups. This 
moves policy towards some fixed point which, in turn, provides the platform for 
zero-sum views, which have already been shown to be beset with problems. To stress 
again, this is untenable in politicised areas where evidence is embedded in the 
process, but does not necessarily shape outcomes. 
it is suggested here, therefore, when explaining evidence use in the context of 
politicised policy areas, that despite being an improvement on the established 
models, the evolutionary model is not a radical enough departure from these. Its 
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strength lies in its specific analysis of the content of the negotiations that take place 
in evidence debates. This manifests itself in a consideration of the mechanisms of 
selection, which show the relationship between evidence and policy to be complex 
because of other factors impacting on the policy process. Consequently, a modified 
version of the evolutionary model is tentatively advocated here. This synthesises the 
key strengths of other models and avoids their shortcomings. It is closest to the 
evolutionary model, adhering to the mechanisms of selection and content of 
negotiations outlined in this approach. It does, however, depart on other grounds. It is 
here introduced as the 'processual model', and its key aspects are succinctly 
illustrated in Table 9.3, alongside those of the evolutionary model: 
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From the data presented above and in Table 9.2, the processual model is best 
thought of as a synthesis of the enlightenment and evolutionary models. With the 
former it shares a dynamic view of the Policy-making process, where there is no 
assumption that evidence will have a direct link with policy formulation, particularly 
in terms of policy outcomes. This is, to reiterate, a view of the policy process that 
assumes an indirect link between evidence and policy and a long-term view of this 
relationship. The processual model accepts that evidence is embedded in the policy 
process and could percolate into decision-making but this is by no means a foregone 
conclusion. With the latter it accepts that evidence is not the only player in this 
process and, importantly, accepts the premise of the evolutionary model's 
mechanisms of evidence selection, as dataftorn the current research has illustrated. It 
departs from the evolutionary model on the grounds that this assumes a direct link 
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between evidence use and policy decision-making that is premised on a rationalist, 
sequential logic of the policy process. 
The processual model is, therefore, premised on a dynamic, non-sequential 
and long-term view of the decision-making process, which sees the role of evidence 
primarily in the process of policy decision-making. This issue is returned to 
subsequently. Being a model of evidence-based policy-making, and not a model of 
research utilisation, however, it also advocates a view of evidence and policy that is 
consistent with the modified version of formalism expressed in the previous chapter. 
It therefore expects that the parameters of any policy debate are continuously 
changing. This was illustrated with recourse to the conclusions and recommendations 
of the most recent ACMD (2008) report on cannabis. 
The fluctuating nature of policy, in this area, is also illustrated by various 
respondents, particularly in relation to the UN Conventions, which provided the 
blueprint for the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act. These, to reiterate, require all signatory 
States to apply criminal sanctions to actions such as drug possession and supply. 
According to the previously mentioned j ourrialist and writer: 
I don't expect politicians at that top level to say anything apart from the fact 
that drugs are evil, they are a scourge and we must fight them because in a 
way saying that gives cover for people locally to operate quite different drug 
policies. Have you looked at Plymouth? Has anyone talked about what is 
going on down there in terms of Plymouth DATs [Drug Action Teams]? I 
mean they are pretty much moving towards what you would call a post- 
prohibition system, in the sense that they have had heroin proscribing 
doctors down there and Drug Action teams and social workers are sitting on 
the burglary committees and working with the police. The police are 
basically following their lead in terms of stepping back and allowing them to 
deal with a really grim drugs problem, as a public health issue, with the role 
of criminal justice rolled back and so that is going to be very, very effective 
and increasingly locally people are going to start doing that but I don't 
expect the top level of political rhetoric or ideological commitment to 
change. I expect the first thing we will hear about that is in twenty years or 
so time when they say "oh we decided to opt out of the UN convention". 
The type of conversation you get at that level is not really going to change, it 
is going to follow the water downhill very slowly, very gradually (RAD4). 
It is important to consider, however, that the pace of change can be slow or quick and 
can occur on different levels of the policy process. The same respondent goes on to 
state: 
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I think from where we are standing everything is slowly moving in our 
direction. That sounds a bit smug but it has kind of been the case over the 
years, so what we now call the 'centre ground' isn't always regarded as 
liberal or radical as it was five or ten years ago. Most people had come to a 
settled view, based on evidence and experience, that the war on drugs has 
long since failed and there was no way it could possibly succeed because of 
the economics of supply and demand or whatever. Most of the people who 
are working in the drugs field commuted that position into harm reduction, 
because it was kind of the best you could do under prohibition; reduce the 
harms that prohibition was causing. But I think, and I have this conversation 
many, many times with people, if you are serious about that, then why mop 
up the floor when you can turn off the tap? Why not address the problem? I 
think within the harm reduction movement ... people are probably feeling a bit more emboldened about saying that and the next International Harm 
Reduction Conference will probably have a lot more plenary stuff on control 
and regulation and ways forward, post prohibition paradigms and so on, and 
so that is my sense that the centre ground has moved (RAD4). 
The radical outlook is one of optimism. It remains to be seen whether the 
drug policy debate is moving in the direction stated above, although history advises 
that the outlook is not good. This optimism is, however, a clear contrast to that of the 
conservative perspective, which has a different take on the future: 
The British government says it doesn't want changes to the UN conventions 
and changes to the UN Conventions are up for review in 2008 and it is not 
going to happen. The Americans are the biggest funders, we don't want it, 
they don't want it, Australia doesn't want it, Canada are a bit flaky, it isn't 
going to happen but that wont stop people lobbying for it ... (CON8) 
They do, however, also recognise the fluctuating nature of policy and the need to 
adapt to this: 
... so many people 
including the media want to talk about what is hot news. 
Now and again you manage to get something in ... I did a three-article series 
me vs. Howard Marks he did his bit and I did my bit so I had half a page of 
the Guardian times three, that is quite a good space, you can actually get 
into talking about prevention, but I think that one of the ways forward that 
we need to go ... would be to get a better appreciation of what can be done 
with prevention. If I can qualify that, that is prevention that is much closer to 
health promotion, in normal parlance, than anything else. It is not what our 
opponents like to call it; prohibition which is something that you may be 
getting into - semantics - fundamental to this whole arena and we are lousy 
at it on our side (CON8). 
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It is revealing that the rational perspective says very little about the future of 
drug policy. This is primarily a product of the fact that they are in a privileged 
position in the wider debate. There is, consequently, no appreciation of the need to 
adapt. This does not mean, however, that they do not see policy-making as a dynamic 
process. It is worth reminding ourselves, at this juncture, of the goals of the ACMD, 
a central group within the rationalist perspective. It is their aim: 
... to keep under review the situation 
in the UK with respect to drugs which 
are being or appear to them likely to be misused and of which the misuse is 
having or appears to them capable of having harmful effects sufficient to 
constitute a social problem, and to give to any one or more of the Ministers, 
where either Council consider it expedient to do so or they are consulted by 
the Minister or Ministers in question, advice on measures (whether or not 
involving alteration of the law) which in the opinion of the Council ought to 
be taken for preventing the misuse of such drugs or dealing with social 
problems connected with their misuse, and in particular on measures which 
in the opinion of the Council, ought to be taken (cited in Science and 
Technology Committee 2006: 13). 
This notion of policy flux is the crux of the main difference between the 
processual and evolutionary models. It is suggested that policies, particularly heavily 
politicised ones, are multi-dimensional but also multi-directional. In this sense, it 
becomes difficult to conceive as policies as wholly evidence-based or evidence-free 
as these are static conceptualisations. It is this that underpins the view of the policy 
process of the processual model, and which demarks it from the evolutionary model. 
Another significant departure of the processual model from the evolutionary 
model concerns, then, the notion of teleology. The analogy of evolution, in this 
sense, assumes culmination in a fixed point and a neat, sequential form of policy- 
making. Instead, a model is required that can account for the back-and-forthriess of 
policy decision-making. The blueprint for this can be found in the sociology of 
knowledge of Elias (1978; 1991; 2000); in particular, Elias' (2000) notion of the 
6civilising process', which can incorporate a simultaneous decivilising process. This 
calls into question the uni-directional assumptions of the progress of knowledge and 
human society. Kilminster (2007: 135) effectively makes this point, comparing this 
view of the history of science with that of Darwin, on whose theory the evolutionary 
model is premised: 
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It is obvious that for Elias, evolutionary theory is not to be identified solely 
with Darwin's version. He clearly regards this as incomplete and 
representing an early stage of elaboration. Anticipating the accusations of 
evolutionary determinism or teleology, he draws the crucial 
distinction ... between largely irreversible biological evolution and 
potentially reversible social development. The life cycle of stars and the 
development of societi , es are not of 
the same kind: unlike a star, it is possible 
for social development to go into reverse and go back to an earlier stage, 
say, to feudal social relations or to a stage where mutual identification is 
less. With this point in mind, Elias thought of civilizing and decivilizing 
processes, for example, as going hand in hand. 
Although Kilminster (2007) is referring to Elias' (2000) discussion of large- 
scale, macro social processes, in this instance, it does provide a useful model or 
analogy for policy development and the evidence and policy relationship. The key 
phrase in the quotation above is 'potentially reversible social development'. It has 
been stressed throughout that policy subsystems are made up of interconnected 
groups and individuals. In effect, they are social phenomena. As this is the case, 
there is always the potential for policy to metamorphoses, which could see a reversal 
of previous developments, or a move forward, in light of any subsequent evidence, 
new or reworked, that emerges. It is this nuance that is ultimately absent from the 
evolutionary model, but it is in this context that the mechanisms of selection of 
evidence must be seen. 
9.6 Summary 
The established models of research utilisation have been vital in conceptualising the 
troublesome relationship between research and policy and have rightly enjoyed 
significant longevity in the policy-making literature. Most depart from the linear 
conceptualisation discussed above, albeit to differing degrees. It is contended, 
however, that none is capable of explaining in enough detail the role and nature of 
evidence in politicised areas and, as a consequence, a newer version; the processual 
model is tentatively advocated. It has been argued here, that the established models 
d6 not translate successfully into models of evidence-based policy-making, in 
politicised areas, for various reasons. First and foremost, they say little about the 
tumultuous nature of evidence itself. In addition, they operate at too high a level of 
abstraction and pay scant attention to the way that evidence comes to play a role in 
the policy-making process, merely describing what the relationship looks like. In this 
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regard, some newer additions to the literature offer significant potential. These 
illustrate not only what the link is between evidence and policy-making, but precisely 
how this relationship is consolidated. 
Whereas the evolutionary model pioneered the journey down the ladder of 
abstraction to explain how evidence comes to be used in policy, it is ultimately 
premised on teleological logic and has a short-term outlook on the relationship. By 
contrast, the processual model advocates analysis at the same level of debate but 
stops short of making teleological assumptions. In doing so, it advocates a view of 
the policy process that is characterised by ad hoc, back and forth decision-making, ' 
typical of highly politicised areas. The case of UK drug classification, in particular, 




A central claim of this thesis has been that in highly politicised policy areas, the role 
and nature of evidence is tumultuous. The episode of cannabis reclassification and 
the subsequent debate between various constituencies concerning the efficacy of 
current UK drug policy and legislation is testament to this. Here, the evidence and 
policy relationship is frequently, but paradoxically, contextualised in terms of a zero- 
sum, linear relationship. Previous chapters illustrated how actors frequently reverted 
to entrenched positions when discussing the role and nature of evidence in the policy 
process. Supporters of current UK drug policies claimed they were (wholly) 
evidence-based, whilst detractors suggested they were, in fact, evidence-free. These 
zero-sum positions were maintained, in spite of the fact that a plethora of 
understandings of evidence are visible in this policy subsystem. 
In the aftermath of the Science and Technology Committee Report (2006), 
which specifically focused on the government's usebf evidence in the policy-making 
process, with particular reference to the drug classification system, derivatives of 
these two positions emerged. Independent research commissioned for the inquiry 
suggested that 'recent evidence is feeding into new policy' (Levitt, et al. 2006: xvi). 
By contrast, based on its findings MacDonald and Das (2006) claimed with some 
assertiveness that the UK drug classification system is an 'un-evidcnced-based 
mess'. It has been advocated, however, that a more nuanced picture of the evidence 
and policy relationship is required, which explains not only what the connection is 
between evidence and policy, but how and why this is manifested. It is suggested that 
the existing models of research utilisation fall short in this regard, but that a more 
recent addition to the literature - the processual model - offers significant potential in 
this endeavour. This concluding chapter explains how this has come into fruition. It 
starts with a general overview of each chapter, before moving on to consider various 
implications of the study in terms of theory, method and policy. Finally, some 
summarising and final comments are provided. 
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10.2 Overview % 
Chapter One served as an introduction to the thesis, highlighting its substantive 
scope. It also provided some historical background on the relationship between 
research, evidence and policy-making, setting the scene for the subsequent analysis. 
Chapter Two suggested that the history of UK drug policy is characterised by 
competing perspectives, each with a valid claim for ownership of the drug problem. 
This was a relic of when issues relating to drugs first fell under State control. 
Remnants of these could be found in the debate over cannabis reclassification in 
2004. It was suggested, furthermore, that the episode of cannabis reclassification is a 
good case study for exploring the opening up of government, consistent with the 
principles of evidence-based policy-making. This was a product of the fact that 
reclassification, arguably the most significant change to UK drug policy in over 35 
years, was related to the New Labour Government's commitment to making policies 
devoid of dogma. 
Chapter Three provided the structure for the subsequent analysis by 
introducing various models of policy-analysis. Here, it was suggested that the 
conditions of the opening up of government, were consistent with more pluralist 
understandings of the policy process. These highlight the multi-layered, multi- 
directional and dynamic nature of policy-making, moving away from the view of 
policy as being neatly sequential, static and rational. Within these, the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework was identified as being best suited to the task of illustrating the 
nature and role of evidence, in politicised policy areas. This is primarily a product of 
the fact that the nature of conflict is central to this analysis of the policy-making 
process. 
Chapter Four continued this discussion and also introduced the fundamental 
methodological principles underlying the study. In addition, it documented the 
challenges that arise when conducting research on a 'live' policy issue, under the 
aegis of a discussion of real-time research. This considered how various external 
factors can impact on the direction of the research, once underway. These issues are 
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also particularly acute in heavily politicised areas because they are never off the 
political agenda, and are thus in a constant state of flux. 
initially, Chapter Five explored these issues in further detail, showing how 
the Advocacy Coalition Framework is utilised in the current context. The basic 
structure of the framework was maintained and three identifiable coalitions in the 
UK drug policy subsystem, the rational, radical and conservative groups, were 
introduced In the context of politicised areas, it was suggested, however, that the 
framework requires significant modification. Here, Vickers' (1965) notion of 
tappreciative systems' formed the backbone of the key change; the replacement 
'coalitions' with 'perspectives'. Perspectives do not assume as great a degree of co- 
ordinated activity on behalf of the various policy actors, as became apparent 
throughout the course of the research. 
The latter part of the chapter illustrated how by identifying the various 
perspectives, a'number of important factors were raised, which contributed to 
differentiation of the various perspectives from one another. There were, however, 
areas of consensus amongst the groups. All recognised that in heavily politicised 
policy areas, other factors play a role in the decision-making process, including 
politics and the media, which has a knock-on effect for the kinds of evidence that are 
available. It was stated, though, that these were not necessarily stumbling blocks to 
the utilisation of evidence as these things should not be juxtaposed. A more fruitful 
line of inquiry is to see how evidence is embedded in policy decision-making and to 
look at the way it is considered in the context of a heavily politicised area. 
By concentrating on the issue Of cannabis reclassification, Chapter Six 
explored the first aspect of the turmoil of evidence by f6cusing on the nature of 
evidence in politicised areas. It illustrated significant discrepancies over what kind of 
evidence was, and should have been, used in the cannabis reclassification. 
Contrasting views between perspectives over this issue were clearly apparent as they 
were over whether the cannabis reclassification was an evidence-based policy. To 
recap, for the radical perspective the answer was negative, as it was for the 
conservative perspective, albeit for different reasons. For the rational perspective, the 
change was primarily evidence-based, constituting the first significant attempt to iron 
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out anomalies within the existing legislation. This view was based on the emerging 
data relating to relative harms and dangers of substances. Despite a plethora of 
understandings over what constitutes evidence in this debate, members of 
perspectives still resorted to zero-sum conclusions about the relationship. It was 
argued here that this reasoning is paradoxical, as zero-sum positions frequently 
recognise the diversity of evidence embedded in political decision-making, whilst 
drawing all or nothing conclusions. Zero-sum conclusions are also premised on an 
understanding of conceptual certainty, in relation to evidence, whilst simultaneously 
recognising its part-contested nature. 
Chapter Seven suggested that the data presented in the main body of the 
chapter could be read as providing further support to the claims made in the previous 
chapter concerning the paradoxical appreciations of evidence. By focusing on the 
wider issue of the evidence-base for the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act's tri-partite 
classification structure, it viewed the data through a different lens. At this stage, 
appreciations of the role of evidence in the policy process were central to the 
discussion. This constitutes the second aspect of the turmoil of evidence. Focusing 
on the location of evidence, more detailed appreciations of the nature of the concept 
emerged, but this also raised the spectre of the issue of power in the policy decision- 
making arena. 
The assumption, as in many models of pluralism, that all kinds of evidence 
have an equal chance of influencing the decision-making process, was called into 
question. What emerged was a dominant view of evidence shared by the Government 
and the rational perspective. This appreciation highlighted the role of evidence, not 
only in terms of outcomes, but also in the process of policy-making. By contrast, the 
radical and conservative perspectives restricted their appreciation of evidence to the 
outcomes of policy. Focusing on the location of evidence also provided further 
confin'nation of the notion that evidence is embedded in policy-making, despite not 
appearing to be so for many engaged in the policy process. 
The remaining chapters explained the complex nature and role of evidence in 
the policy process, in the form of a model of evidence-based policy-making in 
heavily politicised policy areas. Chapter Eight initiated this task by addressing the 
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first aspect of turmoil; the nature of evidence. It concluded that evidence in this 
context, is best seen as a knot concept, and, in doing so, advocates a modified version 
of the formalist theory of meaning to illustrate this. The account of formalism is 
6modified' on the grounds that conceptual flux is seen as the best starting point for 
understanding both evidence and policy in politicised areas. This is because they are 
often 'live' and susceptible to various exogenous factors impacting on them. 
Armed with this conceptualisation of evidence, Chapter Nine continued the 
goal of explaining the nature and role of evidence in politicised policy areas by 
critically evaluating the established models of the research and policy relationship. It 
highlighted a number of criteria which are central to this explanatory quest, based on 
issues arising out of the research. It was suggested that all existing models, in one 
way or another, fall short of what is required. A more recent addition to the literature 
was singled out for particular mention; the evolutionary model, developed by 
Stevens (2007a). The strength of this approach lies in its explanation of how 
&evidence', as opposed to research, is used in policy, offering more than just a 
description of what the connection is. The evolutionary model is, however, beset 
with problems, based around its teleological underpinnings and static view of the 
decision-making process. 
As a consequence, the newer processual model is advocated as the most 
effective way of contextualising the role and nature of evidence in a politicised 
policy area. This model is premised on a long term, dynamic view of the policy 
process, which sees the policy-making process as being multi-layered and multi- 
directional. Furthen-nore, it focuses on the complexity of the concept of evidence and 
underscores a view of decision-making that does not restrict the role of evidence to 
one of policy outcomes, but looks at the role of evidence as being embedded in the 
decision-making process. It does not assume a teleological direction of evidence- 
based policy-making. The processual model can, therefore, account for the many 
perturbations that impact on the policy process. It is necessary to consider some of 
the implications of this in terms of theory, methods and policy, before providing 
some extended final comments. 
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10.3 Reflection on Method and Theory 
In this thesis, the main methodological choices were influenced by emerging 
theories. Researching issues relating to UK drug classification required a degree of 
methodological inspiration. The key findings from the earlier phases of the research 
provided confirmation of the theory, that in politicised policy areas, zero-sum 
appreciations of the evidence and policy relationship were widespread. To initially 
explore this area, a particular methodological approach that could account for the 
nature of conflict within the policy-making arena, was required. The Advocacy 
Coalition Framework is one such model, but as illustrated, it required modification. 
By way of a brief overview, it is fair to comment that the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework was designed as a means of explaining policy change, but is employed 
here as an explanatory tool of analysis. Drawing on the work of Merton (1968), the 
framework was used here as a middle-range theory, highlighting the role of conflict 
in a politicised policy area. 
Data collection was also dictated by the emerging theory. Drawing on the 
findings of earlier chapters, which suggested that the UK drug classification policy 
area is characterised more by conflict than consensus, it was clear that there were 
also different appreciations of what did and should have counted as evidence in 
heavily politicised areas. Consequently, key methods of data collection were required 
that could account for the understandings of evidence from those who were engaged 
in the process, on some level. In this case, analysis of relevant documents and 
qualitative interviews provided the bedrock of the methods of data collection. 
Particularly challenging were the impact of exogenous factors on the research 
process. These were numerous and well-documented throughout and could not be 
ignored. In essence, it was important to build these into the analysis. With this in 
mind, the concept of real-time research was conceived and employed. This primarily 
refers to researching a live, contemporary policy issue, in a constant state of flux and 
highlights the travails of doing this. Of prime importance, was the need for 
flexibility, particularly in the qualitative interviews. As a way forward, it is suggested 
that there is mileage in both the modified version of the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework and the notion of real-time research both of which provide avenues for 
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further research especially in similar policy domains; that is those characterised by 
the three Cs of competition, conflict and controversy. 
The conclusion of this research is that resorting to the established models of 
research utilisation does not provide an adequate explanation of the nature and role 
of evidence in partisan policy areas. With the exception of the linear view, it is 
claimed that various aspects of the established models could be synthesised, and a 
new processual model developed thereon. Currently, the efficacy of the processual 
model is tentatively advocated. The tentativeness stems from the realisation that 
generalising from one case study to other areas of policy is problematic. This is 
typical of any Small N analysis. Generalisation must, however, be the goal of 
research. Hammersley (1992: 68) has pointed out how research should provide 
'information that is both true and relevant to some legitimate public concern'. In this 
sense, it is intended that the processual model be put to empirical test in other, 
similar areas of policy. In effect, the full theoretical implications remain to be seen, 
but it is contended here, that the processual model offers some potential for further 
use in the research utilisation and evidence-based policy literature, particularly in the 
context of politicised areas. 
10.4 Comments on Policy Implications 
Consistent with the processual model, it is envisaged that the policy implications Of 
this study will occur by attrition rather than via a direct causal link. This thesis is 
broadly supportive and optimistic about the future of evidence-based policy-making, 
providing it remains realistic about what can and cannot be achieved. In effect, it is 
suggested that the main policy implications could stem from an initial (and hoped 
for) refraining of the role of evidence in politicised areas. It is suggested that the 
zero-sum conceptualisations are no longer tenable and that more sophisticated 
analysis of the evidence and policy relationship is required from commentators and 
academics in the drugs and broader criminal justice fields. It is these fields where 
zero-sum views originate and predominate. 
The processual model is put forward as a stepping stone in this endeavour. It 
recognises that many other factors are involved in the decision-making process. 
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These include the impact of politics and the media. To reiterate, the processual model 
warns against drawing the conclusion that these are somehow obstacles to the 
utilisation of evidence in policy. In effect, it challenges the widespread assumption 
that heavily politicised polices are evidence-free, but also challenges supporters of 
the said policies to refrain from claiming them to be wholly evidence-based. The 
quest is to show the role and nature of evidence in the decision-making process and 
to contribute towards a toning down, and more realistic appreciation, of what 
evidence-based policy is and can be. It is argued that well-thought out analysis will 
be particularly beneficial in politicised policy areas because, as indicated, these are 
precisely the ones where zero-sum views thrive. In essence, it is hoped that the 
current research could contribute towards more reasoned debate over the use of 
evidence in this context. 
10.5 Final Comments 
Returning to Tonry's (2004) assertion at the outset that on the small issues, evidence 
sometimes counts, but on the larger issues, politics is the order of the day, raises a 
number of key points. This can be seen as the epitome of the zero-sum view. It has 
been suggested throughout and is further illustrated below how such statements are 
understandable. Even though this is the case, however, this does not make them 
useful or, indeed, accurate. 
It is clear from previous discussions that appreciations of whether the current 
system is evidence-based, depend heavily on appreciations of the chosen direction of 
policy. The Government position on drug policy, emerging in the aftermath of 
cannabis reclassification and alongside external interest in the classification system, 
was one that was consistent with the rational perspective. In many ways this is to be 
expected, as the mechanism of the way drug policy should be made is laid out in the 
1971 Misuse of Drugs Act. This requires the Government to at least consult the 
ACMD when countenancing changes to the current legislation and the outlook of the 
ACMD is, for the most part, consistent with the rational perspective. Consequently, 
this perspective of evidence has become the Platform on which the debate now 
operates. According to one senior civil servant from the Home Office: 
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I think David Nutt's work [Nutt et a]. matrix] was probably the dominant 
evidence-base and the ACMD did a sort of review of the literature with 
colleagues from Department of Health and that fed into it. I was closer to the 
more recent work looking at whether it should have been reclassified back 
from C to B, which was Charles Clarke's clear instinct at the time. That was 
really what he wanted to do. That wasn't supported by the evidence and was 
driven largely by concerns on the impact of mental health, particularly 
among young people, that was one of the things the ACMD was asked to 
look at specifically and the evidence that supports that view. In that case you 
have got clear evidence of a Home Secretary accepting and listening to the 
evidence despite his instinct, you know he was pretty clear about that. He 
thought it had been a mistake and that it should have been reclassified back 
up to B (RATL12). 
It must be stated, however, that the Government is under no obligation to accept the 
findings of the AtMD deliberations. The relationship between the ACMD and the 
Government is neatly surnmarised by Vernon Coaker MP: 
We put great store in what they say. We listen carefully to the comments 
that they make. However, it is not a cosy relationship; it is a challenging 
relationship. They will challenge us in a whole variety of areas. I think that 
is as it should be. It is an independent body. It is a body whose opinions we 
respect, and we try to work closely with them (cited in Science and 
Technology Committee 2006: 106). 
Although Coaker is at pains to point out that the relationship is challenging, it 
is premised on a shared appreciation of the nature of evidence. From this and the 
findings of previous chapters in particular, the zero-sum conclusions of the 
perspectives become clear. For the radicals and conservatives this stems from the fact 
that their ideal policy direction and associated evidence is not consistent with the 
view of Government,, ' consequently the current UK drug classification and the 
cannabis reclassification were evidence-free. By contrast, the rational perspective 
and the Government have a different standard of what evidence-based policy is, 
occurring not solely at the level of policy outcomes, but also at the level of process. 
In this sense they can make the claim that policies are evidence-based. 
All perspectives' appreciations of evidence do not start from the same 
platform. It is apparent, then, that the rationalist understanding of evidence, in this 
particular subsystem, has emerged, not so much triumphant, but certainly powerful 
and central to the understanding of evidence per se. The basic point is that there is an 
unequal use of evidence in the policy process by those in positions of power. As a 
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consequence, the pluralist understandings of the nature of evidence, prevalent thus 
far, require some modification. This does not require a radical rejection of pluralism, 
however. The illustration of how certain kinds of knowledge and evidence have 
attained ascendancy in recent drug policy debates is akin to what Bachelard (1972) 
has termed 'sanctioned', as opposed to 'lapsed', knowledge. 
A useful way of contextualising this shift is in a switch from pluralism to 
bounded pluralism (Hall, et al. 1975). This is similar to Etzioni's (1967) criticism of 
more incrementalist models of the policy-making process, which focused on the 
power differentials in the policy process, where some individuals and groups tend to 
dominate. In essence, we are left with a view of the policy process that was neatly 
depicted over 30 years ago by Hall, et A (1975: 150-1): 
our proposition is a simple one: that the making of day-to-day policy on 
social issues in Britain does operate within a distinctly pluralist process, but 
that the limits of policy-making are set by elites ... a ruling class. Social 
policy is not simply limited by class interests for it can clearly serve class 
interests as well ... but it can also serve the purposes of many other vested interests and social groupings ... The policy process is not neutral, but nor is 
it wholly closed and unresponsive to groups outside the ruling classes. The 
preservation of economic and social privilege sets limits and influence tile 
content of much policy, but there is also a relatively open and often 
unpredictable competition for influence among many other interests drawn 
from different ... sectors of society ... we 
have chosen to characterize the 
policy process as houndedpluralism. 
Although it is necessary to stop short of considering the ACMD, and more 
generally, the rational perspective as 'elites', the sentiment expressed in the above 
paragraph can be endorsed. Overall, this thesis has explored and explained the nature 
and role of evidence in politicised policy areas. Confirmation has been sought and 
found for the claim that some form of evidence is embedded in the decision-making 
process (regardless of ones feelings towards this). This does not mean that evidence 
will determine the policy direction. In effect, Tonry's (2004) statement rcintroduccd 
at the beginning of this section misses this key point. 
With this in mind, it is advocated that although problematic, the term, 
sevidence-based policy" is, at least, not inaccurate when used with caution. It has 
been argued throughout that to talk of evidence-free policy is a paradox, however, 
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because evidence is intrinsic to the policy process. Ultimately, then, the question 
should be not whether such policies are wholly 'evidence-based, or 'evidence-free', 
but in what way or how evidence is utilised. By paying specific attention to the 
concept of evidence in terms of its nature and location, within a dynamic policy 
decision-making process, the processual model provides a more nuanced 
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Appendix 1: Early Interview Schedule 
Description of Thesis 
This thesis is concerned with evidence-based policy-making and the overall use 
of research in policy-making. Using the recent reclassification of cannabis as a 
case study, this study focuses on the extent to which this has occurred, if at all, in 
one area of drug policy, namely that relating to the drug classification system. 
General 
0-1 What is your role/title/job description? In effect in what capacity are you 
involved in the policy process? 
0-2 This Government's commitment to evidence-based policy making, it has 
been suggested, has opened up policy making in Whitehall to more 
$outsiders' to what extent do you see your involvement in the policy process 
a result of this development? 
1. How do certain stakeholders in the policy process see their role in the 
development of drug policy? 
I -I How did you come to be involved in the policy process, in effect how did 
you become to be involved in giving evidence to the government/select 
committee? 
1-2 What level of involvement do you think you have in the formation of policy 
where drug classification is concerned? 
1-3 Do you see yourself as a central actor/figure in the process or more on the 
edge of the process? 
1-4 Based on your experience and dealings with the Government do you perceive 
there to be a visible policy network or community that has arisen over the 
issue of drug classification? 
1-5 Can you explain in further detail your relationship with who you see as the 
key players in the drug policy arena, be they lobby groups, ACMD, civil 
servants, politicians, police, media etc. Based on your experience is there a 
sense of 'working together' to achieve policy aims, if not what are the 
stumbling blocks? 
1-6 Who do you think sets the agenda where drug classification is concerned? 
2. What is the relationship between evidence/research and policy formation 
where the cannabis reclassification is concerned? 
2-1 Based on your own experience how do you see the relationship between 
evidence and policy where regard to the classification of drugs is concerned? 
2-2 The reclassification of cannabis, in 2004, from class B to class C under the 
MDA was, according to some academic writers, an 'evidence-based' policy 
change. Based on your experience/knowledge to what extent, if any do you 
agree with this claim? 
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2-3 Do you see the reclassification of cannabis as a significant development in 
the history of UK drug policy? 
2-4 For many commentators the timing of both the decision to reclassify cannabis 
and the decision to review the reclassification were 'politically motivated. ' 
What is your view on this? 
2-5 It was stated in the Select Committee oral evidence session that the 2005 
drugs Bill was rushed through prior to an election, based on your knowledge 
and experience is this claim fair, or were its findings Le in particular those 
concerning Magic Mushroom's evidence based? 
2-6 Based on your knowledge/experience, what problems, if any can you identify 
with the way government uses research and/or evidence? 
2-7 In your experience of the policy process, do you accept that there is a lack of 
clarity where the classification of drugs is concerned primarily concerning the 
nature of harm? 
2-8 In your view, have the policy-making conditions noticeably changed under 
New Labour so that now an increasing number of 'experts' are able to voice 
their opinions in the process, regardless of whether they are taken into 
consideration? 
3. How is power exercised in the policy network? 
3-1 Do you see your work and the way it is handled as having any influence on 
policy? If so why, if not why not? 
3-2 Based on your knowledge and experience of the policy process which 
groups/organisations; are the most powerful in shaping government drug 
policy in the area of classification? 
3-3 In your understanding, do you believe the government operates with the 
notion of a 'hierarchy of evidence' in that the evidence they use to support 
policy is selected on scientific credentials i. e. RCT's more valid than 
qualitative small-scale case studies 
3-4 In your opinion/experience how transparent do you perceive policy decision. 
making to be? 
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Appendix 11: Later Interview Schedule 
This thesis explores the use of evidence in one area of UK public policy. Using the 
recent reclassification of cannabis and its aftermath as a case study, it focuses on the 
role and nature of evidence in UK drug policy-making from the perspective of those 
involved. 
General 
0-1 What is your role/title/job description? In effect in what capacity are you 
involved in the policy process? 
0-2 Are you affiliated to any other organisation concerned with drug policy? 
0-3 How significant do you see the United Nations conventions and their impact on 
UK drug policy? 
0-4 This government's commitment to evidence-based policy making, it has been 
suggested, has opened up policy making in Whitehall to more 'outsiders': to what 
extent do you see your involvement in the policy process a result of this 
development? And/Or do you feel that is the case? 
1. What is the relationship between evidence/research and policy 
formulation where drug classification is concerned? 
1-1 Based on your own experience how do you see the relationship between evidence 
and policy where regard to the classification of drugs is concerned? 
1-2 Do you see the reclassification of cannabis as a significant development in the 
history of UK drug policy? 
1-3 In light of the fact that the ACMD has for 25 years being advocating the 
downgrading of cannabis, in your view why were the conditions right for a 
change in the policy relating to cannabis in 2004 as opposed to any other 
previous time? 
1-4 The reclassification of cannabis, in 2004, from class B to class C under the MDA 
was, according to RAND 2006, an 'evidence-based' policy change. Based on 
your experience/knowledge to what extent do you agree with this claim? 
1-5 In your view what counts as evidence here? 
1-6 For many commentators the timing of both the decision to reclassify cannabis 
and the decision to review the reclassification were 'politically motivated. ' What 
is your view on this? 
1-7 Based on your knowledge/experience, overall what problems, if any, can you 
identify with the way government uses research and/or evidence? 
1-8 In your experience of the policy process, do you accept that there is a lack of 
clarity where the classification of drugs is concerned primarily concerning the 
nature of harm? 
1-9 it was stated in the Select Committee oral evidence session that the 2005 drugs 
Bill was rushed through prior to an election, based on your knowledge and 
experience is this claim fair? 
2. How do certain stakeholders' beliefs affect their role in the policy process? 
Are there recognisable coalitions or perspectives? 
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2-1 How did you come to be involved in the policy process? 
2-2 What level of involvement do you think you have in the formation of policy 
where drug classification is concerned? Do you see yourself as a central 
actor/figure in the process or more on the edge of the process? 
2-3 Do you see your work (individual or organisation) and the way it is handled as 
having any influence on policy? If so why, if not why not? 
2-4 Based on your experience do you perceive there to be visible policy networks or 
coalitions/perspectives that have arisen over the issue of drug classification? 
2-5 Where drug classification is concerned I see that there are three different 
coalitions/perspectives who present a viewpoint; the 'radical' coalition who wish 
to abolish the MDA, the 'rationalist' coalition who strive for more consistency 
and the 'conservative' coalition who are broadly speaking satisfied with its 
operation, but would prefer a more simplistic model like that of Sweden to what 
extent would you agree with this and where would you position yourself? 
2-6 The drugs debate in the UK is typically characterised as entailing certain 
conflicts between emphasis on treatment and emphasis on punishment, do you 
see that this dichotomy is typical of the current situation? 
2-7 Based on your experience is there a sense of 'working together' between various 
groups to achieve policy aims, if not what are the stumbling blocks? 
2-8 In your understanding, do you believe the government operates with the notion of 
a 'hierarchy of evidence' in that the evidence they use to support policy is 
selected on scientific credentials i. e. RCT's more valid than qualitative small- 
scale case studies 
3. How is power exercised in the policy subsystem and what effect does this 
have for the role of 'evidence' in policy? 
3-1 Based on your knowledge and experience do you see any problems with the way 
the ACMD operate? 
3-2 Based on your experience, to what extent is ACMD a 'neutral' body or are its 
deliberations shaped by a specific philosophy or outlook? 
3-3 In your view, have the policy-making conditions noticeably changed under New 
Labour so that now an increasing number of 'experts' are able to voice their 
opinions in the process regardless of whether they are taken into consideration? 
3-4 Can you explain in further detail who you see as the key players in the drug 
policy arena, be they lobby groups (NGOs), ACMD, civil servants, politicians, 
police, media etc? 
3-5 Based on your knowledge and experience of the policy process which 
groups/organisations are the most powerful in shaping government drug policy in 
the area of classification? 
3-6 For pressure groups - do you think the fact that you have a certain perspective or 
motivations for getting involved in the policy process has an effect on the way 
your evidence is used? 
3 -7 Based on your experience has the so-called 'opening up' of government created 
conditions where the lobbying powers of some groups have been weakened? 
3-8 Who do you think sets the agenda where drug classification policy is concerned? 
3-9 In your opinion/experience how transparent do you perceive policy decision- 
making to be? 
3-10 Are there any 'hidden' or other influences on policy-making? 
283 
Appendix III: Continuity and Change in the Interview Schedule 
A comparative look at Appendices I and 11 illustrates the fluctuating nature of the 
interview schedule used throughout the duration of the fieldwork. It is suggested that 
this reflects the turbulent nature of real-time research. The interview schedule was 
amended in light of emerging theoretical, substantive and methodological 
developments that impacted on the research process. Six interviews with respondents 
were carried out in 2006. The remainder took place in 2007. What follows can be 
read, therefore, as a discussion of the changes occurring between 2006 and 2007. 
Nevertheless, it must also be stated that there were also clear lines of continuity. It is 
on these grounds that the current discussion is organised. 
Prior to offering an explanation on the nature of the thesis (if this had not 
already been covered in the planning and initial contact stage with respondents), the 
opening exchanges were used to discuss the ethical issues arising from the research 
process. In particular, the notion that the respondent's consent is an ongoing process, 
running throughout the duration of the research and that they were free to withdraw it 
at anytime. Issues of confidentiality and anonymity were also ensured here. This 
aspect of the research has remained stable throughout. In the early stages the opening 
sequence stated: 
This thesis is concerned with evidence-based policy-making and the overall 
use of research in policy-making. Using the recent reclassification of 
cannabis as a case study,, this study focuses on the extent to which this has 
occurred, if at all in one area of drug policy, namely that relating to the drug 
classification system. 
To reiterate, at the outset of the research (September 2005), the focus was on 
the cannabis reclassification as a singular event. However, various factors external to 
the research, led to a tangible reshaping of the nature of the discussion. It will suffice 
to say at this stage that the origin of this development was Charles Clarke's decision, 
in 2005, to ask ACMD to review the initial cannabis reclassification. This was 
followed by the subsequent inquiry and publication of the Science and Technology 
Committee (2006) report along with the publication of the Nutt, et al matrix (2007); 
the Royal Society of Arts (2007) report and that of the newly formed United 
Kingdom Drug Policy Commission (Reuter and Stevens 2007). These developments 
meant that the focus on the cannabis episode alone was untenable and could not be 
separated from more widespread concerns of the evidence for the efficacy of the 
classification system in general. 
In effect, the renewed interest in the overall classification system provided 
verification for the notion that studying a contemporary policy issue requires 
flexibility. This is precisely because it does not occur in an information vacuum. 
Events occurring in the real world, in real time, can significantly distort or date 
aspects of the research. It is necessary to state that these substantive changes 
coincided with theoretical and methodological developments in the project. Despite 
these external factors impinging on the research, the overall aims, to an extent, have 
remained stable, in that exploring the role and nature of evidence within the 
subsystem has remained a primary concern. However, as the project developed, the 
lens through which evidence was viewed was slightly amended. In general, the 
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schedule underwent various iterations but generally maintained the same structure. 
As regards the latter, there are four discrete sections starting with some general 
background questions before moving on to discuss the main research questions of the 
thesis via a number of sub-questions. In light of these developments, the opening 
statement used for the majority of the interviews morphed into: 
This thesis explores the use of evidence in one area of UK public policy. 
Using the recent reclassification of cannabis and its aften-nath as a case 
study, it focuses on the role and nature of evidence in UK drug policy- 
making from the perspective of those involved. 
The background questions followed and set the scene, providing the context 
as to how the respondent viewed evidence in the policy-making process. The earlier 
schedule was influenced by a more general appreciation of pluralist models of 
policy-making, of which the policy networks literature was initially deemed 
pertinent. These were amended as the Advocacy Coalition Framework became 
consolidated in the research in conjunction with the broader substantive scope. This 
also resulted in a changing of the overall running of the interview. A comparison of 
questions 0-1 to 0-2 in Appendix I and 0-1 to 0-4 in Appendix II reveal these 
developments. The question concerning affiliation is useful in placing subjects within 
one coalition/perspective and the reference to the UN conventions is a related issue. 
These pro-6de the blueprint for domestic legislation, but are the source of much 
debate as to the overall efficacy of the legislation. 
In addition, there is also a noticeable attempt here to challenge the 
assumption as to whether recent changes in the policy-making process actually 
constituted evidence-base policy-making in the context UK drug classification. This 
resulted in the revised hypothesis, central to the notion of 'turmoil. ' In short, this was 
concerned to discover if there were recognisable coalitions/perspectives visible in 
this particular policy subsystem, which broadly speaking, share a similar ontological 
and epistemological outlook as to what constitutes evidence in this debate. Asking 
whether respondents felt changes in policy-making actually constituted 'evidence- 
based policy' and how they viewed their own involvement in the process as a 
consequence of this, was designed to yield data on the discrepancies that occur 
within this debate regarding the nature of evidence. Subsequent developments in the 
remainder of the interview schedule reflect this development. 
A comparison between Question I (and sub questions 1-1 to 1-6) in 
Appendix I and Question I (and sub questions 1-1 to 1-9) in Appendix II reveals a 
clear change in the running order of the interview as well as changes in the nature of 
the questioning. Table A. I illustrates the more fruitful points of comparison based on 
themes identified above. 
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Table A. 1 Points of Comparison in the Fluctuating Interview Schedule 
Theme Appendix I Append x 11 
The Intricacy (Conceptualisation) of Evidence Question 2 Question I 
The Nature of Coalitions/Perspectives Question I Questio 2 
The Issue of Power and Associated Themes Question 3 Question 3 
A more useful comparison is between question 2 (2-1 to 2-8) in Appendix I 
and Question 1 (1-1 to 1-9) in Appendix II, under the heading of 'The Intricacy of 
Evidence: UK Drug Classification. ' These reflect the way that evidence is 
conceptualised by various players in the process; in particular, considering the key 
themes of what evidence is used and should be used in this particular debate. 
Looking at the main research questions of the relevant appendices (Question I 
Appendix I and Question 2 Appendix 11) illustrates the aforementioned switch from 
cannabis reclassification to the classification system more generally. Ascertaining 
these different understandings became central to the turmoil of evidence and 
questions designed to explore this were thus promoted to the start of the interview. 
This data formed the background to the discussion of the tumultuous nature of 
evidence in this particular policy area, another central tenet of the turmoil of 
evidence. 
The switching of the running order also saw a change from thinking in terms 
of policy networks to those of advocacy coalitions. This relates to the second theme 
of whether there were recognisable coalitions in this particular policy debate and 
how these shape the evidence that is produced. Comparisons need to be made 
between Question I Appendix I and Question 2 Appendix Il. The goals Question 2 
Appendix II have a slightly different emphasis from those in Question I of Appendix 
I. This is most apparent in the questions concerning 'working together, ' 'joint 
working' (Sub-question 2-7, Appendix 11) The significance of the 'joint working, 
question stems from the assumption that most respondents were in some way 
dissatisfied with the current operation of the UK drug classification system but that 
the solutions proposed about the most suitable direction for policy change were 
radically different. 'Joint working', or lack of it, has formed a key part of the recent 
history of UK drug policy which has typically seen conflict between competing 
coalitions/perspectives. The inclusion of the word 'coalition/perspective' in certain 
questions (Sub-questions 2-4 and 2-5, Appendix II) relates to the emerging theme 
that there are actually three identifiable coal itions/perspective within this policy 
subsystem, each with a particular appreciation of the problem of the classification 
system and associated evidence that should be used to overcome this problem. This 
provided the data for how coalitions/perspectives were identifiable, forming the crux 
of the way the analysis was organised. 
The final question concerning power in the policy process has remained 
consistent. A comparison of Question 3 in Appendices I and 11 reveals that in later 
iterations the wording has changed slightly reflecting the influence of the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework literature. The added emphasis on the role of evidence in later 
versions reflects developments discussed above relating to the turmoil of evidence in 
particular the notions of power and agenda setting that can have a significant bearing 
on the way 'evidence' is understood, in terms of its location in the policy process. 
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There is further confirmation here that the line of questioning that influenced the 
initial schedule was in need of reworking, in light of emerging theories this is 
highlighted by the removal of the question of a 'hierarchy of evidence' (question 3-3 
Appendix 1) which became subsumed in later incarnations within a broader question 
of what counts as evidence in this particular subsystem. 
As illustrated in Chapter Three, advocacy coalition analysis locates some 
actors at the 'core' and some at the 'periphery' which, in turn, impacts on 
participants feel they get their ideas and beliefs on the agenda. Emerging from this 
data was the view of evidence as being embedded in the debate in contrast to the 
more widespread zero-sum appreciations of the role of evidence in this policy 
subsystem. Further issues covered at this stage include the notion that the 
Government may take advice or share a similar view of evidence from certain groups 
which inevitably means that some evidence is seen as more pertinent than others. 
This is reflected in questions 3-4 to 3-7 of Appendix Il. In turn, it addresses the 
hypothesis that UK drug policy is heavily ideological and therefore evidence that 
corresponds with the dominant ideology (i. e. that of the most powerful coalition) is 
that which finds its way into policy. 
The strength of the Advocacy Coalition Framework, particularly the way it is 
applied in this thesis, is that it builds this into the analysis. It is from such 
questioning that ideas relating to the processual model of research utilisation were 
determined. A further strength is that by focusing on belief systems the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework is able to build into the analysis 'hidden factors' which may 
shape policy (question 3-10). Although, for the most part, these were few and far 
between, it must be stressed that one significant issue did emerge from this. 
Generally, this related to how the nature of 'evidence' used in a policy debate is not 
evenly contested but is shaped by the dominant coal ition/perspective within the 
policy debate. That is, those who have the power to set the agenda. In this thesis, this 
constitutes the coalition/perspective that incorporates or has close ties to the relevant 
legislator or policy-makers. This, in turn, is central to the zcro-sum 
conceptualisations of the evidence and policy connection that are widesprcad in 
heavily politicised policy domains. 
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Appendix V: The Hierarchy of Evidence 
Level: Methodology Brief Description 
Systematic reviews and meta-analyses Systematic reviews review of a body of data of all 
the existing research of a particular kind of 
intervention 
Meta-analYsis is the sum-total of analysis, the 
analysis of all previous analysis. Goes through 
stages of. a) Hypothesis formation - proposing a 
relationship between an implementation (I) and 
an outcome (0); b) Data collection - Collecting 
data from all studies that have investigated I and 
0 relationships; c) Pools together findings from 
all previous analysis of the relationship between I 
and 0; d) Hypothesis appraisal - Stating the 
confidence in the causal relationship between I 
and 0 
2 Randomised controlled trials (RCT) in the social science format individuals are 
(with concealed allocation) randomly allocated to a control group and a group 
who receive a specific intervention (experiment 
group). Otherwise the two groups are thought to 
be identical for any significant variables. They are 
followed up for specific end points. 
3 Quasi-experimental studies (using Used in situations when it is impossible to 
matches) randomly apply subjects to experiment and 
control groups but based on the same principles 
as the RCT but lacking in equivocal internal 
validity 
4 Before and after comparisons 'Cases' with the condition are matched with 
and a retrospective analysis 'controls' without , 
used to look for differences between the two 
groups. 
5 Cross sectional, random-sample studies Survey or interview of a sample of the population 
selected purely by chance at one point in time 
6 Process evaluation, formative studies Process evaluation/formative studies are often 
and action research built into the design of any implementation. They 
struggle to inform policy because they are 
retrospective. 
Action research is a process whereby the 
researcher and client collaborate in the diagnosis 
of a social problem and come to a mutual 
agreement in the development of a solution based 
on the diagnosis. 
7 Qualitative case study and Qualitative case study is research based on a 
ethnographic research. detailed examination of a single case or small 
number of cases. They are beset with problems of 
generalisation 
Ethnographic research is where the researcher 
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immerses oneself in the social setting for an 
extended period of time refers to both method of 
research (usually qualitative) and alýo the written 
output (narrative) 
8 Descriptive guides and examples of Evidence taken from similar interventions seen as 
good practice a beacon for other similar future interventions 
9 Professional and expert opinion A consensus of experience from key figures in the 
field (the good and the great) 
10 User opinion Primarily anecdotal based on reflections of those 
usually the recipient of any given intervention 
(adapted from Pawson 2006) 
